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My painting does not come from the easel. I hardly ever stretch my canvas before painting. I
prefer to tack the unstretched canvas to the hard wall or the floor. I need the resistance of a
hard surface. On the floor I am more at ease. I feel nearer, more a part of the painting, since
this way I can walk around it, work from the four sides and literally be in the painting. This
is akin to the method of the Indian sand painters of the West.
– Jackson Pollock

For Ezra, Samantha, et al. May you always trust
in your creative dreams and how they connect you with
something infinitely larger.
iv
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ABSTRACT
Maria S. LaBarge

RECUPERATING MIMÊSIS: JACKSON POLLOCK AND THE INDIGENOUS
AMERIDCAN SPIRIT

Jackson Pollock has long been heralded as the quintessential Modernist. His work
marks the pinnacle of the Golden Age of Modernism and the culmination of a long
experiment with modernist ideas elaborated by theorists such as Croce, Fry, Bell, Greenberg
and others. Within the predominant concerns of Modernism (including intuition, imagination,
and abstraction), Pollock is the paragon of the modernist solitary genius. However, this view
of Pollock depends primarily on analysis of his drip paintings and disregards the
development of processes inherent within them. This enframing critique of Pollock overlooks
the presence of symbol, allegory, and ritual upon which Pollock’s work depends. It neglects
to account for the fact that far from pure abstractions, Pollock’s work crosses the boundaries
of abstraction in order to reinstitute mimêsis in art.
My analysis of Pollock’s work views his methodology as a recuperation of
indigenous American aesthetics through mimêsis. I claim that through the forms, modes, and
functions of mimêsis Pollock’s work transgresses modernity’s claims to pure form in favor of
an inquiry into the forms and techniques of indigenous American aesthetics, thereby
reintroducing notions of ritual and mythos in contemporary art.
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Introduction

Technique is just a means of arriving at a statement.
Jackson Pollock

So much has been said about Pollock’s alcoholism and possible personality disorder
that it is difficult to look at his art without seeing a representation of Pollock himself.
Authors trying to put together Pollock’s psychological profile often take liberties with their
own creative analyses. One author, for example, stressed that Pollock had a love-hate
relationship with his mother. This strong assessment was gleaned from a letter shared
between Sande and Charles (Pollock’s brothers), where Sande opined, “Jackson is afflicted
with a definite neurosis. Whether he comes through the normalcy and self-dependency
depends on many subtle factors and some obvious ones. Since part of his trouble (perhaps a
large part) lies in his childhood relationship with his Mother in particular and family in
general, it would be extremely trying and might be disastrous for him to see her at this time”
(Emmerling 14). What is most revealing in this exchange is not that Pollock hated his
mother, but that Sande was just as influenced by ideas of repression in Freudian
psychoanalysis as were any of his contemporaries. This is not to suggest that Pollock’s
condition did not require psychoanalysis; rather, during Pollock’s time most believed that the
answers to mental illness, alcoholism, and modern angst were to be found through the
process of analysis.
It is rather odd however, that the critique of Pollock’s work, more than that of any
other artist, inevitably addresses Pollock’s psychological self. The works of other alcoholic
1

painters such as Mark Rothko or Willem De Kooning are largely reviewed as ontic or
independent entities, apart from expressions, mental states, or addictions of the artists. But
the artistic critique of Pollock’s work is nearly inseparable from that of his mental state
(Wysuph 10). Even the art critic Clement Greenberg, who claimed that Pollock was on his
way to becoming the ‘greatest American painter,’ addressed Pollock in terms of his
personality and mental state, not simply just his artwork. In his January 24, 1948 review of
Pollock’s one-man show at the Betty Parsons Gallery, Greenberg conflated Pollock’s work
with both Cubism and Pollock’s emotional state, “Pollock’s mood has become more cheerful
these past two years, if the general higher key of his color can be taken as a criterion in this
respect” (qtd. in Karmel and Varnedoe, “Interviews” 60). Other reviewers also discuss
Pollock’s work in terms of “mood” using words such as “brooding”, “impulsive”, “savage”,
“joy”, “pain”, “reaction” “violent emotion” etc. 1
Pollock’s work is mythic, but Pollock himself is a large part of the myth. Lee Krasner
sought to dispel some of the misunderstandings regarding Pollock’s personality and his work.
In an interview with Art in America after Pollock’s death she explained, “there is so much
stupid myth about Pollock, I can’t stand it!” (30). Pollock was not particularly violent, just
verbal and angry when he was drunk. Pollock was very talkative when he wanted to be, and
when talking, he was articulate and intelligent. Pollock was not suicidal. As Krasner
explains, “There is the myth of suicide. There is no truth in this. It was an automobile
accident like many others. That was a dangerous part of the road; just a while before, I
myself skidded on that part of the road. The state highway department had to fix it soon after
Jackson’s death. That speaks for itself” (30). Despite Krasner’s attempts to dispel the myths
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surrounding Pollock, he is remembered so much for his life and personality that one can
scarcely separate him from his artwork.
These underlying beliefs complicate the critical review of Pollock’s work, for both
the abstract modernist and Jungian critiques emphasize Pollock’s mental health, but to
differing ends. During Pollock’s time, the critical review of his work was largely based on
the tenets of abstract modernism, which looks for flattening of pictorial illusion and space,
structure based on the Cubist grid, abstract and non-representational form, and technical
expertise. B. H. Friedman explains that Harold Rosenberg and Greenberg’s influential
writings helped to define an American modernist aesthetic based on the European modernist
values taught by Hans Hofmann (“Energy” 70). 2 Greenberg summarized Hofmann’s theory
on modern abstract painting saying that, “As is the case with almost all post-cubist painting
of any real originality, it is the tension inherent in the constructed, re-created flatness of the
surface that produces the strength of his art” (qtd. in Karmel and Varnedoe 65). Greenberg,
who was one of Pollock’s greatest supporters during his lifetime, wrote for the New York
publication The Nation. He situated Pollock within the modernist tradition, writing that
“Pollock’s strength lies in the emphatic surfaces of his pictures, which it is his concern to
maintain and intensify in all that thick, fuliginous flatness which began – but only began – to
be the strong point of late Cubism” (Greenberg, “Prospects” 20-30). With this and other
writings, Greenberg suggested that Pollock had appropriated and expanded upon the
techniques of Cubism and thereby resituated the center of the art world from Paris to New
York City.
While the modernist review largely focuses on the formal attributes of paint and
color, calligraphic or hieroglyphic gesture or technique is also important. For example,
3

Margaret Lowengrund stresses the hieroglyphic nature of Pollock’s works, writing for The
Art Digest that “of the Hieroglyphics School, this is an exciting display. It seems to strive to
eliminate spatial form in favor of line and surface interest” (qtd. in Karmel and Varnedoe
61). Parker Tyler also stresses the technical virtuosity by noting that Pollock’s work is a form
of calligraphic, describing it as “a paradox of abstract form in terms of an alphabet of
unknown symbols” (65). Harold Rosenberg stressed the act of painting, or action painting,
saying that “the big moment came when it was decided to paint ... just TO PAINT. The
gesture on the canvas was a gesture of liberation” (“Action Painters” 581). However, this is
not to say the critique of modern abstraction emphasizes gesture or drawing over color or
space. For spatial composition, color, cubist grid or all-over painting, and technique all form
the tenets of modernism and inform the modernist critique of Pollock’s work. But inherent
within this critique lays an underlying awareness of Pollock’s emotional states which, as
Rosenberg stresses, are inherent in Pollock’s work. Rosenberg explains that, “The tension of
the private myth is the content of every painting of this vanguard” (583). Though the
modernist critique focuses on the formal properties of art, the mythic nature of Pollock’s
work remains a foundational factor. Following Greenberg’s valorizing of abstract form, later
theorists and critics like Michael Fried, T.J. Clark, and most recently John Golding in his
book Paths to the Absolute, uphold notions of pure form with its affinities to absolute order
and timeless beauty. Pollock’s abstract drip paintings are summarized as the spontaneous and
purgative expressions of the modern existential man. This mythic nature of Pollock’s work is
again underscored by Rosenberg, who explained that “the act-painting is of the same
metaphysical substance as the artist’s existence” (582). 3 As W. Jackson Rushing notes, even
in the view of modern abstraction Pollock’s work is seen to the result of a tortured artist
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aiming to express the avant-garde’s profound desire to transcend the particulars of history
and search out universal values (“Ritual” 273).
Shortly before and soon after Pollock’s untimely and tragic death, theorists such as
Joseph Henderson, William Rubin, W. Jackson Rushing, Stephen Polcari and others began to
look at Pollock’s work through the lens of Jungian psychoanalysis and formulated a new
criticism based on formative elements from Pollock’s early childhood. Being the youngest of
five sons, Pollock is said to have been born within a dysfunctional family with an
overbearing mother and a disinterested father. 4 Pollock’s life has been carefully scrutinized,
from his early childhood and peers to his lifelong battle with alcoholism. In this view,
Pollock’s artwork has more recently come to be described as a type of ritual healing wherein
his tortured soul found solace. As art historians have begun to take more notice of the
American Indian influences in Pollock’s early drawings and paintings, the psychoanalytic
critique has developed into a belief that Pollock’s drip paintings are evidence of Pollock
engaging in shamanic self-healing. This more recent line of thought is proposed by Restellini
et al. in the catalogue essay to the 2009 Paris exhibition of Pollock’s work at the
Pinacothèque de Paris, which frames Pollock’s work in terms of the cycles of life, fertility,
creation, transhuman transformations, and ritual healing. In the essay the authors write,
“Seemingly following Orozco in style, Pollock nevertheless found his very subject –
shamanism. Shamanism is a form of religious ecstasy in which the participant undergoes
ritual alteration of his identity” (Restellini et al. 8). Despite Krasner’s warning against such
mythmaking, the psychoanalytic critique focuses on mythic content of Pollock’s life,
claiming it to be the content of Pollock’s works as well.

5

Interestingly, these two divergent trains of thought arrive at the same conclusion: that
Pollock’s drip paintings are expressions of the wounded man, evidence of his mental state or
illness and his struggle with modern life and alcoholism. In these views, the art speaks of a
type of universal expression of angst and is inseparable from the man. The divided critique
seems to resolve this irony by dividing up Pollock’s works. The modernist critique claims the
abstraction in Pollock’s later drip painting while the Jungian based theories of the
unconscious provide clarity for Pollock’s earlier works, with the more recent ‘shamanic’
critique serving as the motivation for his later drip work. But this divided theoretical review
is rather problematic, for although both views conclude with a focus on Pollock’s personality
and alternately answer to his early and later works, they do not give us a conclusive
understanding of Pollock’s achievements. Neither critique fully explains how or why Pollock
made the jump from abstract figuration (or representation) to the abstract, nonrepresentational drip paintings. Further, both critiques overlook the overwhelming references
to Native American arts and aesthetic which are so prevalent in both his early and later
works. While both critiques contribute to the mythic nature of Pollock’s personality, each
overlooks Pollock’s great leap into his drip style, suggesting that he completely abandoned
his interest in the American Indian arts to pursue either a pure expression of abstract paint
applied in a new modernist technical mode, or a more Surrealist expression of his own
unconscious mind. In light of this polemical critique, can we find a unifying notion or
concept that runs throughout all of Pollock’s works; an underlying principle that answers to
both the influence of Native American arts and aesthetics and his turn to abstraction in his
drip paintings? Can we articulate a theory of an intentional indigenous modern style while at
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the same time dispelling some of the myths about Pollock and his work? If so, we need to
look beyond the abstract modernist and Jungian critiques of art.
I believe that we can understand Pollock’s work through a unified theory that draws
upon the notion of mimêsis. Thus, in this dissertation, I argue that through the reinstitution of
mimêsis, Pollock recuperates the spirit of indigenous American art. Fortunately, there are
many thinkers, particularly in the field of phenomenology, who can help us articulate a
theory of mimêsis which helps explain the jump in Pollock’s work from his primitivist
references to American Indian arts, and his later abstract idealist drip work. We can glean
understanding from an unexpected resource, namely Aristotle’s Poetics, as well as a long list
of thinkers like Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, Stephen Halliwell,
and others who have contributed to a broader definition of the notion of mimêsis and its role
in art. Therefore, this dissertation is a means by which we can look at Pollock’s work from a
different perspective than what we have presently come to accept as the definitive and proper
critique of Pollock’s drip paintings within the Abstract Expressionism nomenclature.
Through the notion of mimêsis, we can account for the jump between primitivist works to
drip paintings, and more particularly, we can view Pollock’s work as a whole and progressive
inquiry into art from symbolic representation based on indigenous sources to allegorical and
mimetic rituals.
The flow of this study is based on a hybrid methodology that progresses from a
review of the historical context to discussions on art history and theory. It concludes with a
mixture of art theory, aesthetics and philosophy. It is hoped that by doing so, we better
understand more fully the phenomenon of mimêsis itself in art, and the ways in which it is
manifest in Pollock’s work. We will also be able to contextualize the divergent critiques of
7

Pollock’s work as epistemic, and entrenched within the socio-political circumstances of the
past. But more than this, it is hoped that this study will recall and resituate the importance of
American Indian arts within the broader issue of mimêsis during the critical years just before
and after World War II when the United States developed its late twentieth-century national
identity as a commercial, political, and military superpower.
We have two basic and underlying questions. First, to what extent can we situate
Pollock and his work within his social and political time, or what Martin Heidegger would
consider as one’s inhabitation or being in the world? Second, was Pollock’s engagement with
American Indian arts and ideas unique and specific to his life experiences alone or does it
derives from his engagement with the broader world? In Chapter One the socio-political
context of Pollock’s youth and his formative artistic training will be addressed in order to
show that indeed, the representation of the American Indian played a large role in both
politics and the arts. This review will identify how the American Indian has been
traditionally portrayed as an ethnographic subject and then move on to explain an important
epistemic shift in the representation of the American Indian from an ethnographic view to
one of being an American icon. It will formulate a foundation upon which we can understand
the primary importance of the American Indian as an icon for nationalistic purposes. It also
demonstrates how the American Indian, as a topic and icon, permeated all cultural sectors,
from politics to merchandizing, from fine art to popular arts and culture. While some scholars
such as W. Jackson Rushing, Stephen Polcari, and others acknowledge Pollock’s engagement
with American Indian arts, I claim that Pollock’s world was one wherein the American
Indian was embedded into the very fabric or episteme of the era. Because the notion of the

8

American Indian was ubiquitous during Pollock’s formative artistic years, this chapter seeks
to bring this context into view.
Chapter Two identifies the polemic within modernism. We have already mentioned
that the discourse of Pollock is divided. But is it important to analyze this polemic or is it
sufficient only to note that it exists? With some analysis based upon a ground of discourse
and values, it is easy to ascertain that not only is the socio-political context epistemic, but
also art criticism is epistemic as well. If art criticism is also epistemic, based upon a historical
a priori that grounds knowledge, then both the modernist and Jungian reviews of Pollock’s
work are as much (or more) of a critique of Pollock’s context then just critiques of his work.
This review first looks at the modern abstraction review and how this critique is based on
political and cold war conditions. Since the modern critique forms the standard view of
Pollock’s work found in anthologies, histories, retrospectives and textbook reviews, it is
imperative that we situate this view within its own historiography and epistemic context. This
convincing modernist view connects Abstract Expressionism with analytic Cubism through a
variety of influences and sources, but it also over-simplifies the trajectory of Pollock’s work
and neglects to account for his engagement with indigenous arts and themes. Next, a concise
review of the Jungian critique of Pollock will account for a variety of theories, from
psychoanalytic and Surrealist to Jungian. These theories formulate an interpretation that
contradicts theories of pure form, but these are epistemic as well, based upon contextual
trends and interests in psychoanalysis that also fail to account fully for the indigenous aspects
in Pollock’s work. Combined, both theories constitute a polemic within the critique of
Pollock as well as the larger epistemic discourse of modern theory, with its ties to the
political and social discourse of its time. While some have identified the political interests in
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Greenberg’s writings, I claim that art criticism in general can be highly partisan and therefore
un-objective. From this point of view, one which we shall consider as a polemic-modernism,
we will see the divisive and unsettled view of Pollock and how it has overlooked important
indigenous elements in his work. Having clarified the contextual purposes for the art
historian in terms of social, political and artistic contexts, and a review of the nature of art
criticism as epistemically relating to its own historiography and political situation, we will
have established a foundation upon which we can build a theory of mimêsis and all that this
entails hereafter.
Chapter Three asks, if Pollock did in fact engage extensively and purposefully with
American Indian arts, to what extent did he do so and how can we conceptualize this? First,
this chapter draws upon Rushing and others’ observations on Pollock’s engagement with
American Indian arts. It reviews Pollock’s influences (such as Wolfgang Paalen and John
Graham), and establishes his interests in American Indian arts. Few scholars acknowledge
Pollock’s interests in the American Indian arts and this chapter aims to suggest that this
interest was a deeply held motivation for much of Pollock’s art. Second, it is generally
believed that Pollock’s work was highly influenced by Picasso’s Surrealist and Cubist works.
But within our view of the indigenous influences, we can see in this chapter, that rather than
being the inheritor of the Picasso-esque, Pollock’s early work can be shown to be distinctly
American and primitivist rather than Surrealist-Cubist. We will see that, rather than being
works of “significant form” (using the terminology of Primitivism coined by Clive Bell),
Pollock’s works reintroduce a significant content (“Aesthetic Hypothesis”15). Third, we will
look at the notion of significant content, or content within the viewpoint of mimêsis as
representation in its role of participating in social political discourse by discerning the key
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differences between European and American Primitivism. While many acknowledge the
primitivist elements in Pollock’s early works, I claim that there are key distinctions between
American and European Primitivism that better help us understand both Pollock’s works and
mimêsis itself. We will look at the definition of mimêsis in art and philosophy in order to aid
our understanding of mimêsis as content, and to connect our discussion on form and content
within the larger theoretical polemic, the divided theory and the larger subject-object divide
that we have identified in Chapter Two. Acknowledging this broader polemic is important,
for without this view, we would be left with having to continue to choose either the
modernist or the Jungian view, and it would be hard to ascertain just how phenomenal it is
that Pollock engaged in the recuperation of the spirit of indigenous art forms through
mimêsis. Because Pollock references American Indian arts throughout his works, we need the
lens of mimêsis to provide a new way to envision and understand them. Up to this point we
have several key themes we are tracking: first, the episteme of the American Indian as a
political and artistic icon; second, an epistemic and divided modernist theory; and third, an
expanded view the art style Primitivism in order to better ascertain Pollock’s engagement
with American Indian arts that forms the basis for analyzing Pollock’s work as primitivist
and mimetic.
We tend to think of mimêsis as mere representation, illusion, and copies of the natural
world. Within this view, the concept of mimêsis seems a bit shallow and misplaced,
particularly in light of Pollock’s drip paintings. However, it is important that we expand our
understanding of mimêsis in order to apply it to what appears to be the most iconic modernist
and abstract of Pollock’s works, namely the drip paintings. Chapter Four signals a departure
from political art criticism and art historical contexts. Here I present an original analysis of

11

mimêsis in terms of its forms as naturalistic and idealistic representation in order to analyze
Pollock’s work more fundamentally outside Jungian and Modernist lenses. This chapter
continues with an analysis of mimêsis in terms of its forms within a view of its historiography
and particularly within the notions of representational and idealist form in order to clarify the
tenets upon which idealist form depends. This analysis further underscores Pollock’s
profound artistic vision and his commitment to that vision.
Having accounted for naturalistic and idealist representation as the modes of mimêsis,
Chapter Five continues an analysis of mimêsis in terms of its primary idealist modes of
representation, namely: the symbolic, metaphorical, allegorical and ritual modes. Each mode
is built upon its preceding modes and all are operational in Pollock’s work. In this chapter I
continue with an original analysis of mimêsis in terms of its modes and claim that it is
primarily these modes of mimêsis that give us a unique view into the profound depth of
thought and execution in Pollock’s works, and where we most readily come to see and
understand the recuperation of the indigenous spirit of art in Pollock’s allegorical works of
art, including his drip paintings.
Though this dissertation could conclude having identified the forms and modes of
mimêsis and their applications in Pollock’s works, we still have one more question to resolve:
how can we account for the mythic qualities in Pollock’s paintings? Chapter Six leads us into
a key issue that arises from the concept of mimêsis, which is the issue of myth and its
relationship to truth, which is to say its functions. Within a discussion on mimêsis as
mimeisthai, or that which represents the un-representable through idealist form, I analyze
mimêsis as representational of notions of knowledge and truth in terms of recognition,
cognition, correspondence, mythos and myth. In conclusion, Chapter Six enables us to see
12

how fluidly Pollock’s engagement or recuperation of the indigenous spirit in art can be
explained through an expanded concept of mimêsis and mythos. Because our understanding
of mimêsis ultimately derives from Plato and Aristotle’s concepts, our discussion ends with
an analysis of mimêsis as it is defined and located in ancient thought. This excavation of
mimêsis as mythos or truth and its relationship between myth and form is primary to our
broader understanding of mimêsis and Pollock’s work. It also returns us to the problem of a
divided and even polemical modernist critique. For our discussion will demonstrate that the
divide in modernism between formal abstraction and psychoanalytic thought neglects the
notion of myth in art, even while perpetuating the mythic in Pollock’s biography.
The Conclusion to this study ends with a discussion of mimêsis in terms of ritual as
performance, or what we might call the dialectic of immanent and transcendent art. This
point demonstrates how the recuperation of the indigenous spirit is manifest in the act of art
making and the performance of art. Rather than being evidences of the autonomy of pure
abstract form, through mimêsis as ritual Pollock’s drip paintings lie at the apex of two distinct
art traditions: the modernist view of pure form, and the postmodern view of art as happening
and performance. It is in this field of mimêsis that Pollock recuperated the spirit of American
Indian arts as ritual and performance. This is not to say that Pollock acted himself as the
shaman, but rather that he returned notions of truth and the event of truth to art.
There are many pertinent biographies which give insight into Pollock’s life and the
social and political context of his life. One of the earliest is B. H. Friedman’s biography,
Energy Made Visible. In an interview with Lee Krasner, Friedman asked Krasner about
Pollock’s figurative work. Krasner explained that,
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I was familiar with his notebooks and drawings, a great body of work that
most people didn’t see until years later, after Jackson’s death. I’m not talking
about drawings he did as a student of Benton, but just after that, when he
began to break free, about in the mid-‘thirties. For me, all of Jackson’s work
grows from this period; I see no more sharp breaks, but rather a continuing
development of the same themes and obsessions. I saw his paintings evolve.
Many of them, many of the most abstract, began with more or less
recognizable images – heads, parts of the body, fantastic creatures. Once I
asked Jackson why he didn’t stop the painting when a given image was
exposed. He said, ‘I chose to veil the imagery’. Well, that was that painting.
With the black-and-whites he chose mostly to expose the imagery. I can’t say
why. I wonder if he could have. (“Interview” 35-36)
I believe that Krasner’s point is essential to our understanding of Pollock’s work. His work
was based on a development of certain themes, a consistent inquiry into the nature of art
inspired by his knowledge and engagement with the American indigenous arts. His desire to
conceal and veil, and to expose and unveil figurative imagery is a key element in Pollock’s
work, and one which we can best understand within an expanded discussion on mimêsis and
its role in art.
After all the many monographs and biographies about Jackson Pollock and his drip
paintings there is yet more to be learned from his work. This study builds and depends upon
the important works of Henry Adams, Bernard H. Friedman, Helen A. Harrison, Steven
Naifeh and Gregory White Smith, Francesca and Sylvia Winter Pollock, Jeffrey Potter,
Deborah Solomon, and other biographers who have pondered and studied all that is Jackson
14

Pollock. Further, the critical reviews of Pollock’s works by Hilton Kramer, Lawrence
Alloway, Jeremy Lewison, William Rubin, Irving Sandler, Charles Stuckey, Kirk Varnedoe,
Pepel Karmel and others are all vital contributions to our understanding of Pollock’s work.
Several key monographs, exhibition catalogues and key articles give insights to Pollock and
his artworks as well, including those by Alberto Busignani, Elizabeth Frank, Ellen G.
Landau, Frank O’Hara, Bryan Robertson, Daniel Abadie, Claire Stoullig, David Anfam,
Susan Davidson, Margaret Ellis, Katharine Beatjer, Lisa Mintz Messinger, Nan Rosenthal,
Francis V. O’Connor, Bernice Rose, and many others. Further, the insights of W. Jackson
Rushing are essential to this present study. But despite all the work done thus far, we are still
fascinated with Pollock, perhaps because we have not yet fully qualified what aspect of our
humanity he reveals to us through his drip paintings, and more especially yet how his
inquiry, research and pursuit of ideas remains to be fully understood and analyzed. This study
therefore hopes to shed a bit more light, or uncover a new perspective on Pollock’s work and
his drip paintings that will help us get closer to a fuller understanding of his work, the time in
which he worked, and his art as it was, is, and has become. But the question now is not
whether or not Pollock is the quintessential modernist or if he sought to connect or reveal the
unconscious or Jungian archetypes through his art work. For while we know that art and art
criticism springs from specific cultural and political motivations and sources, the question is
why have the indigenous references in Pollock’s work been overlooked by the modernist and
Jungian critiques? More importantly, how can we now account theoretically for the
American Indian art elements in Pollock’s work? I argue that we can answer both questions
through an analysis of both Pollock’s representational and idealist tendencies through an
expanded understanding of mimêsis.
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Chapter One
On View: A Ubiquitous Indigenous Icon

I have always been very
impressed with the plastic
qualities of American Indian art.
Jackson Pollock

Introduction

While some scholars acknowledge Pollock’s engagement with American Indian arts,
most overlook just how deeply the topic of the American Indian was embedded into the very
socio-political context of Pollock’s youth and his formative years of artistic training. The
purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the degree to which the American Indian was
employed iconographically and ideologically within the arts and socio-politics of the era
before and between the World Wars in order to prove that a distinct and pertinent view of the
American Indian was epistemic to the times and it informed the arts, including those of
Pollock and his contemporaries. This chapter excavates the importance of this Indianepisteme in order to demonstrate the degree to which this facet is vital to Pollock’s work and
the degree to which it has been neglected by the critical review of Pollock’s work. In so
doing, we will explore four main concerns. First, we will explore the degree to which the
idea of the American Indian was of great interest to Pollock and his work. Second, this
chapter will differentiate how forms of representing the American Indian and American
Indian arts differ from traditional depictions of the Indian as an ethnographic subject to
becoming an iconic subject in politics and the cultural landscape. It also summarizes the
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ubiquity of the American Indian as subject and icon to suggest how vital this was to an
important mid-twentieth century epistemic shift that appropriated the American Indian as an
icon for nationalistic purposes. Third, this chapter identifies the aestheticized American
Indian in art display and three primary schools of artistic production and art criticism, all of
which further identify the era as one of the Indian-episteme. Fourth, this chapter summarizes
the prolific dissemination of the iconic American Indian in all cultural sectors, from politics
to merchandising, and from fine art to popular arts and culture. The result of these
considerations will confirm that as modernism took root in the New York art world,
particularly just preceding and after the end of World War II, artists like Pollock relied
heavily upon ancient indigenous American traditions, themes and symbols to create a
powerful and unique version of modern art. That many other artists also did so is evidence
that the American Indian was a vital aspect of the geist, ethos, or prevailing episteme of the
time.
I borrow the notion of episteme from Michel Foucault, who used to term to denote
any given body of knowledge (constituted by the sciences, arts, language, and economics)
that defines or describes a given historical era. This is to say that an episteme is one which
defines the spirit of an era, or its cultural tendencies, marking out its apparent boundaries,
concerns, and knowledges. This body of knowledge or understanding defines an era while
constituting what can be considered to be knowledge. As Foucault explains, “in any given
culture and at any given moment, there is always [an] episteme that defines the conditions of
possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice”
(“Order” 168). This is to say that each society has its body of ideas or paradigms that govern
and define the subjects and themes which predominate in arts and sciences, and as Foucault
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explains, these constitute the discourse of what is held to be true or valid for the age
(Foucault, “Truth” 109). For example, the Age of Enlightenment describes the concepts,
ideals, inquiries, and outcomes within the arts and sciences which describe it. These facts and
descriptions of the era can be compared and contrasted to the concepts, ideals, inquiries, and
outcomes of the arts and sciences of any other era (such as the Renaissance era, or in our
case, post-WWII American arts and politics). This system or body of knowledge is both
descriptive of the ethos or geist or spirit of the era, and constitutes what is permissible as
knowledge or understanding. In our use of the term here, we are suggesting that the spirit or
condition of the socio-political era that informed Pollock’s youth and formative creative
training was one imbued with a particular and describable notion of the American Indian that
is inherent within the arts, politics, and social sciences of the era, so much so that we can
describe this era as an American Indian-episteme even though this facet of the American
ethos or episteme of the era has been grossly overlooked. This chapter aims to demonstrate
the ubiquity of the American Indian subject in order to highlight its relevance as epistemic in
the politics and arts of the era, and particularly those of Pollock.

The American Indian Aesthetic in Pollock’s Work

In a questionnaire accompanying his first one-man show at the Art of This Century
Gallery, New York City, in November of 1943, Jackson Pollock confessed that the
indigenous American Indian arts were influential in his work. He wrote,
I have always been very impressed with the plastic qualities of American
Indian art. The Indians have the true painter's approach in their capacity to get
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hold of appropriate images, and in their understanding of what constitutes
painterly subject matter. Their color is essentially Western, their vision has the
basic universality of all real art. (“Answers”, 560)
Pollock believed that American Indian art traditions represented the notion of ‘westernism’,
containing universal vision and displaying ideal subject matter, imagery, and color. Bernard
Freidman, one of Pollock’s friends and early biographers quoted Pollock’s own description
of his working method. According to Freidman, Pollock said,
My painting does not come from the easel, I hardly ever stretch my canvas
before painting. I prefer to tack the unstretched canvas to the hard wall or the
floor. I need the resistance of a hard surface. On the floor I am more at ease. I
feel nearer, more a part of the painting, since this way I can walk around it,
work from the four sides and literally be in the painting. This is akin to the
method of the Indian sand painters of the west. [Italics mine.]
I continue to get further away from the usual painter's tools such as easel,
palette, brushes, etc. I prefer sticks, trowels, knives and dripping fluid paint or
a heavy impasto with sand, broken glass and other foreign matter added.
When I am in my painting, I am not aware of what I'm doing. It is only after a
sort of ‘get acquainted’ period that I see what I have been about. I have no
fears about making changes, destroying the image, etc., because the painting
has a life of its own. I try to let it come through. It is only when I lose contact
with the painting that the result is a mess. Otherwise there is pure harmony, an
easy give and take, and the painting comes out well. (“Energy” 100)
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Synthesizing from Navajo sand painting the methods of circumambulation, sand as media,
and working around and within a painting from the four sides, Pollock (by his own
admission) created his best works, his drip paintings.
We might ask why historians have consistently referred to Pollock’s early
engagement with the Southwest and the American Indian yet scarcely examine how this
context may have shaped him in his early formative years by creating a unique orientation to
the world, and likewise contributed to his aesthetic development? His interest in American
Indian art is well documented and probably began when, as a seven-year-old boy, his family
moved to Phoenix, where there were several Indian reservations nearby. We can certainly see
that Pollock’s childhood environment was unique. Even today more than twenty reservations
occupy one-fourth of the land area of Arizona, including the nations of the Apache, Hopi,
Maricopa, Navajo, Papago, Pima, Yavapai, Yuma, and others. The largest tribes include the
Navajo, Apache, Hopi, Hualapai, Colorado River Community, Gila River Community,
Havasupai, and the Kaibab-Paiutes. The Gila River Reservation and the Ak-Chin Indian
Community are located on the southern outskirts of Phoenix. It was there that Pollock first
encountered American Indian and Navajo art, explored ruins, and attended public exhibitions
of sand painting. According to Sanford Pollock (Jackson’s brother), their exposure to Indian
culture and art was a frequent occurrence. Sanford reflects, “In all our experiences in the
west, there was always an Indian around somewhere” (qtd. Rushing, “Ritual” 281). Rushing
reminds us that Pollock’s brothers, particularly Charles, were also interested in the art of the
Southwest Indians. Together they had collected some twelve volumes of the Annual Report
of the Bureau of American Indian Sand Painting sometime between 1930 and 1935 (“Ritual”
281). 5 In a letter to the critic William Rubin, Pollock’s brother Charles wrote,
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I have the Eighth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology (Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1891). Among other things, it contains 12
chromolithographic plates. Four of these are sand paintings, the others
ritualistic paraphernalia – blankets, feathers, paints, etc. Jack had several
volumes of this kind. As I remember, we bought them together in one of the
then innumerable secondhand bookstores on 4th Avenue – sometime between
1930 and 1935. (qtd. Friedman, “Energy” 91)
Pollock’s interest in indigenous arts is also evident by the many journals and articles on
indigenous arts in his personal library. The artist Alfonso Ossorio (who was a personal
friend of Pollock and also an early collector of his works) recalled that sometime in 1949 he
saw Pollock’s extensive collection of some twenty volumes of the proceedings of the
Smithsonian Reports on Native American Art. The Reports are filled with nineteenth- century
drawings, various artifacts, and artworks including buffalo hide paintings, masks, tepees, and
sand paintings. Ossorio writes,
He had an enormously catholic appreciation of the art of the past: Indian sand
painting, Eskimo art, or the baroque. I think at one stage, when he was
younger, he went to museums. He certainly knew the anthropological
collection at the Museum of Natural History very well. And he knew the art of
the American Indian because he had lived part of his life in the Southwest. He
had the fifteen volumes published by the Smithsonian on American
anthropology – he once pulled it out from under his bed to show me – I
remember being surprised that someone so poor could have such a
publication. (Plessix and Cleve 50)
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Francis O’Connor tells us that in addition to the twelve volumes of the Annual Report of the
Bureau of American Indian Sand Painting, and the fifteen volumes published by the
Smithsonian on American anthropology, Pollock also owned a copy of John Graham’s
System and Dialectics and several volumes of Wolfgang Paalen’s DYN, all of which featured
the art of the American Indians. He also owned multiple books and articles based on
mythology, anthropology, and the primitive art of the American Indian and other cultures
(O’Connor and Thaw 4:187-99). While more will be said later on about the influence of
Paalen and Graham in promoting Native American arts and aesthetics, Pollock’s interest in
Native American art is evident by his extensive literary collection on American art and shows
both his focus on these influences as well as the great impact they had on his later work.
Pollock’s interest in indigenous arts, particularly in the techniques of Navajo sand painting is
evident, not just in his drip paintings but throughout much of his work. Early works display
Indian symbols and allegories, while his later drip paintings mirror Navajo sand paintings in
the use of horizontal canvases as well as his technique of circumambulating the canvas while
dripping paint mixed with sand by the use of sticks and trowels. In methods and materials,
Pollock’s work shows many affinities with indigenous art traditions (Fig. 1).
Pollock’s interest and focus on Indian culture and art preceded his formal studies in
New York, continued throughout his formative work, and is also well documented in nearly
all of the biographical literature. From this viewpoint, it is strange then that in the critical
debate, particularly between Harold Rosenberg and Clement Greenberg (as well as in the
reviews of various others), these interests and influences were not seriously considered as a
point of Pollock’s aesthetic inquiry.
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Figure 1 Pollock Painting – Photographs by Hans Namuth, Agrinde Publications, Ltd. New York, 1978.

It is from this question of Native American aesthetics in the art of Pollock (and
others) during the decade of the 1950s, that this dissertation takes as its point of departure.
For Pollock’s engagement with American Indian arts and techniques is fundamental to his
work, even so much so that the bulk of his work can be seen as a recuperation of indigenous
American aesthetics.
When reviewing the critical review of Pollock’s work, it is clear that this issue of
indigenous aesthetics has been misunderstood or even grossly overlooked or covered up. The
present modern and postmodern discourse insufficiently accounts for the recuperation of this
indigenous aesthetic spirit in the work of Pollock and other likeminded artists. The result of
this deliberate omission has had far-reaching consequences, since the modernist and
postmodern art criticism has left unexamined the processes of representation, allegory, ritual
and trace in Pollock’s work. It has also missed the fact that Pollock united the notions of
24

ideal form with the postmodern tendency towards the revival of historical, cross-cultural
elements and process, and this missing perspective threatens to breach the critical line that
has historically been drawn between Modernism and Postmodernism, Western and NonWestern aesthetics, notions of the ‘civilized’ and ‘indigenous’, and the issues of ideal form
and postmodern multiplicities. Situating Pollock’s work within an alternate view with regards
to indigenous influences blurs long established critical boundaries that have shaped the
current understanding of Pollock’s work. The blurring of these critical boundaries reveals
that Pollock’s work relies upon an underlying indigenous aesthetic, which articulated within
notions of mimêsis provides us with a new and profoundly expanded understanding of his art,
and also formulates an alternative reference point from which to address his works.
This new perspective on Pollock’s work and its ties to indigenous ritual will also allow us
to perceive a common logic, affinity, and natural progression within the experiments of a
peculiar set of artists that include John Cage, Merce Cunningham, Robert Rauschenberg,
Allan Kaprow, and even the work of Andy Warhol (particularly his life films). For these
artists understood that the progress of art was not to be found in the regressions of inter-war
period Social Realism nor the worn and hackneyed schematics of immigrant Surrealism, but
rather in the representation, reiteration, and ritualizing of an indigenous American spirit, and
an experiment on the manifestation of such geist in ritual, in life, and in object. 6 This present
chapter seeks to define this geist or spirit of the age as one which looked to the American
Indian as an icon of a burgeoning nascent American identity that profoundly affected the
course of Pollock’s work and outlook. With these points of orientation in view then, we have
before us the notion of Pollock as a deliberate seeker into the forms and subjects of American
Indian arts, and in so doing, he developed a new expansive indigenous aesthetic that
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combined elements of both the indigenous American Indian arts and contemporary
modernism. For our purposes here, the use of the term ‘indigenous’ is twofold. It involves the
matter of the ‘indigenous’ American Indian and arts as well as the larger matter of Pollock’s
contribution to an evolving American art paradigm and style. The notion that Pollock’s work
is an amalgam of Indian and indigenous aesthetics, and art as process, trace, and form,
constitutes the balance of this dissertation.
But before we can turn our attention to Pollock’s aesthetic we must better understand the
broader world into which Pollock was born (or “thrown”) and the socio-political context that
informed his life and work. 7 This concept of “thrownness” (which I borrow from Martin
Heidegger), is to say that we all exist in a pre-existing world which we share with others.
This shared world is constituted by the socio-political conditions, culture, language, values,
mores and traditions. “Thrownness” describes the shared socio-political-cultural heritage
which one enters at birth. As Heidegger explains, “thrownness” is to be “within the world" as
being-in-the-world in such a way that [one] can understand itself as bound up in its “destiny”
with the being of those entities which it encounters within its own world” (Heidegger and
Krell 56). Our first task in this chapter is to look at this shared world in terms of its views and
representations of the American Indian, in a context that lies outside of the traditional
historical frame, in order to formulate a theory of the Indian as a primary political and social
icon during the era. But the purpose of this chapter is to do more than suggest the impact of
the American Indian on Pollock’s formative years and artistic development; it is also to
reveal how entrenched the American Indian was in nearly all social disciplines, from
government and popular culture to the fine arts.
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Reframing the Cultural Landscape

Traditionally the American Indian was portrayed ethnographically in studies and fine
art. But these portrayals were exchanged for a view of the American Indian as a sociopolitical icon of the era and demonstrate how this icon permeated all social disciplines
representing the ideals and values of the era. As we revisit our traditional views on the
Depression and inter-War era, we will see more tangibly just how the American Indian as an
icon is embedded into the cultural fabric. It is in a view derived from the aesthetic and
representational realm that we see the pressures and assumptions of an ‘artefactual’ and
‘political’ American Indian being particularly pressurized and worked-out. As we will come
to see, this shared cultural and aesthetic view is internalized and aestheticized in a deeply
personalized way for Pollock. Our appreciation of this fact is enhanced with a review of the
visual culture of the Americas as it regarded and represented the Native American.
At this point, there are five key elements that need to be addressed showing just how
embedded or epistemic the visual ‘artefact’ of the American Indian was during the era. First,
the visual culture of the American Indian maintains a traditional ethnographic view of the
American Indian. Second, the appropriation of the American Indian as an iconic image
infused with political meanings arose in the New Deal era. Third, the iconic image was
established within government sponsored art programs and artworks (including architecture
and murals) and repeated and distributed throughout the nation. Fourth, aestheticized
viewpoints within art, art criticism, exhibition, and community education further contributed
to the entrenchment of the iconic-aestheticized American Indian within art circles. Finally,
the distribution of the iconic and aestheticized American Indian spread, in a type of trickledown aesthetics, throughout all popular media and mass-consumer sectors.
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While the ethnographic view of the American Indian was a popular topic in the
thirties, it was not a new phenomenon to natural history in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. As early as 1846, the Smithsonian Institution was commissioned to collect
and display Indian artifacts in order to demonstrate the customs, manners, and history of the
American Indians. Fully aware of the destruction and loss of life, habitat, and lifestyle for
diverse Indian tribes across the nation due to Andrew Jackson’s Indian Removal Act of 1830
and the doctrine of Manifest Destiny in the United States, museum directors attempted to
historicize, study, and to some extent preserve the ethnographic Indian before ‘its’ complete
disappearance. We can refer to this period as the “artefactual” phase in the development of
the emerging indigenous-episteme that we are discussing, a paradigm which would be in full
appearance as a particular mindset in Pollock’s youth, epistemic within political, popular,
and aesthetic viewpoints. During this era, Manifest Destiny (as an official policy of the
United States) was still under full sway as late as the 1890s. The primitive state of the
American Indians was viewed as destined to decline in the wake of modernity. Within this
burgeoning national identity in terms of expansion, the ethnographic regionalist view of the
Indian was promoted by bureaucrats and critics alike.
Speaking to the Smithsonian Board of Regents, Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, the author
of a 6-vol history called the Native Americans, Historical and Statistical Information
Respecting the History, Condition, and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States
(1856), commissioned the museum to collect and preserve Indian artifacts from each Indian
nation as each began to wane or disappear in terms of its unique cultural identity. This move
created a wide collection of ethnographic knowledge, widely available to the broader
museum going and academic culture. The United States Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the
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Smithsonian Board of Regents, the United States Bureau of Ethnology, and various
ethnologists and anthropologists collected, studied, and popularized various artefacts and
produced theoretical historiographies. To this end, the Smithsonian underwrote several
studies and expeditions and established the National Indian Portrait Gallery in 1865. The
gallery included portraits of Indian Chiefs who had traveled to Washington and which
Charles Bird King had painted for the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Fig 2).

Figure 2 Charles Bird King, Young Omahaw, War Eagle, Little Missouri, and Pawnees, 1821, oil on
canvas, 28 in. x 36 1/8 in. (71.1 x 91.8 cm), Smithsonian American Art Museum

Early publications included Sketch of the Navajo Tribe of Indians, Territory of New Mexico
by Dr. Jonathan Leatherman, 1865 and The Problem of the Ohio Mounds by Cyrus Thomas
in 1889.
Other artists aware of the critical problem of the decline of the American Indian and
culture created works of art in protest of the government’s offences, showing that artifact
gathering was a way to preserve the essence of indigenous culture. Such views have since
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become part of the American artefactual landscape and the ethnographic paradigm which
were in full focus during Pollock’s youth and formative years. For example, Pollock would
have known of the artist George Catlin who attempted to document the fading American
Indian and his likeness. Anticipating the potential demise of authentic Indian culture, Catlin
emphasized the importance of his work saying, “I have flown to their rescue – not of their
lives or their race (for they are “doomed” and must perish), but to the rescue of their looks
and their modes” (Catlin 165-6). In similar fashion, as a form of protest and documentation,
John Augustus Stone wrote The Last of the Wampanoag an Indian Tragedy in Five Acts. The
play was performed at the Park Theatre in New York City early as 1821. At least seventyfive other Indian related plays were subsequently written in the nineteenth century.
Moreover, following Old World ethnological hierarchies, the 1893 Chicago World’s Fair
hosted a view of humanity with exhibits of national groups. 8 On an outdoor arcade outside
the main fairgrounds was a region named the Midway Plaisance where live exhibits, rides,
orchestras and bands playing ethnic music and sideshows delighted more than two million
fair attendees. Much like Disney World’s “It’s a Small World” display, whites (AngloSaxon, Teutonic, and Celtic groups) formed the front line of exhibits. Farther into the arena
one could see exhibits of live Asians, Africans, and finally American Indians on display (Fig.
3).
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Figure 3 Map of the Midway Plaisance during the 1893 Columbian Exposition in Chicago

These types of ethnographic representations and displays attempted to preserve ethnographic
information that continues even today to shape our prevailing ideas regarding the American
Indian and his/her cultural past. Our prevailing cultural knowledge remains topological and
ethnographic and this view is preserved in textbooks, anthologies, and museum collections.
Pollock’s knowledge was likewise framed by such artefactual compilations, and this is an
important fact that is often mentioned, but little understood within the context of Pollock’s
oeuvre.
The idea of the American Indian as a primitive man in decline in the wake of modernity
was in full revival during Pollock’s youth and developing years as an artist. This resurgent
interest was expressed in the many exhibits, natural history museums, and galleries during
the late 1930s and 40s. In fact, during this period the United States experienced a vast
increased interest in the ethnographic American Indian. A gathering of information was
disseminated in the form of articles, books, and exhibitions – largely aimed at preserving
Indian arts in the wake of cultural decline. By the 1930s natural history museums had
31

substantially increased their efforts to collect Indian art objects in their permanent
collections. Along with early collectors such as the American Museum of Natural History in
New York City (founded in 1869), and the National Museum of Natural History
(Smithsonian) in Washington D.C. (founded in 1910), the Museum of the American Indian,
the Heye Foundation, the American Museum of Natural History, and the Brooklyn Museum
all had established extensive permanent collections (Fig. 4).

Figure 4 Images Selected from Goodyear Archival Collection at The Brooklyn Museum, Images with caption
quotes selected from A Portfolio of Photographic Views of the World's Columbian Exposition

Like the stately Renaissance wunderkammers, United States natural history museums and
university collections had amassed a large collection of American Indian artificialia, namely,
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handcrafts, rugs, pottery, jewelry, clothing, and ritual objects, making them available to the
wider public. These exhibits were generally ambiguously designed displays that mixed
ethnographic objects, photographs, and paintings. These cabinets of American Indian art
were also displayed in the expositions, exhibits, and galleries that Pollock visited. These
objects and artworks on view were also extensively reproduced in the publications that
Pollock extensively collected. Before the American Indian was appropriated for nationalistic
purposes, the subject of the ethnographic American Indian was already a key feature in the
cultural landscape and was regarded and represented in ‘artefactual’ or ethnographic ways.
These tangible facets of the social landscape can be defined as contributing to the overall
Indian-episteme or geist of the era.
This ethnographic view changed significantly, however, once New Deal bureaucrats
promoted and defined the national art program which was to represent a new national
Depression era consciousness and identity. The American Indian, as a symbol of nationalistic
authenticity, history, and origins became embedded within a new political-Indian-episteme.
Under Roosevelt’s New Deal bureaucracy and programs, traditional views of the
ethnographic American Indian were shaped and institutionalized into a new American ethos
and nationalist identity. During a meeting on the future of the arts, held in Washington, D.C.,
December 8, 1933, an arts committee created the general outlines of the first federallysponsored art program in the history of the nation. The committee included Edward Bruce,
director of the newly created Public Works of Art Project (PWAP), Forbes Watson, a former
art critic and technical director of the PWAP, several museum directors, and First Lady
Eleanor Roosevelt. Their art program supported New Deal aims of reform, repair, and relief.
Designers of the Project were aware of the vastly diverse American landscape. They hoped to
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unify that landscape through the promotion and dissemination of public art. A press release
on the significant meeting was released the following Monday. The release announced that,
More than at any time during the past fifteen years the American artist is
contemplating the American scene. More than ever he is looking at and into
the life of his own land. So that at this time particularly the government’s
project should result in a valuable native record [italics mine]. (Smithsonian)
The committee defined the artistic paradigm aimed at including the indigenous and unifying
the diverse. From 1935 to 1942, Pollock worked for the PWAP, first in the public
monuments department making $1.75 an hour, and later in the mural division, where his
brother Sande also worked (Adams, “Tom” 154).
Following the example of the Mexican government, Roosevelt’s New Deal
government commissioned artists to promote the national agenda, similar to the muralist
program in Mexico. It had begun in the early 1920s (a decade before the US program), when
the Mexican government funded many intellectuals and artists in Mexico City to design
murals for public and government buildings in order to reinforce official political messages
that emphasized Mexican rather than European themes. As Octavio Paz explains, the
similarities to both the Mexican and the United States’ programs are more than coincidence
since both expressed the geist of the times, a nationalistic fever which had spread throughout
Europe and Russia, Latin America and the United States (Paz 11). 9 In fact, the artistic and
critical response to the New Deal art program is similar to the critique of leftist theories by
the likes of muralist painter David Siqueiros, who cried, “We must rid ourselves of the
European Utopia of art for art’s sake… We must put an end to the egocentrism of modern
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European art and the false collection of official Mexican art, with its ‘socialism’ ” (413).
Siqueiros promoted an inclusive art, “We will be preparing ourselves for the society of the
future, in which our type of art will be preferred to all others, because it is the effective daily
expression of art for the masses” (414). Abroad, Theodor Adorno, in a Letter to Benjamin,
succinctly unveiled the matter underlying the issues inherent in European art and political art,
which came to be a concern in the United States in later debates regarding Regionalism and
modernism. Adorno explained, “I am convinced that the further development of the aesthetic
debate which you have so magnificently inaugurated, depends essentially on a true
accounting of the relationship of the intellectuals to the working-class” (523). Whether
framed as New Deal relief reforms or working class agendas, art was at the service of
politics, and in the United States, both disciplines appropriated the iconic and ethnographic
views of the indigenous in order to define the nation as being separate and distinct from
European and socialist nations.
This national agenda for art was supported and promoted by Interior Secretary Harold
L. Ickes. As Secretary, Ickes oversaw the construction in the mid-1930s of the new
Department of Interior Building in Washington D.C. one of the most significant projects
propelling the American Indian to the foreground of American politics and art. 10 The new
Department of the Interior Building was designed by Waddy Butler Wood with much input
and direction from Ickes (Fig. 5).

35

Figure 5 Exterior view of The Department of the Interior Building, Washington D.C.

Ickes had previously served in the Works Progress Administration over Indian Affairs, and
he used the construction of the building to promote the new iconic American Indian by
adding distinct motifs and commissioning key works of art. For example, he commissioned
details such as a buffalo doorknob with an eagle doorplate to adorn the building (Fig. 6). As
well, Ickes commissioned at least twelve murals for the building featuring and highlighting
American Indians in several traditional domestic habitats and scenarios, including being
taught agriculture by European American farmers. To promote Indian art objects, Ickes also
designed the Indian Craft Shop, located on the first floor of the Department of the Interior
Building, which sold arts and crafts by living Indian artists. Ickes was fully involved in all
these commissions in his work for the PWAP and as Interior Secretary. He reviewed sketches
and inspected mural cartoons, made design changes and requests, and inspected murals as
they were being painted for the Interior Building. Ickes was particularly influential in
bringing a new iconic Indian into the limelight of contemporary news and attention. For
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example, the Washington Daily News wrote that “Secretary Ickes has a paternal concern for
the new Interior Building. He designed most of it himself, and financed it through WPA”
(Look 13). It is especially in the Building’s murals that we see an official arts program and
the epistemic nationalized iconic American Indian.

Figure 6 Buffalo Knob & Plate, The Dept. of the Interior Building c. 1934.

The murals demonstrate how the ethnographic profile of the American Indian became
embedded in the visual fabric of the social world as an icon for political purposes. They show
that through the WPAP working artists, government bureaucracies and bureaucrats, the
American Indian became a central subject within the new national agenda and episteme.
Painted by Maynard Dixon, the Interior Building murals Bureau of Indian Affairs: Indian
and Teacher, 1939 and Bureau of Indian Affairs: Indian and Soldier 1939 which hang in the
Building’s third floor on the north side stress this centrality of the American Indian as a key
epistemic national subject (Fig. 7, 8).
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Figure 7 Maynard Dixon, Indian and Teacher, 1939 oil on canvas, 105" x 157", Treasury Section of
Fine Arts, Department of the Interior

Figure 8 Maynard Dixon, Indian and Soldier, 1939, 1939, oil on canvas, 105" x 157", Treasury Section of Fine
Arts, Department of the Interior

Both murals represent the core agenda the Bureau of Indian Affairs had for the American
Indians, providing a means by which they could culturally transition from a warrior based
economy to an agricultural economy. The soldier mural features two Indians, one of which
wears a full warrior headdress and carries a war club. Both Indians are positioned next to two
soldiers, one of whom resembles Captain George Armstrong Custer resting on his cavalry
sword. The central Indian holds a peace pipe that points to the throat of the central soldier.
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Dixon meant this to suggest that “This is our land. You shall drive us no further” (Doss,
“Presentation”). But the overarching theme suggests the victory of the US over the Indian
warrior and the transition of the nineteenth-century warrior lifestyle into a peaceful
coexistence with the dominant power. Like the iconic image on the Indian Head penny, the
warrior signifies a stoic and idealized past, a symbol of the ethnographic view which
surrenders to the commercial and political US agenda. 11 The ethnographic American Indian
takes on new meanings that are entrenched with nationalism and contemporary economic
concerns. Furthering iconic associations with political economics, the Indians are framed in
part by the silhouette of either a tepee or the suggestion of a country church façade,
suggesting the role that religious conversion might play in the domestication of the Indian,
while the abundant buffalo in the distance now echo a time long past.
A similar message is represented in Dixon’s farmer mural where a twentieth-century
chieftain in western dress stands proudly against a tall stalk of corn. Meanwhile, an Indian
woman carries large stalks of corn, and a youth (both in western clothing) learns farming
techniques from a government official dressed in a khaki uniform. Beyond the figures there
is a vast open landscape and a tall barn, suggesting an ample harvest and stores for the
winter. Clearly there is a change in the epistemic framing of the American Indian, from
ethnographic views to one of assimilation. Lost in the view of the American Indian are the
ethnographic details of tribal dress, cultural practices, and beliefs that otherwise distinguish
the figures from their European American counterparts.
Both murals were officially titled “Themes of the Bureau of Indian Affairs” and were
intended to suggest a progressive narrative of “the passing of the old regime of the Indian and
the beginning of a new era” (Doss). Dixon’s narrative murals suggest the Bureau’s agenda
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for the modernization of the Indian while also highlighting the loss of Indian culture this
involved. The sense of loss is underscored by the monumental figures which are pushed close
to the foreground and removed from a natural landscape through the flattening out of the
picture plane. The wide empty space evokes the vast Western horizon but removes it from
any notion of time or historical specificity. The presence of the Indian underscores a new era
in Indian affairs and art-political agendas wherein the Indian is an important icon.
All the other Indian murals in the Interior Building commissioned by Ickes emphasize
similar iconic views of the American Indian. Each shows a custom from Indian life and
culture that situates the Indian within their cultural practices, but does so in symbolic and
iconic ways. Scenes of Indian Life and Apache Round Dance by Allan Cafran Houser, 1940,
Buffalo Hunt by Woodrow Wilson Crumbo, 1940, Preparing Yard for Weaving by Gerald
Nailor, 1940, Pueblo Life: Buffalo Chase, Pueblo Life: Buffalo Dance and Pueblo Life:
Pottery Making by Velino Herrera, 1940 and others feature Indians in social settings
performing everyday activities pertaining to their respective lifestyles and customs (Fig.9).

Figure 9 Allan Cafran Houser, Apache Round Dance 1940, Mural, oil on canvas, 97" x 95", Program: Treasury
Section of Fine Arts, Location: South Penthouse
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But removed from any context, the images fail to show the effects of acculturation or
assimilation relating to relocation, or 1930s policies aligned with the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934 and its new commitment to Indian land ownership, tribal government and
economic self-sufficiency. These other murals serve as a study of the characteristics of
various peoples and the differences and relationships between them, but framed within the
context of the larger government bureaucratic viewpoint. The view is always of an iconic
Other wherein one Indian stands in for the whole or all others while representing a new
political mode. Like in medieval emblems, the American Indian serves as a personification of
a new nationalistic political identity. It precisely this type of political promotion of the iconic
view of the American Indian that justifies the claim that the indigenous defines the episteme
during this era.
One of the most iconic of WPAP murals featuring new political views on the
American Indian was designed by Kenneth Adams, 1937 (Eldredge 13). Adams was
commissioned to paint a mural series in the Zimmerman Library at the University of New
Mexico in Albuquerque (Fig. 10). Library president James Fulton Zimmerman requested four
panels to portray the unity of the region’s diverse ethnicities: “The Indian, showing his work
as the artist, The Spanish, giving a general idea of their contributions to the civilization in
this area in the fields of agriculture and architecture, The Anglo, with scientific contributions,
and The union of all three in the life of the Southwest” (University). The Indian mural
depicts figures in traditional dress representing three nomadic tribes, the Apache, Pueblo and
Navajo. The Spanish mural presents figures in traditional Spanish dress in an agricultural
scene that includes agricultural fields, a small cabin, and a church.
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Figure 10 Kenneth Adams, The Indians, Spanish, Anglo, and Cultural Unity, Zimmerman Library, Albuquerque, New
Mexico, 1939

A doctor with scientific emblems is emphasized in the Anglo mural. The arrangement of the
panel continues to promote Old World hierarchical programs for ranking ethnographic
groups and data. But in the fourth and final mural the ethnic groups are brought together in a
scene of friendship and unity. Now dressed in contemporary clothing, the figures no longer
represent individual cultural identities. Rather, the collective figures now embody New Deal
ideals of unity, mutual cooperation and democracy for all. Adams’ Indian within New Deal
politics is the quintessential iconic Indian figure. He is fully politicized and entirely
assimilated. He is seen to be a united part of one nation, with a single shared cultural heritage
and history. Overall the mural sequence is a tribute to the unification of European-American
industry and agriculture displayed as an archetype ideal that relies upon the notion of a
shared indigenous cultural heritage. The episteme of the era is one that seeks for origins and
appropriates an iconic view of the American Indian in order to define a new national identity.
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Just as seventeenth-century Dutch nationals looked to Germania and their mythic
origins, Americans of the wartime thirties looked to establish a unique and indigenous
national cultural heritage. 12 Thus, stemming from a long history of ethnographic interest in
the early origins of the United States forward, through a plethora of imagery the notion of the
American Indian was codified and institutionalized as a political icon through government
programs and bureaucracies growing out of the Depression and the New Deal policies.
Through changing attitudes from Manifest Destiny and industrialism to a new nascent
national identity based on nationalistic tendencies and origins, an ethnographic view became
a politicized emblem rich in iconographic meaning. Ethnographic views of a remote Other
became a central icon of government power. Ironically, this transition from margin to center
appears to have occurred seamlessly. Roosevelt’s New Deal social welfare domestic policies
were intended to repair the economy, bring relief to the poor, reform the financial system,
bring about ethnic assimilation and the regulation of the American Indian. 13 Regional art
(with its inclusion of regional folklore, industries, and American Indians) was popularized
through commissions to decorate the Interior Building, and the Treasury Department’s many
commissions for murals in court houses, post offices, libraries, museums, universities, state
capitols and other venues (Mazow 102). These artworks ostensibly document the episteme of
the time as one of a new social consciousness of the American Indian as iconic and pertinent
to the era. In promoting these representational and iconic views of the American Indian, the
politics of the era influenced artists like Pollock, Gottlieb, Barnett, and others.
While this vision gives us a remote commentary on the state of American Indian
affairs, it also echoes the world in which Pollock found himself as a youth in Arizona, and as
a student and artist in New York City. Furthermore, this vision was not limited to the desert
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fields of southern Arizona and the bureaucratic halls of Washington D.C. The New Deal Art
Registry, an online collaborative database that catalogues public art created under the New
Deal programs from 1934 to 1943, lists 135 Indian related murals. Many of these were
painted on the walls of public federal post office buildings across the country. In post office
murals, genre themes featuring heroicized American Indians witness to the emerging
nationalistic episteme. Such murals were distributed throughout the broader American
landscape. While art imitates life, it also implants images into the mind such that the average
city or rural dwellers could perceive the plight and sights of the American Indian just as well
any other sight or sound within their own perceptible locale. Thus the ubiquitous American
Indian was, through murals and other commissioned projects, disseminated throughout the
fabric of the US political-cultural landscape.
The distribution of the view of the American Indian as iconic demonstrates a
politicized and popularized episteme, one that Pollock would receive and internalize from his
youth onward, and which would later expand upon in his aesthetic practice. In a viewpoint of
the “thrownness” of one’s being in the world, Pollock’s world consisted of views of the
American Indian in his childhood and a plethora of American Indian imagery and artefacts in
the WPAP works he was familiar with, and in some cases contributed to. During the
Depression, when Pollock began working for Roosevelt’s Federal Arts Project, the United
States experienced a new epistemic episode, an outgrowth of a prevailing and systemic
interventionist paradigm which sought to construct a collective and unified national identity
distinct from any European heritage or aesthetics. Pollock’s engagement with American
Indians was unique, from his childhood experiences, interests in collecting publications and
journals, and his work on the highly politicized WPAP murals. His life experiences gave him
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a unique viewpoint into the complexities of iconic representation, appropriation, diversity,
and alternative art making practices, all of which come to be factors in his later work after he
left the WPAP. Within a backdrop of a tradition in representing the ethnographic –artefactual
American Indian, New Deal bureaucrats promoted and defined a new national art program
which appropriated the American Indian as an iconic symbol of authenticity, origins, and
nationalism. The American Indian became embedded within a new political-Indian-episteme.

The Aestheticization of the American Indian

Within this backdrop of the ethnographic turned iconic view of the American Indian
appropriated by a national agenda, Pollock and other artists tapped into the collective
consciousness of the political frontier and appropriated indigenous art and art objects for new
artistic purposes. These iconic artworks were government sponsored through New Deal art
programs and artworks that distributed the iconic view throughout the nation. But the art
world also embraced the representation of the American Indian. One of the early attempts to
fully aestheticize the ethnographic was initiated by Amelia Elizabeth White. Originally
from Santa Fe, White was a Bryn Mawr graduate and socialite. After serving as an army
nurse in World War I, she relocated to Santa Fe along with her sister Martha, where in 1920
they built their estate El Delirio (“The Madness”) in a hybridized style that combined
Moorish, Mexican and Pueblo designs. White became a passionate patron of Southwest
American Indian art and an advocate for Pueblo Indian rights. She was connected to a wider
circle of like-minded American cultural nationalists: intellectuals, artists, writers, musicians,
anthropologists, and archaeologists who rejected national identities affiliated with Europe in
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favor of more regional identities and affinities. White frequently relied on the advice of the
archaeologist F. W. Hodge of the Heye Foundation for her developing collection of
ethnographic literature. She also consulted with artists Walter Pach and John Sloan on her
collection of modern art literature. At her estate, White entertained artists and ethnographers
with chamber music concerts, costume parties, and theatrical entertainments. 14 White also
organized the Indian Arts Fund, the Laboratory of Anthropology, the Old Santa Fe
Association, and the Santa Fe Indian Market. Notably, she also founded the Ishauu Gallery
on Madison Avenue in New York, which later became the Gallery of American Indian Art in
the early 1930s, a gallery Pollock would have frequently visited. The Gallery was exclusively
devoted to Indian art. The gallery manager was Dolly Sloan, the wife of artist John Sloan.
John Sloan also taught art at the Students Art League, where Pollock studied. Thus the New
York and Santa Fe art schools were connected by White, Sloan and others.
In addition, White organized several traveling expositions of Indian art, including the
widely known 1931 Exposition of Indian Tribal Arts. The Exposition was a well-organized
attempt to promote American Indian arts. In addition to White, organizers included Abby
Aldrich Rockefeller, wife of John D. Rockefeller, and Dorothy and her husband John Sloan,
who served as the president. The Expo was supported by a long list of backers such as the
Carnegie Corporation, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
The Expo was also endorsed by the College Art Association and had the support of art critics
like Walter Pach, the archaeologist F. W. Hodge and others. Many of the objects were drawn
from the collections of avid and wealthy Indian art collectors including Abby Rockefeller,
Jr., and Lou Henry, wife of Herbert Hoover, Amelia Elizabeth White, and Mary Cabot
Wheelwright (Mullin 176). Clearly, early efforts to aestheticize were politically supported by
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the artistic and political communities. The organizers were members of an elite group of
eastern Anglo-American intellectuals who intended to “reconfigure the national identity” in
ways that separated the nation from its European ties and claimed American Indians as “the
first Americans” and as the creators of the “original American culture” (170).
The organizers were very clear in wanting to present Indian art as objects with aesthetic
value rather than just displaying the objects as ethnographic artifacts. Mirroring political
isolationist sentiments, they wanted to specifically challenge the prevailing belief that the
designation of fine art was any object derived from European traditions. They believed that
these indigenous objects should be included in fine art museums, particularly those devoted
to Modern art, such as the newly established Whitney Museum. In a letter from Sloan to
White regarding the possibility of entering similar objects into the later 1939 World’s Fair,
Sloan wrote, “I agree with you that we must not go into the World’s Fair unless they will
show the collection as Art and I do not feel that they will” (qtd. Mullin 173). In a similar
tone, in the Exposition catalogue Introduction to American Indian Art, Sloan encouraged
patrons and viewers to exercise their good taste to distinguish the fine art forms as
intrinsically different from trinkets collected by travelers and tourists (174). Despite White
and Sloan’s fears, the overall the Exposition of Indian Tribal Arts was very successful and
became a traveling exhibit. The show opened at the Grand Central Galleries in Manhattan,
and then traveled for two years to many major cities in the East and Midwest, as well as to
Venice for the XVIII Venice Biennale Internazionale d’Arte, 1932 (Rushing, “Spiritual” 273274). 15
Critics reviewing the Exposition contributed to the popularization of the anesthetized
native art object. One journalist described the Exposition as bearing “designs so dashingly
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modern that one can scarcely believe they were woven into a blanket by an Indian woman
who never heard of Paris” (qtd. Mullin 173). The Providence Sunday Journal, 1933, ran an
article “She Learned from the Corn, the Rain and the Buffalo” praising the artist Tonita Peña
for her inner artistic genius (qtd. Mullin 176). Such critics promoted the idea that there
“might be systems of aesthetic value existing independently of the core of the modern world
system and the historic capitals of fashion” (176). The aesthetic view of the Indian-made
object was also promoted as highly fashionable in the popular press. White’s own collection
of Pueblo Indian art objects was featured in newspaper and magazines such as House and
Garden and House Beautiful (176). Inspired by the exhibit, the Junior League of New York
City staged a fashion show that showcased Navajo Indian jewelry. The Associated Press
report covering the show published a review stating such facts as, “Miss Challis Walker, a
prominent debutante, wore a gown of sheer black velvet with a jet and turquoise necklace, a
silver belt… all made by Navajo Indians” (qtd. Mullin 176). The exhibit successfully
reframed Native American art objects as fine artworks with great aesthetic significance. Not
only ethnographic, but aesthetic views of American Indians and their arts were prolifically
disseminated, contributing to the Indian-episteme or a new collective consciousness from
which Pollock and others were “thrown” into and drew upon, either actively and consciously
or subconsciously.
The aestheticizing efforts of Sloan, White, Ickes, and others were successful and this era
became marked by a drastic rise in collecting and exhibiting American Indian arts. For
example, from its inception, the Montclair Art Museum in Montclair, New Jersey was
devoted to Native American art. The museum has in its collection objects in a wide variety of
media: weaving, pottery, wood carving, jewelry, and textiles, some of which date to the early
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eighteenth century. The collection represents the aesthetic achievements from seven major
US regions—the Pacific Northwest Coast, California, the Southwest, the Plains, the
Woodlands, the Southeast, and the Arctic. From 1930-32 Dorothy Miller worked at
Montclair as curator of painting, working on cataloging, researching and installing the
museum’s collection of American Indian. Influential in the dissemination of the aestheticized
Indian, Miller left Montclair to join the staff of MoMA in October of 1934 as Assistant to the
Director (and critic), Alfred H. Barr, Jr., where she continued to curate American Indian
objects. At MoMA Miller was likely involved in the blockbuster American Indian art exhibit
held there in 1941 which so fascinated Pollock (Vaillant 167-169). The exhibit was officially
arranged under the direction of René D’Harnoncourt, who at that time was Director of the
Indian Arts and Crafts Board of the Department of Interior. The review by George C.
Vaillant indicated that the collection was drawn from museum collections across the United
States as well as from current Indian artists and craftsmen. Rather ethnographic in its
portrayal of art and Indian, the exhibition hosted live artists and artisans, some of whom
demonstrated the technical processes for creating the otherwise holy Navajo sand paintings.
Pollock visited the exhibit several times over, viewing an extensive collection of Inuit masks
and witnessing demonstrations of Navajo artists making sand paintings on the gallery floors.
Pollock watched how the artists held colored sand in their hands and with deft precision
poured the sand onto the ground to create, through a combination of controlled and free
motion gestures, precise outlines of mythic half-human and half-animal composite creatures.
These and many other museum exhibits attracted a wide viewership. According to
Melissa Ho, Barnett Newman and his wife Annalee visited the Peabody Museums in Salem
and Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1943 to view exhibits on Northwest Coast Indian, Pre-
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Columbian, and African artworks. Furthermore, the Museum of the American Indian, the
Heye Foundation, the American Museum of Natural History, the Montclair Art Museum, the
Field Museum of Natural History, the Brooklyn Museum, the Whitney Museum, the
Metropolitan Museum of Art, and the Museum of Modern Art all exhibited their extensive
and permanent collections which supplied information and inspiration for New York painters
including Richard Pousette-Dart, Adolph Gottlieb, Mark Rothko, Barnett Newman, Jackson
Pollock and others. The world of Pollock, his contemporaries, and teachers was replete with
images and imagery, exhibits, articles, and reviews that along with public art and murals,
contributing to a collective awareness of the American Indian from a variety of political and
aesthetic viewpoints. The ubiquitous Indian-on-view was part of a nationalist agenda that
was supported by bureaucrats, intellectual elites, and artists alike. Under their social reform
agendas, the traditional way of representing the American Indian in ethnographic ways was
exchanged for an iconic view that equated the American Indian with notions of nationalist
nascent origins. The American Indian became assimilated into the power structures of
framing and disseminating knowledge through New Deal politics and modern and
Regionalist arts in a type of Indian-episteme that personified the new national identity,
distinct and separate from any visual ties to Europe. New Deal government support programs
were widely embedding the ethos of the American Indian nationally, Regionalism and public
murals were painting indigenous views, and museums and curators were disseminating visual
information about the American Indians. The subject of the American Indian is so
widespread along cultural and political disciplines that we can claim that the era is one of an
Indian episteme because the phenomenon of the Indian is not exclusive to one discipline
only. Rather it is entrenched within the socio-political-aesthetic discourse of the time.
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During the same period several regional art schools and museums were also advancing
the same Indian-episteme for the artistic and general public. As a result, it was not long
before artists in New York, Santa Fe, Seattle and elsewhere began interpreting the
aestheticized American Indian arts into hybrids of modern forms in paintings and sculptures
and wrote about the new art for gallery exhibits. As we will explore in this section, the work
and influence of several key individuals impacted Pollock and others to absorb into their
work the motifs and sprit of the American Indian, with the end result that modern art was
transformed. Clearly this vogue for indigenous arts, subjects, and forms was not limited to
just a few abstract artists. Fueling the fashion for the modern indigenous, three primary
schools of art sponsoring and promoting Native American art styles and aesthetics arose,
namely the Santa Fe, the Pacific Northwest Coast, and the New York schools. Through the
schools’ individual leaders, all were intricately interconnected through links to the
burgeoning community of artists in New York. We will outline each in turn: first the Santa
Fe school, and then the Pacific Northwest Coast and New York schools.
As has been previously mentioned, John Sloan, one of the leading members of the
Modernist Ashcan School and one of Pollock’s instructors at the Students Art League, had
more than a curious interest in the arts of the American Indians. Working with Amelia
Elizabeth White and his wife Dorothy on the 1931 Exposition of Indian Tribal Arts, Sloan
was particularly fascinated by the Pueblo Indians and what he saw as aesthetic freedom in
their arts. In order to paint with the freedom he found in Santa Fe, he bought an adobe house
on 314 Garcia Street in 1920, where he spent four months each year until 1954 (Fig. 11).
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Figure 11 John and Dolly Sloan and friends in the dining room at Sloan's Santa Fe Ranch, 1939

As mentioned above, White founded her Gallery of American Indian Art in New York in the
1930’s, and Sloan’s wife Dolly served as gallery manager. Like White and others of the
Santa Fe art school (such as Mary Colter, 1869-1958, founder of the Santa Fe architecture
and interiors style, and Dorothy Dunn, who founded the Santa Fe Studio School in the
1920s), Sloan believed whole-heartedly that the arts of the American Indians were works of
fine art rather than ethnographic objects, a viewpoint espoused by White and the purpose of
her Indian Art Exposition. Sloan was also one of the earliest advocates of indigenous art as
aesthetic objects and was influential in disseminating this aesthetic approach not only in his
association with White, Colter, Dunn, and various anthropologists and Santa Fe intellectuals,
but also through his work with the Indian Art Exposition and other exhibits like it. 16 In 1920
he arranged for the first exhibition of Indian paintings to be shown (along with Mable Dodge
Luhan’s collection of contemporary paintings) at the Society of Independent Artists exhibit at
the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York.
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John and Dorothy Sloan, through their involvement in the Art Exposition, creating an
art center in Santa Fe focused on American Indian arts and portraits, and their associations
with politicians, bureaucrats, social reformers, and intellectuals contributed to the
popularization and dissemination of new views on the indigenous. Sloan’s work was also
influential in motivating a new generation of artists at the Student Arts League, where he
taught from 1916 until 1937. Pollock took Sloan’s life drawing class at the League in 1933.
Both of Pollock’s instructors (Sloan and Benton) were involved in the dissemination of an
artistic agenda that included new views of the American Indian as indigenous, and in terms
of regionalism and nationalism, thereby contributing to the episteme of the era.
While Pollock associated more with Benton and Sloan, he also knew Mark Tobey and
other members of the Pacific Northwestern Coast School. The Pacific Northwestern Coast
School of indigenous inspired modern art interpreted the indigenous aesthetic in vastly
different ways. The school included a group of confirmed and devoted artists, namely Mark
Tobey, Guy Anderson, Morris Graves, and Kenneth Callahan, who all celebrated the
aesthetic properties of indigenous arts (Fig. 12). They also greatly contributed to the episteme
of the American Indian through a new aestheticized view of the indigenous in their art,
although this view was distinctly modern and abstract. But given the national agenda and
spirit of the times, it cannot be said that their subjects were entirely autonomous from
political agendas. They believed that art was a type of metaphysical pursuit and the core
values they sought to express were universal brotherhood, commonality of world’s religions,
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Figure 12 Mark Tobey, Electric Night, 1944, Seattle Art Museum

primacy of the laws of nature, and art as a universal language (Junker 10). Tobey expressed
the notion of universality in this way,
The root of all religions, from the Baha’i point of view, is based on the theory
that man will gradually come to understand the unity of the world and the
oneness of mankind. It teaches that all the prophets are one – that science and
religion are the two great powers which must be balanced if man is to become
mature. I feel my work has been influenced by these beliefs. (Hess 60)
The artists of the Northwest school sought to express metaphysical harmony through the
appropriation of the rich cultural traditions of the Pacific Northwest’s Native American,
Asian, Pacific Islander, Scandinavian and European immigrant populations. Tobey, Graves,
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and Anderson were also avid collectors of Northwest Coast indigenous art and artifacts and
they observed the dances and rituals of the Swinomish people at a longhouse near La Conner,
Washington. They were intrigued and inspired by Tlingit totem poles and other Native
American art objects (Junker 10). In fact, Tobey had escorted Dorothy Miller, the previously
mentioned curator of paintings at MoMA, to see J. E. Standlye’s extensive collection of tribal
arts which he kept in his Ye Olde Curiosity Shop on the Seattle waterfront, a store that boasts
of its selling curiosities since 1899 (Junker 53). Within these influences and those brought
home from their many travels abroad, the artists of the Pacific Northwest School drew upon
pan-cultural myths and symbols for the foundations of their visual style. For example,
Graves Eagle of the Inner Eye, 1941 evokes the spirit of a totemic warrior veiled within an
opaque mountainous landscape (Fig. 13).

Figure 13 Morris Graves, Drawing for Eagle of Inner Eye, 1941
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Pollock and others of the New York school knew Tobey and would have seen Tobey’s all
over compositions and calligraphic white writing style at the Willard Gallery, New York
City, in 1944 and also at the 1946 survey show at MoMA titled Fourteen Americans. The
primary differences between the Santa Fe and the Pacific Northwest Coast schools lay in
their representation of the particularities of the American Indian and his/her way of life, and
the portrayal of universal ideals within idealized modes inspired by American Indian arts.
The New York school, like that of the Santa Fe and Pacific Northwest Coast schools,
was the recipient of the same influences and modes of representation (ethnographic, iconic,
and aestheticized), as a prevailing ubiquitous presence. Artists and students of art in New
York City had access to many influential gallery and museum exhibitions and catalogues that
explained the purposes and techniques of Navajo sand painting, mask making, and other
Indian art topics. Pollock and Richard Pousette-Dart were both influenced by Navajo sand
painting and Sloan’s students Pollock, Adolph Gottlieb, and Barnett Newman were intrigued
by Indian masks. We get a notion of the type of lessons Sloan would have taught his students
by reading what he wrote in the catalogue for The Exposition of Indian Tribal Arts,
mentioned earlier. As Sloan explains, “I believe Amer-Indian art will have more influence in
America than the appreciation of African art has had in Europe…We want to help American
consciousness to include this American art” (qtd. Rushing, “Native” 102). The insertion of
the Indian-episteme in political and artist circles was deliberate and widely influential,
particularly in the New York school of art. As we shall see by the end of this study, Pollock
assimilated a variety of artistic ideas in his recuperation of the spirit of indigenous art,
drawing upon the episteme of the American Indian which all aforesaid artists, critics,
curators, bureaucrats, and politicians contributed to and helped to shape.

56

In addition to being fueled and promoted by art colleges and art schools, American Indian
topics were promoted by artists and students. After the 1943 spring semester, students of the
Art League continued their studies in one of the professors’ vacant lofts (probably Sloan’s,
who left New York for Santa Fe every summer), which they called the Studio 35. The Studio
conducted a series of twelve Friday evening seminars where various artists were invited to
lecture. John Cage gave one of those lectures on Indian sand paintings, and it is believed that
Pollock was in attendance (Breslin 263 and Sandler 27). While Pollock was a most avid
follower of indigenous arts and culture, he was not entirely unique in his interests. Teachers
Benton and Sloan brought iconic views and political agendas to the many Art League’s
students. By the time that Pollock’s work was gaining traction in the New York art world, the
artistic climate in which he was interacting had been greatly impacted by the wide variety of
prevailing historical, cultural and political influences that we have been discussing in this
chapter. From political and art centers in Washington D.C and New York City, to the West
Coast and Southwest, the American Indian was portrayed in a multitude of ethnographic,
iconic, and artistic ways. Artists from New York, Santa Fe, and Seattle experimented with
ways to portray the American Indian either in portraits or by appropriating or aestheticizing
their art forms, or the spiritual qualities embedded in their cultural practices and rituals.
Politicians and curators promoted the portrayal and display of the indigenous in murals and
exhibits throughout the cultural and political landscape.
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Political Art Criticism

Art critics and art radio programs also popularized indigenous themes and subjects.
Through art, art criticism, exhibition, and art education, the aestheticized view of the
American Indian helped to plant the iconic-aestheticized American Indian within the Indianepisteme and prevailing national identity. The subject of the Indian permeates throughout the
various disciplines of the socio-political-aesthetic discourse of the era. However, few have
studied the role of the representation of the American Indian in Regionalism and Modern art
styles although period critical theory supports our description of the national agenda and
Indian-episteme. The Regionalist style is in every way as politicized and iconic as the WPAP
murals and iconic views of the American Indians. In the practices, style, modes, subjects and
techniques of Regionalism, we see the assimilation of New Deal politics and socialist
resistance. It may seem we are diverting from our topic of how Pollock recuperated the spirit
of the indigenous art. We might ask, how does Pollock’s aesthetic differ from contemporary
views of the indigenous American Indian as it was being featured in political murals,
exhibits, and the Regionalism of his mentor Thomas Hart Benton? The aestheticized
viewpoints within art, art criticism, exhibition, and the art education community contributed
to the ways of the iconic-aestheticized American Indian became entrenchment within the
prevailing political and social Indian-episteme. A review of Regionalism through art
criticism and theory helps to further establish this notion of the American Indian as both
iconic and ubiquitous, and as a prime influence in Pollock’s work. Because a few key art
reviews underscore the role of the ubiquitous iconic American Indian, we will investigate the
role of art criticism in defining the Indian-episteme.
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In a New Republic article written just months after the October stock market crash of
1929, Edmund Wilson urged artists to return to the painting of the portraits of an authentic
American life. He wrote, “I wish that he [the artist] would study the diverse elements that go
to make the United States, and give us their national portraits” (qtd. Westphal and Dominik
391). Arising out of the socio-political era between the wars, Regionalism articulated and
reiterated a set of values grounded in notions of geography, land and location. It sought to
establish a collective among the diverse and spread out expanses of the nation. Artists,
politicians, writers, and apologists crafted an American cultural identity grounded in rural
communities outside the modern urban centers. This is particularly important to our
understanding of Pollock’s affinities with indigenous arts since Pollock’s primary teacher,
Thomas Hart Benton, was one of the three primary and leading artists working in the
regionalist style. What is important at this present juncture is to describe the art world of
Pollock and his teacher Benton in order to better ascertain Pollock’s sympathies towards
regionalist and Indian subjects.
Regionalism arose initially in the 1920s as a critical response to modern urbanization,
industrialization and the standardization of mass culture. The movement was strengthened as
a result of the Great Depression, when its subsequent unstable economy and social
dislocations furthered the need to craft a sense of stability and place. Regionalism seemed to
satisfy a “part of a desire for security of place amid the disorder and stress of the great
depression [that] permeated all levels of American society” (Steiner 443). 17 Regionalism
became a politically charged national style brazenly opposed to European modernism
through the pen of the influential art critic Thomas Craven, who wrote for the influential The
Dial. Craven was consistent in his critique of modernism and his promotion of regional
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aesthetics and his writings underscore the political context and overtones that informed both
his and later critics’ assessments of art. In his 1929 essay, The Curse of French Culture,
Craven penned, “Go back, my friends, to your own people, and develop the rich materials of
your own land. Art is not produced by culture. Art is the child of new understandings and
fresh appreciations of common things, and it is beyond the reach of those who are slaves to
the impulses of others” (Craven, “Curse” 63). Later Craven added, “We have in America a
number of painters who are not fooled by European conventions” (Craven, “American Men
of Art” 266). Craven was adamantly in support of a new and uniquely American style of art.
Ironically, Craven’s words are later echoed by both Greenberg and Rosenberg who,
after the victories of WWII, were seeking for the next wave and the re-centering of the avantgarde. For not long after Craven touted a superior American art, Rosenberg wrote a
politically charged critique of the fall of the school of Paris. He writes in 1940, “Despite the
fall of Paris, the social, economic, and cultural workings which define the modern epoch are
active everywhere… [but] no one can predict the future of this new phase [of modernism]”
(Rosenberg, “Fall” 543-544). Rosenberg, acknowledging Paris’ once held position as the
cultural center, was now looking for its new resettling. By 1948, Greenberg claimed that the
cultural center had arrived in the American school, writing that, “much to our own surprise,
the main premises of Western art have at last migrated to the United States, along with the
center of gravity of industrial production and political power” (Greenberg, “Decline” 572).
Far from apolitical, Craven and later Rosenberg, Greenberg and others were seeking to
separate American art from the French school. Long before Pollock’s first critical review, art
(like the emblematic American Indian) was a political tool for nationalistic purposes. In this
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view, Pollock’s work becomes a nexus point wherein social and political contexts, a myriad
of art influences, and politically charged criticism meet.
Within the politics of art criticism, and particularly in the works of Pollock and others
working within an inquiry into American Indian aesthetics, the importance of indigenous
aesthetics began to be completely lost. Just as quickly as New Deal politics embraced the
iconic American Indian, highly politicized art criticism (primarily by the pens of Craven,
Greenberg, and Rosenberg) ignored it and omitted it from the discourse of art. The omission
of the importance of the indigenous as epistemic and critical to art is what is in vital need of
recuperation. While we have looked somewhat at the political agenda, there is still more to
glean from the workings of Regionalism, where we can see more fully the pervasive
indigenous American.
Craven was particularly supportive of the Regionalists Thomas Hart Benton, John
Steuart Curry, and Grant Wood. Grant Wood’s pamphlet Revolt Against the City, published
in Iowa City, 1935, echoes much of Craven’s sentiments and shows the political agenda of
the style. Wood declares that,
Painting has declared its independence from Europe, and is retreating from
the cities to the more American village and country life. Paris is no longer the
Mecca of the American artist. The American public, which used to be
interested solely in foreign and imitative work, has readily acquired a strong
interest in the distinctly indigenous art of its own land. (“Revolt” 435-436)
Quantifying the anti-European sentiments of the nation, Wood explains the tenets of
Regionalism as being pro-American, isolationist, and indigenous. He wrote that the “germ”
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of the movement began with the WPA and its structural emphasis on regional centers and its
inclusive and isolationist tone (435-436).
Such reformist art was not limited to dissemination through the plastic arts alone, but
also through the unifying acculturation delivered via radio and other mass media. Leo G.
Mazow in his article “Regionalist Radio: Thomas Hart Benton on Art for Your Sake” details
the way in which Regionalism and the program for reform was circulated by radio and
various print media, such as reproduction lithographs, short film, television, and print media
(101-122). Mazow begins his article with a summation of the geist of the period, “If
modernism, broadly conceived, can be defined as a quest to understand, via paint, prose, and
other media, one’s experiences in an ever-modernizing world, then Benton’s sonic
sensibilities help to locate his work within an American modernist canon” (101).
Benton, Pollock’s painting instructor at the Student Arts League, mentor, and lifelong
friend, was unequivocally the spokesman for Regionalism. The National Broadcasting
Company radio program, Art for Your Sake, 1940s, aimed to clarify the ideological
foundations of modern art as a “national interconnectedness” from region to region (Mazow
102). In the spirit of mass communication and art for the masses, NBC instigated a type of
mass consensus and stability during the Depression and New Deal years. For a time at least,
artist and broadcaster were united in a crusade to create a notion of the national identity and
Americanism. Airing for the first time on January 6, 1940, Art for Your Sake presented an
elaborate dramatization of Benton’s art and life over the NBC network stations. This was
not, however, Benton’s first experience with the medium. His hometown radio debut was in
a March, 1938 broadcast from the Kansas City library, where he appeared with fellow
Regionalists (and Craven’s favorites) Grant Wood and John Steuart Curry. A copy of this
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typescript is in Miller Nichols Library, University of Missouri-Kansas City. He also spoke on
art in broadcasts on April 1939 and September 1940. Just as Roosevelt's fireside chats were
successful due to the direct dialogue the president had with tens of millions of his listeners,
the notion of a national identity and its communicability in art was shared across the nation
through these live broadcast programs and speeches. Highly politicized art criticism, along
with social reformers and a network of artists, all contributed to the new and prevailing
national identity which embraced and disseminated the iconic-aestheticized Indian-episteme.

Trickle-Down Aesthetics

Thus far we have described the topic of the American Indian in political agendas and
art programs. But it was not only favored in politics and artistic production, it was ubiquitous
throughout popular culture as well. In a sort of trickle-down aesthetics, from politics to art,
art display, and art criticism, to the wider popular culture, the Indian-episteme was ubiquitous
within all social sectors, including that of the consumer culture. A brief look at literature,
radio, film, and consumer culture help to establish our view that the Indian-episteme was
fashionable in all domains.
So embedded and ubiquitous was the Indian-episteme that even foreign authors took
notice of it. The British novelist D.H. Lawrence wrote a detailed account of the diverse tribes
of the Southwest in his essay, New Mexico. He observes that from “the Indian who sells you
baskets in Albuquerque” to one “who slinks around Taos plaza"—two popular venues for
“sightseeing and buying souvenirs”, the popularization and commercialization of the region
was the main threat to the indigenous lifestyle (Lawrence, “Hopi” 138). In Lawrence’s essay
63

The Hopi Snake Dance he describes how thousands of tourists were entertained by the
performance that took on the air of a native “circus performance” (138). In the essay
Lawrence describes “the process by which tribal customs and ceremonies are converted into
the stuff of ethnological spectacle” (Snyder 663). Lawrence also depicted reservation life and
the pueblos of the Southwest in his novel, St. Mawr, 1925. His description paints the era as a
sort of “ethnological theme park” (664). Lawrence’s friend Aldous Huxley also wrote about
the American Indian in his novel Brave New World, 1932. In the novel Huxley envisioned a
modernistic “evolved” society far removed from moral influences reflected in the simple and
stable elements of the southwest Indian pueblo population.
Radio programs also popularized the subject of the American Indian. The Lone
Ranger, featuring a Texas Ranger and Tonto, a devoted but subservient Indian sidekick, ran
for 2,956 episodes beginning in 1933 (Hoffman 6). The popular Rin Tin Tin, 1930-1933 was
a program about Rusty and his dog, the only survivors of a hostile Indian raid. I Was There,
1935 included American Indian characters. The popular Red Ryder, 1942 featured Little
Bear, the Navajo ward of the hero Ryder. Because radio reached mass audiences, such
programs popularized the Native American as a household subject, albeit one that promoted
ethnocentric stereotypes and iconic representations. Most programs modeled New Deal
agendas at assimilation but maintained traditional (and stereotypic) hierarchies wherein the
ethnic white male dominated society or cared for the indigenous, while others maintained
Manifest Destiny sentiments and the need to subdue hostile and unpredictable Indians who
resisted expansionism and assimilation (Hoffman 6-14).
Novels also popularized the American Indian and promoted hierarchies and
stereotypes. The Pioneers, The Last of the Mohicans, The Prairie, The Pathfinder, and The
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Deerslayer, published and reprinted from 1823-1941 celebrate and commodify the wild,
uncivilized, proud, and wise iconic Native American (Hoffman 33). American Indians were
commonly mentioned in Laura Ingalls Wilder’s Little House on the Prairie, 1935 and Walter
D. Edmonds The Matchlock Gun, 1942. Many films adopted the stories and compositional
strategies from these and other novels making the American Indian a consistent topic for
films. From the beginning of the development of motion pictures, the Western played a major
role in Hollywood as an entertainment staple. In fact, Edwin S. Porter’s 1903 silent movie
The Great Train Robbery was so commercially successful that in 1908, just five years later,
the Western genre was firmly established and was listed in movie distributors’ catalogues as
a distinct category (Slotkin 231). Before the onset of talkies, Pollock and his contemporaries
would have seen some of the eighty-nine films that featured American Indians out of some
two hundred silent films which were made, including The Silent Enemy, which was made in
1930, a year after Pollock began art classes at the Students Art League (Hoffman 22).
Although somewhat interrupted by the advent of talking pictures and the tough years of the
Depression, the theme again regained importance in the years 1938-39, when the studios
experienced a Renaissance of the Western (Slotkin 256). In the 1930’s-1940’s, the golden
age of the big-budget Western films, audiences were given a consistent view of life on the
frontier and the polemic between “untamed” American Indians and gun slinging settlers.
John Ford’s Stagecoach, 1939 was one of such popular Western film. In an interview, Ford
declared, “Y’know, I’ve killed more Indians than Custer, Beecher, and Chivington put
together” (qtd. Hoffman 41). Like Raoul Walsh’s The Big Trail, 1930, Cecil B. DeMille’s
The Plainsman, 1936, and John Ford’s My Darling Clementine, 1946, Fort Apache, 1948,
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She Wore a Yellow Ribbon, 1949 and many others, the presence of the American Indian is
portrayed either a “vicious savage” or as an iconic Indian (43). 18
Souvenir shops like Ye Olde Curiosity Shop in Seattle, Ickes’ Indian Craft Shop
(located on the first floor of the Department of the Interior Building), and a myriad of
souvenir shops that dotted the highways of the West and Southwest sold art objects made by
living Indian artists. These art objects found their ways into average American homes. These
objects were sold as authentic ethnographic art objects, retaining a sense of ‘nativeness’ and
wonder, curiosities for travelers and bibelots (Phillips 6). Even roadside gas stations and
cafes displayed Cigar Store Indians, relics of Old World personifications appropriated as
icons for the tobacco industry that had also become national emblems of an appropriated
American heritage. Likewise, songs, poems, advertisements, commercial packaging, and
posters drew upon American Indian themes and icons. Many WPA posters featured
American Indians, such as in the 1938 poster for the Federal Art Project exhibition, Index of
American Design, held at the Federal Art Gallery, 50 Beacon Street, Boston, Massachusetts,
and the Poster for the Indian Court Exhibit held at the Golden Gate International Exposition
in San Francisco in 1939 (Fig. 14). Beyond the marketing of Indian wares, the
commodification of the indigenous included touristic views on tribal performances of rituals
and ceremonies. For example, companies such as the Harveycar Indian Detours Company
(Fig. 15) invited tourists to visit Indian pueblos and see “live archaeology” (Snyder 664).
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Figure 144 1939 WPA Artist Projects poster

Figure 15 Harveycar Courier. Image from Indian Detour Brochure. Caption says: In 1926, there were three of
us. Now we are many more
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Stemming from the political New Deal culture which claimed national independence
and power, the larger political paradigm was one of the United States cultivating an
indigenous national identity based on political independence and isolation. Social reformers
and artists likewise promoted the Indian-episteme for political and aesthetic purposes.
Further, Regionalism with its ties to nascent self-consciousness found its maturity in political
propagandist radio broadcasts and from critics like Craven. The political and art agendas
were much more aligned than perhaps we have excavated in our post-Cold War perspectives.
For as Craven stresses in his praise for Benton, “He knows his politics, his America, and his
technical history of art” (qtd. Doss 98). Such a view renders the critique of MoMA’s 1941
American Indian art exhibit prophetic. George C. Vaillant wrote of the exhibit, “The visitor
becomes keenly conscious of his Indian heritage, of the presence of a truly continental
American art, one which we may hope someday to rival” (Vaillant 167-169).
Conclusion

The ongoing accumulation of Indian arts and crafts displayed in various museum
collections and shared in exhibitions contributed to the development of the myth of a nascent
and indigenous political heritage. But the impact on Regionalism and artists in the West, the
Pacific Northwest Coast, and particularly the Desert Southwest (where Pollock grew up) is
clearly much larger than traditional or mainstream art reviews reveal. The iconic American
Indian was epistemic, woven into the domestic and national paradigm. The use of mass
media and entertainment to sustain the mythic elements of the American West and the Native
American as a cultural icon witnesses the degree to which this episteme was entrenched in
the social fabric of what Foucault calls the “positive unconscious of knowledge” (Foucault,
“Concepts” xi). Ultimately the appropriation and adoption of the iconology of Native
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American art as being an important source of inspiration for modern abstract art is evident in
the Northwest and New York art schools. All these visual and cultural venues disseminated
in concert a rich view of a stereotypic indigenous spirit which affected both the general
cultural milieu of the United States and ultimately the individual personal expression of
many artists of the mid-20th century.
Within this political and artistic landscape we find the indigenous, the primitive, the
ethnographic, iconic, and the symbolic American Indian, and the aestheticizing of the
indigenous spirit in the hands of several key artists, the greatest of which was Jackson
Pollock. Most important in our discussion of Pollock’s work is the fact that the American
Indian was a significant icon in the political and artistic culture of his formative years as a
child, in his youth, and his early years as an artist. Pollock studied with Sloan and Benton,
both artists who popularized regionalist and indigenous views of American life. Pollock’s
fine and commercial arts world was inundated with ethnographic, stereotypic, and at times
valorizing images of the American Indians. Additionally, he saw American Indians up close,
while playing near Indian reservations in Arizona in his childhood. He was, with his brothers,
an avid collector of literature about the arts of the American Indians, including copies of
Wolfgang Paalen’s journal DYN, John Graham’s System of Dialectics and article “Primitive
Art and Picasso”, and twelve volumes of the Annual Report of the Bureau of American
Indian Sand Painting, and fifteen volumes published by the Smithsonian on American
anthropology.
Like Pollock, other artists from Santa Fe and Seattle to New York were also drawing
inspiration from the arts of the American Indians and these sentiments were expressed in the
many exhibits featured in art and natural history museums and galleries during the later
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1930s and 40s. Rather than locating a single influential source for this phenomenon, we can
identify an interrelated web of influential sources seeking to represent American Indians and
their arts as subjects and icons. We find a network of nexus points between federal agents
and agencies, artists, critics, curators, galleries, museums, and popular culture which witness
to an increased and enduring interest in the arts of the American Indian, with a resulting
increased production of a wide selection of books, articles, exhibitions, radio shows, movies
and TV programs. In an effort to redefine a national identity, much of this interest in
American Indians and art was fueled by the United States government. Whether in terms of
the ethnographic, politicized, iconic and aestheticized representations, it is clear that the
American Indian was a ubiquitous cultural feature, an integral part of the episteme and visual
discourse of the early to mid-twentieth century United States which heavily influenced and
impacted the social and artistic focus of many artists, including Pollock’s subconscious and
conscious mind. Because this is the world in which Pollock and others found themselves, our
review of Pollock’s work must include this wider view of the existing cultural context. But
this view is not the view that has been described in art critical and historical discourse. As we
will see in Chapter Two, the formalist and psychological critiques of Pollock respectively
either fail to recognize or largely minimize Pollock’s assimilation of the ideography of the
Native American experience. With this reality in mind, our subsequent discussion will retrace the way in which Pollock embraced, recuperated, and re-envisioned the indigenous
American aesthetic. The result will require a recasting of the politicized critical response to
his work during his lifetime and the current characterization of his work, neither of which
fully acknowledges Pollock’s engagement with, and debt to, the iconic American Indian’s
ethos, ritual, and spirit.
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In conclusion, the ideological-iconic-aestheticized American Indian permeated all
cultural sectors, from politics to merchandising, and from fine art to popular arts and culture.
The new iconic and aesthetic representations of the American Indian and its arts differ from
traditional ethnographic depictions of the Indian and witness to an important mid-twentieth
century epistemic shift that appropriates the American Indian for nationalistic and artistic
purposes just preceding and after the end of World War II, and as modernism began to take
root in the New York school. It is in this multilayered social and political context that artists
(like Pollock) drew upon ancient indigenous American traditions, themes and symbols to
create a powerful and distinctly American modern art.
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Chapter Two
Modern Critical Divisions

Jackson’s work is full of the
West. That’s what gives it that
feeling of spaciousness. It’s what
makes it so American.
Lee Krasner

Introduction

We have seen that the representation and iconology of the American Indian was
present in all socio-political and aesthetic domains of the formative years of Pollock’s youth
and artistic maturity. So ubiquitous was the subject of the American Indian that we can claim
an Indian-episteme was operating during the era. We have also seen that art criticism was far
from neutral during the socialist and anti-socialist years of the time, when politicians, social
reformers, artists, and art critics turned to the indigenous as a symbol of Americanism. But
this fact of American art has been neglected in the critique of Pollock. Thus the intent of this
chapter is to continue to analyze the relationship between art criticism and the prevailing
socio-political episteme in order to identify the two prevailing polemical interpretive theories
on Pollock’s work; namely, the modernist and the psychoanalytic-Jungian critiques. Through
this analysis we will further come to see the political undertones within the art criticism of
the era and the reasons for which this criticism has overlooked the presence of the Indianepisteme in politics and art, particularly in the works of Pollock. We will first consider the
problem of art criticism and its tendency to create and contribute to art mythologies. Second,
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we will analyze the basic tenets of the modernist and the psychoanalytic critiques and
identify how each perpetuates myths about Pollock’s work. Third, we will analyze both
critiques as polemically divided in their assessments of Pollock’s work and question the
degree to which each critique speaks to the socio-political episteme of its time while ignoring
the topic of the indigenous and its role in Pollock’s work and the larger art world. Through
this analysis we will see that the theories regarding Pollock’s work are divided and highly
political representations that speak to the politics of nationalism and subjectivity, and in so
doing, contribute to the mythology of Pollock while ignoring the issue of the political and
artistic appropriation and iconology of the indigenous. Further, this analysis demonstrates the
need for theorists to find a unifying tenet that can resolve the polemic between the modernist
and psychoanalytic critiques, move beyond mythologizing Pollock, and account for the
indigenous spirit of art in his work.
First and foremost, art criticism conforms to the prevailing socio-political episteme of
its time. But in our case, art criticism has failed to recognize the importance of the iconic
Indian-episteme. In the case of Pollock’s work, this art criticism follows two distinct but
opposing views, the modernist or abstract viewpoint, and the psychoanalytical or Jungian
critique. While drastically different in approach, both viewpoints contribute to the myth of
Pollock as being the quintessential hero of the art world during a time when the notion of the
American hero was emblematic of the isolated modern man. The art critic Hilton Kramer,
writing for the New Criterion, identifies the ways in which art criticism conforms and
contributes to prevailing epistemic knowledge and to the mythology surrounding Pollock’s
life and work. Kramer’s review of the 1989 MoMA retrospective on Pollock’s work
demonstrates the way in which the modernist view conforms to epistemic knowledge while
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promoting and extending paradigmatic knowledge through the conclusions it draws. The
retrospective, exhibit featured an extensive and splendid array of drip paintings, drawings,
and photographs of Pollock at work (Fig. 16).

Figure 15 Pollock Painting – Photographs by Hans Namuth, Agrinde Publications, Ltd. New York,
1978

The visceral power of Pollock’s canvases was utterly spell binding; the effect was magnified
by the scope of the show, with over two hundred works on view. The exhibition was
organized by Kirk Varnedoe, then curator at MoMA, with the help of assistant curator Pepe
Karmel. Varnedoe wrote the main exhibition catalogue essay while Karmel wrote an essay
that focuses on the films and photographs of Pollock that were taken by Hans Namuth.
Combined, both essays focus on Pollock’s methodology and his mature work, his allover,
non-hierarchical, “structured drip paintings”. Varnedoe organized the retrospective to
demonstrate how Pollock’s work was a “consistently sublime achievement” moving from
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early experimental works to his mature drip style (Kramer 12). As Karmel explains in the
exhibition catalogue,
Coming to artistic maturity in the early 1940s, Pollock was drawn to an art of
the sign rather than an art of primordial sensation. His early work derives with
almost painful obviousness from Picasso and Miró, but, astonishingly, within
a few years he had discovered a way to go beyond his masters. Pollock’s
achievement, in his pictures of 1947-50, was to transform graphic flatness into
optical flatness – to show that by piling layer upon layer, sign upon sign, you
could generate a pictorial sensation equivalent to that of the primordial visual
field. (Karmel. “Comet” 132)
From its inception to its catalogue descriptions, the show was designed to highlight Pollock’s
abstract drip style. The show positioned Pollock as being not only the heir of Picasso and
Cubism, but also victorious over Miró and Picasso, giving New York artistic supremacy over
Paris. According to Kramer, who reviewed the show, Varnedoe organized the show to frame
only Pollock’s drip paintings, excluding any work that suggested a contrary narrative.
Furthermore, Kramer vehemently insists that in their extensive essays both Varnedoe and
Karmel exploit the characterization, even the mythology, of Pollock being an action painter.
Kramer’s review of the MoMA show and the catalogue essays provides a model for our
analysis of the larger divided review at stake in the overall critique of Pollock.
For Kramer, a critical mythology has existed for decades and it goes something like
this. The modern critique proclaims that after dabbling in the unconscious and various
approaches Pollock arrived at his mature works, or rather his pure abstract drip paintings,
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those which according to Varnedoe, were for the modernist at least, “the only important
pictures he ever created” (Kramer 12). The modernist review suggests that the only work
worthy of mention are Pollock’s drip paintings, and it disregards the body of his earlier and
formative works, claiming that they were mere dabblings along the way to his true mature
style. Kramer’s summation of the MoMA exhibit (and the larger modern critique of Pollock)
characterizes it as being predominantly preoccupied with the formal (abstract) and material
qualities of art while ignoring other prevailing theories that do not conform to modernist
tenets, such as the psychoanalytic-Jungian approach (which opposes it), as well as any
account of the indigenous elements in Pollock’s work. While we have seen in Chapter One
that the Indian-episteme was an important element in the broader cultural-political spectrum,
the modernist critique lost view of this fact in its rush to embrace the new and abstract
qualities of the New York art scene, and the psychoanalytic-Jungian approach lost sight of
the larger relationship between Pollock and the socio-politics of the time in order to
perpetuate ideas regarding subjectivity. While differing in approaches and findings, both
critiques reveal multiple epistemes at work even while focusing on Pollock’s persona and
contributing to the Pollock mythologies. In the following analysis, therefore, we will first
review the politicization and polemic within a divided modern criticism. We will review the
modernist critique that claims Pollock is an abstraction painter fulfilling the demands of
abstract pure form, and we will also explore the Surrealist, Jungian, and more psychoanalytic
approach to Pollock’s work. Then we will consider this polemical-modernist-critique within
the context of its being part of a larger divided critique that overlooked the indigenous
Indian-episteme within American Modernism, and more specifically in Pollock’s work. As
Foucault noted, “in any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one
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episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a
theory or silently invested in a practice” (Foucault, “Truth” 168). But as our analysis will
reveal, while art criticism has operated within the political confines of knowledge, in so
doing it has also failed to account for the waning political promotion of the Indian. History is
an accounting of a perpetual series of waning and emergent epistemes. As one episteme
comes into play with its collection of acceptable knowledge and discourse, another episteme
fades into the background. In hindsight, we can recuperate the influence of the indigenous
American spirit of art which fell out of favor to the critics even though it still remained
pertinent to the artists of the time.

Mythologies

The modernist critique claims that Pollock is a uniquely abstract painter whose
abstractions fulfill modernism’s claim to pure form. In the August 1949, Life Magazine
article “Jackson Pollock; is he the greatest living painter in the United States?” Pollock at
work was featured in a short one-page spread with feature photographs taken by Life
photographer Martha Holmes. The article stated that “Recently a formidably high-brow New
York critic hailed the brooding, puzzled-looking man shown above as a major artist of our
time and a fine candidate to become “the greatest American painter of the 20th Century.
Others believe that Jackson Pollock produces nothing more than interesting, if inexplicable,
decorations. Still others condemn his pictures as degenerate and find them as unpalatable as
yesterday’s macaroni. Even so, Pollock, at the age of 37, has burst forth as the shining new
phenomenon of American art” (Seiberling 42). By the time that the article was published,
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Pollock’s work had already been collected in five US museums and forty private collections.
Pollock was exhibiting in New York, Italy, and had had a one-man show in avant-garde
Paris, where he was “fast becoming the most … controversial U.S. painter” (43). With the
Life article, Pollock’s notoriety expanded beyond the art word.
The Life article describes several distinct issues that arose in Pollock’s so-called drip
paintings. First, the article questions the appearance or characteristics of Pollock’s work that
marked a distinct change from the Social Realism of his teacher Benton. Second, the article
questioned Pollock’s method of making art. Pollock mixed enamel paint with sand, which he
then poured out directly onto flat canvases stretched out on the floor or ground. He dripped
the paint onto the canvas with stir sticks. Dispensing with the easel and paint brush, Pollock’s
method questioned the very nature of art by way of its means of manufacture. Third, Pollock
supposedly dispensed with the appearance of subject matter, creating entirely abstract works.
Life Magazine highlighted the fact that some viewers thought Pollock’s paintings looked like
mere “piles of spaghetti” and were confused at the lack of recognizable subject. Not
recognizably Regionalist and not entirely abstract critics and the larger public grappled with
how to characterize and think about Pollock’s drip paintings. But one pertinent and primary
thing is obvious to us today. The review of Pollock was not at any time neutral nor objective
for when the article headlined, “is he the greatest living painter in the United States?” the
article was really questioning the status of American art in context with the larger world of
art. Though Regionalism waned for abstraction, the need for a purely American style of art
did not. Americans wanted an American art. The question the article begs is whether or not
Pollock could be the most “American” of the New York School.
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When Life Magazine ran its feature article on Pollock in 1949, Pollock became
nationally recognized, surpassing the recognition awarded to his friends and fellow artists in
the New York school. His notoriety expanded from well beyond New York art circles to the
popular media. But both art and popular reviews focused on the cultivation of his public
persona as being first and foremost American, and secondly as an icon of post war angst and
existentialism. As Dennis Raverty points out, Pollock inherited a quintessential American
“aura of a pop-existential hero: a lonely, sensitive, misunderstood genius, not unlike
contemporaneous movie idols Marlon Brando or James Dean” (Raverty 337). Pollock’s
tragic and untimely accident and death, like that of James Dean, became a symbol of a
“romantic apotheosis” that contributed further to a mythic persona and positioned him as “an
American icon” (337). Barbara Rose positioned the myth of Pollock beyond popular media to
suggest that he filled a need for American heroes which was no longer being fulfilled by
soldiers in the more peaceful post war years.
In the immediate postwar period, the American people were understandably
casting about for heroic figures to fill the shoes of those who risked their lives
in combat. With no suitable political figure such as de Gaulle to fill the void,
the country was ready -for the first time to acclaim a cultural hero. (qtd.
Raverty 337)
Like Benton, Pollock was portrayed in the media as a hard-drinking, chain-smoking,
quintessential hyper-masculine, tough American man. Pollock represented a new type of
Americanism. The issue of Americanism is primary here, but as we have discussed in
Chapter One, Americanism can take different forms, such as identification with the
indigenous and the authentic as in the years following World War I. But in fact, even in his
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earliest reviews, the literature on Pollock tends to emphasize these two key political points:
his masculinity and his Americanism. Descriptions and biographies, critiques, and reviews
tend to begin with some reference to Pollock, the American from Wyoming, conflating
images of the masculine and wild west with patriotism and politics. Such references aim at
distancing Pollock from what is thought to be his European influences in order to claim him
as an American icon. An early example of this type of writing is the review of his 1943 show
at Art of this Century Gallery published in Art News that said, “A former student of Benton
and a denizen of Wyoming, California, and Arizona, his abstractions are free of Paris and
contain a disciplined American fury” (qtd. Raverty 340). Americanism here denotes the wilduntamed, masculine, and authentic West, which ironically, is not too great a distance from
the idea of a nascent American Indian heritage.
This type of appropriation of art for politics’ sake has a long precedence in American
art criticism and the irony is that American critics who came to wholeheartedly embrace
modern abstraction, like Meyer Schapiro and Clement Greenberg, also in some form had
earlier recommended Regionalism and the aestheticized view of the American Indian during
the New Deal years. Later, after World War II and the ascendance of New York as the new
center of world art leadership, America’s status as a global superpower transformed their
critical discourse into something quite different. Critics moved away from lauding
Regionalist and American Indian or Primitivist influences in Pollock’s work in order to
identify with the new and emergent postwar socio-political sphere. As a result, critics glossed
over or abandoned entirely a key element in Pollock and other modern artists’ work – the
Native American indigenous spirt. For example, we see epistemic shifting art criticism in the
writings of Schapiro. Promoting Regionalist art in the essay, ‘The Social Bases of Art’, which

80

was presented at the First American Artists’ Congress in New York in 1936, Schapiro applied

the traditions of Marxist critique in order to establish a social basis underlying
representational (and regional) art. He began the article defining modernism as the reduction
of the social to the condition of the “anti-individual” – one who is separated or divorced from
social relationships. But for Schapiro, no artist can truly be disengaged from life’s social and
political strata, and because of this an entirely disengaged, disinterested art is unachievable.
The rare exception to this condition would be the truly free artist, one who is, according to
Schapiro, financially and socially independent and able to preoccupy him or herself –
exclusively in art. This type of autonomy would be an uncommon circumstance, if ever even
possible. Schapiro explained, “Artists who are concerned with the world around them in its
action and conflict, who ask the same questions that are asked by the impoverished masses
and oppressed minorities - these artists cannot permanently devote themselves to a painting
committed to the aesthetic moments of life, to spectacles designed for passive, detached
individuals, or to an art of the studio” (Schapiro 510). An artist who is detached from life’s
concerns and able to work for pure enjoyment and consumption (even aesthetic consumption)
is an artist who is detached from life with its attachments to society, nature, and history.
While this artist may become more attuned to “possibilities of feeling and imagination” the
artist is no longer free to participate cooperatively in the social tasks of producing solutions
to the urgent and pressing concerns of the day. For Schapiro, true freedom, like art, is an
activity within the social and political sphere. By its very nature, then, art for Schapiro is
political.
Echoing Schapiro’s views on the political nature of art, and in part also echoing the
concerns of the German left, Greenberg formulated a positive critique of Regionalism veiled
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within a theory of the dialectic politics. For Greenberg, social political decline results in a
breaking up of cultural traditions into diverse forms and academicism. He writes,
It is among the hopeful signs in the midst of the decay of our present society
that we - some of us - have been unwilling to accept this last phase [of art] for
our own culture. In seeking to go beyond Alexandrianism, a part of Western
bourgeois society has produced something unheard of heretofore: - avantgarde culture. A superior consciousness of history – more precisely, the
appearance of a new kind of criticism of society, an historical criticism –
made this possible. This criticism has not confronted our present society with
timeless utopias, but has soberly examined in the terms of history and of cause
and effect the antecedents, justifications and functions of the forms that lie at
the heart of every society. (“Avant-Garde” 530-531)
This avant-garde culture is defined by Greenberg as one having the benefit of historical
criticism in which to critique the conditions of the present age. Rather than an expression of
an ‘eternal natural condition of life’, the present can be seen as the “latest term in a
succession of social orders”. Art for Greenberg is political in that art participates in the social
political sphere as a form of criticism and “superior consciousness” (531). Like Schapiro,
Greenberg claimed that artists were ostensibly dependent on society for their support and that
the task of art was not a repudiation of society, but an expression of society as well as a
means by which art could move forward in the “midst of ideological confusion” (530). For
Greenberg, like Schapiro, art is political and ideological and from this view, any critique of
Pollock’s work depends upon surveying the social-political and ideological context with
some accuracy, aware of potential blind spots unseen by virtue of specific ideological
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viewpoints. Just as artists and politicians appropriated the Indian-episteme among other
ideas, critics like Schapiro and Greenberg come to art as cultivated viewers, with leftist
sentiments and feelings that heralded Regionalism as a free expression of the masses. This is
not to suggest that any one particular paradigm (such as the Indian-episteme, Regionalism or
abstraction) was or ever is unilaterally endemic; rather, it is important to recognize that
multiple paradigms often exist simultaneously, overlapping, transitioning, and transforming
one another. Thus we can see that the critique of Pollock’s work is mixed and divided,
illustrating the nature of art criticism as being rooted in prevailing ideologies and epistemes
and sub-epistemes that both illustrate nationalist politics while minimizing politics that had
embraced the indigenous. The distillation of what was a myriad of indigenous themes,
subjects, representations, and icons has become the prevailing discourse of American
modernism. But much has also been lost or cast out; namely, the epistemic role of American
Indian aesthetics and arts. Looking closely, however, we can recognize the phenomenon of
multiple paradigms at work when we compare early and late reviews of Schapiro and other
critics. Rather than a complete epistemic shift of truths, postulates, and knowledges, we see a
gradual emergence of multiple domains of thought, some waxing more prevalent while
others wane. In this specific case, we see how art criticism emerges within the discourse of
socialism while neglecting the Indian-episteme and its relations to an indigenous nationalism.
We also see multiple paradigms at work in Greenberg’s highly political Marxist essay
“Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” published in the Partisan Review in 1939. In the essay he claims
that “high art” describes the values of the bourgeoisie and the extreme right, the Nazis and
Communists for example. But this is problematic for art because, as Greenberg notes, avantgarde abstract art preoccupies itself with the forms of art while arising from the ruling class
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to which it belongs and depends upon for its financial survival. The paradox for avant-garde
art is that it depends economically upon a dwindling ruling class which in its autonomy no
longer illustrates. He writes, “But today such culture is being abandoned by those to whom it
actually belongs - our ruling class. For it is to the latter that the avant-garde belongs” (533).
By rising above culture, avant-garde art is experiencing its own economic decline.
Paradoxically, the same (increasingly bourgeois) society which produces formalism
or the avant-garde also produces kitsch art, which belongs to the masses. Kitsch is a type of
“predigested” art which requires no effort or reflection on the part of the spectator, yet it
supplies the same satisfaction for the newly literate working classes (as for the bourgeoisie)
with its appetite for readily available forms and narratives. Thus, kitsch is neither
autonomous art for the elite class nor art for the masses. In traditional culture class taste is
distinguishable by its forms. But modern culture has blurred the lines between the classes and
has subsequently made cultural and artistic dichotomy less noticeable.
In his subtle and yet ironic review, Greenberg reveals three paradigms at work,
autonomous and abstract art in decline, kitsch art for the masses, and his proposed solution to
the problem, namely, socialism. Greenberg summarizes,
Capitalism in decline finds that whatever of quality it is still capable of
producing becomes almost invariably a threat to its own existence. Advances
in culture, no less than advances in science and industry, corrode the very
society under whose aegis they are made possible. Here, as in every other
question today, it becomes necessary to quote Marx word for word. Today we
no longer look toward socialism for a new culture - as inevitably as one will

84

appear, once we do have socialism. Today we look to socialism simply for the
preservation of whatever living culture we have right now. (540)
Greenberg’s concern for elite culture and avant-garde art is paired with his socialist leanings,
demonstrating or showing how art criticism is not only political, but can also reveal how
multiple epistemes or paradigms of thought can exist in the same review. From this point on,
Greenberg will lean away from Marxist criticism to favor autonomous art, or at least to see
art within the frame or lens of modern abstraction. What is clear (in Greenberg’s essay and
Schapiro’s early writings) is that both critics had socialist leanings and both viewed art from
this point of view, at least during the heyday years of Regionalism. In the case of Greenberg,
his socialist and modernist leanings witness to the existence of two differing ideals within
one review. Art criticism is epistemic and it can reveal multiple epistemes, even within
singular or individual essays.
What is also imperative to recognize here is the way in which both Schapiro and
Greenberg concurred: that art is epistemic, born out of the social-historical culture even
though both critics neglect to perceive the Indian-episteme as definitive to that socialhistorical culture. Proving this theory is the way in which both critics radically altered their
socialist views on art after the New Deal era to embrace abstract art and the importance of
the formal properties of art or formalism. Noting the shifting epistemic tide, both critics yield
to the new emerging discourse and discontinue consideration of the Indian-episteme (which
had waned in predominant political discourse and programs but was still at play in the
aesthetics of Pollock and others). The very notion of the socially engaged artist is a far cry
from Schapiro’s later views on modern and autonomous art. In his 1953 essay “Style” and
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with a detached indifference, Schapiro defined modern art itself as indifferent and
disconnected. He wrote,
One result of the modern development has been a tendency to slight the
content of past art; the most realistic representations are contemplated as pure
constructions of lines and colors. The observer is often indifferent to the
original meanings of works…The radical change in attitude depends partly on
the development of modern styles, in which the raw material and distinctive
units of operation – the plane of the canvas, the trunk of wood, tool marks,
brushstrokes, connecting forms, schemas, particles and areas of pure color –
are as pronounced as the elements of representation. Even before nonrepresentative styles were created, artists had become more deeply conscious
of the aesthetic-constructive components of the work apart from denoted
meanings. (Schapiro, “Style” 148)
Schapiro’s embrace of abstract art and his focus on form and media belies his earlier Marxist
appraisal of 1930s realism. Schapiro now identifies the student of style as being separated by
discipline. The archaeologist looks at motive or pattern, the historian investigates historical
formation and change. The philosopher of history or culture looks at collective thinking and
feeling with its attendant forms. But style itself does not conform readily to such designations
and divisions. For Schapiro, style has come to be an ahistorical distinction which embraces
all creative activity, from art, even the “drawings of children and psychotics” (148). Art and
style is now, for Schapiro, a manifestation of the “basic unity of mankind” rather than an
epistemic social and historical condition of its time (148).

86

In embracing abstract art and a new modernist episteme, Schapiro also claims that art
has come full circle. He explains that contemporary styles “recall primitive art” because
modern artists were “the first to appreciate the works of natives as true art” (148). Schapiro
also embraced the “primitive” or indigenous spirit in American abstract art while repudiating
epistemic theories of art and style, and this repudiation belies the new epistemic moment
which Schapiro and the later writings of Greenberg, Harold Rosenberg, and a host of other
critics incorporated. The new episteme is one of a divided modernism, a polemic in the
critique of modern art that repudiates content, particularly content related to American Indian
themes, while embracing primitivist abstract form as sources of inspiration. We see this new
episteme in the critical writing of Schapiro, Greenberg, and even in the Life magazine article
on Pollock, where as an iconic American he is as important in the article as the review of his
work. Evidencing the new modernist episteme with its emphasis on individuality and
personal expression, Pollock the myth is synonymous with Pollock the artist. The point we
are stressing here is that art criticism, like art styles and political thought, shift and change.
Art criticism, far from objective, reveals prevailing socio-political contexts with their
collected body of knowledge and power. Our job is to excavate and recover that which
becomes lost in changing viewpoints.
We might note that Greenberg’s change in thought is no less overt than what we see
in Schapiro’s writings, for Greenberg’s works are consistently aligned with the progressions
of the avant-garde and politics. What was a critical review of avant-garde movements within
cultural conditions (in Greenberg’s early kitsch essay) becomes a highly charged political
statement that aligns, more closely than at any other time, the New York avant-garde with a
new post-war national identity. For example, in a January, 1948 review of Pollock’s one man
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show at the Betty Parson’s gallery, (one year before the Life article) Greenberg wrote that
Pollock would soon be the greatest American painter. Greenberg writes, “Since Marin – with
whom Pollock will in time be able to compete for recognition as the greatest American
painter of the twentieth century – no other American artist has presented such a case”
(Greenberg, “Review” 62). A few months later, in his review in the Partisan Review, 1948,
Greenberg wrote that the avant-garde had left Paris and had reached the shores of the United
States. As Greenberg explains, “then the conclusion forces itself, much to our own surprise
that the main premises of Western art have at last migrated to the United States, along with
the center of gravity of industrial production and political power” (Greenberg “Decline”
549). The essay was overtly political, evidencing a new modernist episteme wherein art and
politics now focus on issues of supremacy. Just as the United States had recently become the
world’s foremost military and commercial superpower, with its epicenter in Washington, DC,
the new center of the art world was to be located in New York City. In the hands of
Greenberg, Schapiro, Rosenberg, and others, art criticism is no longer an interpretation of art
as an expression of a collective Americanism, but rather art criticism as an assertion of the
global positioning and agenda of a world superpower. Having emerged from the war with a
renewed economy and a sense of global power, the United States needed a new art that
manifested its new domestic and international character. By critical declaration, art, and most
especially the American Abstract Expressionism movement, became the abstract
manifestation of a new national identity. The myth of Pollock, as the existential hero, lonely,
sensitive, and misunderstood, echoed prevailing social isolation sentiments under cold war
politics. But the truths of Pollock’s engagement with indigenous aesthetics are not fully
recognized, much less understood.
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Greenberg’s political leanings have been analyzed in more detail in other works but a
short review only stresses the point that his art criticism is rooted in the episteme of its
origination. 19 Despite earlier socialist leanings, Greenberg joined the American Committee
for Cultural Freedom, and became one of the organization’s executive committee in 1950. He
was also an outspoken supporter of McCarthyism. In 1951, Greenberg charged a former
colleague at The Nation of being pro-Soviet (Frascina 76). When preparing his collection of
articles in Art and Culture: Critical Essays, 1961, Greenberg altered many of his earlier
essays to reflect his newer political views. “The Pasted-paper Revolution”, 1958, was
relabeled “Collage” and substantially altered. His “Modernist Painting” was also altered as
were many other essays (69). During a time of New Deal and isolationist politics and cultural
nationalism, Greenberg was fully aware of the inward subconscious glance of mid-30s
politics. His later alterations speak less of Greenberg’s political leanings and more of the
changing political climate that his updated views reflect. In the years after the war,
Greenberg’s earlier sympathies towards social art waned in his enthusiasm for an art that
would be primary in not only New York, but the global art scene as well. Before Greenberg
declared Pollock the posterchild of American abstraction, he was seeking a national hero –
one with ties to the national frontier, the collective American, but yet a refined cosmopolitan
– Greenberg was clearly waiting for Pollock. Through the writings of Schapiro, Greenberg,
and others we see that art criticism is epistemic, based on shifting paradigms of thought and
politics. Being so, art criticism has inherent blind spots which can be identified only in
hindsight. But this fact is only one of the points to consider when reviewing the collective
review of Pollock’s work. For though art criticism is paradigmatic, it also follows multiple
paradigms, some of which occur simultaneously. In the review of Pollock’s work, we have
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two predominant viewpoints: the modernist view, and the hybrid psychoanalytic-Jungian
critique. Both theories are part of the story and the mythology of Pollock and his work.

The Critique of Abstract Modernism

Before Life Magazine questioned the viability of Pollock’s work, Greenberg had
appropriated Pollock as both an abstract and a quintessential American artist. Writing
predominantly for the New York publication The Nation, Greenberg was one of Pollock’s
greatest supporters during his lifetime. It was Greenberg who situated Pollock within the
modernist tradition as early as 1943, at the time of Pollock’s first one man show at the Peggy
Guggenheim Art of This Century Gallery, writing that Pollock “has gone through the
influences of Miro, Picasso, Mexican painting, and what not, and has come out on the other
side at the age of thirty-one, painting mostly with his own brush” or rather his own
‘American’ style (Greenberg, “Art” 51). Two years later at Pollock’s second solo show
Greenberg further stressed that Pollock’s victory over European art “establishes him, in my
opinion, as the strongest painter of his generation and perhaps the greatest one to appear
since Miró” (52). Consistently and from this point on, Greenberg claims Pollock’s supremacy
as an abstract American painter who succeeds over European artists. In 1947 Greenberg
declares Pollock’s victory in appropriating and surpassing French Cubism to a London
audience, writing that, “…Pollock’s strength lies in the emphatic surfaces of his pictures,
which it is his concern to maintain and intensify in all that thick, fuliginous flatness which
began – but only began – to be the strong point of late Cubism” (Greenberg, “Prospects” 2030). With this and other writings, Greenberg declares that Pollock had resituated the center of
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the art world from Paris to New York City. In the essay The Crisis of the Easel Picture
(1948) Greenberg emphasized Pollock’s work in purely formal tones. He coined the term
“all-over” and described the work as “decentralized” and “ polyphonic”. He wrote that
Pollock’s work was “…a surface knit together of a multiplicity of identical or similar
elements [that] repeats itself without strong variation from one end of the canvas to the
other…” (224). Greenberg emphasized that, having no clear subject, the picture dissolves
into “sheer texture, sheer sensation” (224). Greenberg’s art criticism was ever tinged with his
personal politics, which predisposed him to overlook the influence and representation of
American Indian arts and subjects in Pollock’s works. To be fair, however, Pollock often hid
these elements well, at least in his drip paintings. But without reference to Pollock’s earlier
works and the preponderance of Pollock’s representational qualities, Greenberg co-opted
Pollock as the point of both the arrival of American modernism and its departure from
European antecedents.
As early as 1940 and drawing upon the influence of the quintessential modernist Hans
Hofmann, Greenberg articulated his modernist agenda for the objectivity and purification of
art in his essay The American Avant-Garde. Greenberg wrote that, guided by a “notion of
purity… the avant-garde arts have in the last fifty years achieved a purity and a radical
delimitation of their fields of activity for which there is no previous example in the history of
culture” (Greenberg, “Avant-Garde” 529). Purity or rather formalism is a way of describing
the attributes of art, such as perspective or its lack thereof. Hofmann claimed that the highest
aim of art was to preserve or articulate the two-dimensional picture plane. In Hofmann’s
words, “The essence of the picture is its two dimensionality. This law connotes at once: the
picture plane must achieve a three dimensional effect (as distinguished from illusion) by
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means of the creative process. These two lawful principles apply both to color and to form”
(Hofmann, “Aims” 356). Rather than create Renaissance-like illusionistic and perspectival
space, the painting must always acknowledge its limitations as being a two dimensional
object. Any sense of perspective within the painting must not be illusionistic, but created
through the means by which paint is applied to the canvas. Greenberg had taken Hofmann’s
lecture courses at the Art Students League and was highly influenced by him. For Greenberg
(like Hofmann), purity is the acceptance of the limits of any given art medium. Greenberg
does not, in any of his writings, acknowledge that he saw or understood Pollock’s
representational qualities and references to indigenous forms, for after his turn from socialist
views on art for the masses, Greenberg was always predisposed to promoting the tenets of
modernism, which he learned from the master of modernism, Hofmann.
Greenberg’s interests are not just on the pursuit of abstraction. for he also evokes the
episteme of late modernism that claims autonomy for art as a respite from national politics.
We have already analyzed Greenberg’s socialist sentiments in his essay “Avant-Garde and
Kitsch”, where he believed socialism would redeem art from its decline. In his shifting
politics, Greenberg had in fact been waiting for Pollock (or at least someone like Pollock)
who would redeem American art, saving it from the materialistic values of the bourgeoisie,
not for socialist aims of art for the masses, but for modernist aims of autonomy from politics.
For Greenberg, abstract art held progressive values that resonated with “something deepseated in contemporary sensibility” that “corresponds perhaps to the feeling that all
hierarchical distinctions have been exhausted, that no area or order of experience is either
intrinsically or relatively superior to any other” (“Avant-Garde” 532). Abstract or avantgarde art held promise for the redemption of art from art’s decline in changing social classes.
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But in later writings, as socio-politics moved beyond the quest for a national icon and
unaffected by the Indian-episteme, Greenberg’s claims for art aligned more with the notion
of the political supremacy of the burgeoning national identity as a world superpower, primary
in industrial and military strength a supremacy that rises above all politics, writing in his
essay “Towards a Newer Laocoon” that,
I find that I have offered no other explanation for the present superiority of
abstract art than its historical justification. So what I have written has turned
out to be an historical apology for abstract art. To argue from any other basis
would require more space than is at my disposal, and would involve an
entrance into the politics of taste - to use Venturi's phrase - from which there
is no exit - on paper. My own experience of art has forced me to accept most
of the standards of taste from which abstract art has derived, but I do not
maintain that they are the only valid standards through eternity. I find them
simply the most valid ones at this given moment. (557-8)
By Greenberg’s own admission, he was disposed to abstract art for personal and political
reasons. Whether writing epistemically for the left or the right, he found abstract art a
constant in changing times. For Greenberg, supremacy and autonomy became the only viable
solution for art and politics. He concludes his sentiments writing that, “The arts lie safe now,
each within its ‘legitimate’ boundaries” or rather, abstraction (557) .
Greenberg saw the hope of abstract art in Pollock’s work. By 1948, just as Pollock
had developed his mature drip style, Greenberg heralded abstract art as “the only vital style
of our time” and this was to be best expressed through Cubism. He considered Cubism the
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best means by which contemporary feeling could be conveyed (which we can describe as an
autonomy of art in an age of supremacist politics) and he predicted that Cubism would
continue to serve as the primary style for the modern world. But even more important,
writing epistemically, Greenberg considered Cubism’s immigration to the United States to be
a sign that “that the main premises of Western art have at last migrated to the United States
along with the center of gravity of industrial production and political power” (“Decline”
572). Greenberg was looking for an American Picasso, which he found in Pollock’s drip
paintings with their layers of color that produced surfaces of non-illusionistic space and even
all-over masses of entanglement that produced no focal point. In Pollock, Greenberg found
the epitome of Manet’s project of overcoming illusionistic space and subject which he
described in The Crisis of the Easel Picture, 1948, and emphasizing the materiality of art
which he explained in Towards a Newer Laocoön, 1948. Before Pollock, Greenberg was
predisposed to seeing European style Cubism and Modernism take firm root in American
soil. For the United States to become a unitedly superpower, it had to claim supremacy in art
and not just politics. Although representation of Indian symbols and allegories are inherent in
Pollock’s early paintings, Greenberg chose to overlook this subject matter in favor of a
formal materialist view that mirrored supremacist politics.
Following Greenberg’s valorizing of abstract form, later theorists and critics like
Michael Fried and T.J. Clark, and most recently John Golding in his book Paths to the
Absolute, and Kirk Varnedoe and Pepe Karmel, curators for the blockbuster MoMA
retrospective, Jackson Pollock, uphold notions of pure form with its affinities to absolute
order and timeless beauty. In rather formal terms, Clark argues in favor of a modernism
without representation. For example, in a review of Pollock’s Number 32, 1950 Clark
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explains that modernism is comprised of a “convolution’ of signs and metaphors, offering an
occluded totality that might stand for a world but simultaneously annihilating that
representation’s intelligibility” (Harris et al. 101). He also explained that, “If a painting is to
be abstract at all – this seems to me the drip paintings logic – then it ought to be so through
and through, down to the last detail or first gestalt: it ought to be made into the opposite of
figuration, the outright, strict negative of it” (101). Clearly Clark missed the nuanced and
allegorical references to Native American art.
Michael Fried in Three American Painters admitted that critics have almost
completely failed to understand Pollock’s work. He claims that Pollock had taken figuration
to a new mode of representation but still touted this new aesthetic as purely “optical”. Fried
negates the impact of figuration for a form of pure visual effects. He describes Pollock in
purely formal terms, noting the line which is neither contour nor edge, and where each part of
the canvas is to be discerned in conjunction with its other parts. Contours and shapes “have
been purged of figurative character” - no longer contour, no longer the edge of anything
(101). It does not, by and large, give rise to positive and negative areas: we are not made to
feel that one part of the canvas demands to be read as figure, whether abstract or
representational, against another part of the canvas read as ground. This is tantamount to the
claim that, “line has been freed at last from the job of describing contours and bounding
shapes – that it has been purged of its figurative character… the illusion established in these
paintings is not tangibility but of its opposite: as though the dripped line, indeed the paintings
in their entirety, are accessible to eyesight alone, not to touch” (101).
From the earliest reviews of Pollock’s work, we find a mixture of differing
perceptions and agendas. Some reviewers focus on the material forms in Pollock’s work.
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Others look for markers reflecting the social tides of the era. Art criticism, like art, is
entrenched and embedded in its time. During Pollock’s era, many critics such as Craven,
Schapiro, and Greenberg favored an indigenous art that iterated the values of an isolationist
ideology. Based on nascence they also sought to include the Native American within
regionalist working class politics which included, among other things, farming communities
and industry. But Schapiro and Greenberg, sensing the pulse of changing political agendas,
grew to tout modernist values based on formalism at the expense of subjective content.
It is important to note that the abstract modernist view continues to be the most
widely accepted interpretation of Pollock’s work, found in art history books, and widely
reiterated in retrospective shows. Returning to MoMA’s 1985 retrospective show in light of
the modern critique, we can see that Varnedoe and Karmel’s retrospective exhibit promotes
this quintessential modernist-abstract frame of Pollock’s work, which was first articulated by
Greenberg. Even in a recent biography on Pollock, Tom and Jack, the Intertwined Lives of
Thomas Hart Benton and Jackson Pollock, Henry Adams endorses the modernist-abstract
critique and situates it more fully and formally within the analytic Cubist tradition while
overlooking the epistemic socialist and nationalist politics of Greenberg’s theories. In the
book Adams puts forth a convincing argument for the role Cubism (through Benton) played
in the development of Pollock’s abstract-modernism. According to Adams, Benton served as
a link between abstract and Pollock’s drip paintings. His claim, based on formal technique
and principles of abstraction seeks to answer the question as to why Pollock abandoned
content (references to indigenous art and other representational elements) for pure form. In
order to better understand the question of representation or mimêsis, and the significance of
Pollock’s representational content, this question of pure form needs to be analyzed. It is
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helpful to see the current problem through Adam’s review which summarizes earlier
monographs and articles, (such as many just cited), within the abstract-modernist conclusion.
Because this viewpoint promotes and even seemingly secures the modernist view, it is
helpful for our studies on Pollock as something to consider in all our questioning. Further,
the polemic between modernist abstract form and the psychoanalytic-Jungian interpretation is
illuminated by Adam’s keen observations for content.
Few American artists had direct association with European modernism, or more
specifically Cubism. Pollock’s teacher and mentor Thomas H. Benton was one of those
artists, along with his friend Stanton Macdonald-Wright, Macdonald-Wright’s brother
Willard Wright, and Morgan Russell. Working in Paris during the height of the Cubist era,
Russell and Macdonald-Wright cofounded Synchromism, a style that hybridized a Cubist
technique of fracturing form with a theory that investigated rhythmic arrangements which
they found in the works of the old masters such as Michelangelo and Titian. For them, color
becomes a means for expressing rhythmic sequences imbued with spiritual significance.
Abstract or semi-realistic compositions are born out of luminous spirals, targets, and faceted
prisms in primary hues, as seen in Benton’s 1917-8 work Constructivist Still Life (Fig. 17).

97

Figure 16 Thomas Hart Benton, Constructivist Still Life, circa 1917-19, Columbus Museum of Art.

During Benton’s brief stay in Paris he worked with MacDonald and adopted
Synchromist theory and style. Benton helped to promote Macdonald-Wright’s Synchromist
show at the Carroll Galleries in New York in March 1914. When the Macdonald-Wright
brothers returned to the United States, Benton continued to associate with them, showing
Synchromist work with them in the 1916 Forum Exhibition, the first comprehensive
exhibition of American modernist works. By 1919, however, Benton had moved beyond
using exclusive prismatic color, but his work retained compositional sequences of rhythmic
form. Benton’s advocate, the art critic Thomas Craven, wrote that, “For the development of a
complete rhythm extending through large masses of sculptural forms, modern art has
uncovered no gift like that of Thomas H. Benton, a painter who seems to belong neither to
his own department nor to the domain of sculpture” (Adams, “Tom” 54). In Craven’s article,
“The Progress of Painting,” featured in two installments in the Dial, in April and June of
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1923, Craven declared that art’s progress from Massaccio to Benton had been a consistent
trend towards the mastery of form. Cubist artists returned form to its position in the hierarchy
of formal properties, saving form from its dissolution in Impressionism. Extending this trend
for form, according to Craven, was Benton. It was evident that Benton had translated the
complex Synchromist rhythmic forms derived from Cubism into “masses of sculptural
forms” returning abstract form back to volume, weight, contour and figuration.
Though Benton turned from purely abstract work, he continued to adapt Synchromist
rhythm in complex swirling compositions of urban and rural American life. In Benton’s
composition People of Chilmark, 1923, forms spiral upward, morphing into foliage, hills, and
clouds that swirl around a central theme that envisions the small town on Martha’s Vineyard
(Fig. 18).

Figure 17 Thomas Hart Benton, People of Chilmark, 1920
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Swirling, expanding, and pulsing compositions became Benton’s hallmark style, evident in
even his most complicated ten panel mural, America Today (Fig. 19).

Figure 18 Thomas Hart Benton, America Today, City Activities with Subway mural panel, 1930-31

The mural was commissioned by Alvin Johnson for the boardroom of the New School for
Social Research in New York. It’s interesting to note that this mural was commissioned
while Benton was still teaching Pollock and other art students at the Art Students League.
Pollock was very familiar with this work as he served as the model for many of the male
figures in the painting. Filled with swirling, undulating, and elongated figures, Benton
breathed Synchromist principles of formal technique and abstract form into inventive scenes.
Adams explains that Benton formulated his Synchromist-inspired technique into the
pithy epigram, “the hollow and the bump” (Adams, “Tom” 302-3; Emmerling 12).. 20 This
idea ultimately derives from the great nineteenth-century sculptor Auguste Rodin who
described sculpture as “simply the art of depression and protuberance” (Adams, “Decoding”
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1). Rodin’s secretary, the poet Rainer Maria Rilke, used a similar phrase, “lumps and holes,”
to describe Rodin’s working method. From Rodin to Matisse and from Matisse to
Macdonald-Wright and Benton, the notion of lumps, protuberances, and bumps with their
recessions, holes, and hollows passed to Benton. He adopted this method fully during his stay
in Paris, learning to apply it to small scale sculptures which he used as models for his
paintings. Further, Benton diagramed surface designs that described compositional flow and
movement. He reduced figures to abbreviated stick figures in order to analyze how surface
forms might emerge from the center of these figures. He envisioned volumes as cubes to
formulate volume and mass. Just as the qualification of three-dimensional space and volumes
enervates Rodin’s sculptures, Benton’s “hollow and bump” method gives his work, after his
Synchromist years, its rhythmic ebb and flow.
This new “hollow and bump” way to envision and enliven form had become an
irreducible feature of Benton’s work by the time he repeatedly taught this methodology to art
students, including Pollock, at the Art Students League. In Benton’s art classes students
analyzed all types of art forms from Chinese brush paintings, Persian miniatures, Indian
sculptures, to Baroque and Mannerist painters. Marianne Berardi compared notes from
Pollock’s drawing books with Benton’s article “The Mechanics of Form Organization in
Painting” which he wrote for Arts, 1926 (1). She identified precise correspondences between
Pollock’s drawings and Benton’s article, demonstrating how influential Benton’s theory of
“the hollow and the bump” is in Pollock’s artistic training. Benton’s “hollow and bump”
technique of analyzing rhythmic volumes is was also a means of expressing them. From
Macdonald-Wright to Benton, and from Benton to his students (and especially Pollock), the
“hollow and the bump” came to mean much more than technical applications of paint. It
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came to signify a unifying modern and universal principle for art. We see Benton’s influence
as an early tendency in Pollock’s painting, Going West, 1935 (Fig. 20).

Figure 19 Jackson Pollock, Going West, 1935

Clearly Pollock interpreted Benton’s swirling vortex, his undulating landscape, and his
wandering self-absorbed figures. The technique of applying paint to canvas in swirling and
rhythmic ways appears to be a commonality between Benton and Pollock, and from Cubist
shattered forms to Synchromist rhythms and Benton’s “hollow and the bump”
methodologies, the modernist interpretation of Pollock’s work appears to be secure.
But this interpretation is problematic in three ways. First, this passing of the pulsating
torch from Benton to Pollock credits Greenberg, Lee Krasner, and Hofmann for Pollock’s
mature style. Second, it contributes to the mythology of Pollock as a monumental icon of
Americanism or alternately of being ill and emotionally unstable, a myth that Kramer accuses
both critiques of creating. Third, it conveniently bypasses the issues of mimêsis and
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indigenous American Indian forms in Pollock’s works by focusing on the new and prevailing
modernist episteme rather than observation and analysis of indigenous elements in Pollock
and others’ works of the time. According to Adams, after leaving the Art Students League,
Pollock worked at negotiating a means in which to aestheticize or reiterate Native American
symbolic content, but this was merely a phase. Adams extends the abstract modernist claim
that Pollock’s later drip paintings are not mimetic reiterations of indigenous forms, but a sort
of return to the ebb and flow of art that was initiated under Benton’s tutelage at the League.
According to Adams, Pollock abandoned his teacher’s ideas until he met Lee Krasner.
Through Krasner’s influence, and particularly her training with Hofmann and her friendship
with Greenberg, Pollock ‘came to himself’ like the prodigal son and returned to Benton’s
“hollow and the bump” system a wiser and more mature artist.
Krasner and Pollock met in November of 1941, six years before his first drip painting.
Krasner, a student of Hofmann, had embraced Cubism as the foundation of modern form.
Krasner admired Matisse, Picasso and Mondrian. She was devoted to abstraction and could
not understand how anyone “could take Benton seriously” (Adams, “Tom” 239). As Adams
explains, “The art critic Barbara Rose, reflecting a widely held view, has declared that
Krasner helped Pollock escape “Benton’s narrow provincialism and develop a more
international, sophisticated view of art” (243). One time, after the couple began living
together, Krasner picked up a brush in order to show Pollock how to paint, presumably in a
more cubist manner. She naively believed that all Pollock’s ideas had come from a provincial
Benton. But in fact, as Adams explains,
Benton for his gruff pretensions, was a thoroughly cosmopolitan figure. He
could read books in foreign languages; he had lived in Europe; he had traveled
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widely in the United States; his friends included leading intellectuals and
artists, not only painters but poets and musicians; he read philosophy and
aesthetics; and he had studied art history from top to bottom, including things
that are often left out, such as Persian miniatures and Hindu sculpture. (242)
Despite Benton’s sophisticated knowledge of art and its diverse forms, Krasner considered
him to be archaic. She disregarded the figural traditions in Western art and art history in
favor of the abstract art of her teacher Hans Hofmann. Her disregard for Benton was overtly
expressed and according to Adams, effective in convincing Pollock to feel the same way. But
when attempting to teach Pollock a better way for making art, Pollock became furious. He
stormed out of his studio and felt resentful for months afterwards. Krasner and Pollock were
so diametrically opposed in their approaches that they did not talk about art, nor did they
attend museum and gallery exhibits together (242). Yet despite their artistic differences,
Adams believes that Krasner was largely responsible for Pollock’s shift to what seems to be
complete non-representational art in 1947 by exposing him to Hofmann’s influential ideas.
Hofmann was very influential in the promoting Cubist and abstract formalism in his
work at the Student Arts League and elsewhere. Bavarian born, Hofmann studied in Munich
at Heinrich Wolff and Ernst Neumann’s school for graphic arts and became a full-time
resident of Paris by 1905. In 1930, Hofmann accepted the invitation of his former student
Worth Ryder to come to the University of California at Berkeley. Hofmann began teaching at
the Art Students League in 1933, two years before Benton left the League to paint a mural for
the Missouri state capitol building and to work as the head of the painting department at
Kansas City Art Institute. By 1934 Hofmann opened his Hans Hofmann School of Fine Arts,
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located at 137 East 57th Street where he taught Krasner, the critics Greenberg and
Rosenberg, and a long list of confirmed abstract expressionist painters.
Like Benton’s “hollow and the bump” theory, Hofmann was also (according to
Adams) influential in Pollock’s work. By 1942 Hofmann had experimented with dripping
paint as in his painting, The Wind (Fig. 21).

Figure 21 Hans Hoffmann, The Wind, 1942, Oil, duco, gouache and India ink on board, 43 7/8 x 27 3/4 in. (111.4 x 70.5)

He, in a way similar to Benton, developed a color theory based on “push and pull” which
greatly influenced Mark Rothko’s meditative panels. Hofmann’s method was based on the
interdependent relationships that occur between form, space, and color. But taking account of
his general oeuvre, we see the cubist grid which provided an underlying structure in his
work, like in his Still Life Interior, of the same time, 1941 (Fig. 22).
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Figure 22 Hans Hofmann Still Life Interior, 1941 Oil on panel, Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York.

In Still Life Interior we see how Hofmann aligned his structures and forms evenly and
methodically along a vertical and horizontal grid creating a matrix of structure to forms along
xy quadrants. Krasner’s work also forms upon a structured cubist grid that holds the all-over
compositions together in even rows and columns, easily identified in her Untitled 1949, from
her Little Image series which she began soon after she and Pollock moved to Long Island
from New York City (Fig. 23).

Figure 203 Lee Krasner, Untitled, 1949
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Even in her looser compositions, such as Gaea, 1966, with its sweeping broad strokes of
paint and tightly controlled forms, the grid forms an underlying organizational structure (Fig.
24).

Figure 24 Lee Krasner. Gaea. 1966

An obvious articulation of this tightly formed grid is absent in all of Pollock’s
painting; however, recent restoration on Pollock’s work Alchemy, 1947 does in fact show an
underlying grid upon which Pollock structured his work (Belcher) (Fig. 25). The painting,
having hung on the wall of Peggy Guggenheim’s palazzo on the Grand Canal in Venice, had
collected sixty years’ worth of dust and cigarette smoke from visitors to the gallery and
Peggy’s many parties. During the restoration, the conservator Lucian Pensabene found very
light delicate outlines in white, forming a loose grid, or what is “comparable to a grid” on the
canvas upon which Pollock organized, with balance, intention, and precision his splatters and
lines of paint (Belcher). The recent and past evidence, from a long line of critics (even those
preceding Greenberg), would agree with the prevailing theory that Pollock’s work took a
drastic turn from figurative to non-representative between the years 1942 and 1947.
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Figure 25 Jackson Pollock, Alchemy, Oil, aluminum, enamel paint, and string on canvas, 1947,
Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York.

The only explanation seems to be a return to Benton’s “hollow and bump” or an embrace of
Hofmann’s “push, pull” in a sort of to and fro technique that arrived to Pollock through
Krasner’s influence. In this modernist argument Pollock’s work is divided into three primary
phases. First, Pollock looked to Benton and Benton’s friends like Ross Braught or José
Clemente Orozco. Second, Pollock looked to John Graham and synthesized a sort of Picassoesque primitive style replete with symbols and imagery based on Jungian theories of the
unconscious. Third, and lastly, Pollock turned to abstraction which gave him a freer mode of
expression that was heavily influenced by the abstract art of Hofmann through Krasner. This
viewpoint suggests that Pollock’s artwork was fluidly influenced by his friends and
associates at differing times of his artistic output, ultimately culminating in an all over
abstract style. But this explanation overlooks mimêsis to suggest a sort of regression from
Benton’s original influences to an experimental phase, and then to Hofmann’s ideas.
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This critique has an obvious blind spot that discounts Pollock’s engagement with
American Indian themes and mimetic figuration. In an interview with Dorothy Strickler for
the Smithsonian Institution Archives of American Art, Krasner reported that she had brought
Hofmann home to meet Pollock and to see his work in 1949. Hofmann was intrigued and
asked Pollock, if he worked from nature as there were no still lifes or models to be seen in his
studio. According to Krasner, “Pollock replied, ‘I am nature.’ And Hofmann’s reply was,
‘Ah, but if you work by heart, you will repeat yourself.’ To which Jackson did not reply at
all” (Strickler). Even if Pollock had adopted this new mode of abstraction, he apparently was
not very interested in Hofmann even though he was the foremost authority on abstract art in
America at that time. With further analysis we can find a solution to the problem of Pollock’s
“disjointed” artistic phases and his seemingly turn to abstract form through an investigation
into mimêsis as a means of recuperating an indigenous American spirit of art.
Second, Adams contributes to the mythology of Pollock. He promotes the idea that
Pollock was an impassioned but simple man. Often, he cites Pollock’s personality,
alcoholism, and intelligence. For example, Adams explains the reason for Krasner’s
influence on Pollock, writing that, “we learn that the creature most dangerous to man is not
some reasonably brainy primate but the slithering crocodile, with a brain the size of a poker
chip, which because it has few thoughts is singularly successful in turning thought into
action” (Adams,“Tom” 244). He continues, “Krasner’s strength – and one could say this of
Pollock as well – was not sophistication but a more primitive instinct.” (244) Like writings
that posit Pollock as the western equivalent to James Dean, judging Pollock’s intelligence as
primal and instinctive looks to fables and hearsay more than art. Adams concludes his
commentary on Pollock to say that,
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The real problem was that Pollock was very sick. While mediations now exist
for bipolar illness, they did not exist in Pollock’s lifetime. Surely the real
problem that Pollock encountered at this juncture was not that he somehow
failed as an artist but that he suffered from a then incurable disease – a
depression so crippling that it often made him unable to work at all. What is
remarkable is that despite this disease, which incapacitated him most of the
time, he nonetheless produced such a memorable body of achievement. (352)
The point is not that Pollock was an alcoholic or may have suffered from depression or
bipolar personality disorder, or any other number of conditions authors cite. Rather, dwelling
on Pollock’s personality and personal life, in this case, overshadows the deeper concerns we
have for his work, namely, his ability to take the socio-political epistemes or paradigms of
his time, particularly the Indian-episteme to create a body of work that evidences in often
concealed and covert ways.
Third, although Adams extends the modernist critic of pure form, he more profoundly
(and inadvertently) acknowledges the underlying representational and mimetic qualities in
Pollock’s work. For he shows that the art historian Marianne Berardi has found some key
aspects of Pollock’s drip paintings which suggest that Pollock never fully committed to nonobjective art (Adams, “Decoding” 56). Adams points out that the assumption that Pollock’s
earlier drip paintings such as Autumn Rhythm or Lavender Mist: Number I, 1950 were
entirely abstract and non-figurative may be incorrect. In actuality, there are elements of
figuration in his drip paintings. For example, x-ray analysis has disclosed a dark figure
beneath an intricate web of splotched and interlaced paint lying at the bottom of Pollock’s
Fathom Five,1947 (56). Furthermore, Berardi discovered that Pollock also concealed his own
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name in his first monumental painting, Mural, 1943. For Smithsonian Magazine, 2009,
Adams wrote that it was discovered that Pollock had written his name on the painting Mural
in big bold letters, not as a signature, but as a structural device. 21 Adams concludes that the
use of his name served as a compositional technique. Pollock organized the painting around
his name according to a compositional system—vertical markings that serve as the loci of
rhythmic spirals—borrowed directly from his mentor, Benton (Adams, “Decoding” 56). This
may certainly have been one reason that Pollock included his name on the painting, but Sue
Taylor found that Pollock hid a myriad of symbols, including letters, figures, and even
numbers in his paintings. Recent x-ray analysis of many of Pollock’s paintings confirms that
he did indeed embed a myriad of representational elements into his drip paintings. In addition
to letters, symbols, figures and numbers these include body parts, birds, faces, swastikas and
other indigenous symbols (qtd. in Adams, “Decoding” 57). These along with the figural
elements in Pollock’s earlier and latest paintings suggest that figuration was an integral part
of Pollock’s intentions. Pollock even said as much in 1945 when he stated that “I choose to
veil the images” and in 1956 declared that “I'm a little representational all the time. But when
you're painting out of your unconscious, figures are bound to emerge.” In conclusion, Adams
perpetuates the notion of modernist form in his ‘hollow and bump’ thesis but concedes that
Pollock was a representational, figurative painter. He admits that Pollock, “seems to have
been disclosing [in his black paintings] what he was doing in the understructure of his earlier
paintings” (Adams, “Tom” 349). Adams has hit upon the very key point of this study, that
Pollock’s work is highly representational and mimetic. This is not to say that his work
embodies the notion of mimêsis as being an exact or faithful copy of a thing, but that it
represents in some way, be it figurative or symbolic, and thereby Pollock transgresses the
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notion of modernist non-representational form. Chapters 3-6 will analyze mimêsis in its
various forms, functions, and modes. But for the present, Adams notes that Pollock’s work is
representational and figurative, and I claim that this fact is most pertinent to our
understanding of his engagement with indigenous arts. While the modernist analysis prevails
today, Adams and others are beginning, in analysis and hindsight, to acknowledge the
presence of the spirit of indigenous art, representation, mimêsis, and alternative paradigms of
thought or epistemes at work. Because of this, we need to recognize modern art criticism as
epistemic rather than infallible. In Adams review we see the extension of the modernist
critique in three ways. First, it promotes a trajectory of art from Cubism to Benton and from
Benton to Pollock through the influences of Krasner, Hofmann, and Greenberg. Second, it
perpetuates the mythologies of Pollock’s personality which tend to overshadow his
accomplishments. Third, the critique overlooks the importance of the many figurative
elements in Pollock’s work and the issue of representation and indigenous influences and the
significance of these hidden representational and figurative elements.
The modern critique, from Greenberg to Clark, Fried, Kraus, Adams and many
others, seeks to position Abstract Expressionism, and particularly Pollock, within the history
of Western art with a single trajectory from Manet to Picasso, from Picasso to Pollock, from
Pollock to the Color Field painters, setting up a logical foundation to bridge the apparent gap
between the two fields. The purpose of this brief retrospective on the history of modern
criticism in America is to situate the criticism of Pollock within the larger problem of art
criticism itself. For just as the nation was seeking a new authentic identity apart from
European culture and precedents, art criticism also looked to separate itself from European
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styles and to demonstrate American efforts to extend the trajectory of Cubism and Western
art.
The relationship between Cubism, Synchronism, and American abstraction seems to
be a logical, visual, and even a foregone conclusion. First, as Caroline A. Jones demonstrates
in Eyesight Along, Clement Greenberg’s Modernism and the Bureaucratization of the Senses,
Greenberg’s style of art criticism developed from an assorted array of influences that account
as much for Hofmann’s aesthetics as for his own political agenda. From Hofmann,
Greenberg inherited a love for the orderliness of Pantone colors and color charts and surface
flatness, and analytic Cubism (Jones, xxiii, 181). 22 But Greenberg’s engagement with art
criticism has a long and complicated politically driven history and just as quickly as
Greenberg proclaimed Pollock’s supremacy over Parisian antecedents, the broader Indianepisteme and search for a nascent national identity was discarded for one of supremacy and
power. Like Pollock, Greenberg witnessed two distinct epistemes in the art and political
worlds. Both were caught between two distinct and powerful thought forces. It is in the gap
between Regionalism and Abstract Modernism that Pollock and Greenberg formulated their
artistic beliefs. Rather than a smooth transition between one form to the next, the gap or
distance between the two is much wider than anticipated. The modernist critique claims that
Pollock is a uniquely abstract painter whose abstractions fulfill modernism’s claim to nonrepresentational form. But Pollock’s engagement with the Indian-episteme and the
recuperation of mimêsis forms an underlying theme that the modernist critique has
overlooked. However, before analyzing what might be missing in the critique, we need to
analyze the psychoanalytical critique as well.
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The Psychoanalytic Critique

The psychoanalytical-Jungian critique of Pollock’s work is no less problematic.
When Hilton Kramer critiqued the MoMA retrospective of Pollock’s art, he asked one
primary question: why did the curators Varnedoe and Karmel omit the psychoanalytic
critique of Pollock’s work by showing only works that appeared to lead up the drip style,
particularly when a large body of art criticism on Pollock adheres to the Surrealist, Jungian,
and more psychoanalytic approach to Pollock’s work? Because the critique of Pollock’s work
is polarized between two opposing interpretations, both views need to be analyzed. The
psychoanalytic-Jungian critique claims for itself three primary conditions: first, Pollock went
to three different Jungian analysts for therapeutic purposes; second, he gave his first analyst
Joseph Henderson, a collection of drawings which Henderson interpreted as being based on
Jungian archetypes; and third, art historians claim Pollock’s work is inspired by Surrealism,
which is to say based on impulses and imagery derived from the unconscious. In this section
we will first consider the origins of the Jungian critique in Harold Rosenberg and others’
reviews of Abstract Expressionism and how these are rooted in Jungian principles. Next, we
will analyze the images Pollock gave to Henderson and note the references to American
Indian arts within them, and finally, we will look at more recent theories stemming from the
Jungian critique which equate American Indian motifs with ideas about shamanism.
Unlike Greenberg, Rosenberg acknowledged the issue of performativity in Pollock’s
work. He coined the descriptive term “action-painting” to emphasize the motional or gestural
quality of Pollock’s making. In his essay, American Action Painters, he writes,
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At a certain moment the canvas began to appear to one American painter after
another as an arena in which to act - rather than as a space in which to
reproduce, redesign, analyze or ‘express’ an object, actual or imagined. What
was to go on the canvas was not a picture but an event. The painter no longer
approached his easel with an image in his mind; he went up to it with material
in his hand to do something to that other piece of material in front of him. The
image would be the result of this encounter. (Rosenberg, “American” 581)
For Rosenberg, the Action Painters, (Pollock and DeKooning, for instance) were expressing
something deeply personal and subjective, a type of allegorizing of personal experience.
They were painting the actions of their subjective experience, responding to pure instinct and
automatism wherein the artist was “pouring” out an “essence” of himself in the painting
(581). Further, Rosenberg explains that, “A painting that is an act is inseparable from the
biography of the artist. The painting itself is a ‘moment’ in the adulterated mixture of his life
– whether ‘moment’ means the actual minutes taken up with spotting the canvas or the entire
duration of a lucid drama” (582). Art was no longer objective. “The new painting has broken
down every distinction between art and life” (581). For Rosenberg, art now was an act that
translated and transcended the psychological experience. Rosenberg’s issue of self and
personal experience constitutes the basis for the psychoanalytic-Jungian approach to
Pollock’s work.
Rosenberg claims that action painting, and more specifically Pollock’s drip paintings,
are based on a process of self-discovery and self-creation. Pollock’s abstract drip paintings
are summarized as the spontaneous and purgative expressions of the modern existential man.
As Rosenberg explains “the act-painting is of the same metaphysical substance as the artist’s
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existence” (583). Even in the view of modern abstraction, Pollock’s work is seen to the result
of a tortured artist aiming to express the avant-garde’s profound desire to transcend the
particulars of history and search out universal values (Rushing, “Ritual” 292). As Michael
Leja observes, overall Rosenberg’s critique describes the Surrealist technique of automatic
writing or painting from the unconscious. Rosenberg posed himself as a “new, mystificating
theorist and defender of modernist abstraction’s origin and involvement in the individual
soul, spirituality, and interiority” (Leja 36). This connection between Surrealism and
Rosenberg’s critique of the canvas as now being a place for the “artist to act” is not
accidental. Rosenberg’s involvement with Surrealism was profound. He contributed regularly
to the View, the Surrealist magazine which was founded by Parker Tyler and Charles Henri
Ford in 1940 (36). The View printed Rosenberg’s Surrealist poetry as well as a dialogue
between Rosenberg and André Breton in 1942. Rosenberg also created a series of answers to
a Surrealist survey. Rosenberg’s Surrealist review of Pollock put the issue of subject and the
constitution of the subject through art firmly in the oeuvre of American political criticism.
Art is political, and the subject is composed through art.
To begin with, one of the central issues in the Jungian critique is the issue of the
subject. While the abstract modern critique, with its ties to epistemic nationalism that
embraced modernism as an antidote to socialism, focuses on the forms of art, Rosenberg’s
critique argued that European modernism was surpassed through the American subjective
experience and that art criticism now required a response something akin to “psychoanalysis”
(Kramer 12). This very idea that Pollock’s drip paintings, and for that matter his entire
oeuvre serves as some type of medium for the development of the human psyche comes to us
through Sigmund Freud’s theories on art, and that of his successors (Jacques Lacan, Carl
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Jung, and others) who speak on the unconscious. First, Freud’s theories consist of defining
the unconscious mind and second, he proposes methods for accessing it. The unconscious is
that part of the mind which constitutes processes such as thought, impulses, memories,
motivations, and the imagination. These processes may not be accessible to objective
introspection but form the substrate upon which human conscious thought depends. As Freud
writes, “Properly speaking, the unconscious is the real psychic; its inner nature is just as
unknown to us as the reality of the external world, and it is just as imperfectly reported to us
through the data of consciousness as is the external world through the indications of our
sensory organs” (Freud 121). Demystifying the unconscious through the analysis of dreams
and art is, according to Freud (and Jung), vital for understanding the unconscious and
conscious mind.
We think of the era as one in which nationalism prevailed and for which a modernist
aesthetic, without references to the working classes or the indigenous, was most suited. But
other emerging theories were coming into play, notably here, the psychoanalytic critique and
its emphasis on individuality. For Freud, and Jung, imagery from art or dreams provides the
images that can reveal to us the unconscious mind or more specifically the relationships
between human nature and thought. Through the interpretation of dreams or art the
mysterious inner life or substrate of all consciousness, upon which conscious thought
depends, is available to us. As Freud explains in The Interpretation of Dreams, the arts are
primary modes for expressing the unconscious and its constancy over time. 23 To understand
the unconscious, we need to access it through dreams and art. There is a certain visual
language which reveals to us the nature of the unconscious. But the visual field needs to be
translated into verbal language in order for us to understand it. Art is a window into our souls
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or natures, serving as an illustration of the inner substrate of conscious and unconscious
thought. Psychoanalysis is needed in order to access the meaning of the images, whether they
appear in art or dreams. As W. J. T. Mitchell explains, “psychoanalysis is a science of the
laws of expression that govern the interpretation of the mute image. Whether that image is
projected in dreams or in the scenes of everyday life, analysis provides the method for
extracting the hidden verbal message from the misleading and inarticulate pictorial surface”
(Mitchell 1108). No matter the source, visual imagery must be decoded, or translated into
words that we can understand and talk about. Translating or analyzing the visual field is a
means by which the messages of the unconscious can be viewed through the conscious mind,
the center of verbal language and thought.
Freud’s ideas are expanded upon by the Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung, who describes
the unconscious in terms of the individual and the collective. The collective unconscious is
the universal unconscious which is shared by all species. It is also the repository of universal
images or rather symbols and mythologies which are shared and understood by all humans.
Jung explains that archetypes are iconic images that represent “typical situations of great and
vital importance, which have repeated themselves in the course of history innumerable
times” (qtd. Lu 21). These ancient symbols and myths, passed from one generation to the
next, constitute archetypes that form the foundation of all conscious thought, shared by all
individuals, present and past. As Jung further explains, symbols and myths reside in the
unconscious of all individuals and form the basis of their cultural traditions in diverse and
creative ways. Accessing the history or evolution of each culture yields a record of the
human psyche. 24 The arts of primitive man are, in Jungian thought, as relevant to art and
thought today as in times past, for they reveal what it is to be human. In Jung, this notion that
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art is a means to access the unconscious is a fully developed theory. Art is not only revelatory
of consciousness, but all art, whether in the individual or as understood in bygone or
‘primitive’ cultures, is scientifically relevant. From this idea of the collective conscious and
its expression in archetype imagery found in art, Pollock’s drip paintings, and for that matter
his entire oeuvre serves, in the psychoanalytic critique, as some type of medium from which
the developing human psyche is made known to us. Pollock’s symbols and subjects are
interpreted as signs of the consciousness of an eternal past and present.
Rosenberg removed Pollock from the epistemic discourse of modernism and its
grounding in Cubism, transcending modernism by evoking the notion of individuality and
subjectivity, claiming it to be “some exalted realm of existential ‘action’ wherein the human
psyche is not questioned, only represented” (Kramer 12). He explains that, “guided by visual
and somatic memories of paintings he had seen or made – memories which he did his best to
keep from intruding into his consciousness – he gesticulated upon the canvas and watched for
what each novelty would declare him and his art to be” (Rosenberg, “American” 583). Rather
than pure form, the psychoanalytic model views Pollock’s works as being spontaneous
expressions of his unconscious mind.
Rosenberg was not alone in his evocation of experience over thought. Over a decade
before Rosenberg’s essay, Greenberg cited experience, and particularly the irreducible
elements of experience, as being the second development in the avant-garde’s progression
(with the departure from ideals as being the first). He explains that in departing from
expressing ideals, each art discipline expands “the expressive resources of the medium in
order to express with greater immediacy sensations” (“Avant-Garde” 556). Communicating
sensation can only be perceived through the “sense through which [the sensation] entered the
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consciousness” (557). While Rosenberg emphasizes artistic subjectivity and experience, the
sensible and perceptible qualities of art are key elements for both critiques.
Other critics found Surrealist elements in Pollock’s work. Robert M. Coates wrote
that Pollock’s style was “a curious mixture of the abstract and the symbolic” being “almost
wholly individual” and based on the influence of Picasso (Coates 97-98). Another author
compared Pollock’s work to Surrealist automatic writing, saying “Pollock still uses an
automatic technique, pushing totemic and metaphorical shapes into swirling webs of
pigment” (Anon., “Reviews” 55). Perhaps the Surrealist critique was most succinctly written
by an anonymous critic who wrote,
Chaos.
Absolute lack of harmony
Complete lack of structural organization.
Total absence of technique, however rudimentary.
Once again, chaos.
But these are superficial impressions, first impressions…Each one of his
pictures is part of himself. But, what kind of man is he? What is his inner
world worth? Is it worth knowing, or is it totally undistinguished? Damn it, if
I must judge a painting by the artist it is no longer the painting that I am
interested in… ( Anon., “Chaos” 70)
While confused about how to interpret the work, the critic admits to the links between the
subjective experience, self-creation, and art. Like Rosenberg, each critic drawing upon
Surrealist tendencies emphasizes some element inherent in the psychoanalytic view such as
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symbolic elements, intense emotion, the inner (unconscious) world, automatic writing, and
the individualism. Rosenberg and other likeminded critics saw Pollock’s work through a
particular episteme that makes up the flip side of the modernist theoretical coin.
While some critics saw archetypal and unconscious elements in Pollock’s work, this
critique reached a fuller theoretical ground much later than did the critique of abstract
modernism. In fact, this critical view gained followers after Pollock’s death. Shortly after
Pollock’s untimely and tragic death theorists such as William Rubin, W. Jackson Rushing,
and Stephen Polcari and others began to look at Pollock’s work with a new criticism based
on the formative elements from Pollock’s early childhood. Being the youngest of five sons,
Pollock is said to have been born within a dysfunctional family with an overbearing mother
and a disinterested father. 25 Between 1934 and 1937, after having studied at the Art Students
League, Pollock suffered from some type of emotional or psychological situation and began
drinking heavily. In 1939 he began treatment with Dr. Joseph Henderson, a Jungian
psychoanalyst in New York City. Henderson wrote that Pollock was not particularly
responsive to analysis, but he was highly engaged and enthusiastic when discussing art.
Henderson requested that Pollock bring his drawings in for them to discuss during his
therapy sessions. Henderson would critique Pollock’s drawings according to Jungian
archetypes and principles. As Henderson reflected,
I wonder why I neglected to find out, study or analyze his personal problems
in the first year of his work… I wonder why I did not seem to try to cure his
alcoholism…I have decided that it is because his unconscious drawings
brought me strongly into a state of counter-transference to the symbolic
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material he produced. Thus I was compelled to follow the movement of his
symbolism as inevitably as he was motivated to produce it. (qtd. Wysuth 14)
According to Henderson, Pollock was diagnosed as schizophrenic with periods of “violent
agitation” wherein he could produce no clear imagery. He also suffered from periods of
withdrawal and isolation. Henderson used his expertise in Jungian analysis to critique
Pollock’s work evidencing unconscious imagery related to such things as sacrifice, psychic
energy, figurative archetypes, composite animals and birds, and embryonic forms.
Henderson’s notes, along with the observations of Surrealist critics, contributed to a broader
Jungian report on Pollock’s work and psychological state of mind. His childhood struggles
with peers and his later battle with alcoholism have been carefully scrutinized, such that
Pollock’s artwork has more recently come to be described as a type of ritual healing wherein
his tortured unconscious self found solace in art.
In an unpublished lecture, “Jackson Pollock: A Psychological Commentary” (1968)
Henderson explained the purpose of Pollock’s drawings and his progress as a patient.
Henderson admits that much of their communication was about Pollock’s art. 26 Accordingly
Pollock’s ‘inability’ to express himself appears to have been arrested when he discussed art.
Henderson’s account suggests that Pollock saw these sessions as a type of research, a type of
one on one investigation into unconscious archetypes and their manifestation in art, dreams,
religious imagery and myths, a consistent art dialogue with a Jungian representative. Had
Henderson described Pollock as opening up his innermost feelings about his mother and
father, or his early childhood experiences, we might consider these sessions as deeply
moving psychological excavations. But with careful reading, we see in Henderson’s
statement that Pollock attended his weekly sessions as faithfully as he attended Benton’s art
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classes. He not only attended, but brought in his finished homework, drawings and sketches
that he had made, mostly beforehand, for review and discussion. Further, according to
Henderson, Pollock did not practice free association based on his own drawings and was
‘intolerant’ of any ‘real objectivity’ toward them. When Henderson suggests that, “I had to
be content with saying only what he could assimilate at any given time, and that was not
much”, we see that Pollock was learning Jungian thought, but only in terms of his own works
of art, and only to the degree that Pollock felt Henderson’s commentary applied to them.
This fact is further underscored by Henderson’s report that, “Most of my comments centered
around the nature of the archetypal symbolism in his drawings, I never could get onto a more
personal level with him, until after he stopped bringing the drawings.” Clearly Pollock’s
interest in discussing art was all encompassing, enough to fill the time spent in weekly
sessions between early January or early 1938 until September, 1940 when Henderson moved
out of New York and referred Pollock to see the analyst Dr. Violet Staub de Laszlo.
Henderson’s original diagnosis was that Pollock suffered from schizophrenia. As to
Henderson’s diagnosis of Pollock’s mental condition, what we can know from letters written
by Pollock and his family members indicate that Pollock suffered from alcoholism, and
possibly a mood or mental disorder or imbalance. Once Pollock started to see the Dr. Staub
de Laszlo, he was treated for alcoholism, not schizophrenia. Whether Pollock suffered from
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression, or any number of conditions related or unrelated
to his upbringing and early childhood experiences is beyond the reach of any researcher. But
what is at stake in the psychoanalytic critique is the degree to which Pollock’s health
determined his artwork, and to what degree his artwork reflects his health and wellbeing at
any given time during the timeline of his creative output. The entwining of Pollock’s work
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and his mental health is part of the myth that makes it necessary for us to seek a more
objective way to analyze his work.
Henderson’s monograph Jackson Pollock: Psychoanalytic Drawings, 1970 was
written to demonstrate a theoretical association between Pollock’s drawings and his
psychological state. The title is misleading as it emphasizes not art but psychoanalytic
processes (Wysuth 42). Along this vein, Henderson described Pollock’s drawings as though
they had been constructed along a progression towards healing, even though the drawings
were undated and there is no clue as to their actual chronology. The timeline of the drawings
is entirely unclear. Further Pollock did not make the drawings in Henderson’s office nor
were they created for psychoanalytic purposes. Nevertheless, in his lecture, Henderson
organized Pollock’s drawings along thematic lines, beginning with images of violent
agitation, slides showing paralysis or withdrawal of vital energy, and finally works indicating
(according to Henderson’s interpretation) a pathological form of introversion (Wysuth 4243). Along these lines, Henderson used the drawings and sketches to show progress in his
patient, Pollock. In a lecture based on his book, Henderson explains, “Following a prolonged
period of representing human figures and animals in an anguished, dismembered or lamed
condition, there came a new development in the drawings Pollock made during therapy” (qtd.
Friedman, “Energy” 42). Henderson pointed out symbolic elements that demonstrated
Pollock’s improvement in assimilating a symbolic repertoire that evoked the workings of his
unconscious mind. For example, Henderson’s interpretation reveals Jungian themes on
unresolved familial tensions. He described one image as having, “Those pathetic upper limbs
reaching upward toward an unfeeling purely schematic female torso must denote a problem
left unsolved and perhaps insoluble, a frustrated longing for the all-giving Mother” (qtd.
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Wysuth 42-3). As a Jungian, Henderson sought to interpret art along various Jungian topics
including mother-father archetypes. Henderson’s point of view predisposed him to seek for
and find signs and to order these within a theory of self-disclosure and healing. Hence the
cross, circle, square, mandala, axis mundi, and other symbols suggested integration between
Pollock’s particular mental condition and more universal vibrations. Opposing elements in
Pollock’s work were seen to be increasingly unified in harmonious articulations of the
archetypal dominations of circle and square, even though no direct ordering of such symbols
exists in the overview of the undated drawings (qtd. Wysuth 43). Henderson’s psychoanalytic
view, in opposition to Greenbergian notions of non-representational form, has contributed to
the theory that Pollock’s unconscious mind is an entwined and inseparable, irreducible
component of his drip paintings. Being a component of the unconscious, Pollock and his
artwork are then mythic, as mysterious as the unconscious mind itself.
But careful scrutiny of what we can know helps us to disentangle the myth from the
man. For example, different biographers have suggested that Pollock was not particularly
well read and that he spent a lot of time brooding. But contrary to these and Henderson’s
findings, evidences to the contrary suggest that Pollock was eager to discuss art and other
topics with friends, critics, and family members. He was particularly passionate in his art
discussions, suggesting that Pollock had a clear point of view from which he argued. Other
accounts confirm that Pollock was avidly involved in sharing his passion for art with his
friends and colleagues. For example, one of Pollock’s friends, Harry Jackson, reports on an
evening with Pollock at height of Pollock’s career. Jackson notes that,
It’s a lot of crap about Jack not talking much; he talked ….. one long night,
drinking beer in the kitchen. Jack brought out Cahiers d’art and analyzed
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Tintoretto in great detail, explain the composition of this and that; what he
was doing was bringing me pure Tom Benton: Venetian Renaissance to Tom
Benton, Tom to Jack, Jack to Harry. He talked especially about composition
that night, and Lee Krasner came down several times to say, ‘Jackson, come
to bed – you’re going to be so tired and you’ve got this and that to do.’ But we
went on until dawn, with Jack describing Tintoretto and weaving a spell: “See,
it goes back over there, and then over here, and it never goes off the canvas.
(Adams, “Tom” 309-310)
Pollock had many friends and supporters that he associated and talked about art with: Lee
Krasner, Willem de Kooning, Ashile Gorky, David Smith, Reuben Kadish, Benton, and Axel
Horn are just a few that biographers mention. It seems clear from varied sources that Pollock
discussed art passionately and frequently with artists and non-artists both. Henderson claims
that Helen Marot, another of Pollock’s friends, called to report on her association with
Pollock. She reported to Henderson that, “I saw Jackson Pollock last night and he talked for
hours in a stormy but fascinating way about himself and his painting. I don’t know but it
seems to me we may have a genius on our hands” (qtd. Wysuth 43). Whether at the Cedar
Tavern associating with other artists or with Benton or his family members, Pollock was
eager to talk about art. From Henderson’s account, his discussions about art accounted for the
bulk of his therapy sessions with Pollock, suggesting that Pollock was an avid talker,
depending on his audience and the topic at hand.
We can conclude that Henderson’s assessment (and especially his lectures and book),
though highly influential in fashioning Pollock into a mythic archetype, was based on his
own paradigmatic experience, a subset of the larger evolving 1970s consciousness toward
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individuality within a new social and collectivist paradigm. This trend for psychoanalysis
was manifest in the various societies for Jungian thought in New York, such as the Analytical
Psychology Club of New York, which was founded in 1936, and the Medical Society for
Analytical Psychology - Eastern Division which was established in 1946. Henderson
contributed to the Jungian episteme by taking his part in the highly influential New York
Jungian Analytical psychology community, and by perpetuating its precepts in his writings,
and particularly in his lectures on Jackson Pollock and his drawings. As such he contributed
his part to the episteme that attributed to Surrealism the artistic manifestation of Jungian
thought and existential views on selfhood. Further, we know that at least three close personal
associates or family members thought answers could be found in Jungian theories and each
(his brother Sande, and his friends Helen Marot and the artist John Graham) urged Pollock in
his pursuits of Jungian thought. This is not to say Pollock sought healing or even felt he
needed healing. Nor is it to adamantly describe Pollock as Jungian. But rather this is to say
that it is clear that Pollock spent over a year discussing art in private sessions with a Jungian
professional. But what drove Pollock to seek counseling was not his artwork but his
alcoholism, which Henderson failed to treat.
The psychoanalytic view also suggests that Pollock’s work rests upon a relation
between art and psychotherapeutic art analysis and gives Henderson much credit for directing
Pollock’s work along Jungian theoretical tenets. In his review of Pollock’s drawings, Wysuth
explains, “Indeed the causes of Pollock’s response to Surrealism and psychic automatism are
to be found in the nature and effect of his mental crisis of 1938-1940, and particularly in
Henderson’s emphasis on the psychological relevance of visual symbols” (Wysuth 44-45).
The psychoanalytic interpretation contributes to a host of Surrealist critiques of Pollock’s
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work that misses the finer details of Pollock’s work. Viewing Pollock within a mythology of
complicated influences between unconscious art influences, impulses, family tensions, and
artistic choices, the psychoanalytic critique, like the abstract modernist review is epistemic or
historically contingent. But outside of either critique, we can conclude that Pollock was an
avid researcher, an investigator into Native American arts and symbolism that informed his
inquiry into the authenticity of art. Rather than a passive vehicle absorbing all the emotional
and aesthetic influences around him, we must see Pollock as actively and intentionally
networking, and consciously making choices in his own life and art. The result of analyzing
the psychoanalytic and the abstract modern critique is that we see art criticism as
paradigmatic and historically contingent, ignoring or deemphasizing key elements that
caused each to miss the significance of the indigenous elements in Pollock’s work.
We have already reviewed the abstract modern narrative that defines the stages of
Pollock’s work and ultimately leads to a descriptive conclusion about abstract form in
Pollock’s drip paintings. Proposing a contrasting timeline, Francis O’Connor establishes a
fundamental approach to the stages of Pollock’s work that credits Henderson with Pollock’s
radically changing approach to art. For O’Connor, the phases of Pollock’s work coincide
with the times and events of his hospitalization, or treatment for alcoholism. The first phase
of Pollock’s work encompasses the time from Pollock’s studies at the Art Students League
until his mental crisis and subsequent hospitalization in 1939. The second phase O’Connor
proposes begins with Pollock’s first one-man show at Peggy Guggenheim’s Art of This
Century Gallery, 1943 and encompasses works believed to be inspired by Benton, Diego
Rivera, Albert Pinkham Ryder, Surrealism, and psychic automatism. Wysuth adds to this
timeline and even stresses that within this phase, Henderson was a key influence in Pollock’s
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work and helped to establish the trajectory Pollock’s work would take in subsequent years.
Wysuth suggested that in working with Henderson, “Pollock became keenly aware of the
psychological relevance of visual symbols and was forced to adopt a new aesthetic
vocabulary with which to articulate a new need” (Wysuth 12). O’Connor credits Henderson
with guiding and teaching Pollock Jungian aesthetics. O’Connor emphatically states that,
“The radical change in Pollock’s art at this time… reflecting as it does the influences of
Surrealism and psychic automatism – must be seen in conjunction with the fact that in about
1940-1 Pollock was undergoing Jungian analysis. His whole personality was undergoing a
radical change” (qtd. Wysuth 19). Wysuth and O’Connor agree that in this stage, Pollock’s
work has affinities with Surrealism but Pollock departed from such to formulate his own
unique style which they claim is based on Jungian psychology, influenced by Surrealist
automatism, and inspired by social activism of Benton and the Mexican muralists from which
Pollock confronted his own need to express an inner reality in the last phase of his work.
Thus, according to this psychotherapeutic frame, Pollock used Surrealist automatism to form
a deliberate and new vocabulary for expressing the unconscious.
The final stage in Pollock’s art, according to O’Connor’s review, was the period of
Pollock’s drip paintings, from 1947 until his death. This stage, according to the Jungian
critique, was marked by fundamental changes to Pollock’s earlier style and approach. This
phase, like that proposed by Adams, is marked by an all-over drawing, with deep compacted
compositions that fit within specified borders or even the edges of the canvas. For both
timelines, automatic drawing is used to elicit unconscious imagery, and imagery is obscured
or veiled until it is at last non-existent. Although Adams and others now demonstrate that
imagery was not entirely abandoned but rather is more expertly covered over as a “presence
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of obscure images lurking in shallow webs of over-painting” (Wysuth 19-20). This fact of
Pollock’s figurative work is not new, however, for William Rubi, writing in 1959 and later,
acknowledges Pollock’s continued inclusion of figuration. He says, “As we study these key
transitional works [Shimmering Substance, Eyes in the Heat] we become aware that
fragments of Pollock’s earlier totemic presences are covered by the rhythmical linear patterns
of white paint… these presences have not been wholly “painted out” but lurk mysteriously in
the interstices of the white lines” (Rubin, 15) (Fig. 26). Careful scrutiny of these paintings,
particularly Eyes in the Heat, reveal faces which are both concealed and revealed within
undulating lines of paint in pulsing colors that recede and advance.
But in O’Connor’s timeline, rather than being the pinnacle of Pollock’s oeuvre, his
drip paintings are interpreted as symptomatic automatic drawings that digress from true art.
As O’Connor explains, this type of drawing is interpreted as being consistent with the ways
in which schizophrenics draw, and “proves” what Henderson and subsequently Wysuth, and
others contend: that Pollock’s work is primarily a window into his mental health (Wysuth
10). This pursuit of reasoning, that connects art and sickness, forms the foundational outline
of Pollock’s work which has been followed in diverse degrees by Ellen Landau, Leonhard
Emmerling, Stephen Polcari, Sue Taylor, and others with some variations which explain
Pollock’s work in terms of revealing or searching for the unconscious, or in terms of healing
from the position of the ill and ill-minded.
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Figure 26 Jackson Pollock, Eyes in the Heat, 1946, Oil and enamel on canvas, 54 x 43 inches, The Solomon R. Guggenheim
Foundation Peggy Guggenheim Collection, Venice, 1976

The French exhibit Jackson Pollock et le Chamanisme 2008 was designed to
highlight this view. Polcari, in the catalogue accompanying the exhibit, claims that Pollock’s
end phase works, his drip paintings, were the result of a shamanic healing ritual in which
Pollock sought to heal his wounded self through art (Polcari, “Chamanisme” 6). Polcari also
claims that Pollock departed from his inauspicious and humble beginning as a student of
Benton and devotee of the Mexican muralists. Polcari writes that, “These artists were antiModern and Pollock seemed to have little with which to grow. But from these modest
beginnings, the future of American art flowered” (6). Polcari suggests that Pollock’s work
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took a more radical departure from his tutor Benton, and in seeking Jungian archetypes,
Pollock’s work became intertwined with key principles of shamanic ritual practice. Polari
outlines specific themes found in shamanic ritual practice, such as sacrifice and death,
fusions of human and animal and male and female, germination and birth, and pictographic
imagery that confirm shamanic elements. Polcari perpetuates the mythologies of Pollock,
such as how alcoholism and strained mental health led him into a ritual shamanic practice.
Under the theme ‘sacrifice and death’ Polcari suggests that “Shamanism is a form of
religious ecstasy in which the participant undergoes ritual alteration of his identity. The
growth of his alcoholism, the approach of war, the years of psychotherapy with the and the
rise of interest in American Indian art and culture fueled a turn toward a concept that
promised to heal him and society” (22). Polcari explains that “Transformation is not a just
question of subjects. Pollock sought to develop a style that would directly convey if not
reenact shaman ecstasy” and that “in shamanism, all does dance and celebrate its ecstatic
power” (22). Outlining various beliefs of transformational shamanism, he draws upon
psychoanalytic mythologies to connect Pollock’s work ritual sacrifice, loss of self-identity,
merging identities within specified nature, and the transformation of self through dance. Most
importantly however, is the fact that Polcari concludes the exhibit catalogue with a statement
on Pollock’s mental health, reinforcing the myth of art and man, beauty and unconscious
drives and forces. He writes, “Before he drove himself off the road, Pollock’s last art
recapitulates his constant subjects and images, indicating that he never gave them up even if
they disappeared for a while under linear webs. Pollock’s late work redoes his earlier work
and search, suggesting that it was never completed” (22). Thus, through stressing shamanism
Polcari also (inadvertently) reinforces our understanding that Pollock remained committed to
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figuration, recuperating the spirit of the American Indian through mimêsis. The Paris
exhibition featured key artworks that were carefully chosen to be juxtaposed with indigenous
masks and carved weapons and amulets to stress these relationships. In the way that
MoMA’s retrospective was a spin in favor of the modernist abstract view, the Paris exhibit
intended to frame the Jungian interpretation of Pollock’s work. No two exhibits could be
more different. In light of both views, Pollock remains a mythic enigma.
No doubt Polcari drew upon a discourse which began shortly after Pollock’s death
wherein Pollock was compared to the shaman. First, the anthropologist Mircea Eliade’s 1959
text, The Sacred and the Profane, described the sacred space as the place where the
transcendent comes together with the everyday, with ritual acts wherein the shaman enters an
ecstatic state. Further, when Namuth first released his photographs of Pollock painting, the
Abstract Expressionist Robert Goodnough described Pollock’s studio as a ‘sacred space’
(qtd. Raverty 343). Robertson furthered the connection between sacred and profane when he
wrote that,
Pollock was conscious of this [Indian] iconography… but he was even more
influenced by the practice of Indian sand painting. This form of art is part of a
ritual. Its conception is opposed to the modern European idea of art as a
separate activity for its own sake, with no magical properties and with no part
to play in ritual. The act of painting itself had become for Pollock a semireligious activity. Everything he felt and experienced was unleashed into it….
The search was ended, the great gesture was made, and the exorcism was
complete. The effort killed him. (qtd. Raverty 343)
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Overall, the description seems to fit not only with Pollock’s last paintings and death, but also
with Jungian notions of universal archetypes and rituals, and the larger Freudian and
psychoanalytic concerns with the unconscious and the construction of the psyche.
Goodnough’s description tends to continue to perpetuate the myth of Pollock more than it
reveals a formal understanding of his work and his commitment to indigenous iconography
and aesthetics. More importantly, in Goodnough’s analysis, the overarching theme of
American Indian arts competes with psychoanalytic sentiments and this point reminds us that
both the psychoanalytic critique with its emphasis on subjectivity and the modernist critique
with its emphasis on nationalism answer to prevailing epistemes more than excavate a clear
picture of Pollock’s work. Both critiques appropriate Pollock’s work for the purposes of
distinct socio-political agendas. Both critiques acknowledge the presence of the influence of
indigenous art, but neither critique can answer to that presence. We are at an impasse with
the polemical-modernist critique of Pollock. We need to find an objective theory that focuses
on the importance of these American Indian art elements and connects this theory to the
larger problems of philosophy and aesthetics.

Epistemic Art Criticism

The central issue in the scholarship on Pollock is the divide between two politically
entrenched critiques, the modernist claim for non-representational form and the
psychoanalytical interpretation that focuses on subjective content which is generally
reviewed within a Surrealist critique with its myriad reflections on Pollock’s mental states of
mind, a search for the unconsciousness, and correspondences to Jungian archetypes,
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figuration, and more recently, Pollock as shaman. However, a careful review of Pollock’s
work reveals a lifelong commitment to figuration related to indigenous content from his
earliest drawings to his final drip paintings. While a large body of art criticism on Pollock
adheres to the Surrealist, Jungian, and more psychoanalytic approaches, these (like the
modernist view) tend to overlook these indigenous elements in Pollock’s work. The critical
review of Pollock’s work is thus divided along two primary diverging lines of critique: a
modernist review and a hybrid Jungian review. Both views are perpetuated in current
scholarship and art exhibitions, even though the critique overall is based upon a polemicalmodernist episteme, divided between formal properties and psychoanalytic content that fail
to see Pollock’s art in the light of his indigenous influences.
Rosenberg’s outlook was no less political than Greenberg’s. In 1940 Rosenberg wrote
an essay on the decline or fall of modern art in Paris. He wrote, “At the stroke of the Hitler
gong, the last tremors in art, literature, science, politics, cease as if at a signal”. Rosenberg
considered America to be the only safe harbor for the expression of free artistic-speech.
Rosenberg said that the fall of Parisian art hegemony gave way to American dominance as
the world’s “vanguard culture” (Rosenberg, “Fall” 541). Like Greenberg, Rosenberg was
certain that American art was rising to preeminence. Rosenberg envisioned a purely
American aesthetical moment apart from Parisian influences and intrusions. But in the
critique of Abstract Expressionism and Pollock’s work, while Greenberg focused on the issue
of paint on canvas, Rosenberg concentrated on the gesture of painting itself. For Rosenberg,
the moment of painting, the action, the emotion, the gesture in its immediacy was this pure
American moment.
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Critics in the 1940s were concerned that American painters were losing sight of the
subject as abstract modernism began to overshadow the achievements of Regionalism.
Without subject or figuration, American modernism was at risk of becoming mere
“wallpaper”. As Rosenberg articulated, having left the easel, mural paintings that exclude the
spectator become “a wall decoration” (Rosenberg, “American” 581). Kramer explains that,
decoration — “wallpaper,” as Rosenberg derisively characterized it — was an issue that was
deeply troubling to virtually all of the painters of the New York School (Kramer 12). This
preoccupation with subject and its loss, particularly in light of the larger dialogue with
European modernism, was at the heart of the divided critique and of the American modernist
movement. Robert Motherwell also articulated this preoccupation, saying that “Every
intelligent painter carries the whole culture of modern painting in his head. It is his real
subject, of which anything he paints is both an homage and a critique, and everything he says
a gloss” (qtd. Kramer 12). Pollock was equally aware of this competition to create a
significant version of American Modernism. In Answers to a Questionnaire, Pollock’s
statement on art, Pollock said that he felt “the problems of modern painting [could] be solved
as well here as elsewhere” (Pollock, “Answers” 560). This competitive avant-garde agenda
triggered multiple American variations on the notions of art over life, art-for-art’s sake, and
significant form. This ever-present burden to surpass European modernism was felt to have
been accomplished by Rosenberg’s notion of action painting, which confirmed and
articulated the subject of the self. We recall Rosenberg’s claim that “the canvas began to
appear… as an arena in which to act – rather than as a space in which to reproduce”.
(Rosenberg, “American” 581) Formal concerns such as composition, color, and
draftsmanship were replaced with a fundamental expression of an event. The canvas was now
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“an arena” for action rather than a space for form. But Rosenberg’s critique did not
successfully reposition Pollock’s work from the critique of pure form. Rather, Rosenberg’s
critique posed a division in the interpretation of Pollock’s work.
This divided critique adheres to a larger separation which encompasses a divisive,
polemical-modern-episteme. Knowing this larger polemic helps us to situate Pollock’s work
within a new theory of the indigenous elements, even the Indian-episteme within American
Modernism. In order to more clearly see through the myth of Pollock, and to emphasize the
polemic within the discourse of modernism, let us return to Kramer’s review of MoMA’s
retrospective exhibit. For Kramer’s criticism is twofold. First, he is concerned that
Rosenberg’s critique is self-serving. Secondly, he criticizes the curators Varnedoe and
Karmel for promoting a mythic view of Pollock, rather than showing exclusively that Pollock
was inherently always abstract. First, in his criticism of Rosenberg, Kramer considered the
very idea of action to be “sheer nonsense”. He explains that Rosenberg’s critique was
intended to promote his own socialist and Surrealist agenda under the guise of art criticism. 27
Kramer recognizes Rosenberg’s views as Surrealist and acknowledges that the abstract
modernists inadvertently conflate Rosenberg’s notion of action along with its inherent ties to
Surrealism, with non-representational form.
Kramer’s second concern regards Rosenberg himself. For, according to Kramer,
Rosenberg capitalized on Pollock’s notoriety, particularly after Pollock’s painting methods
were emphasized in Namuth’s film. Rosenberg, who was known to have despised Pollock
and his work, “shamelessly exploited Pollock’s notoriety without according him appropriate
recognition or even mentioning his name. He turned his private mockery of Pollock’s
painting into a bogus manifesto for the entire Abstract Expressionist movement” (12). This
137

mythology, as Kramer sees it, has continued to inform the review of Pollock, and was overtly
present in MoMA’s retrospective, and this was Kramer’s primary concern with Karmel’s
account of Pollock’s work. For in Karmel’s essay, he focuses on the act of painting and
references Namuth’s photographs of Pollock at work. Thus Kramer is concerned that Karmel
perpetuates the myth of action painting even while promoting the notion of nonrepresentational form, combining and merging both sides of the modernist theoretical critique
(Modernist and Jungian) into one nicely contained explanation of Pollock’s work as being a
conflation of both action and pure form. Though not explicit, such action implies a
theoretical challenge to modernist claims for the irreducible flatness of painting upon a
modernist grid. The irony is that Karmel’s essay, rather than establishing a criteria for
understanding Pollock’s methodology for painting as action, merely reiterates the modern
trope. Pollock’s mature works, regardless of how they are dripped and splattered, fail to
achieve high modernist non-representational form, a fact that Varnedoe also substantiates and
promotes in his essay (Varnedoe, Kirk, “Comet” 17). In all his criticism of Varnedoe,
Karmel, and Rosenberg, Kramer demonstrates that it is the modernist (GreenbergianHofmann) view of Pollock that he subscribes to. We might deduce that Kramer’s point of
view, though not explicit in his critique of Rosenberg or Varnedoe, is more concerned that
the idea of action painting and gesture threatens to proscribe an alternative theory to the
modern trajectory of purity in art. The notion of gesture is tantamount to removing the
location of painting from its material structure to the body of the artist.
This is the dilemma at hand. Having two opposing interpretations, both of which have
political undertones and agendas, subsequent theorists (and as we have seen, curators as well)
need to either extend or reconcile the oppositions in art criticism. Just as Varnedoe and
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Karmel inadvertently attempted to unite the modernist and psychoanalytic critiques in the
MoMA retrospective of Pollock’s work, Rosalind Kraus subsumes the psychoanalytical
critique within a claim for formalism in her essay The Optical Unconscious. But Kraus
intentionally mediates between formalism and theories of the subconscious when she
contends that Greenberg and later Fried focus on the formal and optical aspects of modernist
works while neglecting the unconscious source of art. For Kraus, the artist is not a master of
creation as much as he or she is the medium from which unconscious drives and desires are
brought forth. Kraus explains that this merging of Surrealist urges into form was brought
about by artists being “tyrannized and depressed by the psychologizing whine of
‘Existentialist’ criticism”, and thus these unique artists explored the limits of their experience
within the confines of their medium until they reach an autonomy that surpasses even selfreflexivity (“View” 953). Kraus attempts to redeem Pollock and Abstract Expressionism
from a purely abstract Greenbergian (and company) rhetoric by hearkening to Rosenbergian
views on automatism, subjectivity, and artistic presence that she articulates by combining
Surrealist impulses with modern abstract form. Kraus’ conclusions are not far from those laid
out clearly in William C. Seitz’s dissertation in 1946. Seitz claimed that Pollock’s drip
paintings were based on a rectilinear structure where “the irreducible unit of his style, despite
rectilinear structure, was the individual stroke, though its identity was apt to be lost in the
total textural maelstrom and the optical pulsation effected by variegated color” (qtd. Kramer
12 ). 28 Seitz’s early dissertation focused almost entirely on modernist form, which he
conceded was a structure upon which Pollock’s “passion” was poured into non-objective
abstraction. 29
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Ironically, for all his criticism of Rosenberg, Varnedoe, Karmel, and the MoMA
exhibition, Kramer’s arguments, like Kraus’s essay and Seitz’s dissertation, reveal the fissure
in modernism which remains hidden even to modernist criticism. For within the polemicalmodern critique we have both a theory of experience and a theory of form. In the MoMA
show, and Kraus’ reiteration, experience becomes subsumed within form. In Pollock, the
myth of the self with its psychology, unconsciousness, and automatism becomes reconciled
in pure form. The subsequent critique of Pollock, which is most evident in the MoMA
retrospective and Varnedoe’s review, that has formed and been reiterated by Michael Fried,
T.J. Clark, Kramer, and others since Greenberg’s first accolades, has typically been the
articulation of the unification of the mythologized unconscious existential subject through
Surrealist automatism within the autonomous upon an irreducible rectilinear grid. On the
other side, the Jungian view, as developed by Rosenberg, Wysuth, O’Connor, Polcari, and
others claims for Pollock a theory of experience and self-development that, through
archetypes and American Indian imagery, culminates in a ritual of self-healing.
The divided critique of Pollock’s work attests to a larger schism within the modernist
critique, divided between subjective experience and objective form. The divided critique also
witnesses the epistemic nature of art interpretation. As Kraus explains, “we can no longer fail
to notice that if we make up schemas of meaning based on history, we are playing into
systems of control and censure. We are no longer innocent” (“View” 951). While seeking to
be objective, the modernist account of Pollock’s work appropriates it in order to perpetuate
the narrative of modernism, and while coming from a different direction, the psychoanalytic
interpretation does the same thing. Art criticism belongs to its own narratives and epistemic
structures. As Kraus explains, “If the norms of the past serve to measure the present, they
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also serve to construct it” (951). Failing to see the epistemic nature of art criticism, or rather
to say its own historical narrative is to contribute to that narrative. Upholding a narrative of
the past is to make it coercive, or at least epistemic. Abstract and psychoanalytic
interpretations perpetuate the myth of Pollock and his works. Knowing this larger polemic
helps us to resituate Pollock’s work within a new theory, even an Indian-episteme that
accounts for the indigenous elements throughout his work. For Pollock ought to be seen
neither as an abstract modernist nor a Jungian, but as the hinge, nexus, or apex of American
art before it achieved its primary status as quintessentially “American” in all the epistemic
interpretations of what “American” means in any given era.

Conclusion

As we have seen in this chapter, the interpretation of Pollock’s work is bound up
within two competing narratives. Through a close analysis of both the modernist and the
psychoanalytic critiques, a critical relationship between art criticism and prevailing sociopolitical epistemes is revealed. Both interpretations also have essential blind spots that cause
them to perpetuate narratives and mythologies about Pollock and his work that are
intertwined with the pervasive socio-political epistemes of the times. Before Pollock’s death,
and especially afterwards, Pollock’s personality (or alcoholism and illness) was publicized
along a variety of art and popular channels. Life Magazine described him as “brooding”
(Raverty 342). Later Time Magazine called him, “Jack the Dripper,” conflating art with
madness and violence (342). As Raverty explains, “These pop-existential and tragic-romantic
references proliferated after his death, when this aspect of the myth crystallized” (342). For
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example, Brian Robertson wrote that, “As a man, Pollock was taciturn and contemplative by
nature, though he was drawn to violence by fatality and, at last in his death, by its finality”
(qtd. Raverty 342). 30 These allusions to Pollock’s personality and mental states are repeated
ad-nauseam in the many succeeding biographies and histories of Pollock. Like Benton’s
radio broadcasts, popular media helped to fix our notion of Pollock within prevailing
epistemic conditions. Before his death, the myth of Pollock included the notion that,
unpretentiously dressed in blue jeans, Pollock was approachable. His ties to the great
American West, untainted by European manners, furthered the notion that he was just a
regular “one of us” type of guy that anyone could talk to if they encountered him at the Cedar
Tavern. This view, as well as the redundant view of Pollock as the self-tortured iconic artist,
has since been popularized in the popular and critical media. Additionally, the mythic
reputation of Pollock was fueled by many postwar factors that the art and popular media
unwittingly drew upon. One of these factors includes the belief that Pollock was following a
myriad of influences that explain his jump from figurative work to his abstract drip paintings,
a jump that took him from Benton to Masson. In between these two points, historians and
critics site a long list of influences in Pollock’s life that include everyone from Pollock’s high
school art teacher, Benton, the Mexican muralists, the work of David Alfaro Siqueiros,
Picasso, Masson and the Surrealists, Graham and even Krasner, Greenberg, and Hofmann
among others. Another element in the myth is the notion that Pollock was the quintessential
existential (and mentally unstable) romantic hero of postwar angst in search of the
unconscious. But in hindsight, this is a very limited view of a more complex social, political,
and artistic time with its respectively influenced artists.
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The critical review on Pollock’s work, which began during Pollock’s early career and
continued henceforth, largely takes two opposite paths: the view of Pollock’s work as
Abstract Modernism or the Jungian critique along with its hybrid version of shamanic
healing. Both theories agree that Pollock made a drastic shift in style when he began working
on his drip paintings. Unfortunately, neither theory has found a viable explanation for this
shift, though modernists claim he solved the problems of modern art by pursuing nonrepresentational form, while the Jungian critique believes Pollock found the unconscious
through automatist drawing. During Pollock’s time, the rather mixed reviews of Pollock’s
work were largely based on the tenets of abstract modernism, which looks for flattening of
pictorial illusion and space, structure based on the Cubist grid, and abstract and nonrepresentational form, and largely stresses the abstract free forms of his later drip paintings.
Greenberg’s influential writings helped to define this American modernist aesthetic based on
the European values taught by Hofmann and promoted by others. The modernist view
oversimplifies the problem by focusing on purely formal characteristics of the work such as
the attributes of paint, color, and gesture.
On the other hand, the Jungian review mainly draws upon the works that predate his
drip phase, stressing Pollock’s inner experience and search for archetypical symbols and the
content of Pollock’s unconscious mind evidenced by an outpouring of psychological energy
in his mature works. This later review has more fully emphasized a psychoanalytic view of
Pollock’s personality, which view has continued to be stressed in biographies and subsequent
monographs. Rosenberg’s theory of action and the expression of the inner psyche is an
important point in the Jungian review, but in many of these theories such views ultimately
morph into theories of shamanism and self-healing.
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While both critiques have a significant following, the modernist critique continues to
prevail as the mainstream response to Pollock’s work in art history textbooks, major
retrospectives, and theory anthologies. Overall, the review of Pollock focuses on abstract and
symbolic form but largely ignores references to indigenous forms and representational
content. Some theories however merge these opposing views into one in which primitive,
indigenous, Surrealist and Jungian elements are subsumed into an ultimately abstract and
formal end. This divided view amounts to a critical polemic which Kraus and others attempt
to resolve in terms of abstraction in Pollock’s later drip painting with theories of the
unconscious providing clarity for Pollock’s earlier work and the motivation for his later drip
work.
Thus far we have seen that Pollock lived and worked during a time of rapidly
changing political views that embraced notions of nationalism and nascent identity that were
suddenly changed for a self-concept of national hegemony wherein the United States became
the industrial and military superpower of the world. After the great Second World War,
Americans sought to demonstrate to the world that they had taken their rightful place as the
leader of the cultural, military, and economic world. Pollock fit nicely within this world and
its needs. As Raverty writes,
The art of the Abstract Expressionists itself was too complex, too esoteric to
become a shibboleth to represent American superiority in the realm of culture
for a general audience. Only Pollock among them had the combination of
rugged American character, misunderstood tragic genius, and mystical
transcendence around which could be woven a myth that would transform him
into a popular icon. (Raverty 345)
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Being at the apex of the complications of nation building during a turbulent inter-war and
postwar period, Pollock himself became iconic to the times. His work has been viewed from
a variety of perspectives. Highly political art criticism has found in Pollock the virtues of an
apolitical, ahistorical, transcendent modernism based on pure form. Surrealist and later
Jungian critics have also found in Pollock the quintessential and existential modern man,
seeking to express the inner world of the human psyche (Leja 37). But to be clear, the New
York art world was far from homogenous. Mixed together in a sort of melting pot, one could,
during the late 1930s and early 1940s, find an assorted mix of Regionalism and New Deal
murals, abstract modernism, Surrealism, and interests in the calligraphic, the indigenous arts
and Primitivism, as well as Cubism. The artists of Pollock’s generation considered
themselves Intrasubjectives at one point, and Abstract artists at another. If the times
experienced shifting national and cultural identities, so too did the art world. American artists
were experimenting with what it meant to have purely “American art” and so were art critics
and theorists. In fact, at some point even Pollock concluded that,
The idea of an isolated American painting, so popular in this country during
the thirties, seems absurd to me, just as the idea of a purely American
mathematics or physics would seem absurd. And in another sense, the
problem doesn’t exist at all; or, if it did, would solve itself: An American is an
American and his painting would naturally be qualified by the fact, whether
he wills or not. But the basic problems of contemporary painting are
independent of any one country. (qtd., Ross 138)
With all the experimentation of the era, and the swiftly changing notions and identities of art
and politics, it is clear why the review would also be mixed, varied, and polemical. The
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aesthetic indigenous spirit that informed Regionalism and promoted the inclusion of Native
American subjects and forms in art waned before postwar optimism and the cultivation of a
more homogenous national identity. Just as quickly as the national identity abandoned the
notion of the iconic Indian and the Indian-episteme, Regionalism and Realism waned for
Abstract Modernism. Contemporary art criticism also, like art and politics, fell sway to new
evolving ideas and Greenberg, Rosenberg, and other critics of the time analyzed Pollock’s
work within post-war ideologies. These narratives have clouded our understanding of Pollock
and his drip paintings ever since. But the real irony is that the modernists claimed the same
articulation of a truly indigenous style that the Regionalists declared they were constructing.
Greenberg, Schapiro, and others’ writings promoted a universal ahistorical Platonic form,
and Rosenberg claimed existential constitution of the self through art, all within a highly
charged cold war political ideology. The irony is that the very notion of the political is
antithetical to the notion of the universal, for the political is always entrenched within the
here and now. Schapiro, Greenberg and even Rosenberg’s claims for pure form (or pure
gesture) are undermined by their politics.
We have seen that in analyzing the prevailing interpretive theories, to conduct any
serious research on Pollock and his artwork one enters into an entire discourse with its own
epistemic rules, hierarchies of authorities, and construction of its own knowledges. The result
of our analysis on the divided critique of Pollock’s work shows that the theories witnesses to
a larger division in modern art theory. This polemic demonstrates an inadequacy for either
theory to adequately interpret the indigenous elements in Pollock’s work.
Most importantly, both views admit to two issues that inform this study to a large
degree. First, Pollock never fully left figuration, and even made figuration explicit in his last
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works. As Pollock wrote to Alfonso Ossorio and Ted Dragon in 1951, “I’ve had a period of
drawing on canvas in black – with some of my early images coming thru – think the nonobjectivists will find them disturbing – and the kids who think it simple to splash a Pollock
out” (Karmel, “Interviews” 79). Secondly and of equal importance, all authors mention
Pollock’s interest in Native American art, but how this interest served as a driving force and
unity throughout all of Pollock’s work is yet to be explained. The two issues are related.
Pollock’s interest in Native American arts is evidenced by and through the figurative and
representational elements of his works. It is through the concept of mimêsis that we can come
to understand both representation and figuration, and the importance and influence of
American Indian art on Pollock’s artistic output. Our job is to unhook Pollock’s work from
diverse and polemical art criticism (with its attendant ties to changing epistemes) and then
proceed to make sense of his retrieval of mimêsis from the indigenous within a critical view
that neither repudiates representation for pure form nor pure form for mythologies. We need
a more inclusive and unifying explanation that draws upon the actual influences that Pollock
grappled with, incorporated and expressed in his entire artistic life. Just as one cannot neatly
separate one’s life choices from the context in which they were made, we cannot separate
Pollock’s work from everything that influenced his development as an artist and as a human
being. But in the concept of mimêsis we will find a unifying factor that will reveal to us a
new and expanded understanding of Pollock as a complex artist who found a way to reiterate
representational and ritual elements within the painted canvas that are derived from
indigenous American Indian arts.
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Chapter Three
American Primitivism: a Case for Mimêsis

I am representational
all of the time.
Jackson Pollock

Introduction

Thus far we have seen that the American Indian was an important subject for
political, social, and aesthetic reasons during the formative years of Pollock’s childhood and
artistic training. We have also seen that despite the ubiquitous subject and iconology of the
American Indian, art critics overlooked its role in the formative arts of American modernist
painters. Instead, the primary critics of Pollock’s works during his life time, namely
Greenberg and Rosenberg, appropriated Pollock’s works to further their own political
agendas – Greenberg on behalf of a subject-less non-representational form, and Rosenberg in
favor of Surrealist subjectivity. Both critics embroiled Pollock in a contest for supremacy in
the art world just as American politics and culture did so, inhabiting it new role as a global
super-power. The divided theory on Pollock’s work has largely overlooked the highly
representational or mimetic attributes which constitute overt references to American Indian
symbols and subjects, as well as hidden abstract figures, faces, birds, numbers, letters, and
even Pollock’s initials and name that have been recently revealed through x-ray analysis
(Adams, “Tom” 272). Both his early primitivistic and later drip paintings are filled with
representational imagery that directly reference and allegorize American Indian symbolism
148

and mythology, and this indicates that Pollock developed a grammar of representation.
Figuration, representation, and American Indian symbols are so prevalent that it seems
certain any critique of Pollock’s work, and especially his later drip work, must include a view
that takes these mimetic signs into account.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze Pollock’s representational or mimetic
elements, particularly those which are inspired by American Indian art, outside of the lens of
Greenberg’s theory of cubist form, and Rosenberg’s theory for subjectivity. We will look at
European Primitivism and the issues of abstract form and the rejection of traditional mimêsis
in order to illustrate the key differences between European and American Primitivism,
particularly in terms of mimetic representation. First, we will analyze European Primitivism
and identify a division between artistic form and art subjects in modern art to which Pollock
and other American artists were responding. Second, we will consider how Pollock and other
American artists revalidate the art subject (or rather mimêsis or representation) through the
recuperation of the spirit of indigenous American art. Third, this discussion will look at how
Pollock’s artwork constructs and evokes new possibilities of meaning by establishing a
ground for the theoretical role of the representation of indigenous art in terms of mimêsis. We
will find that from these considerations that there is a division or even schism already evident
in the polemical-modernist critique, the divide between Greenbergian formalism and
Rosenberg’s subjectivity. But this analysis will further illustrate how Pollock’s work marks
neither the height of modernist non-representational form nor the depths of anguished
subjectivity, but rather exposes and addresses the schism within modern art by revaluing
mimetic representation.
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European Primitivism

Our first task is to analyze Primitivism in order to demonstrate how Pollock and likeminded artists’ primitivist works differ mimetically (or in terms of significant content) from
those of Picasso. This is a logical place to begin a discussion on Pollock’s representational
qualities because Pollock has been compared extensively to Picasso, and most theorists agree
that Pollock entered into a dialogue with Picasso in both his Surrealist and Cubist phases,
thus concluding Picasso’s work within a new form of expressionism based on a Cubist grid.
Greenberg claims Pollock inherited and developed Picasso’s Cubism and Rosenberg and
others believe Pollock developed Picasso’s later unique surrealist tendencies (“Laocoon”
554-560). But our concern is not with Picasso’s Cubist, Surrealist, or earlier and later
representational tendencies. We are merely concerned with identifying, analyzing, and
providing a theory for the unique and distinctly indigenous and mimetic American elements
in Pollock’s work by addressing the comparisons theorists have made between Pollock and
Picasso. To analyze these indigenous elements, we need to address these elements in terms of
primitivist subject matter and through a discussion on representation or mimêsis. We need to
distance our view from the traditional modernist critique of pure form and irreducibility of
the picture plane, and look earlier to Primitivism for it is in Primitivism that we can best
understand the differing handling and reiteration of indigenous art elements. We will first
look at both Pablo Picasso and Pollock’s primitivist works in order to identify and distinguish
the differences between them in the theoretical terms of form and content in art, or rather to
identify “significant form” from “significant content”, which forms the basis of Primitivist
critical and theoretical art theory (Bell 15). This is not to make a comparison for the purposes
of competition, to claim some type of American supremacy (as Craven, Rosenberg and
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Greenberg did). Rather, this is to say that modern art has many forms and that Pollock’s form
is representational, differing significantly from Picasso’s primitivist period. To best
understand these theoretical concerns, it is helpful to examine the historical context of the
traditions within the style of Primitivism and its underlying mimetic premises.
Europe’s fascination with indigenous people has taken many forms. At its core, the term
‘primitive’ denotes notions of origins with close associations between native people and the
land they inhabit. The notion of the ‘primitive’ has a long tradition in art and literature, and
the term itself was originally applied to fourteenth and fifteenth century Flemish and Italian
works of art (which were considered authentic if made in the region of Flanders and Northern
Italy). The concept came to be particularly descriptive of the arts representing indigenous
peoples (Egyptian, Persian, Indian, Javanese, Peruvian and Japanese), and later included the
arts of tribal cultures, such as those in Africa and Oceania, or the rural peasants living in
uncontaminated small European agricultural communities, particularly within the era of
exploration and colonialism (Perry 3-4).
At the basis of all of these forms of exotic Primitivism is a relation that draws upon and
extends two entrenched traditions within European art which are important for our
understanding of mimêsis and Pollock’s work. First, exotic Primitivism extends a long
tradition of representing and symbolizing the foreign ‘other’ in his/her accompanying foreign
land. This association between land and figure as icon has been retained throughout the
history of Primitivism and is a well-established tradition that conflates the exotic female as a
personification of the land. Its origins were first developed by Cesare Ripa in his Iconologia,
1560-1645. In the Iconololgia Ripa developed several personifications within European Four
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Continents iconography wherein exotic female types are rendered as icons that represent the
land and Mother Nature (LaBarge 101) (Fig. 28). 31

Figure 28 Frontispiece for Francois Valentijn’s Oud en Nieuw Oost Indien, 1726

For example, Africa is personified by a female figure carrying tusks and dressed in a turban
(Ripa 104). The Americas are personified by a female figure dressed in a grass skirt, wearing
a full feathered headdress upon her head. She sits upon an iconic animal avatar that is derived
from the land, such as an armadillo (as shown in this example) or in other renditions, a
beaver. She also carries symbolic trade goods such as silver coins and corn that further
identifies the geography, climate, and land (Fig. 29). Asia and Europe are likewise
represented by female figures with indigenous accoutrements, flora, and fauna.

152

Figure 29 Late 16th-century Dutch print depicting a female personification of the continent America, engraved
by Flemish designer and engraver Adriaen Collaert after a design by Marten de Vos

In Four Continent personifications and other primitivist works there is an obvious
emphasis on the trade goods, generally from Asia, Oceana, Africa or the Americas, which are
being given to Europe in the form of tribute. This expression of power and domination of
Europe over the “other” brings us to our second point, which is that European Primitivism
denotes or visualizes a discourse of power in that it contributes to a set of ‘texts’ or the
broader “complex network of sociological, ideological, aesthetic, scientific, anthropological,
political and legal interests” as well as aesthetic forms which determine an episteme
(Foucault, “Truth” 168). This is one of the observations that Said makes in his theory of
Orientalism. This primitivist discourse denotes an episteme of European supremacy over the
exotic in the form of both the viewer’s gaze and the notion of the exotic as being personified
by the female figure. Even in imagery describing the earliest colonial encroachment into
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foreign lands, we see the exotic and primitive within views of such power. For example, Jorg
Breu’s woodcuts for Ludovico Varthema’s Die ritterfisch und lobwirdig Ruyss, printed by
Hans Miller in Augsburg, in 1515, demonstrates an attempt to systematize ethnographic
information through narrative scenes (Fig. 30). 32

Figure 30 Jörg Breu d. Ä. zugeschrieben, Idol von Calicut, in: Ludovico de Varthema, Die Ritterlich und
lobwürdig Reisz, Strassburg 1516

Breu’s portrait of an Indian deity is created through a medieval syntax that conflates Hindu
deities with the notion of demons. But in the woodcut, a female figure, inwardly focused on
almsgiving, invites the male gaze that suggests power over both the female as the exotic
personification of India, and the deity as the personification of a set of cultural beliefs and
practices. In the earliest primitivist works of art, it is clear that the basis of primitivist art
rests upon the relations between figure as a personification of both geography and cultural
practices that describe exotic land and people. By framing cultural practices as demonic,
European colonization and acculturalization is justified. Thus two facets of primitivist art
(whether in the graphic arts of colonial travel literature such as geographies, maps, atlases,
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travel accounts and ethnologies, or in fine art and paintings) combine to represent the
indigenous “other” iconographically as a symbol of land and culture within a visual discourse
of possession and domination. Europe’s fascination with the primitive and indigenous during
colonialism is also evidenced by the plethora of sixteenth to eighteenth-century
Wunderkammers (princely collections of naturalia and artificialia) and ethnographic studies.
Late colonial meanings and concepts within the notion of the ‘primitive’ draw upon
traditions derived from pastoral poetry, the ideals of Rousseau’s ‘noble savage’, and Darwininspired social evolutionists. Primitive peoples those nearer to nature than those living in
“corrupt” civilization, were perceived (particularly in the writings of Rousseau) as pure and
natural, living close to nature within idealized societies. 33 For Rousseau, primitive people
were a source of knowledge and worthy of emulation and understanding. Rousseau explains,
“It is still more cruel that, as every advance made by the human species removes it still
farther from its primitive state, the more discoveries we make, the more we deprive ourselves
of the means of [that which is] the most important of all” (Rousseau 6). The nineteenthcentury German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder contributed to the popularization of the
indigenous or rural class. In amassing an extensive collection of rural folklore, he wrote that
there is a distinct connection between ‘simple’ people and notions of purity. He writes, “The
savage who loves himself, his wife and child with quiet joy and glows with limited activity
of his tribe, is in my opinion a more real being than that cultivated shadow who is enraptured
with the shadow of the whole species” (Kedouri 57). In art or literature, to portray the
indigenous was to emulate its virtues.
Emerging from the natural sciences, anthropology continues this fascination with “other”
and the indigenous, particularly as it developed into the study of culture in the late nineteenth
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century. 34 Theoretical Darwinism (with its notion of a hierarchy of species) lent justification
to African slavery and Manifest Destiny, while also encouraging the study of the indigenous
“other” in a myriad of live installations on display at anthropological museums and zoos,
such as in the World Columbian Exposition, held in Chicago in 1893, which hosted live
displays of American Indians, and the British Museum which hosted ethnological exhibitions
of African people in cages, and the 1931 Colonial Exhibition in Paris, which displayed
Kanaks from New Caledonia. Such displays demonstrate the fascination with the indigenous
or “primitive”. With the obsession for classifying and categorizing man as a species,
anthropologists sought for underlying structures to reframe the notion of the primitive within
a universal condition of all humans. The nineteenth-century British anthropologist E. B.
Tylor advocated a theory of uniformity that formed the basis upon which early to midtwentieth century anthropologists such as James Frazer, A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, Emile
Durkheim, Marcel Mauss and Claude Lévi-Strauss built theories of structural functionalism
that model institutionalism and social systems, and later structuralist anthropology which
looks at language and symbolic structures. Comparative studies that once analyzed physical
and cultural differences, and encouraged the display of varied ethnographic types of humans,
became outmoded in favor of studies which compare the structures of indigenous beliefs,
myths, and rituals. Europe’s fascination with “other” became a fascination (as we see in
Jungian thought) with overarching archetypes in art and theory.
Through shifting and evolving ideas, late nineteenth and twentieth-century primitivist
artists sought to continue to portray the associations between land and native-ness, by
portraying the naïve innocence of tribal peoples living outside of the influence of modern
technologies and industry and instead living within the purity of uncultivated (or at least
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minimally cultivated) nature. Thus, primitive art subjects continue to look to the forms and
experiences of rural, exotic, and indigenous peoples. This search for the indigenous also
helped to fuel nationalist tendencies to seek for local and regional histories and folklore. An
increased interest on the ‘primitive’ brought a regional life into view. In Britain, classicism
was exchanged for folk culture. This also extended to the Continent, where examples of local
and regional myths were collected, such as in the Grimm Brothers’ collection of fairy tales in
Germany, and the nineteenth-century revival of traditional regional tunes as we see in the
Hungarian Dances of Johannes Brahms, and the folk inspired compositions of Edvard Grieg,
Antonin Dvorak, Bela Bartok, and others. Likewise, many nineteenth-century artists depicted
naturalistic representations of the ‘primitive’ including Jean-Léon Gérôme, AlphonseÉtienne Dinet, Jules-Jean-Antoine Lecomte du Noüy, all of whom exhibited at the annual
Salon des Artistes Français or the more liberal Salon de la Societé Nationale des Beaux.
Their naturalistic landscapes and portraits such as Noüy’s White Slave, Salon of 1888 and
Gérôme’s The Terrace of the Seraglio, 1886 depict naked and semi-naked women along with
exotic accoutrements such as incense burners and hookas within an Arabian palacecompound. The painting is composed to represent an exotic setting, wherein the all parts of
the painting, from architecture, clothing, and other cultural artefacts express exotic culture
and geography (Fig. 27). Likewise Jules-Jean-Antoine Lecomte du Noüy’s White Slave
emphasizes regional and exotic differences while evoking notions of local customs (Perry 4).
The Primitive painters Nasreddine Dinet and Paul Gauguin also painted sensual, darkskinned women as symbols of ‘primitive’ life dressed in ‘primitive’ dress, posed in settings
in nature that depict the flora of their land of origin. The primitivist trend resulted from
increased awareness of the living conditions of foreign peoples within French colonies,
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equating the exotic female with exotic locations but also evolved out of traditional French
Realism and the works of Millet, Courbet and others.

Figure 27 Jean-Léon Gérôme, The Terrace of the Seraglio, 1886, Private collection, oil on canvas

These later types of primitivist representations have several inherent problems which
make them very difficult to analyze. First, they intersect the boundaries of several art styles,
including not only Primitivism, but also Exoticism and Colonialism. But these art styles all
share in portraying the indigenous or exotic “other” in iconic ways that retain associations
with land, culture, and power structures.
Mid-twentieth century theories such as Edward Said’s Orientalism expose the power
relations at play in colonial arts and literature, particularly between the “primitive” or
indigenous “other” and those representing, speaking for, and governing them, particularly
under the rule of Colonialism. 35 Said’s theory particularly aims to undermine the critical
studies conducted under Orientalism, because Orientalism describes native Near Eastern
cultures from perspectives derive from outside viewpoints of such cultures. In doing so,
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Orientalists perpetuate and reinforce such power. Complicating these matters even further is
the issue of the representation of ruling classes as “other” by the indigenous. From this unempowered perspective representation is often a component of ritual magic in the works of
native peoples. This is one of the many issues explored by Michael Taussig in his book
Mimesis and Alterity, a Particular History of the Sense. 36 But for our purposes here, being
that this dissertation is a phenomenological critique of mimêsis, particularly as it helps us to
distinguish and theorize upon the recuperation of the indigenous spirit of art in Pollock’s
work. Suffice it to say that we can only briefly mention the difficulties of these images, as
there is not time nor space here to critically analyzing these various points of reference. A
critique of Colonialism, Orientalism, and the problems of representing the ‘other’, while
important issues at stake in our concerns with representations of American Indians and their
art, is better left for a more in-depth study of these issues of “other” and appropriation. This
is not to undermine the absolute importance of recognizing how American art and politics
has represented the American Indian as an indigenous “other” and has done so from powered
positions. Rather, this fact further underscores why it is imperative that we recognize the
Indian-episteme as being in fact a pertinent part of the history of this era. For presently, the
subject of the American Indian is nearly all but forgotten in today’s consuming concerns with
globalization, technology, hybridity, and post-post humanist art. If we can recognize the
Indian-episteme and designate it as such, we are establishing foundations for further
analyzing the concerns of alterity and its representations, and for giving due recognition to
our indigenous American brothers and sisters who deserve far more than our utmost respect.
But for the purposes of this study, in order to look at these issues from an aesthetic and
phenomenological point of view, it is important to also recognize the most elemental
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relations in primitivist art which are those relations between land and people, and how such
representations are mimetic, even if the representation of such is brought about from Euro-or
American-centric artistic points of view.
More recently to our present concerns, Van Gogh’s early peasant scenes continue this
very long standing artistic tradition that connects the female figure with geography,
landscape, and culture while simultaneously experimenting with abstracted elements such as
distorted figures, flattening of illusionistic space, and vivid and expressive color. Gauguin
also continued the primitivist discourse in seeking territorial authenticity and ethnographic
origins by looking to folk culture in Brittany and later to Martinique and Tahiti. Gauguin’s
idealizing primitivism draws upon this well-established tradition of conflating the female
figure with personifications of land, exotic culture and power. Gauguin’s exotic females are
laid bare by his invasive portrayals, powerless against the advancing encroachment of the
viewer/colonialist into their lands, values, and cultural practices (Fig. 31).

Figure 31 Paul Gauguin, Day of the God (Mahana No Atua), 1894, oil on canvas, 68.3 x 91.5 cm, Art
Institute of Chicago.
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Similarly, in previous and subsequent odalisques (be it those of Ingres, Gérôme, Dinet, and
others), and the portrayals of women in customary clothing (such as those by Gauguin’s
Breton women, Ēmile Bernard, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, and others), the association between
power, supremacy, gaze, the exotic, and associations with territory, geography, and land
carry with them an extensive colonialist tradition based on a political and social domination
over geographic locations and cultural practices.
In terms of art, Primitivism witnesses to a long tradition of first, representing the ‘other’
as it is found in colonial travel literature such as maps, atlases, travel logs, geographies, and
ethnologies. Fine and graphic arts related to Colonialism perpetuate two fundamental
precepts. First, such imagery denotes the underlying power structures that claim possession
of the indigenous “other” and its lands, and secondly, represent the indigenous in iconic,
symbolic or naturalistic ways that symbolize this broader political and social discourse (Said
203). 37 Just as the American Indian became a symbol for nationalism, regionalism, and
authentic Americanism, Europeans sought for a sense of ethnographic origins through a view
of the many lands and peoples they had amassed under colonialism and these pursuits are
recorded in primitivist art. As the avant-garde came to embrace the primitive in new ways,
the ubiquitous indigenous was a global phenomenon, a symptom of a larger condition of
colonial hierarchical ethnographies, classifications and taxonomies (“Order” 73). 38
Within this broader backdrop of primitivist and exotic personification and representation,
Picasso’s abstract primitivist work Les Demoiselles d’Avignon, 1907 is considered a defining
landmark work in the history of art precisely because it severs all traditional ties between
geography, figure and nature (Fig. 32).
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Figure 32 Pablo Picasso, Les Demoiselles d'Avignon, 1907, Oil on canvas, Museum of Modern Art, New York
City

Based on Picasso’s interests in Cezanne-esque geometric shapes, Picasso set out to solve the
problem of “the representation of the three-dimensional object and its position in space on a
two-dimensional surface” (Kahnweiler 204). Picasso created the work to showcase the forms
of art over the specificity of the subject and create a new syntax for prioritizing an object’s
form and position in space over empirical accuracy of the representation and identification of
such object. Thus, the women in the painting are neither specific women nor are they
personifications of Africa; rather, they exist as a general category of their elemental forms.
The abstract Congo masks help to depersonalize the women as well as emphasize and
accentuate the lines and angles of the flattened and abstract forms.
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The critical theory of modern abstract art, as delineated by Clive Bell, Benedetto Croce,
Alexander Shevchenko, and others, declares Picasso’s primitivist works initiated a major
break from mimetic art traditions by focusing on artistic form over naturalistic
representation, and by focusing on form at the expense of traditional meanings tied to the
personification of land and culture. It is not that Picasso’s Primitivism severs ties to
representation that is most important, but that he severs ties between representation and its
meanings between representation as a form of socio-political discourse. In the essay The
Aesthetic Hypothesis, Clive Bell establishes three principles upon which Picasso’s
Primitivism in its abstract formal qualities establishes an overarching theory of modernism
within the oeuvre of Western art. There are three main claims Bell makes that are important
for us to consider in this debate between form and content. First, he makes a claim for form
over content in art. Second, Bell describes form as the universal condition of all great art.
Third, he makes a case for the justification of formal art devoid of representational qualities.
First, Bell explains that modernism is the inheritor of great artworks of the past because
the formal properties of art bring on aesthetic feelings. If such aesthetic feelings arise from
the colors, shapes, and compositional strategies of Primitivism, then Primitivism is equal to
the beautiful art of the past. For if aesthetic pleasure arises from the forms of art, rather than
its content or subject matter, then form is that which underlies all great art:
There must be some one quality without which a work of art cannot exist; possessing
which, in the least degree, no work is altogether worthless. What is this quality? What
quality is shared by all objects that provoke our aesthetic emotions? What quality is
common to Sta. Sophia and the windows at Chartres, Mexican sculpture, a Persian
bowl, Chinese carpets, Giotto's frescoes at Padua, and the masterpieces of Poussin,
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Piero della Francesca, and Cezanne? Only one answer seems possible - significant
form. In each, lines and colours combined in a particular way, certain forms and
relations of forms, stir our aesthetic emotions. These relations and combinations of
lines and colours, these aesthetically moving forms, I call ‘Significant Form’; and
‘Significant Form’ is the one quality common to all works of visual art. (15)
For Bell the primary condition of modernist art is this issue of “significant” form which is not
descriptive, representational, or mimetic. The notion of “significant form” describes the
formal elements of art which produce an aesthetic appreciation for the art object. Bell looks
to Primitive art as an example of how this formalism does not contribute to “accurate
representation” or a knowledge of what is being represented, but rather the art object itself
highlights the importance of the formal properties of art, its elements and design principles,
and its compositional strategies. For Bell, the issue is not whether representation is accurate,
symbolical, or a means by which one object is appropriated for the sake of representation.
Rather, representation of all types is relegated as insignificant in light of the formal
properties of art such as form, volume, color, etc. Secondly, for Bell, formalism is not only
the condition of modern art, it is the universal condition of all art:
Whether we consider Sumerian sculpture or pre-dynastic Egyptian art, or
archaic Greek, or the Wei and Tang masterpieces, or those early Japanese
works of which I had the luck to see a few superb examples ... at the
Shepherd’s Bush Exhibition in 1910, or whether, coming nearer home, we
consider the primitive Byzantine art of the sixth century and its primitive
developments amongst the Western barbarians, or, turning far afield, we
consider that mysterious and majestic art that flourished in Central and South
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America before the coming of the white men, in every case we observe three
common characteristics – absence of representation, absence of technical
swagger, sublimely impressive form. (15)
Thus, for Bell, “significant form” unites all styles of art throughout all periods and is a
universal principle, which provokes aesthetic feelings in the viewer while at the same time
justifying them. Subject matter or the representation of nature is irrelevant because the formal
properties are primary. Modern art has victoriously overcome ancient Greek and traditional
imitation and representation. Third, Bell continues to explain the decline of the importance of
mimêsis in favor of form, or l'art pour l'art. For Bell, representational art may portray
delightful narratives and subject matter or content, but without significant form it lacks
aesthetic value. As Bell explains,
We are all familiar with pictures that interest us and excite our admiration, but
do not move us as works of art. To this class belongs what I call ‘Descriptive
Painting’ - that is, painting in which forms are used not as objects of emotion,
but as means of suggesting emotion or conveying information. Portraits of
psychological and historical value, topographical works, pictures that tell
stories and suggest situations, illustrations of all sorts, belong to this class.
That we all recognize the distinction is clear, for who has not said that such
and such a drawing was excellent as illustration, but as a work of art
worthless? Of course many descriptive pictures possess, amongst other
qualities, formal significance, and are therefore works of art: but many more
do not. They interest us; they may move us too in a hundred different ways,
but they do not move us aesthetically. According to my hypothesis they are
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not works of art. They leave untouched our aesthetic emotions because it is
not their forms but the ideas or information suggested or conveyed by their
forms that affect us. (14)
In other words, what makes a work of art great is not the content of the work, the narrative,
mythic, or representational or mimetic qualities that illustrate the natural world or the lived
experience. What makes a work of art great is the appearance of its forms, the arrangement of
its formal parts (color, line, shape, etc.) within the overall composition. In Bell and
subsequent theorists, we can see the decline and repudiation of mimêsis.
The British theorist Herbert Read further clarified the distinction between abstract
and representational art. Writing for the symposium on ‘Revolutionary Art’ staged by the
Artists’ International Association (formerly the Artists’ International) in London in 1935,
Read claimed that abstract art is not derived from temporal and historical conditions. Thus it
can be qualified as “pure form”, meaning that it is non-representational, non-figurative, and
archetypal. Read says,
It is at least arguable that the purely formal element in art does not change;
that the same canons of harmony and proportion are present in primitive art, in
Greek art, in Gothic art, in Renaissance art and in the art of the present day.
Such forms, we may say, are archetypal; due to the physical structure of the
world and the psychological structure of man. (503)
Read’s claim to pure and archetypal form seeks to ground abstract art, including Picasso’s
primitivist works, within a notion of universal or pure form without ties to ideas. In other
words, archetypal forms are unchanging and not subject to the particulars of history or
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subjectivity. Further, abstract art lays no claim to ideology as it is an escape into a world
without ideologies (503). By Read’s definition of modern art, representations of the natural
world from a phenomenal perspective, in terms of rendering objects (or figures) as viable
natural forms, suggests a psychological attachment or intention that obstructs all claims to
universal patterns and archetypes. In other words, mimetic works of art block the viewer’s
ability to see beyond the natural world, mimêsis prevents a viewer from focusing on the
formal properties of art themselves, such as line, color, composition, etc. It is this detachment
(from the phenomenal in exchange for a universal that is based on formal properties of art)
which defines modern abstract art. 39 Representation has become lost to art, supplanted by
pure form: and a schism in art is drawn between formal and representational concerns.
Picasso initiated a new mode in modern art that institutes the primacy of form or “significant
form” and in so doing eschews representational content or mimêsis, thereby separating art
from long held traditions in socio-political discourse. This is an important point for both our
theory of mimêsis and Pollock’s recuperation of the indigenous spirit of art. Picasso’s break
with art traditions disrupts the traditions of meaning long held within primitivist art.
Hans-Georg Gadamer acknowledges this dilemma between formalism and meaning
in abstract art.
Even in those modern pictures built up out of meaningful elements that
dissolve into something unrecognizable, we can still sense a last trace of
familiarity and experience a fragmentary act of recognition. But is that
sufficient? Can we not on reflection see that we are quite unable to understand
such a picture as long as we look at it as a purely objective pictorial
representation of something? What is the language of modern painting? Surely
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a language in which gestures suddenly acquire momentary significance only
to sink back again into obscurity is an unintelligible language. In the language
of such pictures we seem to encounter the rejection of meaning rather than its
expression. The concepts of imitation and recognition fail us and we find
ourselves at a loss. (Gadamer 100-101)
Gadamer is fundamentally indicating that the notion of formalist art, that which depends
upon significant form over content appeals to us despite its loss of mimetic presentation. The
nature of abstraction as pure form is that it is unintelligible in that it does not participate in
the representation of empirical objects. In repudiating representation, pure abstract art
becomes a language or a code without an attendant meaning ascribed to it. Rather than
relaying information in the way the conscious mind receives and processes information,
formalism indicates nothing. This is not to say that nothing is unworthy of representation in a
variety of delicious forms and colors, rather, it is that such form is precisely what it professes
to be and therefore points to nothing outside of itself. In its pointing to itself, pure form
declares the autonomy of art. But it also severs traditional associations between art and the
socio-political discourse.
Though considered primitivist, Picasso’s primitivist artworks sever all ties to naturalistic
representation and traditions deriving from primitivist representation such as traditional Four
Continent personifications, Darwinian-Rousseauian pastoral theories, and subsequent and
attendant colonial discourse and power structures. Rather than explicitly or naturalistically
illustrating African masks or evoking the mythic and ritual qualities of African art or the
female as territory and geography, Picasso abstracted the essential forms of the mask, which
he then infused onto abstracted, unidentified, non-associated, objectified, female figures. The
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figures are not intended to be read as indigenous African figures symbolic of the continent.
Likewise, the masks are intended to be seen as forms of masks rather than masks that evoke
African rituals. In so doing, Picasso initiated a new modality of art that appropriates exotic
forms without representing them or their socio-political functions and relations. The work
institutes a radical new form of primitivism which is abstract, objective, and devoid of earlier
primitivist sentiments (Rubin 15). It is not that we cannot see an abstract representation of
African masks and nude prostitutes in the painting. But the abstract imagery has taken on
new meanings in its forms. Picasso’s Primitivism is a drastic point of departure away from
representation or mimêsis in the specific function of primitivist art as illustrative of the
relations between land and female figure personifications. Rather than extending an art
tradition of meanings, Les Demoiselles explores instead how art is based on its own formal
properties of shape and form, lines, colors, composition, etc. (Rubin 17). Rubin claims that
Picasso’s primitivism “depends on the autonomous force of objects [apart from nature] – and
especially on the capacity of tribal art to transcend the intentions and conditions that first
shaped it” (15). Whether or not nature inspired the initial idea, Picasso’s abstractions
“transcend” or surpass nature. Separated from any representational functions in meaning or
ties to indigenous lands, cultures, ritual, myth, or ethnographic traditions, Primitivism
becomes an abstraction or formalism, interested in the primacy of form, objective material,
and geometrical two-dimensional shapes. From this point of departure, subsequent primitive
artists reflect this drastic shift toward the primacy of form or structure over nature.
This emphasis on objective form is most apparent in Picasso’s Nude with Raised Arms,
1907 (Fig. 33).
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Figure 33 Pablo Picasso, Nude With Raised Arms, 1907

There is a direct relationship between the forms of tribal art (and more specifically Dogon
sculpture) in terms of two-dimensional geometric form, ornamental surface detail, organic
color, and formal symmetry (Fig. 34).

Figure 34 Dogon Sculpture, Male Figure with Raised Arms, 14th-17th century, Mali, Tintam Village, wood,
patina. Metropolitan Museum of Art, NY
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Both European artists and connoisseurs have since prized the neo-abstract forms of
primitivist works for their simple outlines, distorted figures, and repetitive ornamental
patterns. Avid collectors with a distinct appreciation for the elemental forms of primitive art
objects began to amass large collections of art objects from Africa, Oceana, and tribal
Americas. But Picasso’s radical shift abandoned verisimilitude for promoting art’s formal
tendencies. He did so at the expense of expressive content and traditional meanings, thus
creating the divide or schism in art between art as object and art as signifying subject matter,
a divide between form and content,

American Primitivism

The role of mimêsis as “significant content” is reinstituted in American Primitivism and
continues in Pollock’s drip paintings. Nearly thirty years after Picasso’s Nude, between 1941
and 1944 many American artists including Mark Rothko, Barnett Newman, Gottlieb, Richard
Pousette-Dart, Pollock and others, explored Primitivism by appropriating uniquely American
pictographic forms, indigenous signs, and symbols in art. Rather than focusing on the formal
properties of art, they reinstitute mimetic representation that conveys both illustration and
narration in terms of pictographic and ideographic representation. In this collection of
primitivist works American Artists explore the mythic and narrative content held within
indigenous art forms. For example, Mark Rothko’s The Sacrifice of Iphigenia, 1942 and Rites
of Lilith 1945 are based on pictographic imagery, as are Adolph Gottlieb’s pictograph works
such as Pictograph # 4 and Vigil, 1948 (Fig. 35).
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Figure 35 Adolph Gottlieb, Vigil, 1948. Oil on canvas, 36 × 48 in. (91.4 × 121.9 cm). Whitney Museum of
American Art, New York

In another example, Gottlieb’s Pictograph Series are based on recognizable American
indigenous ideographic imagery and symbols that evoke Pacific Northwest Coast Tinglit
culture like we see in this 300-year old Chilkat blanket, which is organized in registers that
evoke language, iconic narratives and ancient mythologies represented in new forms (Fig.
36).

Figure 36 Chilkat Indian Blanket, mountain goat wool, cedar bark, Canadian Museum of History.

Rather than personifying land, flora and fauna, American artists looked to indigenous arts
and iconography as the vessels of ancient myths and rituals and as the basis for a unique form
of American Primitivism.
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Barnett Newman first defined the nature of American Primitivism and the importance of
primitivist content saying, “It is becoming more and more apparent that to understand
modern art, one must have an appreciation for the primitive arts, for just as modern art stands
as an island in the narrow stream of Western European aesthetics, the many primitive art
treasures stand apart as authentic accomplishments that flourished without benefit of
European history” (qtd. Rushing, “Native” 131). In 1947 Newman curated the show “The
Ideographic Picture” at the Betty Parson’s Gallery, where Pollock and others exhibited
primitivist works of art. In the exhibition catalogue Newman defined the new style as
“ideographic” based on symbols, figures or hieroglyphs. He writes that, “…... there has
arisen during the war years a new force in American painting that is the modern counterpart
of the primitive art impulse... here is a group of artists who are not abstract painters, although
working in what is known as the abstract style” (“Ideographic” 565). Like others, Pollock
adapted indigenous arts into ideographic, hieroglyphic, and abstract forms, calling his
artworks “stenographic” as in his Stenographic Figure, 1942 to suggest that he, like his
colleagues considered the pictographic narrative to be an important element in art (Polcari,
“Pollock” 6) (Fig. 37).
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Figure 37 Jackson Pollock, Stenographic Figure, ca. 1942, Oil on linen, 40 x 56", Museum of Modern Art.

In light of this, how we can distinguish the ways in which the American painters differ from
the abstract work of Picasso? The answer lies not in the forms, but in the content of the
American painters’ works.
Richard Pousette-Dart’s Palimpsest, 1944 is a key work that illustrates this relation
between symbol and mythic narrative content. It presents a visual structured mythology
within which a myriad of mimetic events take place. A palimpsest is a tablet or writing
material wherein an original text has been effaced or scratched off in order to make room for
a new text. But often, traces of the original writing remain visible (Fig. 38). In Palimpsest
Pousette-Dart reinterprets American petroglyph writings and symbolic images that were
repeatedly incised on rock surfaces by ancient artists over thousands of years. Natural rock
formations (like those found in Moab, Utah and other locations with the arid desert
Southwest) show art as additive, with countless layers of petroglyphs, words and images
being incised upon and over earlier versions over countless millennia (Fig. 39).
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Figure 38 Richard Pousette-Dart, Palimpsest, 1944

In the painting, Pousette-Dart evokes this sense of timeless reiteration by applying layers
upon layers of forms, some partly erased, others rewritten in new forms (Rushing, “Ritual”
278).

Figure 39 Dinosaur National Monument, Utah
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His illustration evokes mythic messages and the passage of time within an overall
composition that also structures the way in which such plays out on the canvas. In the
making of the palimpsest, Pousette-Dart re-enacts the creation of mythic writing over ages.
Content (the subject and act of ancient writing) is more important than the form or
composition. Unlike Picasso’s primitivist works which preference form over content, the
painting represents and embodies the idea of ancient narratives and the act of writing
ancestral myths over the forms of such writings. Like the other American primitivist
paintings, it reinforces the function of mimêsis as representation and illustration. This is not
to say that such representation is accurate as in verisimilitude. Representation or mimêsis can
be loosely described as imitative, illusionistic, or a form of copying the natural world. More
will be said about the forms of mimêsis in Chapter Four. But presently, to represent is to give
a faithful, suggestive, or abstract rendering of the empirical world.
Pollock, who has long been compared to Picasso and considered the heir of his Surrealist
and Cubist forms, has countless drawings and paintings that directly reference American
Indian arts and art forms. Pollock’s painting Birth, from the same era, ca. 1938-1941
continues American primitivist indigenous subjects illustrated and arranged in a frieze-like
way, evoking ancient pictograms and rituals (Fig. 40).
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Figure 40 Jackson Pollock, Birth, c.1941. Oil paint on canvas, Support 1164 x 551 mm, frame: 1207 x 597 x 64
mm, Tate Museum, London

Pollock’s primitivist paintings like this are traditionally interpreted as Surrealist. But the
underlying references to American Indian arts and artifacts, and in this case Inuit masks, are
clearly visible in the larger body of American primitivist works. In Birth for example,
Pollock repeatedly illustrates such a mask from a variety of perspectives that emphasize the
mask’s asymmetrical features. The painting also evokes the underlying structures of masking
wherein art is used to veil one’s true visage in order to reveal something about a theatrical or
mythological character. Distorted facial features are an important aspect of such indigenous
character masks, and this distortion is replicated in the painting. In so doing, Pollock retains
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and repeats the distorted features of Inuit mask making traditions and returns mimêsis to
modern art (Fig. 41).

Figure 41 Inuit mask, Yup´ik mask, ca. 1910, Good News Bay, Alaska, Driftwood, baleen, feathers, paint, cotton twine,
Smithsonian National Museum of the American Indian, NY

The emphasis is not on the pure forms of masks, as in Picasso’s Les Demoiselles and his
Nude with Raised Arms, but rather Pollock’s painting comments on the richness of the
functions of masking. Where Picasso stresses “significant form,” Pollock returns “significant
content” to modern art. Form is underplayed and “significant content” is magnified and
repeated in the various positions of the masked forms. In an age that celebrates abstract art as
primary, Pollock refutes the notion of pure form through representation or mimêsis.
Pollock’s painting Number 1A, 1948, reads very much like Pousette-Dart’s Palimpsest as
Pollock evoked the notion of timeless return and repeat in the motion and motif of his
dripped paint that conceals and discloses a myriad of hand prints barely visible beneath the
tracery of paint (Fig. 42).
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Figure 42 Jackson Pollock, Number 1A, 1948, Oil and enamel paint on canvas, 68" x 8' 8" (172.7 x 264.2 cm), MoMA, New

York

That Pollock’s version of the palimpsest is also his first all over drip painting, the presence of
his hand prints, placed repeatedly over time beneath the repetitive dripping lines of paint, is
significant. The handprints, symbolic of red handprint pictographs near Monarch Cave Ruin,
in Cedar Mesa, Utah, suggest the presence of the ancient Anasazi, through mimetic
representation, reiteration, and reinterpretation (Fig. 43).

Figure 43 Anasazi red handprint pictographs, Monarch Cave Ruin, Cedar Mesa, Utah
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The associations between Indian art and symbols and modern art is abundantly clear in
Pollock’s extensive drawings and sketches. In an untitled painting we will refer to as Frieze,
ca. 1945 Pollock illustrates indigenous American arts by referencing Eskimo masks at the
very center of the image, along with pictographic figures, and geometric signs reminiscent of
Kiowa shields. Both European and American primitivistic styles draw upon and reference
indigenous art forms and objects, but Pollock’s Frieze conveys the notion of a narrative in a
theatrical manner as figures are posed as if acting out a scene (Rushing, “Native” 183-4)
(Fig. 44). 40

Figure 44 Jackson Pollock, Untitled (Frieze), ca. 1938-41, Gouache, watercolor, colored pencil, pen, brush and
India ink on cardboard, Metropolitan Museum of Art

The artwork presents meaningful relationships between the symbols and figures that convey
a significant narrative rather than Bell’s notion of “significant form”. Likewise In an untitled
watercolor and ink study, ca. 1939-1942 in the estate of Lee Krasner, Pollock methodically
experimented with Navajo symbols and masks (Fig. 45). Centrally placed in the watercolor is
a representation of an Indian mask. Swastikas, emblems with directional energy arrows, and
an adaptation of a thunder bird are clearly rendered in the right field of the painting. To the
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left, pictographic-like markings are organized like fleeting thoughts, perhaps as if to
represent the inexpressible collective memories of a historical culture, gaining aesthetic
validation and recognition in the public eye. A Directional Emblem, which is another
common motif in Navajo art, is placed in the upper right of the painting by Pollock (Fig. 46).
In Navajo art, the symbol is made from intersecting horizontal, vertical, and diagonal lines,
and it serves to direct the ritual and sacred power energy of the emblem along cardinal
points: north, south, east and west.

Figure 45 Jackson Pollock, Untitled Drawing, watercolor, colored pencil, pen, brush and India ink on paper,
Metropolitan Museum of Art.

Figure 46 Navajo Cardinal

Figure 47 Navajo Prayer Stick Emblem
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When the emblem is portrayed in Navajo ritual sand paintings, the emblem is placed in the
center of the picture frame denoting its powerful position (Newcomb 28). Pollock’s
directional motif is a direct reiteration of the Navajo symbol but it is modified from the
arrows, snakes, the Navajo Prayer Stick, and other symbols from which it derives (Fig. 47).
Pollock reiterates the notion of the Prayer Stick and Directional Emblem as
associative energy in another untitled work made around 1946 (Fig. 48). In the painting
Pollock orients the energy center to the bottom of the painting, with modified, abstracted
prayer sticks retaining an outward movement along cardinal directional points. Associations
with Indian emblems are still visible. But more importantly, the sacred energy explodes
along these directional points. One year before Pollock’s first drip work, the painting reads
like a schematized map of the very metaphysical matter of ritual in motion.

Figure 48 Jackson Pollock, Untitled Drawing, watercolor, colored pencil, pen, brush and India ink on paper, Metropolitan
Museum of Art.
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The associations between American Indian signs and symbols are more than overtly evident
and they reveal Pollock’s ongoing interest in the representation of concrete objects, be they
emblematic or figurative. Rather than Picasso-esque pure form or psychologically laden
archetypal imagery, Pollock reintroduces mimêsis by representing indigenous American
forms and symbols in his paintings and drawings.
Pollock’s interests in Indian arts, forms, and myths were supported by several key
friends and associates, particularly in his association with Wolfgang Paalen and John
Graham, as well as his research in the periodicals and journals he collected (as mentioned in
Chapter One). Our review could dwell on these influences at length, but our concerns depend
less on the outward influences of Pollock’s imagery and more on the ways that mimêsis
signifies the myths embedded within American Indian arts. 41 Picasso eschews content for
highly abstracted forms but Pollock returns content within the veil of abstraction. Rather than
continuing the modernist trend for pure form, Pollock reversed Picasso-esque form in favor
of a uniquely mimetic and content laden American art.
There are two primary points to consider in our discussion regarding “significant content”
and “significant form”. First, in Picasso’s primitivist works, (for this study is not concerned
with Picasso’s cubist, surrealist, or later representational works), the mythic is dispensed with
in exchange for form, conveying formal structure. Picasso’s Nudes give no reference point
upon which we can ascertain any phenomenal reality of the figures beyond the form which
they present. But American artists’ application of mimêsis to represent figurative forms
evokes a myriad of meanings and associations to historically contingent realities. Rather than
affirming notions of pure form, the American artists’ works transgress modernism’s
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emphasis on pure form through their commitment to a tangible and perceptible
representational and narrative content.
Second, European Primitivism depends upon a discourse that includes personifications of
the female figure as land and territory which are conflated with issues of dominance and
conquest. Picasso severs all ties to this discourse, which originates along with the earliest
European colonial expansion. American Primitivism however, evokes instead the notion of
ancient mythologies, forms, and symbols in a way that evidences a distinct and even new
discourse (rather than colonialism) that suggests a new American paradigm based on the
notions of nationalistic authenticity and self-identity. Rather than extending the female Indian
as a personification of the Americans, modern American artists appropriated the forms of
American Indian arts, preserving vanishing cultural traditions within a new American-Indian
inspired art form that personifies the political and social climate of the Indian-episteme.
While the extent and ramifications of the American Indian-episteme in art and its discourse
warrant additional exploration, our present concerns address the way in which Pollock added
to the paradigm in ways which reveal a broader understanding of the time, and of art’s ability
to evidence and contribute to prevailing discourses. 42 Rather than severing ties with tradition
through the repudiation of mimêsis, Pollock and other American artists recuperate mimêsis
within American Primitivism and through the representation of American Indian arts along
with their associated meanings and discourses.

Mimêsis and the American Indian in the Discourse of Pollock, Graham, Paalen, and Henderson

We have considered the broader scope of colonial Primitivism and how it differs
significantly from American Primitivism and its ties to the era’s Indian-episteme. These
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differences also demonstrate that American Primitivism carries forth the Indian-episteme and
embodies this within a unique style that precedes the divided critique of Pollock’s work, the
polemical-modern-episteme with its hierarchies and discourses. With further analysis we can
look to two key figures, John Graham and Wolfgang Paalen, for their contributions to
American Primitivism. We can also revisit the subject of American Indian inspired content in
the drawings Pollock gave to Henderson. Within the larger view of the Indian-episteme,
American Primitivism, and Pollock’s work, we can establish a scientific and theoretical
ground for understanding the way in which Pollock’s work continues art principles of the
Indian-episteme within the broader scope of his work.
We have already discussed (in Chapter One) the primary art schools wherein the
American Indian arts and themes were aestheticized and promoted: the Santa Fe School, the
Pacific Northwest Coast School, and the New York School. In New York City and American
Primitivism, some of the artistic interest in pictographic, ideographic, stenographic,
primitive, and indigenous was generated by the Russian-born immigrant artist John Graham.
Graham had studied in Paris in the 1920s and it was there that he became a devotee of
Picasso and Primitivism. When he immigrated to the United States he studied at the Art
Students League with John Sloan, who we have already seen was very active in promoting
Native American art in New York and Sante Fe, and Indian inspired subjects in modern art.
As Rushing explains, “Graham recalled with pride that he was a student of Sloan, whom he
described as the greatest teacher of any nationality he had ever known. Upon Sloan’s passing
in 1951 Graham noted with great emotion that his former teacher ‘has always been to me the
most inspiring person’ in art” (qtd. Rushing, “Native” 217).. 43 Graham was an artist, theorist,
and art historian, expert in Prehistoric, African, Oceanic, Mexican-Pre-Columbian, North
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American Indian, and Modern art. He became a well-known connoisseur and dealer in
primitive art objects from Africa and Oceania, dealing especially in small sculptures at his
“The Primitive Arts” gallery in Greenwich where he sold his own artwork and primitive
objects he gathered from abroad (Landau 80). He became part of the essential New York
avant-garde, along with Gottlieb, Newman, Pollock, Pousette-Dart, Rothko and others who
believed that Native American art, with its emphasis on myth, primordial origins, rituals, and
symbols, was viable as a means by which modern art could transcend the social and political
issues of the era.
Graham was also a follower of Jungian thought and he incorporated Jungian ideas into
his Systems of Dialectics, 1937, which was highly influential among the primitivist artists.
Gottlieb, Pollock, Pousette-Dart and others all owned copies. In the System Graham stresses
the belief that American Indian art most specifically continues to be a relevant art form
because it connects Prehistoric art with modern and contemporary art and thereby shows the
validity of its forms and subjects. He believed that “all great art is ceremonial” (qtd. Rushing,
“Native” 123). He writes, “The purpose of art in particular is to reestablish a lost contact
with the unconscious (actively by producing works of art), with the primordial racial past and
to keep and develop this contact in order to bring to the conscious mind the throbbing event
of the unconscious mind” (Rushing, “Ritual” 273-274). Graham also wrote the article
“Primitive Art and Picasso” printed in the Magazine of Art, April 1937, which was
influential among the New York primitivist artists. Pollock also owned a copy of this article
and met with Graham in 1937, the year it was published (Langhorne 47). In the article,
Graham furthered his thesis by analyzing Eskimo and North American masks, and Tlingit,
Kwakiutl, and Haida carvings. But he also made it clear in the article that he was not a

186

follower of Picasso’s Cubism (Rushing, “Ritual” 273-274). Graham’s interest was in myths
and universal content, not as subject-less pure form. After both showing works at the
McMillen Gallery, 1942, Graham and Pollock became friends united in their interests in the
primitive and Primitivism. In an interview about Graham and Pollock’s relationship, Willem
DeKooning was asked if Graham discovered Pollock. DeKooning explains, “Of course he
did. Who the hell picked him out? The other critics came later – much later. Graham was a
painter as well as a critic. It was hard for other artists to see what Pollock was doing – their
work was so different from his. It’s hard to see something that’s different from your work.
But Graham could see it” (qtd. Friedman, “Energy” 54). Graham’s influence on Pollock was
seminal and may help to explain Pollock’s continued interest in American Indian art and why
he remained committed to figuration, even when it was veiled and obscured in his drip
works.
It was Graham, Fritz Bulman and Pollock’s second Jungian analyst Violet de Laszlo who
went with Pollock to the earlier mentioned MoMA Indian Art show, 1941. It was there
Pollock had watched sand painters create and destroy paintings at its entrance. Polcari writes
that, “That show had been crucial to the development of his goal of an art of ritual,
generative force, and altered consciousness, and significantly, as a result of seeing it, he
adopted forms from several different Native American cultures, some of which we have
seen” (Polcari, “Pollock” 83). Further, Pollock studied Inuit masks like those in Graham’s
article, “Picasso and the Unconscious”. Similar masks were also on display at the American
Museum of Natural History and were also illustrated and discussed in depth in the BAE
Eighteenth Annual Report, 1896-97, pt 1, which Pollock had collected, as well as in other
Annual Reports Pollock owned. As an avid collector of American Indian arts and author and
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theorist on indigenous and modern art, Graham was united with Pollock’s interests in
indigenous American arts, subjects, themes and forms. Like the artists of the Santa Fe and
Pacific West Coast schools, the New York school participated in the epistemic interest in the
American Indian. But this interest became a long-term passion in Pollock’s work, not for its
abstracted forms, but for its mimetic, representational, symbolic, metaphorical, and
allegorical possibilities. In this respect, Pollock’s work amounts to a drastic departure from
Picasso’s pure and later Cubist form, rather than the fulfillment of it.
Another key figure in alignment with Pollock’s interests in recuperating the indigenous
spirit in art is the artist theorist Wolfgang Paalen. Paalen immigrated to New York two
months before the diaspora of wartime European Surrealist refugees. Six months before the
“First Papers of Surrealism” exhibit at the Art of This Century gallery, Paalen made it clear
that, just as Graham separated himself from Cubism, Paalen was separating himself from the
Surrealist group. Paalen wanted to initiate a new mode that would be a “synthesis of the
implications of modern science [anthropology] and modern art” (Paalen and Sawin i). Paalen
wrote about and collected masterpieces of Pacific Northwest Coast Indian art. His journal
DYN, which was devoted to anthropological studies of Indian art, was distributed in New
York at the Gotham Book Mart, which was a regular meeting place for New York artists (i).
Paalen’s special interest issue of DYN, in December of 1943, focused on a variety of
American Indian topics. In the preface Paalen wrote, “Occidental art had experienced an
osmosis with Asia, Africa, and Oceana, and “now it has become possible to understand why
a universal osmosis is necessary, why this is the moment to integrate the enormous treasure
of Amerindian forms into the consciousness of modern art….To a science already universal
but by definition incapable of doing justice to our emotional needs, there must be added as its
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complement, a universal art: these two will help in the shaping of the new, the indispensable
world-consciousness” (qtd. Rushing, “Ritual” 274-5). Paalen sought to unite the myths and
images of Oceanic and African arts with those of the Americas. The journal ran for two
years, publishing a total of six issues, but seven essays from the collection were republished
in 1945 in the book Form and Sense, also by Paalen. As Martica Sawin explains, “With the
dearth of forward-looking writing on art in those final months of World War II, Paalen’s
modest book took on a prophetic aspect, as it set forth a program for art in a postwar world at
the dawn of the atomic age. The fact that works by Pollock as well as Robert Motherwell,
William Baziotes, David Hare, and former Surrealists Roberto Matta and Gordon Onslow
Ford, were reproduced in the book (as well as in the last issue of DYN) is evidence of
Paalens’s intention to claim these artists for his new movement” (i). Motherwell painted
some of his earliest works in Paalen’s studio and translated Paalen’s publication from French
to English for New York readers.
Pollock’s Bird, 1938-41 was featured in DYN with an accompanying article by Paalen
that compared the meaning of the American Indian fire bird with that of an ancient Greek
mythological bird in flight (Fig. 49, 50). The bird appears in profile, head with one eye
looking outward and outstretched wings. On the bird’s chest we again see an upside down
Haida embryonic motif that Pollock used in many of his drawings and his painting MoonWoman Cuts the Circle. Paalen writes, “The great cosmic symbolizations, through all
differences of epoch and of race, remain astonishingly alike. Perhaps a new interpretation of
the myth of Prometheus will reveal, by analogy, the significance of the Mexican myth” (6).
Like Graham, Paalen sought to unite a burgeoning discourse on American Indian arts with
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trends in European anthropology and structuralism, and both artists were aligned with
Pollock’s aims at evoking American Indian arts and subjects in modern art.

Figure 49 Jackson Pollock, Bird, 1938-41, Oil and sand on canvas, 27 3/4 x 24 1/4" (70.5 x 61.6 cm), MoMA, New York

190

Figure 50 Cover, DYN, Amerindian Issue, Wolfgang Paalen, ed.

Given his associations with Graham and Paalen, might we entertain the possibility that
Pollock entered Jungian psychotherapy analysis with Henderson for aesthetic purposes, as
part of his overall inquiry into art, archetypes, and native aesthetics? Pollock entered
psychotherapy shortly after he began associating with Graham, and when we consider the
fact that Pollock sought Graham out, his interest in working with Henderson was also
probably based on a working paradigm of the representation of indigenous subjects and
forms. While Henderson gave long written explanations of archetype forms, Graham taught
viscerally, in terms of imbuing artworks with magic (Rushing, “Native” 183-4). Considering
the evidence of Pollock’s sketches while under Henderson’s care suggests that Pollock’s
interests in Henderson may have been more artistic than previously understood. Much of our
understanding of Pollock’s interests in American Indian arts comes from a study of the many
drawings Pollock gave to Henderson (which are now in the permanent collection of the
Museum of Fine Arts, Boston). Generally used as evidence for a Jungian critique, as we have
mentioned earlier in Chapter Two, the eighty-three drawings and one gouache painting that
Pollock gave to Henderson reveal several key ideas regarding American Indian arts upon
which Pollock experimented, with imagery related to animal figures like the bull, horse,
serpent, and bird, improvisations on dancing figures and figures in promenade, signs like
totems, arrows, shields, masks, birds, and primitive designs derived from North American
and Mexican Indians.
Henderson believed that the drawings were evidence that Pollock was evolving into an
improved psychological state in conjunction with a ‘new’ ordering of universal symbols such
as the cross, circle, square, mandala, axis mundi, and other elements that were meant to
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symbolize an increasingly harmonious whole. Because of this, the drawings have been cited
as evidence for the psychoanalytic critique of Pollock’s work. However, the drawings were
neither dated nor numbered, and they were not specifically made for Henderson (in many
cases they relate to a body of work created before Pollock’s time in therapy). As mentioned
earlier, Henderson arranged the drawings in a way so as to show progress in Pollock’s
psychological state of mind. In a display of epistemic acumen, Henderson used Jungian
thought to organize Pollock’s work in a way that confirmed Jungian ideas, subsuming new
‘evidence’ into the existing Jungian paradigm.
Drawings listed as number two and three respectively were claimed to be examples of
Pollock’s periods of “violent agitation” marked by Pollock’s inability to render any clear
shape or figure. His drawings during this stage of his psychological progress were marked by
agitated, impulsive lines devoid of clear intentions. In a state of supposed psychological
withdrawal, Pollock created tightly compacted compositions with highly articulated
compartments that frame figures and forms. Henderson cited plate number ten as an example
of Pollock’s introversion. Henderson wrote that, “All energy seems to have been drawn from
the upper “conscious” region which appears lifeless, wooden and anguished. The life force or
psychic energy is represented by a huge snake (lower center) which denotes the unconscious
and upon which the human figure is completely and dependently attached” (qtd. Wysuth 10).
But this plate could be interpreted any number of ways, including a view that reads the grimreaper like figure as a type of personification that steps over the horses and their riders who
have fallen to the ground. Being that they are wooden type figures, the horses take on a
mythic appearance that makes one readily think of epic of Troy. Overall, Henderson saw
positive progress in Pollock’s mental state in plates number thirty, thirty-six, and fifty-seven.
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In these plates he believed the symbols such as Haida embryonic forms, arrows, skeletal
figures, and vertical designs compositions were less tortured and imbued with psychic
energy.
Following a prolonged period of representing human figures and animals in an
anguished, dismembered or lamed condition, Henderson claims that he witnessed a new
development in Pollock’s drawings. He writes,
This was not merely the dissociation of schizophrenia, though he was
frequently close to it. It has seemed to me a parallel with similar states of
mind ritually induced among tribal societies or in shamanistic trance states. In
this light the patient appears to have been in a state similar to the novice in a
tribal initiation rite during which he is ritually dismembered at the onset of an
ordeal whose goal is to change him from a boy into a man. (10)
Henderson’s emphasis on “schizophrenia”, “states of mind”, and “shamanistic trance states”
serve to interpret Pollock’s work along Jungian thought. But regardless of any other
references in the drawings, we clearly see that the drawings have overt references to tribal
symbolism and Native American signs and imagery. We could ask to what degree these
forms indicate Pollock’s mental state, but more relevant is the question as to what evidence
do the drawings contribute to our understanding of a paradigm that sought for an authentic
form of American Primitivism?
Two separate drawings in India ink, watercolor, and crayon show how Pollock
interpreted the Navajo thunderbird into a more universal supra-symbol, bedecked with a
feathered headdress and hovering above austere landscapes. Both drawings were given to
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Pollock’s second psychiatrist, de Laszlo, who began treating Pollock after Henderson left
New York City. De Laszlo indicated that Pollock was “engrossed in the activity of the
Navajo painters of the Singing Chant as they fashioned their images by spilling tinted sand
on the floor” at the Museum of Modern Art’s exhibit Indian Art of the United States 1941,
which we know Pollock attended several times over (Heidelberg 24). In this exhibition
Pollock had gazed upon various art objects (including masks) and observed the diversity of
forms, signs, symbols, and art practices such as sand painting, that allude to sacred and
powerful access points to the metaphysical (Fig. 51).

Figure 51 Navajo Sand Painters at MoMA, “Indian Art of the United States” 1941 exhibit

Pollock’s obsessions with indigenous American art and particularly with Navajo sand
painting is manifested through his direct the reiteration of Haida and Navajo symbols in
many of the drawings he had given to Henderson. 44
Looking at the studies overall, what can we conclude about Pollock’s interests and
experiments in art? First, many of the studies are clearly based on Bentonesque volumes.
Further, these may have some imagery that was possibly inspired by Picasso’s Guernica,
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although theses associations are fluid and circumspect rather than exact quotations and
reiterations. To understand this claim it helps to know that Guernica was first exhibited at the
Valentine Gallery in New York in early 1939 (Fig. 52).

Figure 52 Pablo Picasso, Guernica, 1937. Oil on canvas. 349 cm × 776 cm, Museo Reina Sofia, Madrid.

Then the painting was exhibited in a retrospective of Picasso’s work called Forty Years of
Picasso’s Art, which was held at MoMA from November 1939 until January 1940, a time
that corresponds with Pollock’s visits with Henderson. Elizabeth L. Langhorne claims that
Picasso had a tremendous influence on Pollock’s work. She writes, “In Picasso Pollock
discovered his artistic master, the artist after whom he would strive to model himself, but
from whom he would simultaneously seek to distance himself so as to clear an imaginative
space in which to individuate as an artist” (Langhorne 65). Langhorne continues to show how
through Jungian archetypes, mystical Yoga and American Indian art, Pollock “initiated the
challenge to Picasso” rather than extending Picasso’s theories (64). References to Picassoesque imagery can also be seen to possess Indian inspired motifs and symbols drafted within
Bentonesque forms and principles. More specifically, of the sketches collected by
Henderson, plates 1, 10, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 31, 48, 49, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63 and to a
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lesser extent, 77 are clear studies on Bentonesque volume with modeling, shading, and
emphasize anthropomorphic or totemic forms and figures. Plate 10 features symbolically
colored figures piled on top of each other with one figure in ochre reaching up out of the pile,
looking upward with outstretched arms and hands (Fig. 53).

Figure 53 Jackson Pollock, Plate 1, Untitled Drawing

The figures present us with an understanding of Pollock’s sense of compact design,
monumental narratives, and experimentation on flattening volumes without losing the
content of such volumes and forms. For example, he combines diverse smaller inscriptions
amidst monumental myths, a figure amongst wooden horses, and a human figure draped over
a coiled snake. Plate 25 contains an Escher-like labyrinth of a totemic figure folding in on
itself. Each drawing gives us glimpses at the creative mind working out representation,
monumentality, and mythic narratives. It’s clear Pollock mastered draftsmanship and volume
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and was looking at other means by which a story could be told in terms of signs and symbols
(Fig. 54).

Figure 54 Jackson Pollock, Plate 25, Untitled Drawing

In Plate 58 Pollock experimented with the ideas of masking and morphology but not at
the expense of weight, modeling, and volume (Fig. 55). In the imagery, which seems to be a
mother and child, the identities of the two figures merge and morph into two-dimensional
masks that obscure identity within the pseudo-identities the masks create.

Figure 55 Jackson Pollock, Plate 58, Untitled Drawing
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At first glance this image seems to be a clear replication of Picasso’s surrealist works. But on
further investigation, and in looking at the drawings and sketches as a whole, it is clear that
Pollock treated symbolic forms with a primary sense of volume, scale, and composition. It is
entirely unfeasible to suggest that he adopted Picasso’s Cubism, or Surrealism for that
matter, for Pollock’s works contain strong narratives of mythic proportions. This is not to say
that Picasso’s later works are not mimetic, but that the present discourse on Picasso has
interpreted his Cubist and Surrealist works for their formalism. It is this precisely a refutation
of abstract formalism that differentiates Pollock’s drawings from the early formal works of
Picasso. In Pollock’s drawing the figures have weight and volume and powerful wide-eyed
expressions on the two morphing masks and power in the mother’s outstretched hand that all
suggest a narrative or myth with an intendant meaning and moral. Picasso’s formal work
might have influenced Pollock’s sense of abstraction, but any lost content in Picasso’s work
is supplanted by Pollock’s content-laden drawings and sketches. For they are based less on a
fracturing of the surface plane and more about the creation of new mythic composite
voluminous phantoms – far more related to Indian totemic composite creatures than Picasso’s
reiteration of abstract form. It is impossible to conflate Pollock’s imagery with Cubist form
because Pollock’s images move within the dynamic energy of unfolding narratives.
One of the most telling drawings is plate 31. In comparison to Picasso’s Primitivism,
Pollock’s coiled steed expresses an intensity and emotional impact that transgresses the
notion of pure form (Fig. 56). The figure appears to be on the verge of springing upward and
outward in response to a dramatic narrative. The drawing, in light of the overall oeuvre of
drawings and paintings witnesses a continued lack of formalist rationality, because the
drawings’ abstracted forms are overshadowed by a sense of dramatic and unrelenting mythic
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narrative. The steed emerges from the confines of its own block- like structure like
Pygmalion’s bride arising from the stone. With bared teeth the steed flairs its nostrils. Its
twisted bent neck threatens to uncoil at any moment, while the steed’s hair blows in the wind.
Rather than one of Picasso’s static, fractured, and dismantled bulls of his early abstractions
(and not his mimetic later works), Pollock’s steed threatens to charge. We see a myth
emerging in our anticipation of the end result of this coiled energy. Yet the drawing achieves
that key balance indicative of great art: the equal juxtaposition of form and representation,
mimêsis in terms of accurate renditions of nature as narrative and in this case, nature in
impending action. The drawing suggests a high level of “significant content” though not
entirely without significant or rather volume-rich form.

Figure 56 Jackson Pollock, Plate 31, Untitled Drawing

In light of this unfolding argument for Pollock’s use of mimetic form it is clear that
Picasso, though considered to be one of the primary advocates for pure form in art, also has a
large body of mimetic works from his earliest Rose and Blue phases to the mimetic
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abstractions of his latest works. This paper does not suggest that Picasso eschewed mimesis
throughout all of his works. Rather this comparison takes its point of departure from only a
small portion of Picasso’s extensive oeuvre, namely his experimentation with pure form in
his primitivist and cubist works. However, Pollock’s critics, from Greenberg to Langhorn
and others continue to compare the two artists with the result that Pollock extends Picasso’s
Cubism (Greenberg) or his Surrealist works (Langhorn). To realize how divergent Pollock’s
works are from that of Picasso’s, we can look at the differences between Pollock’s primitivist
works and those of Picasso’s to see that before Cubism and Surrealism, Pollock had already
embraced mimetic representation in terms of naturalistic (or illusionary) volumes and weight,
mythic narratives, and an indigenous aesthetic.
Overall, we can see that even in creating small scale studies, Pollock had a keen interest
in ordering compositions. Out of the eighty-three images, at least thirty-one drawings and the
gouache painting show a definite sense of composition and completion. In these drawings the
elemental parts are magnified yet tightly compacted, giving precedent to a sense of the
monumental by ratio of available space to imagery size. For example, in Pollock’s twentyone and a half by fifteen-and-a-half-inch gouache painting, four monumental figures fill the
frame and appear to be larger than life. In each case, Pollock penciled in a tightly composed
arrangement of juxtaposing volumes that allude to three dimensions against dynamically
merging parts, all while concealing and revealing suggestions of concrete and mythic forms.
Overall, images fill the given space evenly, with clear balance between the parts as well as
the negotiation between negative and positive space. The images are intentionally arranged
within the given confines of the borders with no apparent attempts to transgress such borders.
Nearly all of the drawings suggest a sense of well-composed completion.
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Similar findings are seen in Pollock’s sketchbooks presently in the permanent collection
at The Metropolitan Museum of Art. These sketchbooks include three notebooks, labeled as
Sketchbook I, II, and III by the museum. The sketchbooks date from 1937 to 1941,
overlapping the supposed dates of the sketches collected by Henderson. Sketchbooks I and II
indicate the type of studies Pollock learned from Benton, studies of Old Masterworks that
diagramed composition, movement, and volumes. Unlike the sketches Pollock gave to
Henderson, the note book sketches are dated, making timely interpretations possible. One of
the problematic issues with the Metropolitan sketches is that the third notebook, or notebook
labeled III, has been interpreted along the lines of the modernist tradition. They are believed
to be evidence of Pollock’s departure from Benton-like forms into a transition through
Orozco and the Mexican muralists, Picasso, Surrealism, and finally to abstraction, or more
specifically an emotion-laden Abstract Expressionism. However, Natalie Maria Roncone has
analyzed the third notebook to show the close relationship the sketches therein have to
Benton’s lessons on form and composition. For example, as Roncone demonstrates, sketches
like that in Plate 2r, Sketchbook III, shows strong affinities to compositional and figurative
design in El Greco’s Adoration of the Shepherds, 1608. Both compositions are pyramidal in a
structure that bears sinuous voluminous albeit floating forms. In what appears to be three
versions of El Greco’s composition, figures and animals become enlarged, moved, and
recolored, yet retain their function as supporting casts members to a larger drama. As
Roncone writes, “The agitated drawing, attenuated figures, eye-cracking tonal shifts, brittle
planes and unstable spaces articulate Pollock’s expressive take on El Greco’s ecstatic
devotional painting” (Rancone 29). As in notebooks I, II, and III, and as we can see in the
Henderson studies, Pollock often chose to forego concrete settings, instead focusing on
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placement of totemic and figurative volumes that play out mythic narratives within either
open vistas or dense architectural supports.
What is most striking about Pollock’s drawings overall, however, is the fact that in each
(with the exception of plate eighty-two), Pollock invents American Indian inspired imagery
that plays out in mythic narratives and dramas. In some plates, this imagery is overtly Native
American. 45 For example, in plate 7, a bald eagle emerges supremely from the composite,
even totemic of parts of a bull, human, and other animal parts (Fig. 57). The arrangement of
the parts within a hierarchical structure, along with an emotional content which is shown on
the faces of the bull, gives the composition a narrative quality. Instinctively we know we are
looking, not at a formal arrangement of various unrelated parts, but rather at a complete
narrative that features a culmination of drama, and a hint at resolution. Pollock’s
commitment to American Indian imagery, in this case in terms of the symbolic eagle or
thunderbird, is also evident in two drawings that were given to de Laszlo (Fig. 58, 59).

Figure 57 Jackson Pollock, Plate 7, Untitled Drawing
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Figure 58 Jackson Pollock, Untitled Drawing

Figure 59 Jackson Pollock, Untitled Drawing

Instead of being a collection of unified Jungian archetypes or a witness to the formalism of
European Primitivism, we have before us an encyclopedic investigation into a wide variety of
signs and forms (many of which are experiments upon indigenous aesthetic thought), built
upon Bentonesque volumes. Most importantly, this collective visual material indicates that
Pollock was clearly seeking for a new vernacular in which to convey a difficult subject – not
the self and its particular mental states, but a collective and universal syntax which might
express the multi-epistemic exigencies of the present in a way that harmonized with past
forms. The drawings given to Henderson, along with sketchbooks and paintings, demonstrate
Pollock’s experimentation with mimêsis as representation and mythic drama. Pollock
associated with Graham and Paalen during the formative years in which he developed his
characteristic style. His sketches and artworks suggest his keen interests in representing
American Indian symbols and forms. These interests were very much aligned with the
pursuits in art, literature, and theory shared by Graham and Paalen. While Henderson was a
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Jungian analyst who appropriated Pollock’s sketches for a psychoanalytic critique of healing,
it is clear from the collective of Pollock’s sketches, that Pollock was experimenting with
ways in which to evoke and even recuperate the indigenous spirit in art. Pollock’s
sketchbooks indicate his strong commitment to figuration and his continued commitment to
represent American Indian arts and themes. In Pollock, the Indian-episteme is seen in its
fullest and most enduring representation.

Conclusion

There are three key points to remember in our discussion on Picasso and Pollock.
First, European Primitivism derives from a long tradition wherein art envisions through
mimêsis prevailing socio-political concerns and circumstances. But art’s envisioning
functions and modes become obsolete with Picasso’s emphasis on the formal properties of art
in his primitivist works. Second, American Primitivism is borne out of an enduring Indianepisteme which is uniquely American. In so doing, American Primitivism returns mimetic
function to art, particularly in the works of Pollock. Third, interpretive theories have
overlooked the persistence of mimetic indigenous elements in Pollock’s work, and in the
works of the other American primitivist painters as well. These theories on Pollock’s work
are divided between the formal properties of art and the subjective content of art as per the
modernist and psychoanalytic critiques respectively. The result of Pollock and his
contemporaries’ experiments with indigenous forms is that mimêsis, absent in Picasso’s
primitivist works, is returned to art, along with its associations to envisioning socio-politics,
necessitating a new way to articulate or interpret Pollock’s work as mimetic.
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First, Picasso’s form of Primitivism breaks art from its traditional role of imitating the
natural world. In so doing it severs art from its relationships to historical meanings and
associations within socio-political paradigms. Drawing upon a discourse in art and politics,
European Primitivism envisioned the indigenous as a foreign “other” personified by female
figures that associate nature, land, and territory, with ethnicity. Within these associations,
power and hierarchies are embedded within the image and viewer responses such as the gaze
and all that it entails. But Picasso’s emphasis on form at the expense of content disappropriates the female figure, rendering it meaningless, without associations to place, time,
people and culture. Picasso repudiates representational content or mimêsis (at least in his
primitivist works) for a style based on pure form and the outer geometries and colors of
denatured objects.
Secondly, we have seen that, in opposition to Picasso’s abstract forms, there is a
specific and tangible content in American Primitivism that returns “significant content” or
mimêsis to art, and this return has come about through the recuperation of indigenous arts
along with its forms and symbols that evoke ancient myths. Figuration, representation, and
American Indian symbols, are predominant in Pollock’s work, and in the work of several key
American primitivist artists including Newman, Rothko, Pousette-Dart, Gottlieb, Graham,
and others. With the incorporation of mimêsis in the form of American Indian arts into
modern art, the American Primitivists return the associations of land, origins, myth, culture,
and meaning to art. Operating within multiple epistemes (including the Indian-episteme and
the polemical modern-episteme), art becomes again a signifying structure that personifies the
meanings of socio-political discourses. Pollock was not alone in conflating the primitive as a
new mode with modern art. But perhaps he experimented with these notions longer than his
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contemporaries, including Newman, for even in Pollock’s last drip paintings we now know
that there are both hidden and unconcealed figures that witness to his continued commitment
to representation.
Thirdly, a divided theory has been at a loss to account for the existence of this
pertinent style and its associations within a prevailing Indian-episteme, even though Newman
identified and qualified the American Primitivist movement as, “spontaneous, and emerging
from several points” as “a new force in American painting that is the modern counterpart of
the primitive art impulse” (Newman 566). Neither the abstract modernist nor the
psychoanalytic views can fully account for the purposes to which artists explored American
Indian themes within matters of outer abstract form or what Newman called “non-objective
pattern” and Bell considered “significant form”. Although Newman makes it clear in his
essay “The Ideographic Picture” that American artists were returning to mimêsis as a form of
signification which also re-presented American Indian symbols and themes, neither side of
the polemical modern-critique acknowledges this end and how their modes and techniques
clearly set them apart from the abstraction of Picasso’s Primitivism and Cubism and
Surrealist autonomism. Newman explains the theory which Graham, Paalen, and the
American Primitivists worked to create by saying “It is now time for the artist himself…to
make clear the community of intention that motivates him and his colleagues. For here is a
group of artists who are not abstract painters, although [they are] working in what is known
as the abstract style” [Italics mine] (566). Clearly the division in art between formalist
tendencies and mimetic content are felt in Newman’s essay and in the minds of artists
working in the Primitive style. While working with abstraction, they wanted to be known for
returning content to art. These issues regarding form and content, and appropriating symbols
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to portray a uniquely American art were valued by artists and theorists, and combined, their
works constitute a discourse of art and theory based on uniquely American paradigms which
speak to American socio-politics of the era, rather than to pure form.
By appropriating indigenous forms and symbols, Pollock and American Primitivism
return significant content (with its associations with land, cultural practices, and
iconography) or rather, mimêsis to significant form. This fact has been entirely overlooked by
the critical discourse on Pollock as Greenberg and others who promote quintessential
modernists that repudiate imitation in lieu of pure form and abstract gesture. It is likewise
ironic that both the abstract modern and the psychoanalytic critique have neglected to
account for the indigenous elements as belonging to a unique and separate American
paradigm. Both sides of the polemical modern-episteme have appropriated Pollock’s work
for their own purposes of pure form, gesture, and Jungian-shamanistic healing. Neither
critique has considered Pollock’s continued commitment to aestheticize American Indian arts
within all phases of his artistic output.
We have identified the representational qualities in Pollock’s art and have labeled
them as “significant content”. We have seen that these representational qualities constitute
content which is drastically different from Picasso’s “significant form” or pure abstract form.
We have also looked at how “significant content” establishes a ground for a theory on
Pollock’s recuperation of the indigenous spirit through mimêsis. We have not seen that
mimetic works of art need be constructed as accurate depictions of nature. Rather, in iconic
representation such as in personifications, fictitious settings (such as in the works of French
exotic primitivism), and in the abstract representations of Pollock, Dart-Pousette, Gottlieb
and others, meaning is retained alike. That which designates meaning is the subjects and their
207

relations in a work of art. In Picasso’s abstract Primitivism it is precisely his intention to
emphasize the formal properties of art over subjects in art that disrupts artistic cultural and
political meanings. Situating the differences between pure form and representation in art, we
see that the divide between Picasso and Pollock coordinates with a larger dualism in art and
critical theory, and particularly in the divided formalist and Jungian theories regarding
Pollock’s work. But prior to the divided critique of Pollock, the most blatant example of
modern art’s disregard for mimêsis and the resulting schism in modern art, is found in the
origins and outcomes of European Primitivism, particularly in the work of Picasso. To
understand Picasso’s achievement is to first understand the schism in modern art and art
criticism and second, to recognize the role of mimêsis in the split. Having now exposed such
critical blind spots, we now can expand upon a theory of mimêsis to more fully analyze how
Pollock recuperates the indigenous spirit.
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Chapter Four
Mimêsis and its Forms

I believe easel painting to be a
dying form, and the tendency of
modern feeling is toward the
wall picture or mural.
Jackson Pollock

Introduction

In light of American interests in claiming for themselves a nascent and developing pre
and post-War self-identity, Pollock retained a commitment to the influences of an Indianepisteme while situating himself squarely within the developing politicized aesthetic contest
which we have defined as the modernist-polemical theory. We have already looked at
Pollock’s commitment to representation within his Primitive works and drawings and the
placement of hidden figures within his drip paintings. This discussion looks further at these
tendencies in terms of the forms of mimêsis in order to demonstrate the broader way in which
mimêsis is at play in Pollock’s works. First, this discussion seeks to augment an
impoverished definition of mimêsis as verisimilitude by looking at the ends to which mimêsis
has been historically defined. Second, this discussion looks at the history of mimêsis in order
to locate two primary forms of mimêsis and to recuperate the source of their decline in
modern art. Third, this discussion questions how decline in the importance of mimêsis (as in
Picasso’s Primitivism for example) might account for the broader polemical-modernist
theory, or what we might call the schism in modern art. From these considerations we will
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see how mimêsis accounts for both verisimilitude and idealized representation, and can thus
be applied to both the figurative and abstract elements in Pollock’s paintings, even within the
large context of a divisive modern art.
Central to this discussion of mimêsis is the notion of pointing toward. The irony is
that, whether constructed in terms of abstract form or in the representation of the natural
world, art points to or refers to something even when that something is itself. Art is
representational and depends upon vision as well as perception, and the interpretation and
agreement of meanings. Even abstract art manifests an idea, transcribing it from one form
(such as in the intellect or in nature) into a system of signification along with its signs and
signifiers. But as we have seen, art based on its forms points only to itself and not to the
larger world of things, ideas, and the broader socio-political discourse. Robert Williams
explains the nature of art as a signifier in declaring, “When a picture succeeds in creating an
illusion, it can be said to point beyond itself. It points in this way when it suggests physical
presence; it points further when it represents a story or an emotional state or a type of
character; further still when it gives form to ideals of physical beauty or moral perfection, or
attempts to express complex philosophical truths” (Williams 17). This pointing function of
art is key to our understanding of how art is mimetic. It directs our attention to that which it
signifies. Thus, this chapter looks at mimêsis beyond the modern usage of the term to
uncover its forms in naturalistic and idealistic representation and in context with its
historiography in modern art and philosophy.
Certainly, from our brief overview of European and American primitivist trends, we
see that Picasso broke all ties to primitivist traditions through the repudiation of mimêsis in
exchange for an art based on abstract form devoid of significant content (not in his later or
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earliest works, but in his Primitivism and Cubism). But the American primitivist tradition
demonstrates a commitment to return to art its signifying role, denoting a paradigmatic
discourse through mimêsis as an engagement with (or a reaching out to) that which is
mimetically represented, namely American Indian art traditions and myths. Within our
present view of the Indian-episteme, socio-political epistemes, and polemical-modernism, we
need to now ask how does the notion of the recuperation of mimêsis allow us to formulate a
theory that appeals to the concerns of the polemical-modern-episteme and the divided
theoretical interpretation of Pollock’s work? We will address this point in this section by
looking at mimêsis and its origins, as well as its decline, repudiation, and final recuperation.
Then we will proceed further to define the primary forms of mimêsis.

Mimêsis and Its Origins in Philosophy

Our initial foray into a discussion on mimêsis itself depends upon a basic
understanding of the term. Greek thought establishes our concrete understanding of mimêsis.
From the Greek word mimeisthai (μιμεῖσθαι), mimêsis is ‘to imitate’. Alternatively, mimêsis
has been interpreted as imitation, illusionistic, verisimilitude, and the representation or
copying of the natural world. Historically mimêsis establishes the criteria for judging art, and
determines that the accuracy of art’s imitation of nature forms the merit upon which good art
is based. For example, Pliny the Elder gives an account of an art contest and lavishly praises
the artist Parrhasius for having won the competition. As part of the feat, Zeuxis painted a still
life of grapes. The grapes were so realistic that a flock of birds pecked at them. Parrhasius
congratulated Zeuxis on his great accomplishment and then took Zeuxis to his studio to see
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his own masterpiece of realism. Zeuxis went to draw back a curtain to see the painting
behind it only to find that the curtain was actually and indeed the painting. While Zeuxis had
fooled birds, Parrhasius had deceived Zeuxis (Pliny 001:35:36). This view of mimêsis as a
form of verisimilitude, faithful illustration or copy, and the representation of nature, has
remained consistent throughout the classical era. But the definition and notion of mimêsis has
undergone many changes and presently has many nuanced meanings. Further, we have
earlier defined mimêsis, according to its ancient Greek origins, as representation, illustration,
or the faithful copy nature (verisimilitude). This definition applies to both Pollock’s artworks
and sketches, of which only a small fraction have been addressed here. But this is a bit
problematic because Pollock’s form of representation returns content to art but does so
through abstracted form. Our understanding of mimêsis must be enlarged in order to apply it
equally to both the representational and what appear to be the formal properties in Pollock’s
work. While this point is less important in his primitivist works, it is vital for identifying later
on the indigenous elements in his drip works. Therefore, we will return to the ancient
definitions of mimêsis as well as identify the changes and permutations of these definitions in
the modern era.
Mimêsis as Naturalistic Representation

Aristotle supports the naturalistic view of mimêsis as that which copies the empirical
world. He extends the ancient view that says that what is copied is implicated in a dialectic of
perception of the empirical world. First, Aristotle explains that art is mimetic because it
copies the natural world in the forms of mimicry, imitation, and representation. The faithful
representation of nature in art enables viewers to recognize nature and the plausibility of
natural consequences in art. As empirical objects and actions of the world are copied in art,
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the imitation enables viewers to experience these objects and actions. This relationship
between likeness and the empirical appearance of that which is being imitated, between the
world and its representation, is the key element of mimêsis for Aristotle (Heath xii).
Aristotle also declares that imitation is the means by which learning takes place, a point
which is addressed more fully in Chapter Six. For the present, Aristotle claims that nature is a
means by which one learns truth and it is art which facilitates such processes. In the Poetics,
Aristotle claims that the origin of art or at least poetry arose through natural means (Sallis
174). “Mimesis is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower
animals being this, that he is the most mimetic and learns at first by mimêsis” (Aristotle,
“Poetics” 1448b2). Just as children naturally engage in imitative play, and this attribute of
imitation belongs naturally to human character, poetry, art, and learning grow naturally out of
similar mimetic activities. Following Pre-Socratic and traditional Greek aesthetics, Aristotle
unitedly defines art as mimêsis in terms of recognition and representation.
Socratic thought, however, adds another dimension to our understanding of the nature of
representation. In articulating Socrates’ ideas, Plato is the first thinker to extensively explore
art and mimêsis in ways which inextricably link art with philosophy. In fact, it is art’s ability
to imitate which is precisely the concern Plato has with art. In Plato’s Republic, art deceives
through imitation. Rather than showing the real ideal or metaphysical truths, art can only
copy what exists in the natural world. In Plato’s hierarchy, the natural world is merely an
imitation of the ideal, so if the natural world is a copy of an ideal, then art is a copy of a copy
– a third rate copy far removed from the original truth (Sallis 174). For Plato, art objectifies
by making a copy, thus removing it from the ontological authenticity of that which is being
objectified, namely truth or the Ideals. Through imitation, art is inseparably linked to truth
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because of how it plays upon how truth is signified. For Plato, art imitates in a way that
obscures our views of the ideal.
Plato explains the problem with mimêsis through a dialogue between Socrates and
Glaucon (Plato, “Republic” 607b). Socrates asks, “What is mimêsis?” Using an example of a
couch, Socrates explains that there is the couch itself (or rather the perfect ideal) and then
there are many material couches made by craftsmen. The “Higher craftsman” makes all
things, including “all implements but also makes everything that grows naturally from the
earth.” He also “produces all animals – the others and himself too – and, in addition to that,
produces earth and heaven and gods and everything in heaven and everything in Hades under
the earth.” Socrates challenges Glaucon by saying that he could also make all things by
carrying a mirror about, thereby reproducing all things through imitation or likeness. Glaucon
answers, “Yes, appearances but not beings in truth” (596c-e). Plato’s point is that there are
real things, their imitations, and their reproduced appearances. Art images constitute a third
order – the order of mimêsis. But such order is deceptive because is antithetical to the
metaphysical truths – it is only a phantom of the real and not the real itself. “Therefore,
mimêsis is surely far from the truth” (598b). Plato is less concerned with representation and
more concerned that representation can be deceptive. It can only reproduce the appearances
of things. Plato’s concern is that things, whether in art or life, are perceptible through sight
and such visions can be deceptive.
Platonic thought is concerned with truth and its objective forms, which forms or ideals art
can imitate but not authentically produce, whereas Aristotelean thought claims that through
mimêsis, authentic forms of knowledge or truth arise in the experience and consciousness of
the viewer. From such ancient origins, mimêsis has gained an extensive philosophical
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tradition. Platonic opponents to mimêsis refer pejoratively to art’s role in copying,
illustrating, imitating, and “counterfeiting” nature (Halliwell, “Aesthetics” 14). But both
Plato and Aristotle agree that the mimetic is that which represents or copies another thing,
generally from nature. It is easy for us to recognize the naturalistic representation in
Pollock’s primitivist works, drawings, and hidden figures (even though these are often rather
abstract), and this is because the figures and symbols appear like that which they imitate or
represent. An abstract figure can be recognized as a simplified form of what it represents.
But such a limited view on mimêsis as mere imitation cannot fully address the arts’ many
functions and capacities of expression and representation, technique, psychological affects,
objects and modes (14). Naturalism alone fails to account for the way in which mimêsis is
more broadly an underlying condition of art than previously supposed. If anything, mimêsis
is more broadly applicable to all representational forms of art, accounting for not only
representation but idealism as well. While our present concern has been representation, and
namely the recuperation of the Indigenous American spirit in art, our concerns are also with
the nature of mimêsis as idealism and the way these forms are situated within the broader
contexts of the divisions between first, formalist and Jungian art criticism, and second, the
broader art dialectic between subject-content and formalism. Thus, we need to go beyond the
theories of naturalistic representation to formulate a theory of idealistic representation, as
found in Plato for help in addressing these issues.
Mimêsis as Idealistic Representation

It is easy to identify representational elements in art, for the copy or imitation of nature is
easy to identify given the way in which we see the world. But idealistic representation is a bit
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more difficult to recognize. Again, we turn to Plato for the articulation of symbolic or
idealistic representation. These ideas are largely outlined in Plato’s Symposium wherein Plato
applies mimêsis to his arguments concerning the Ideas, explaining that the regard of beauty is
obtained through the attainment of objects of desire that serve as mimetic devices along the
procession towards the ideal (129). In Plato’s Republic, mimêsis is characterized as that
which corrupts, but in his Symposium the soul comes to know and contemplate Beauty (as
one of the Ideals) by first coming into contact with inferior, even mimetic forms. In the
Symposium, a drinking party honors Agathon, who had recently won a prestigious poetry
competition, and here the party guests (Phaedrus, a heroic poet, the politician Pausanias, the
physician Eryximachus, the comic poet Aristophanes, and the poet Agathon) discuss the role
of love, desire and beauty in life, politics, and health. 46 Socrates summarizes the guests’
sentiments and clarifies the relationship between love, beauty, and philosophy.
First, Socrates both defines and personifies Love. First, Love is a symbol of lack. It is that
desire or feeling which points to that which one wishes to “have in the future” and is what
one presently lacks (Plato, “Symposium” 201a- 201b). Second, Love is an object, a
personification or a symbolic representation of the ideal. 47 Love is represented as a spirit. He
notes, “One should first define who Love is and what he is like, before talking about his
characteristic activity [italics mine]” (201c). Love then, is an ideal which is personified and
symbolized. But being that Love is both lack and object, the loved is objectified as the
beautiful being that is also the representation of what is lacking, which by reason must be
better in some way than that which the lover who lacks. Thus a connection between lack and
love are established, such that any object of desire, be it a beloved one or an object of wealth,
achievement, or even wisdom, is the fulfillment of love’s desire in promise but not in
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actuality. For lack impels one to move from one beautiful thing unto an even more beautiful
thing, in a progression, until one arrives at an understanding of the most beautiful, Beauty
itself in its unchanging and eternal nature. The Symposium dialectic illustrates the movement
from carnal desire to the love of beauty and the arts such as music or medicine, and then
from a spiritual yearning to find one’s other half to a desire for wisdom and beauty. Love is a
mediating force that inspires one to seek the greatest of all knowledge, the knowledge of the
Form of Beauty. Inextricably linked to the course of love are the symbolic objects of love,
from objects of desire to ideas of knowledge. These objects are mimetic representations or
symbols of higher or more ideal forms of the concept of love.
In this dialogue, love is relational, always pointing or directing itself to its object,
whether that be another individual or towards philosophy, or even Beauty itself. As Socrates
explains, one begins with a love of one beloved only to realize that the beauty of one is like
the beauty of all and such a one will become as Plato writes, “a lover of all beautiful bodies”
(210a). This understanding will lead one to regard the beauty in all souls and to value the
achievements and good deeds of the soul. Socrates explains that one “will realize the beauty
in souls is more to be prized than that in the body. If therefore someone’s soul is good even if
his physical attraction is slight, that will be enough for him” (210c). This will cause one to be
“compelled to contemplate the beautiful as it exists in human practices and laws” (210c).
Contemplation will then lead to a view of wisdom regarding the nature of beauty itself.
Socrates says, “he will turn towards the vast sea of the beautiful and while contemplating it
he will give birth to many beautiful, indeed magnificent, discourses and thoughts in a
boundless love of wisdom until there, strengthened and invigorated, he discerns a unique
kind of knowledge” which is the knowledge of Beauty itself (210c).
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Overall, love or eros is represented within a carefully designed argument that serves as a
method for arriving at a knowledge of the Ideal of Beauty. Beauty is arrived at through
movement from one mimetic object (or object standing in for meaning) to another in a
progressive movement within a hierarchical model (Plato and Howatson vii). In a similar
way that dialogues in Plato’s Republic lead the reader to knowledge of truth, the Symposium
leads the reader to a knowledge of Beauty. Therefore, abstract concepts such as love do not
supplant mimêsis, but rather gives mimêsis a new function in pointing to objects which serve
mimetically as objects of desire. We will now leave this point for another analysis, but
suffice it to say that Platonic thought, and its Neoplatonic forms, apply mimêsis within a
hierarchical structure that delivers viewers (or hearers) to a transcendent plane, an arrival at a
new truth beyond otherwise present understanding. The key issue to note in this dialogue is
that objects as representations are mimetically implicated in a dialectic between subject and
object, lack and attainment, movement and transcendence. Representational objects then are
those things which symbolically point to other things.
Plato’s Allegory of the Cave also illustrates the mimetic functions of symbolic devices
(in this case an allegory) that point to another thing (Plato, “Republic” 514a). In Plato’s cave,
puppeteers create shadows on the cave wall. But to the enlightened one who sees the
shadows for what they are, the shadows point to the puppeteers. Then the pointing goes from
the puppeteers to the cave itself and then to the brighter world beyond, and from the world
outside to the sunlight and from the sunlight to the form of Truth as that which illuminates.
Clearly this is one of the strange ironies in Platonic thought, that Plato uses symbolic
representation to illustrate his points. But Plato always has in mind the higher aim of
obtaining a truth to which mimêsis is applied. Whether in art, object, or symbolic language,
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what we have in Greek philosophy then is the attribution of mimêsis as that which is
connected inextricably with some form of representational pointing toward the Ideals, or
imitating nature in ways that transport viewers towards those Ideals. As in Aristotelian
didactic functions, Platonic mimêsis is the means by which the perception of knowledge is
attained. The issue of mimêsis is applicable to the function of art by accounting for not only
the representation of nature (as in Aristotelean thought), but as in beauty and symbolic
representation in Platonic idealism and philosophy as well. Henceforth, art and philosophy
have been inextricably linked. In our study Picasso’s repudiation of mimêsis is both a break
with European traditions in manifesting the colonial “other” and it is also a break with an
extensive discourse into the very nature of art as ideal and didactic forms of attaining
knowledge. 48 This break constitutes a schism in art and theoretical discourse in that it severs
art from both its signifying role as representation and its role in the symbolic mimetic
language of philosophy.
Mimêsis as Historically Defined

Because our concerns with mimêsis in Pollock’s works are both representational and
idealist in nature, a brief overview of mimêsis gives us a clearer understanding of what is at
stake when we analyze and interpret Pollock’s works. For our understanding of Pollock’s
works depends upon a definition of mimêsis along two primary forms: naturalistic
representation and idealist representation. Naturalistic representation is representation that we
recognize as an illustration or representation of an empirical object within the natural world.
Idealist representation is a bit more complicated as it pertains to iconology, the use of signs,
symbols, icons, emblems, allegories and metaphors and the like, wherein that which is seen
in the painting represents something else, such as a concept, meaning, narrative story or
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myth, or the like. Both of these two forms of representation have been in decline in art since
the onset of the modern era. Here is a brief overview of these forms and their decline.
By the third century CE, Platonic ideas regarding art and its relationship to truth had
overcome Aristotelian concerns with nature. Plotinus, the influential leader of a new school
of thought known as Neoplatonism, drew upon the ideas largely outlined in Plato’s
Symposium specifically pertaining to the beautiful and its ability to inspire and elevate the
soul. For Plotinus, objects of beauty inspire viewers to feel desire and to learn to perceive
beauty. In perceiving beauty, one comes to contemplate and yearn for yet a higher beauty
still. In a progression from a type of natural desire, to an indifferent aesthetic appreciation of
the beauty in nature and things, to finally a search for higher beauty which brings about the
contemplation and comprehension of the Beautiful, Good, and True, all beautiful objects are
symbolic or ideal representations of desire. As in the Symposium, the highest desire is beauty
and all things progressively point to beauty in a hierarchical and progressive way. Beauty is
what Plotinus calls the final contemplation, a unity or “world-soul” which then yields an
intuition into a single idea, the “world-mind”, which is the pinnacle concept that human
thought can ascertain (Williams, R. 3). But the attainment of such a unity is only arrived at
through the function of objects which mimetically point to greater things, upward and
onward along the transcendent journey. But in Plotinus’ thought, the symbolic representation
lies less in objects and more in the beauty of those objects, such that beauty is symbolic of
the Ideal of Beauty.
Plotinus notes that beauty is found in the natural world as well as in the arts, music,
dance, and the visual arts. Both objects in nature and art are symbolic representations of
divine beauty. In a hierarchical structure or worldview, Plotinus perceives levels of high and
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low realities “in a sequence that descends from the ultimate, transcendent source of all being,
the One, down through the mediating powers of nous (intellect) and psuchē (soul), to the
lower reaches of material nature” (Halliwell 314). Within this model, (as in Plato’s idealist
model) the lower objects of nature “constantly reach up to and strive to become like” the
higher realities, each in turn pointing to even higher realities which ultimately “constitute
their origins and causes” (314). Lower realities point to higher realities, and mimetically
represent them erstwhile the higher realities provide telos, purpose and patterns for being,
thereby drawing all lower forms upward. As Halliwell explains, “On the largest scale,
Plotinus can speak of the relationship between everything and the One as a case of mimêsis:
all things aspire to the eternity and goodness embodied in the first principle of the cosmos”
(314). All things are thus related, point to, and are implicated in a cosmic upward moving (or
hierarchical) mimêsis.
By virtue of its pointing or representational quality, beauty is also a form of mimêsis.
It exists and functions in the hierarchical notion of mimêsis in its progressive form, as the
destination of contemplation. Beauty is represented in the intellect (nous) or works of the
imagination and the ideals of the soul (psuchē) (314). Imitations of beauty are also acts of recreation, symbols of “natural or divine creation”. In this way, any beautiful object, whether in
nature or imagination, is a representation of divinity. Plotinus explains that, “If, again, we
mean beauty in relation to ourselves as spectators in whom it produces a certain experience,
this Act (of production) is Motion,--and none the less Motion by being directed towards
Absolute Beauty” (Mackenna and Page 62). Thus Plotinus reverses Plato’s belief that art is a
third-rate copy or phantom of truth while retaining Plato’s use of symbolic representation in
philosophical discourse (as in his allegories). For in Plotinus mimêsis is elevated to its
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highest form in the relationships between creation, representation, and movement from
nature to art, and then to the ideal in the contemplating spectator. Rather than a deception, art
as the representation of beauty is the means by which the soul ascends. Drawn from Platonic
ideas, Plotinus’ conception also draws close to Aristotle’s belief that art is related to nature,
and the creation of art is a natural imitation in the way nature bestows an imitative instinct.
But imitation in Plotinus can either be that of nature or that of the idea in the artist’s mind,
and both sources point upward toward the divine (Williams, R. 34).
At the conclusion of Classical and Early Christian thought we find three forms of
mimêsis, mimetic representation with clear relations between likeness and the appearance of
the empirical object thus represented, art as pointing either towards or away from truth, and
symbolic representation in art and word (as in allegorical illustrations), and the notion of
beauty. We have witnessed a myriad of examples of Pollock’s use of representation in the
way he recuperated American Indian art forms, for at times his representations have clear
likenesses of American Indian art symbols and forms. At other times his imagery is more
symbolic and allegorical in nature. But Pollock also uses mimêsis in idealist ways. Because
of this, it is helpful to understand the basic tenets of mimetic idealist art. Understanding what
mimêsis is philosophically in ancient and medieval idealist thought equips us to analyze ideal
mimêsis in Pollock’s primitivist and drip paintings, as both representational and as movement
pointing towards idealism. Since the discourse of modern art, with its emphasis on abstract
and disinterested pure form, has obscured our view of mimêsis as idealist, it is therefore
important that we also acknowledge the rejection and subsequent loss of idealist and
naturalistic mimêsis in art that has led to a forgetting and obscured view of the types of
mimêsis we find in Pollock’s work.
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Decline of Naturalistic and Symbolic Representation

Mimêsis as both symbolic representation and the representation of nature came into
disrepute in philosophy by the late eighteenth century when Alexander Baumgarten applied
the term ‘aesthetics’ to art and developed his science of perception. Art became a source for
“immediate and particular sensory cognition” in the viewer and the more profound and
philosophical methods and functions of mimêsis were forgotten (Halliwell 8). In its
traditional role of representation or verisimilitude, mimêsis was displaced by a theory of
disinterest. Platonic idealism and Aristotelian representation of nature were de-emphasized
instead for visual sensation. Drawing upon Baumgarten’s theories, the philosopher Immanuel
Kant claims that artistic genius, autonomy and matters of taste are the key elements in art. He
writes that, “What distinguishes art from objects of craft is the skill or genius of the artist in
creating something which departs significantly from nature, or is not given as a rule by
nature” (Kant and Meredith lix). So rather than adhering to classical judgements that
implicate mimêsis as a valuation of good art, Kant claims that art’s affects, brought by the
skill of the artist in departing from nature and mimêsis, is what constitutes great art. Further,
in Kant, the pleasure in art is a universal function of the viewer and not contingent on any
particular feature of art such as in its naturalistic and idealist representational or mimetic
functions, forms, or conditions. Kant explains this fact, “All one wants to know is whether
the mere representation of the object is to my liking, no matter how indifferent I may be to
the real existence of the object of this representation. It is quite plain that in order to say that
the object is beautiful, and to show that I have taste, everything turns on the meaning which I
can give to this representation, and not to any factor which makes me dependent on the real
existence of the object” (205:20). For Kant, the quality of the mimetic representation and the
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connection to knowledge of the thing, whether through natural representation or idealization,
are not the important features of art. Rather, what is primary is the objective perception one
gets from the work of art (or nature). Kant best explains this objective view writing that,
Here we have to attend generally to what has been already adverted to, that in
the Transcendental Aesthetic of judgement there must be no question of
anything but pure aesthetic judgements. Consequently examples are not to be
selected from such beautiful or sublime objects as presuppose the concept of
an end. For then the finality would be either teleological, or based upon mere
sensations of an object (gratification or pain) and so, in the first case, not
aesthetic, and, in the second, not merely formal. So, if we call the sight of the
starry heaven sublime, we must not found our estimate of it upon any concepts
of worlds inhabited by rational beings, with the bright spots, which we see
filling the space above us, as their suns, moving in orbits prescribed for them
with the wisest regard to ends. But we must take it, just as it strikes the eye, as
a broad and all-embracing canopy: and it is merely under such a
representation that we may posit the sublimity which the pure aesthetic
judgement attributes to this object. … Here, for determining grounds of
judgement, we must not have recourse to concepts ends … to influence
aesthetic judgement. (270:5-25, 122)
For Kant, what is before our eyes and its relationship to what we conceptually see through
mimêsis or representation is a distraction to pure aesthetic judgement. Rather, the forms as
they “hit the eye,” provide matters for aesthetic judgments which are sensations that occur
before one ponders upon about what a picture represents. What is represented in art (or
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nature) is not important, rather, how the scene is visually presented in colors, shapes and
forms is what is important (270:5-25, 122). Kant asserts that aesthetic judgments must be
independent from both the content of idealism and the subject of representation in art. Thus
the importance of mimêsis wanes in favor of celebrating an acknowledgement of perception
and an understanding of the formal properties of art (Huhn 5). Such pre-perceptions are
particularly attuned to issues of creativity, imagination, and genius but they overlook subject
matter in art. As the philosopher John Sallis explains “genius is to be wholly opposed to the
spirit of mimêsis” (qtd. Sallis 171). Genius is not that which perfectly imitates nature such as
in Zeuxis’ fruit or Parrhasius’ drape. Genius is defined as the artist who “gives the rule to art”
or rather, turns from nature and its forms and ideals (Kant and Meredith 307:5-10, 168). The
emphasis in Kantian aesthetics shifts away from naturalism and idealism, and the final form
of a work of art is less relevant than the manner of its creation. Kant devalues mimêsis in art
since art is no longer required to be mimetic or representational. Kant, like Plotinus (and for
that matter Coleridge and the German Romantics), relocates the nature of the pointing
function of art from that of an art object pointing to nature to the pointing or directing from
an art object to a higher or more ideal object or concept of beauty. 49 For in Kant, this
movement is no longer situated in the artwork, but rather is held in the mind upon the first
glance at a work of art. Kant’s movement is not only important for our understanding of a
type of genealogy of mimêsis, but also because modern aesthetics (and the critique of
Pollock) draws heavily from Kant’s theory of abstraction and disinterest.
In summation, the modern era witnesses three modes regarding representation or
mimêsis which are inherited from a classical and medieval past: first, representation in
regards to the natural world, second, waning representation as idealist pointing to divinity or
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ideals along a hierarchical movement towards eternal unchangeable forms, and third, the
disinterestedness of the viewer to both forms of mimêsis. Ironically, however, in Kant’s
Critique of Judgment, the art viewer takes a Neoplatonic journey (or at least hierarchical
process reminiscent of Neoplatonism) that begins with the desire to possess a thing of beauty,
to a state of disinterested aesthetic pleasure, and finally to a state of judgment or perception
of beauty that echoes the movement towards ideal Beauty in Plato’s Symposium. In tracing
the genesis of aesthetics, Meyer Abrams claims that the Kantian model is a secularized
variation of Platonic and Neoplatonic transcendence (Abrams, “Natural” 12). However,
transcendence lies primarily in the mind and perception, and art is merely a catalyst for this
process rather than functioning as a device pointing toward higher forms of beauty or truth.
Thus there is one sharp difference between Kantian and Platonic idealism, and this difference
lies in the displacement of the art object, and particularly the role of art as representation.
This is because of the way in which Kant limited knowledge to the realm of appearances (the
phenomenal as opposed to the noumenal essences of things). For in Kant, both the experience
of art or nature is coequal because both produce aesthetic feelings. But the production of
feelings is derived from the forms of art, not its subjects or content, and thus the quality of art
as a faithful copy of nature becomes an irrelevant consideration in the production of such
feelings (Halliwell, “Aesthetics” 8). Separated from mimêsis and nature, art is autonomous.
Aesthetic feeling is subjective, provoked by form and individual taste and therefore separated
from mimêsis. Thus in Kant and German Idealism, art began to experience its schism, its
separation from itself in its mimetic functions and affects, techniques, modes, and objects.
Mimêsis in both its naturalistic and idealist forms becomes irrelevant to the judgement of art.
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Schisms in Modern Art: Mimêsis, Idealism, and Abstraction

As in philosophy, mimêsis in art also comes into disrepute in the modern era, and it is
this decline in the value of mimêsis that leads to a schism in modern art. Leading up to
Picasso’s stand against mimetic representation and Pollock’s reintroduction of it, art was
embroiled in a duel between mimêsis as symbolic and naturalistic representation. Ironically,
as the reception of art is considered within Kant’s theory of disinterest, representation is at its
peak by the mid-nineteenth century. At its highest point, the issue of faithful representation
or verisimilitude in art is embroiled in the conflict between the French academic idealist
tradition and the more sensuous Realist movement (Williams 124). Honoré Daumier
illustrated this aesthetic conflict in a lithograph titled Duel of the Academician and the
Realist, 1855 (Fig. 60). Realists looked at the contemporary world with a belief that
modernity was a revolutionary time worthy of memorialization in art. Rather than looking to
ancient myths for ideal models for modern society, Realists looked to the contemporary
objective world and replicated this world with faithful reproductions. The Realists believed
their work expressed, as Théophile Thoré explains, “new, truly human art expressing a new
society” (qtd. Williams, R., 124).
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Figure 60 Duel of the Academician and the Realist, 1855. (UCLA Hammer Museum, Los Angeles, CA

A new society required a newer form of art equal to the task of expressing the spirit of the
age, one that faithfully captured the appearances of contemporary life and nature while
dispensing with idealistic themes and appearances.
This issue of ‘expressing a new society’ quickly became problematic, however, as
artists and theorists grappled with determining what ought to be the content and form of the
modern present. Mimêsis quickly became at odds with notions of modernity. With Courbet,
Millet, Manet, Daumier and others, art became interested in verisimilitude, heightened
naturalism and the concrete objects or forms of modern life and distinct and exclusive
mimetic forms became more apparent, namely verisimilitude, idealism, and sensationalism.
Art’s idealist tendency also gave rise to abstraction and Symbolism, while from naturalism
and sensationalist tendencies we find art branching out into the Aesthetic movement,
Surrealism, German Expressionism and Social Realism (with its sister style, American
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Regionalism). This tension between expression and modernity’s need to find modern forms
of expression becomes the genesis of a schism in art itself, a polemical modern-episteme
between representation as naturalistic, idealistic, and sensational, and abstraction as in
formalism or pure form separated from or distanced from the ideas and objects of the
empirical world. We see this larger schism in the divided critique of Pollock’s works and in
the way in which Pollock addresses the problems of modern art through mimêsis.
Idealism in Art

We ought to make it clear at this point that abstract and idealist art are two distinct
and separate categories. Remember that in mimetic art, there is a pointing action towards the
idea, ideal, or empirical object whereas in abstract art, the function of art is to bring attention
to art’s formal properties. Moving toward idealism, the artists of Das Blaue Reiter, Wassily
Kandinsky and Franz Marc, sought transcendence beyond the everyday to reveal eternal
values in form and color. Their primary concern was in finding a universal form for art. They
believed that there was a correlation between the possibilities that modern art could express
and the deeper concerns of humankind at large. Kandinsky articulates these aims,
There exists, however, another outward similarity of artistic forms that is
rooted in a deeper necessity. The similarity of inner strivings within the whole
spiritual-moral atmosphere - striving after goals that have already been
pursued but afterward forgotten - this similarity of the inner mood of an entire
period can lead logically to the use of forms successfully employed to the
same ends in an earlier period. (Kandinsky 89)
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Kandinsky claims these “forgotten” and archaic and idealist inner spiritual yearnings had
become lost to bourgeoisie materialism and had created a division between modernity and
primitive societies. Kandinsky believes that through idealist art, one can “see” hidden truths
which are not yet “explained by modern-science” (89). For Kandinsky, art can point to ideals
which are not presently visible. The color blue becomes symbolic of spirituality and one’s
ability to move beyond oneself. Abstracted forms and color become equated with music in
terms of each media’s fundamental and universal expressive capacities. The saturation of
primary color within abstract forms is, for Kandinsky, equal to the essences of a spiritual life.
Kasimir Malevich also ‘liberated’ color from its functional role in representation of
the natural world to reveal color’s idealist or spiritual underpinnings. For example, the color
blue, rather than its associations with representing sky became, in Suprematism, a
representation of infinity. Rather than painting objects, Malevich sought to create a new
mode of art that references the pure qualities of color in order to free the ideal. He claims that
“will is able to develop an artistic system when the object has been annulled in the artist's
mind as a pictorial framework and a vehicle” (Malevich 290). Malevich sought an art that
was free from traditional naturalistic representation in lieu of new idealist uses of color in
order to create a new mode of art that represented freedom as well as infinitude. He writes,
“Swim in the white free abyss, infinity is before you” (290). In his mind one is only free in a
state of transcendence, when his or her will focuses critically and philosophically on that
which eternally exists in order to attain new phenomena and knowledge. Both Malevich and
Kandinsky are problematic artists because they appropriated abstract form and appear to be
formalist artists. But their intent continues the pointing action of mimetic art, for they sought
for an idealist art that represented a sort of Schopenhauer-esque notion of cosmic will,
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wherein color and form can point to the divine, or envision it as a type of underlying
metaphysical presence of order and structure. 50 These idealist artists yearned to recapture lost
ideal essences and sought to do so by implementing a neo-Neoplatonic idealism wherein art
points upward. Their works point beyond the picture frame to the spiritual ideals they
espoused and hoped viewers would embrace.
This pursuit in representing the divine adheres to ancient Pre-Socratic and Platonic
traditions wherein metaphysical mimêsis is interpreted as mimēma or the representation of the
cosmos or rather that which cannot be represented. Because the very act of attempting to
represent the divine acknowledges the difficulty of and limits of mimêsis (which depends
upon a concrete idea to represent), mimēma acknowledges the pointing action of mimêsis as
well as its limitations (Halliwell, “Aesthetics” 274, n30). It also hearkens to Platonic and
Neoplatonic emphasis on idealist mimêsis as a means to gain ideal knowledge or wisdom.
Such non-representational idealism acknowledges a change or loss in concrete notions of a
tangible God and seeks for an unchangeable metaphysical in terms of a theosophical concept
of mystic or cosmic “One”, or one overarching, driving, undifferentiated and immutable
force, or some notion of eternal structure. Rather than envisioning the metaphysical as
embodied in tangible bodies, such as the Greek deities Zeus and Athena for example, or the
planets and stars, the metaphysical is more ethereally defined. Thus both artists and those
working in idealist (albeit abstract) forms during the turn of the century presuppose a type of
spiritual value in art, wherein art expresses a deeper underlying hierarchy of spiritual or
mystic experience which cannot be represented through concrete recognizable forms. Idealist
abstraction moves art from symbolic color and abstract forms to divine principles along
(Platonic and Neoplatonic) notions of transcendence. Art is seen as having an “'essential

231

spiritual function” that can be systematized into a program that serves as an aid for social and
spiritual advancement (Wood, “Art” 89). Idealist art reaffirms the connection between the
Divine and art’s mimetic functions through mimēma, the representation of the
unrepresentable-ness of the cosmos. It is in mimēma that Newman expresses the aims of the
American Primitivism when he writes, “There is no such thing as good painting about
nothing. We assert that the subject is crucial and only that subject-matter is valid which is
tragic and timeless. That is why we profess spiritual kinship with primitive and archaic art”
(Gottlieb, et al. 14). American primitivist artists sought to portray timeless idealism through
appropriating archaic, primitive, and American Indian symbols and subjects.
Formalism in Art

But such idealism appears to be closely knitted to formal abstraction and here lies
some of the confusion with the interpretation of Pollock’s work. For the formal properties of
idealist art can threaten and visually overshadow art’s spiritual properties. This becomes
particularly evident in the French abstract schools of Impressionism, Picasso-esque
Primitivism and Cubism. Impressionist painters look beyond material objects, but not so far
distant to spiritual properties of art. Rather, the Impressionists seek for the portrayal of time,
atmosphere, and transient light. In so doing, the Impressionists intensify the autonomous and
abstract effects of art (Wood, “Art” 13). We see this autonomy as bordering on the
disinterested and abstract, approaching an undermining of both verisimilitude and idealism.
The object portrayed is no longer related to other objects within the painting or in the
symbolic or metaphysical order. Rather, objects are merely opportunities for color. The artist
Léger succinctly explained the dissolution of the imitated object, “For the impressionists a
green apple on a red rug is no longer the relationship between two objects, but the
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relationship between two tones, a green and a red” (Léger 197). Representation is no longer a
realistic or idealist mimetic act. It becomes an increasingly abstract form with an emphasis
on its structure and material forms. Kandinsky and Mondrian reaffirm the idealist tendencies
of art while the Impressionists, Cezanne and others intensify the autonomous effects of art in
its abstract, disinterested, and autonomous forms. Naturalism and the representation of the
natural world gives way to a discourse on the pure and abstract forms of art itself, l‘art pour
l‘art, underscoring an upcoming repudiation and absence of mimêsis. It is from this point of
departure from mimêsis that Picasso invented first his own version of abstract Primitivism
and then Cubism, and from which Greenberg claimed Pollock’s works to be affiliated with
what appears to be the natural result and development of Picasso’s Cubism and pure form.
But rather than painting non-representational works, Pollock created an oeuvre based on a
continued commitment to representation.
Sensationalism in Art, Mimêsis and Subjectivity

Simultaneously, as idealistic representation increased and naturalism waned before
increasingly abstract art styles, mimetic representation continued to flourish in the portrayal
of subjective experience which had become increasingly important as one of the essential
conditions of the modern experience. While not specifically mentioned or understood in the
art critical record, the representation of the subjective experience constitutes a type of
mimêsis in that art seeks to reveal or represent something of the modern experience. Paris,
the essential birthplace of modernity had, in the mid-1800s, grown exponentially into a
massive urban cultural crossroads. The overcrowded city was largely structured as it had
been since the medieval era and struggled to accommodate massive population growth and
immigration. The French social reformer Victor Considerant wrote in 1845 that “Paris is an
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immense workshop of putrefaction, where misery, pestilence and sickness work in concert,
where sunlight and air rarely penetrate. Paris is a terrible place where plants shrivel and
perish, and where, of seven small infants, four die during the course of the year” (qtd. de
Moncan 10). Riots, disease, crime, and squalor racked the city. This is the city that intrigued
Baudelaire. He found beauty in the experience of the contemporary in all its scenes, scents,
and sights. It was Baudelaire, “one of the greatest and most influential” voices of the new
modernity, who first articulated that the subject of modernity should be the sensual
experience itself. The articulation of such was a sign of artistic authenticity and inner life; the
pre-reflective expression of the mind or soul of the artist (Wood, “Art” 15). 51 In art and art
criticism, sensation seeks to replace idealism and naturalism. Such sensationalism or
authentic experience became the hallmark characteristic of art. As Wood explains, “With the
abandonment of naturalistic correspondence as a criterion, a premium was placed on the
strength and authenticity of individual responses and feelings” (15). This impetus for
portraying the intense feelings and sensations of modernity was felt throughout Europe
before and just after World War I. As with Idealism, artists sought to represent and give form
to inner feelings and metaphysical yearnings.
We see this trend for the subjective in the Post-Impressionist works of Vincent Van
Gogh, Edvard Munch, and the works of the German Expressionists Max Beckman, Emile
Nolde, and Ernst Barlach. In their works, art evokes the human experience, its emotions and
sensations. Such is likewise the case with Parisian artists Auguste Rodin, Henri Matisse,
Emile Bernard, Pablo Picasso in his Blue and Rose phases, and others. The Surrealists also
engaged in a discourse on the subjective experience of the inner unconscious witnessed in
dreams. As de Chirico declared, “To become truly immortal a work of art must escape all
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human limits: logic and common sense will only interfere. But once these barriers are broken
it will enter the regions of childhood vision and dream” (de Chirico 60). Representing the
familiar natural world in art was to be banished, giving way instead to “presentiment” and the
“irrationality of the universe” (60). Mimêsis continues in Surrealist visions by imitating the
fantastical and imaginary rather than the natural. As August Macke explained,
To create forms means: to live. Are not children more creative in drawing
directly from the secret of their sensations than the imitator of Greek forms?
Are not savages artists who have forms of their own powerful as the form of
thunder? Thunder, flower, any force expresses itself as form. So does man.
He, too, is driven by something to find words for conceptions, to find
clearness in obscurity, consciousness in the unconscious. This is his life, his
creation. (Macke 100)
Art was to emanate spontaneously from the deep recesses of the mind and the innermost
feelings of the artist without pre-thought. Surrealists drew upon objects from life but within
dreamy landscapes, inducing mimêsis to point inward into the deep recesses of the
unconscious mind. Rosenberg’s claim that artists were making art out of their feelings
highlights the Jungian critique’s admission to mimêsis’ inward pointing. 52 Within this
backdrop between abstraction, idealism and the articulation and representation of subjective
feelings, it is no wonder that Pollock’s work has been labeled Abstract Expressionism. But
this label denies the primitivist content and mimetic representation we now know are
pertinent to Pollock’s works.
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Conclusion

When we talk of a schism in art we are recognizing that art divided itself into many
diverse styles within two primary forms of art, namely the mimetic and non-mimetic forms.
Within the mimetic form of representation, we see three forms: naturalistic representation of
the empirical world, the inner feelings and subjective experience of the artist, and idealist
representation. The abstract form of art arising from the modern era is formalism which
separates itself from the mimetic functions of art representing the natural world to highlight
the forms of art itself. In formalist and abstract art, art celebrates and explores its formal
properties of two-dimensionality, flatness of the picture plane, color, line, texture, twodimensional form, and the like. As waning idealistic art sought for underlying structures and
declining realism sought the sights, sounds, and flavors of the inner and outer experiences of
life, abstraction became the modus operandi of art. The representation of nature as
verisimilitude fell into derision and mimêsis lost its value. It was regarded as mere copy or
illusion, symptomatic of a traditional and outmoded past, causing idealism to become
erroneously conflated with formalism. Thus from Kant to the end of the nineteenth century,
art becomes divided amongst itself, manifested as disinterested, autonomous, pure form, and
mimetic representation in terms of idealist abstraction, and abstractions of the inner and outer
experience. This conflict is inherent within the problems of modern art with which Pollock
and other artists of the era found themselves grappling, stemming from an extensive tradition
of mimêsis and its relationship to philosophy. As a result, the subsequent critique of Pollock
has been divided between formal and subjective forms. The key and missing element in the
history of art, from Plato and Aristotle, to the present condition of modern art, is the role,
appearance, and disappearance of mimêsis. Mimêsis as representation and idealism played a
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key role in Ancient, Medieval, Renaissance and Early Modern art until its decline in
Enlightenment philosophy and the arts of the later Modern Era. The decline of mimêsis
occurs within the broader philosophical Cartesian dualism which separates objective form
from subjective experience.
In conclusion, it is in appropriating indigenous forms and symbols that Pollock and the
American Primitivists returned significant content, or rather mimêsis, to a new art form
consistent with modes of ideal mimetic art forms. The American primitivist artists looked to
indigenous American art and re-presented these forms in such a way as to convey new and
significant content to art through the representation of existing and new primitivist subjects,
while exploring these themes within matters of significant content rather than the outer
abstract forms, or what Newman called “non-objective pattern” and Bell considered
“significant form” (Newman, “Ideographic” 566 and Bell 14). It is primarily through
representation and symbolic representation that these indigenous forms are reiterated.
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Chapter Five
Mimêsis and its Modes

I choose to veil the imagery.
Jackson Pollock

Introduction

We have seen that there is a specific and tangible content in American Primitivism that
returns mimêsis to art and this return has come about through the recuperation of the
indigenous, with its forms, modes, and symbols that evoke its ancient myths. Our review of
the historiography of mimêsis shows us that there are two primary forms of representation,
firstly verisimilitude or the copy of or re-presentation of the natural world, and secondly,
idealist representation. Mimêsis accounts for more than the representation of nature. It also
explains the nature of idealist representation, but does so along four primary modes, namely:
symbols and the symbolic representation of that which is un-representable, metaphors,
allegories, and rituals. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze these primary modes of
idealist mimêsis in order to illustrate the extent to which Pollock employs mimêsis, even in
his more ‘abstract’ drip paintings. We will first question how each mode is defined in art
theory and aesthetics. Second, we will apply these modes to Pollock’s works. The result of
this analysis will demonstrate the extent to which Pollock’s primitivistic work recuperates
idealist representation within the modes of mimetic representation.
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Symbolic Representation

Further investigation into the nature of symbols gives us four primary conditions that we
need to keep in mind. First, symbolic and representational art calls upon the way in which we
see and perceive. Second, symbols stand in for objects which may be present or absent. In
this case the symbolic representation suffices to bring the signified object, whether from
nature, an idea, or from the imagination, into a state of presence in the mind through the
action of pointing toward. Third, symbols represent concepts which otherwise cannot be
represented. In these modes, symbols are arbitrary and convey meaning, not through direct
correspondence between an object and its representation, but through emblems, signs and
insignia, and personifications infused with meanings. Fourth, art symbolizes that which has
no objective or empirical (or observable) form.
First, symbolic and representational art reveals the function of perception and sight.
Whether illustrating an idea or concept, or a thing of nature, art represents, signifies, or gives
material form to that thing. As we have already discussed in Chapter Four, it does so through
a pointing action – it directs our attention to something. The nature of art reveals the means
by which it is perceived as representational. The eyes present data for the mind, but it is the
mind which sees. For example, in seeing a Dogon mask one sees not only the oriented
surface, that part of the mask which falls within one’s direct line of sight, but also the
contours of the object as it extends three-dimensionally into receding space. Sight sees
frontal perspectives and receding contours. But the mind imagines the object in its full threedimensional form. According to Husserl’s notion of the horizon of the perceptual field,
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objects are apprehended or understood in their three-dimensional forms, which include the
lateral and back aspects of the object even though the object is only seen scientifically within
the direct line of optical vision (Spiegelberg 117). European Primitivism and Cubism
articulate flattened forms, painting three-dimensional objects from nature within the confines
of two-dimensional form and without illusionistic painterly techniques. Nevertheless,
perception in the mind of the viewer renders the abstract forms as recognizable
representations. Picasso’s cubist violin, though abstracted, is still recognized as a violin (Fig.
61).

Figure 61 Pablo Picasso, Composition with Violin, 1912, Cut-and-pasted newspaper, graphite, charcoal, ink on white paper,
mounted to paperboard, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

Though formal abstraction is the intention of Picasso’s Primitivism and ensuing
Cubist works, they ironically challenge this interplay between sight and mind or perception.
Through its radical manipulation of the representation of the natural world through distortion,
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multiple focal and perspectival points and flattened space, Cubism portrays a flattened view
of three-dimensional objects. It eliminates the contours of natural perspectival objects that
the eye sees as recessive shadows. Yet it reveals all the three dimensional sides of the object,
even those sides which are out of the view of the eye (much like the map lays flat a
representation of the three-dimensional earth). All sides, regions, perspectives, and
dimensions are seen at once on the flat picture plane. Such art challenges and critiques the
interplay between vision and perception, as vision now sees what had been left for perception
to imagine. This type of rendering makes Cubism representational and illustrative in that
what is given on the picture plane is no longer left to the imagination. The picture allows one
to see all sides of an object at once. The mind does not have to compensate for what is not in
the perceptual field: the sides, top, bottom, or back of an object. Picasso’s primitivist masks
and Cubist forms confirm Husserl’s horizon of the perceptual field, showing that sight and
perception work together to create a mental image based on perception and sight beyond
what is given in scientific vision (117). What is seen corresponds to what is perceived and
known, even within abstraction. In this way art points to that which we already hold in our
minds.
The irony inherent within Cubism then is that in objectively rendering the object
within a multiple perspective composition that lacks a fixed point of reference, Cubism
reveals the complex interplay between sight and perspective. Because what is given
constitutes an aesthetic experience that is unnatural to a preexisting perspectival knowledge
of nature, Cubism calls into question the nature of art as true and faithful representation,
while revealing art to be merely a referent or a sign that can illustrate more than that which
sight can see. While the sign is assumed to be a transparent referent, one that coordinates
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equally to the referent, interchangeably such that the content (that which is being illustrated
or signified) is materially or formally equivalent, Cubism reveals that the sign can be
capriciously unnatural or transgressive to the signified, yet the sign still illustrates that which
is signified. The referent is tied to the actual not by an equivalency but through an
interpretive ground given through accepted meanings within perception (Barthes 689). As
Burgin writes, “Cubism we can see as constituting a radical critique of this concept, a
practice compatible with the recognition of the disjunction of signifier and signified within
the sign” (Burgin 912). Ironically, Cubist and other formalist tendencies critique the validity
or truthfulness of the image while affirming the representational value of art, even in its
abstract form. We see that mimêsis accounts for the representation of both nature and the
symbolic or ideal through its pointing action and the interplay between sight and perception.
Our definition of mimêsis thus agrees with both Aristotelian views on mimêsis, as
representation and imitation, as well as those held by Plato as the representation of higher
ideals through symbolism. First and foremost, though, mimêsis is carried out by its pointing
action within the nature sight.
Secondly, how does mimêsis represent things through symbolic ways and means? Like
objects in nature, symbols represent through pointing towards some other thing. What we
learn from Pollock is that mimêsis takes many forms (as signs, symbols, and representations
in the form of names, numbers, hand prints, abstract human and animal figures, birds, totems,
arrows, swastikas, circles, and many other signs and symbols) that point outward by
representation to indigenous art forms. We have seen examples of all these in his primitivist
work and hidden in his drip paintings. Idealist representation is highly significant in that it
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refers to something outside the painting in the form of an empirical object, and idea, or object
imbued with meaning.
Aristotle speaks of signs of identification such as birth marks, tattoos, scars or other
bodily marks that identify and come to signify an individual, such as Odysseus’ scar which
the nurse uses to identify him when he returns home (Aristotle, “Poetics” 21). He also

mentions necklaces or amulets that serve as trademark accoutrements of an individual, or of
particular skills that symbolize an individual. Signs, symbols, or tokens signify individuals or
events. This is based on a sign system wherein the object is represented mimetically as a
sign. In some cases, the symbol can also stand in for the power of an object, such as when the
king’s seal makes a document valid, signifying the power or presence of the king. Certainly,
art can be said to be both sign or symbolic, having both nuanced purposes and meanings. But
it is in directing our attention to another thing that symbolic representation (and naturalistic
representation for that matter) brings meaning to mind.
Originally the Greek word sumbolikos or ‘symbolic’ meant a sort of remembrance
which came out of the ancient Greek practice of token giving (Gadamer 31-32). One would
affectionately (or as an oath) give a token of a half of an object to another. Upon future
meetings, both parties could produce the halved object which would fit together as a
complete whole, witnessing to the friendship or covenant. The token was then symbolic of
the nature of the relationship between the two parties, and the relationship was recognized in
the symbol. As Gadamer explains, “In the case of the symbol, on the other hand, and for our
experience of the symbolic in general, the particular represents itself as a fragment of being
that promises to complete and make whole whatever corresponds to it” (35). Mimetic art
functions in the same way, it re-presents what is given or known. It fits or corresponds to this
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knowledge via recognition and thereby completes or makes whole two parts. Whether we are
discussing American Indian symbols or thunderbirds in Pollock’s primitivist artworks, or
friendship bracelets, we recognize these as signs. We find in them a familiarity according to
our experience with American Indian arts and artifacts.
All of these signs, symbols, or copies of nature are differing types of signifiers which
point to something else outside of them. They direct our attention to that which is signified,
either the object or the concept being represented. They stand in for something which we
cannot have always before our eyes, but which we might want to retain or keep in mind. For
example, we might want to take in the literal presence of the Sierra Nevada Mountains, but
this is impossible for most except those who live at the base of that great mountain range. Yet
through Albert Bierstadt’s representation, we will have the view of the thing (as a
substitution for the real) ever before us in the form of an image or painting (Fig. 62).

Figure 62 Albert Bierstadt, Among the Sierra Nevada, California, 1868, oil, 72 x 120 1/8 in. Smithsonian
American Art Museum
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Though a substitution or memento, Bierstadt’s work signifies and points to the real mountains
and conveys knowledge about them to us as viewers. But more than standing in through
naturalistic representation, Bierstadt’s works are imbued with glowing ethereal light which
serves as a symbol conveying meanings held about the sacredness of untamed nature. The
light becomes a substitution or memento of divine presence.
Likewise, Pollock’s works are not just copies of indigenous forms, symbols and signs
- they convey our collective knowledge of Native American life and art, transferring this
knowledge into new forms while pointing to its precedent origins. The relationship between
the signified and the signifier depends on a relationship wherein meaning is bequeathed and
pointed to by the signifier. In other words, we recognize the indigenous forms and symbols in
Pollock’s work as pointing outside of his work to a body of knowledge based on our
experiences and previous encounters with indigenous art forms. Our previous encounters
form a body of knowledge to which we apply meaning. Art points towards the indigenous
forms, which in turn point back to our pre-ascribed meanings (Husserl 72). Once infused
with powerful meanings, the sacred signs convey meaning in their reiterated and copied
forms. Exact meanings and translations are lost but not the presence of meaning. Mimêsis
then is implicated in meaning and knowledge through signification as a symbolic practice
that points toward the thing signified.
Third, in terms of symbolic representation, it may not always point to or correspond
to an object of fact. Rather, both representation and symbolic representation can signify that
which is imaginary or conceptual. Whether from nature, an idea, or from the imagination, art
brings something into view or into a state of presence through the action of pointing toward.
Pollock represented the signs, symbols, figures, masks, birds, animals, and such in his
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drawings and paintings, some of which are highly abstracted, such as the figures in his drip
paintings. But Pollock also invented imaginary constructions of forms and figures, many of
which we see in his drawings; nevertheless, they carry the function of symbolic
representation and signification in their pointing and representing of that which is absent
from our view, even that which is held in his mind. One of Pollock’s early paintings, Flame,
1938, gives us a symbolic representation of fire (Fig. 63).

Figure 63 Jackson Pollock, The Flame, ca. 1934-8. Oil on canvas mounted on composition board, 51.1 x 76.2 cm, New
York, The Museum of Modern Art

While the representation does correspond to an empirical object, one of fire, it symbolizes
not a specific fire, but the notion of fire as a primitive yet constant concept. Pollock’s use of
contrast and the way he juxtaposes the bright reds, yellows, and whites within the dark
browns and blacks, causes the eye to see the flames as pulsating through the interplay of the
colors in their receding and advancing tendencies. The painting is symbolic of the concept of
fire and all the meaning that may at any time be attached to the notion of fire, without
necessarily referring to a specific fire per se. Not all works of mimetic art must correspond to
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“specific, empirical, originals” to be considered mimetic (Halliwell, “Aesthetics” 16).
Whether pointing to an object of fact or its properties such as pulsating and flickering heat, or
the representation of an imaginary idea or a concept, art is the manifestation of an effort to
represent.
Symbolic representation in art functions much like symbolism in poetry. Even Plato,
who questions the verity of art in its representation of truth and the Ideals, depends upon
symbols in his allegories. For example, he speaks of the sun as a symbol of enlightenment in
his Allegory of the Cave, and the River of Forgetting as death in the Myth of Er. Whether in
art or the language of philosophy, images and words point to that which is absent
symbolically and that which is pointed to can be an empirical object or one that is imagined.
Philosophers like Plato become as “painters of mental images and interpreters of a cosmic
work of art” (71). Philosophers, like artists, strive to paint a vivid image with words in order
to present or embody the ideals conceived in and held in their minds. Whether in art or in
text, artists and philosophers give form and utterance to that which is rational or imaginary,
or otherwise held in their perception and thought. In this way, “philosophers are painters in
another medium” (130). Whether as a concept or an image held in the mind, symbolic
representation evokes and conveys these meanings to the viewer or hearer.
On this third point we might further distinguish the symbolic and its representation.
For representation gives us something empirical or imaginary which can be given in
representational form. But the symbolic can be that which represents something that cannot
be represented outside of the use of a sign or symbol. In this regard, ancient theorists note
that some things are known to be but yet are immaterial. As immaterial objects (asōmata),
they cannot be represented visually because there is not a “perceptual likeness”, or
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homoiotēs, from which such an image or eidōlon can be given (130). In this case, art must
depend upon a symbol, one which corresponds through meaning but not necessarily through
correspondence. This is the experimentation of the symbolist poets and artists of the late
nineteenth century who sought to question meanings held in arbitrary signs. Symbols can be
arbitrary in their correspondence because they depend upon a shared or collective meaning,
and they describe concepts which otherwise cannot be represented as object-image
correspondences (Duan 2). Ancient and Renaissance personifications, insignias, and emblem
traditions function as symbols in this way as they carry meaning through often arbitrary
imagery which is given and holds meaning. For example, Athena Nike in her personification
as the winged goddess symbolizes victory. Not at any other time does Athena, the goddess of
war and wisdom, represent or convey the meaning of victory, except in her winged form. The
emblematic bees on the Barberini coat-of-arms represent the family’s wealth. But at other
times, the bee might be a symbol of industry or of an agricultural product (honey). The
symbol carries upon itself the meaning or the concept, though such is ascribed (rather than
inherent to) the symbol. But the symbol (as in the example of a bee) is arbitrary in how it is
applied or given meaning. Further meanings may multiply for any given symbol, but in any
given use each symbolic representation takes the form of a sign or symbol in a singular rather
than a collective fashion. An individual symbol constitutes a whole or unity within a singular
sign. One symbol incarnates or makes visible the broader concept which may be otherwise
hidden or undisclosed.
When modernist theories disparage imitation, they are condemning a long tradition of
making visible the conceptual and the imaginary and proposing that art divorce itself from its
signifying function. It leaves symbolic or conceptual iteration to the sole realm of
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philosophy, removing art’s role in philosophical discourse. Abstract formalism creates a
point of schism in art, a divide between the sensible and rational, or what is seen and what is
thought, by attempting to divorce art from its own signifying role in mimêsis. American
Primitivism illustrates how American artists, and particularly Jackson Pollock, found a
solution to modern art’s dilemma. For in Pollock’s primitivist and later works, we clearly see
a fundamental signifying rational structure that unites content and meaning by retaining art’s
pointing function through naturalistic and symbolic or idealistic representation.
While symbolic representation can account for the hidden and visible symbols in
Pollock’s works (for example, the hand prints we see beneath the dripped paint in Number
1A), symbolic representation can also account for the dripped paint as well (Fig. 42). For as
in our definition of mimesis in Chapter Four, idealist art points to an ideal or concept outside
of itself, and in this case, to Pollock’s performative techniques among other things. Despite
its seemingly abstract qualities, the dripped paint points to that which we as viewers perceive
in our minds; namely, the way the paint is applied. Our perception of the thing is inseparable
from our view of the thing. But because we perceive Pollock’s sweeping dancelike motions
through our perception, the applied paint is symbolical representation rather than a
naturalistic one. We don’t see Pollock dancing, we see paint, but we perceive both. Thus, in
its ontological presence, idealistic art can present a trace of something recognizable that
relates to a concept or an ideal (or in this case an act), much like the way a symbol can
represent the making of an oath or contract. In its autonomy and abstraction, the drip
paintings can claim mimêsis as their ground because they lay claim to the ways symbols
evoke underlying acts and ideals, such as in Pollock’s manner of painting or the more
idealized structure of universal form.
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Fourth, symbolic representation gives form to that which is not representable. The
relationship between representation and the Ideal gives ground for idealistic representation.
Idealist art, as we have seen in the works of Malevich or Kandinsky, for example, represents
mimetically, through a notion of unknowability inherent to an understanding of the character
of the metaphysical as being un-representable but having some underlying structure or
thingness. Kant explores this in his discussion on the thing-in-itself as being that which
cannot be perceived in space-time, or in the appearance of material things in space-time. The
thing-in-itself can only be represented, it cannot be revealed. Kant explains that, “What
objects may be in themselves, and apart from all this receptivity of our sensibility, remains
completely unknown to us” (Caygill 80, Kant A 42/ B, 59). Halliwell explains that the PreSocratic notion of mimêsis addresses this difficulty with representing the thing-in-itself, since
as we have seen for ancient Greeks, the Divine resides in the concept of mimeisthai which
“modifies mimesis and imitation to represent the difficulty of depicting the divine”
(Halliwell, “Aesthetics” 274 n30). Mimeisthai, more specifically, is the term that indicates
that something is an expression or signification of the cosmos. Mimeisthai signifies that
which mimetically represents the cosmos in terms of a code or symbol rather than a direct
representation. This form of mimêsis depends upon an “older Pythagorean-cum Platonic
tradition of metaphysical mimêsis” that makes visible the relationship between the cosmos as
an overarching structure that requires signification or a code-based idealism (274 n30). In
other words, idealism represents order and structure, the formal and material concerns of the
cosmos, but not the cosmos itself. Idealist art mimetically reproduces the notion of order and
structure, and thereby re-signifies the notion of an ordered cosmos. This is the nature of
idealism, which gives a concept material form by making some thing or concept intelligible.
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Idealist art becomes a symbolic language or a code that is imbued with meaning; it represents
order and structure, the formal and material concerns of the cosmos, but not the cosmos
itself. Further, as we have noted in Chapter Four, because some things are known to exist but
are more conceptual and immaterial (asōmata), having no known material equivalent or
homoiotēs or image eidōlon to imitate, the notion of mimeisthai comes into play to represent
that which is un-representable (Halliwell 130). Mimeisthai accounts for the representation of
what is known to exist outside of material form. In this way mimeisthai is implicated in the
representation of knowledge, giving knowledge of a thing material form, despite the fact that
it is given outside of direct imitation.
Gadamer clarifies this point by evoking Pre-Socratic ideas regarding mimeisthai. He
explains that Pythagoras taught that all things are imitations of the universe itself. Pythagoras
specifically cites tonal harmonies and numerical ratios and subscribed such harmonies to all
phenomenological or material things. The miracle of the kosmos is that all things seek pure
harmonious relationships in accordance to other things (Gadamer 101). So while the Divine
or Ideal may not be expressible in representation (mimeisthai), the order of the Divine may
be expressed through the representation of any number of its forms. Thus, it is in the
expression or representation of order that mimeisthai gives representation, for mimeisthai
“reveals the miracle of the order of the kosmos” (101). This is not to say any form or object
reveals the Divine, but that any object that reveals Ideal order reveals the Divine. As
Gadamer explains, “Every work of art still resembles a thing as it once was insofar as its
existence illuminates and testifies to order as a whole. Perhaps this order is not one that we
can harmonize with our own conceptions of order, but that which once united the familiar
things of a familiar world. Nevertheless, there is in every work of art an ever new and
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powerful testimony to a spiritual energy that generates order” (103). Further, Gadamer
explains that any work of art wherein one encounters “a spiritual and ordering energy” is a
mimetic work of art that evokes the Ideal. Idealistic representation even is seemingly abstract
appearances, such as in all of Pollock’s drip paintings, lays claim to this form of unrepresentable representation.
Meaning is given to idealistic representation, even in its abstract forms in the way that
symbols and emblems become imbued with meaning. As Mondrian explains, “Art is in
essence universal” (Mondrian, “Plastic Art and Pure Plastic Art” 370). Mondrian discusses
this as the “relation” between art and the “universal” and explains that “gradually art is
purifying its plastic means and thus bringing out the relationships between them” (370). It is
through the form of art that universal meaning is given. Idealist art evidences transcendence
because it points (as in Platonic and Neoplatonic idealism) to that which is a higher Ideal or a
metaphysical truth. Whether in the works of the early modern idealists such as Kandinsky or
Malevich, or in the drip paintings of Pollock, abstract idealism reveals the ordering structure
of the miraculous cosmos. To say that modernism evokes Platonic thought is to say that it
emphasizes pure form or structure and a movement or pointing to the ideal. What cannot be
represented directly through mimêsis is given through mimeisthai, the representation of the
un-representable by representing what can be seen as properties of the said un-representable
or thing-in-itself.
Whether in idealist or spacial terms, painting or language or music can, by the very
notion of signification, be applicable to both. Art can act as a signifier of idealist concepts as
well as natural forms. For example, we see an inward pointing in the articulation of formalist
art in European Primitivism or Cubism, which presents artistic form; however, it does not
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directly point outwards to any ideal structure. Abstract formalism does not entice the viewer
to sympathize psychologically with what is abstractly represented nor does it evoke the unrepresentable. Thus, formalism deconstructs into an art of order that no longer resembles the
order of nature or the cosmos, or the human experience; it severs art from its broader
signifying functions. However, Pollock’s work subscribes to a definition of idealism in its
adherence to evoking absolute truth through structure and form while confirming the unrepresentability of it. Pollock’s drip paintings, and especially the dripped paint portions of his
drip paintings, attest to such an order and idealist structure without reference to objects from
the natural world. We know this by the way in which Pollock’s dripped paint points,
measures, and defines the surface of the canvas, with the layered paint pulsating through the
interplay of receding and advancing color. Combined with the hidden figures within,
Pollock’s drip paintings also attest to the mimetic nature of art as that which can represent
both the ideal and the natural worlds in ways in which consciousness perceives them. We
have seen how mimêsis can answer both to the representation of nature and Platonic and
Neoplatonic idealism as mimeisthai. The symbolic modes of mimêsis encompass symbols,
(with attendant emblems and personifications), metaphors, allegories, and through the
concept of mimeisthai, the notion of structure and its associations with the order of the
cosmos. Together in Pollock’s work, we see both mimêsis and mimeisthai at work in his
hidden and overt representations and in his idealist dripped paint technique.
In sum, symbolic representation derives in part from sight and perception because the
mind can perceive more than the eyes see. In this way, symbols can convey meaning in the
perception even when the representation does not have likeness in the empirical world.
Second, symbols function through the pointing action of art, but directing the mind’s
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attention to that which the symbol represents or signifies. Because of the pointing action,
symbols can stand in for or signify a person, event, object or token, or even a treaty or
covenant. In this function, symbols stand in and point to something beyond as a memento of
that something. In this capacity, symbols carry the pointing toward function, taking the
viewer out of the picture field into perception and knowledge of the thing symbolized.
Symbols are used to convey the imaginary and concepts in both art and poetry. In the case of
the imaginary, symbols appropriate a corresponding image that gives form to that which is
held in the imagination. Third, in terms of the conceptual, a symbol may be arbitrary, and in
this case it is the meaning conveyed that holds the symbol to the concept. But the sign with
its attendant signification allows for things to be represented which have no direct
correspondence in nature. As signs, symbols, insignia, emblems, personifications, and such,
the symbol brings to mind a concept that might otherwise have no form. The correspondence
between the emblem and an object in nature may be arbitrary to the meaning which is given
to the emblem. For example, Athena’s wings might have been used to represent embracing
love, but ancient Greek artists and poets agreed that her wings should signify the notion of
victory. Pollock’s representational and symbolic qualities maintain this fundamental
approach to the distinction between representation and the symbolic functions of mimêsis
wherein meaning is understood through correspondences to empirical objects, or
conceptually understood in the mind and imagination, or through that which is evoked by
symbols and symbolic representation in their pointing action. This pointing can be carried out
in terms of signs, insignia, emblems and personifications. Fourth, symbolic or idealist
representation evokes that which is un-representable such as meanings, concepts and ideas
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which have no empirical form. Such ideas often allude to metaphysical presence or structure
and are given form through mimeisthai in art.
Pollock’s paintings reinstitute pre and post-Socratic definitions of art as mimetic that
draws upon the both the correspondences between the empirical world and the ideal
(Halliwell, “Aesthetics” 15). Pollock’s work reinstitutes the relationship between art as
signifier and the broader world of nature and ideas as the signified, thus declaring that art is a
symbolic structure. Whether in imitation of forms in nature, or ideals and concepts held in
the mind, or in representing something which has no equivalent found in nature, mimêsis
points and directs the mind to its objects by playing upon the ways in which the mind
perceives in empirical and ideal ways and in the way that art conveys meaning.

Mimêsis as Metaphor

In addition to symbolic representation and meaning, art also conveys through
metaphor in a variety of ways. First, art transcends media specificity because it can designate
through a variety of forms and materials. 53 Secondly, art symbolizes through designating and
naming. Third, art participates in substitution, possessing fluid and mutable qualities.
Whether in imitation or symbolic representation, mimêsis is significant in that it makes anew
– it serves as a copy of the thing in a new form or material. It is not an exact copy but rather a
form by which a thing is expressed or re-presented. The re-presentation can take any form.
The forms of representation, symbolic or otherwise, constitute a metaphor or a type of image
or figure of speech in which meaning is applied. This is like symbolic representation in the
way a metaphor carries meaning upon itself. Symbolic representation has a fixed notion
attached to it, whereas metaphor has a more fluid function which can still be accounted for
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by the concept of mimêsis. In art, and particularly Pollock’s work, the metaphorical nature of
art witnesses to its several aspects. First, all mimetic arts transcend specific material form;
second, the metaphor is a naming process; and third, metaphor and art are interchangeable.
Our first lessons on the metaphorical nature of the arts in terms of media specificity or
material form come from Aristotle’s Poetics. Aristotle speaks of the universal function and
distribution of mimêsis in painting, poetry, and music, all of which are mimetic arts that
represent or signify an idea or the character of a thing in a variety of media. He explains,
“Some people use the medium of colour and shape to produce imitations of various objects
by making visual images (some through art, some through practice), others do this by means
of the voice” (Aristotle, “Poetics” 3). Elsewhere he also includes dance and language (verse
and prose) to his list of mimetic arts. He does not tell us that only certain myths can be
represented by certain media. Rather, all the arts are mimetic and thus the myth itself is the
universal thing which finds material specificity only in mimêsis – its representation. Art as
imitation or illustration (whether symbolic or otherwise) gives concepts, ideas, or myths
some material form. But any concept or representation can be given in multiple forms, not
just philosophical descriptions or images in paintings. Through the arts, concepts are able to
transcend media specificity.
Any number of Pollock’s drawings illustrate the functions of metaphor in art. One of
the simplest examples of media interchangeability is his untitled drawing which I will refer to
as Adam ca. late 1937–39. The drawing simply illustrates this definition of mimêsis as
metaphor by the way the metaphor works in a multiplicity of media (Fig. 64).
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Figure 64 Jackson Pollock, Untitled Drawing, ca. 1937-39, colored pencil, graphite, paper, Metropolitan
Museum of Art

The work shows Pollock’s finesse with line drawing and inscribing volumes. In the drawing
of Adam’s torso, which we recognize as a copy or re-presentation of Michelangelo’s Adam
from the Sistine Chapel, c. 1511–1512, Pollock captures Michelangelo’s sensuous volumes
of musculature as well as Adam’s apparent languid disposition. Michelangelo’s Adam is
duplicated on the paper as a reference to the notion of origins, revealing in some visual form
the underlying principle of the origins of material form. This is what Aristotle might
reference as the underlying essence governing the material manifestation of the thing, or
what Plato might abstractly consider the soul of the thing, as discussed in his Phaedo.
Pollock also conveys metaphor as a mode of mimêsis by drawing an ideographic language
based on signs or symbols that represent an idea or convey a concept. The petroglyphic text
as a symbol of original language provides the textual equivalence of the notion suggested by
the Adam figure. It evokes and represents the notion of the origins of writing. Because
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Pollock juxtaposes the ideogram with the image, we see that the drawing conveys a message
about origins, archetypes, and ancient mythologies, and demonstrates how the singular idea
of origin is represented through both graphic and visual means of representation. The essence
of the drawing conveys representation of a concept, wherein the relationship between visual
and narrative imagery equally convey the signified so as to suggest mankind and his sojourn,
as in ‘we all like Adam’, or a type of ‘universal we’ in terms of origins and archetypes. He
does not expressly say one is the other but conveys the possibility that one form is like the
other, thereby giving us a new understanding of both ideas singly and in their relation to each
other according to their position in comparison or juxtaposition in two media, drawing and
text (Ricoeur, “Rule” 28).
Pollock imitates indigenous petroglyphs and juxtaposes these with a copy of
Michelangelo’s Adam to universalize a broader content, an ideal or truth, by giving it a
transcultural and trans-historical setting. Rather than focusing on the forms of indigenous
American art, Pollock suggests a universal truth that supersedes any given historical or
cultural context. More broadly, the image conforms to Aristotle’s claim that mimêsis
transcends media specificity. The relations between two forms of mimêsis as respective
media underscore the relationship between the signifier (as word and image) and the
signified. Mimêsis then, is not media specific, but rather it is the metaphorical conveyance or
representation that transcends word, music, dance, or image because it can be given form in
any of those media.
Again, we can look at Pollock’s drip paintings and see the metaphor of hiding and
concealing, hiding naturalistic figures and symbols beneath paint that conceals them. The
metaphor of concealing is carried out by medium or paint, and the action of applying the
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paint, or the dance that conceals. Rather than juxtaposing text and image, it is in paint and
dance that the metaphor of concealing is carried forth. The philosopher Gotthold Ephraim
Lessing, who was influential in Greenberg’s understanding of the formal properties of art,
claims that mimêsis interferes with the imagination, and that rather than painting what is,
artists should only paint that which is beautiful. When too much is shown in the arts, little is
left for the imagination to contribute: “Since the artist can use but a single moment of everchanging nature, and the painter must further confine his study of this one moment to a single
point of view” (Lessing 8). One of his concerns is that the arts ought to focus on their
inherent media specificity, for he believes there is a limit to what each media can accomplish.
He denies the metaphorical and symbolic functions of art, saying that, “Homer treats of two
different classes of beings and actions,—the visible and the invisible. This distinction cannot
be made on canvas, where everything is visible, and visible in precisely the same way” (77).
Lessing believes that only certain ideas can be represented in painting, and it is this notion of
what painting cannot do that Greenberg held on to. But Pollock rejects the idea of media
specificity; Pollock reasserts the mimetic quality of all arts. Each art is unlimited by its
expressive materials and properties and each media can interchangeably express all the
needful “visible and the invisible” concepts and things alike.
In any metaphor, one can see “two things in one” just as in Pollock’s drawing we see
origins in two forms (Ricoeur, “Rule” 26). This helps us to see that mimêsis is more than
representation. It functions as a metaphor that can take many forms, in this case, ideogram
and image. When Pollock drafted his sketch, he gave us his understanding of the
metaphorical nature of art as being an interrelationship between hieroglyphic text and image.
The sketch and his paintings illustrate the way in which mimêsis functions as a means by
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which any idea can be given aesthetic form, whether in word, image, tune, dance, or other
medium. Barnett Newman also reiterates this relationship when he writes that an ideograph
(or signifier) is “a character, symbol, or figure which suggests the idea without expressing its
name” and that the ideograph represents an idea through “symbols, figures, or hieroglyphics”
without naming the object in direct speech (“Ideographic” 565). The idea is not so media
specific that it cannot transcend into new forms. The metaphor is fluid rather than meaning
specific. Newman makes it clear in his essay “The Ideographic Picture” that American artists
were returning to mimêsis as a form of signification which also re-presented American Indian
symbols and themes in terms of “ideographs”. Their modes and techniques clearly set them
apart from the abstraction of Picasso’s Primitivism and Cubism and Surrealist autonomism.
When Newman explains that “here is a group of artists who are not abstract painters,
although [they are] working in what is known as the abstract style” he is asserting that the
American artists are transcending media specificity to show us the metaphorical nature of art
(566).
We have already suggested that Pollock’s work combines symbolic text in the form of
ancient American Indian symbols, swastikas, cross-hatching lines, arrows, and markings
similar to those inscribed on ancient rocks with figures – either as stick figures or more fully
developed representations, as in his drawing of Adam’s torso. The progression of Pollock’s
work, rather than becoming formal abstractions, demonstrates a continued commitment to
representation. Through the reiteration of indigenous themes and symbols, or what Newman
calls “ideographs”, Pollock was applying mimêsis as symbolic representation, taking and representing the indigenous forms as metaphorical in the way such representations function
interchangeably among image and text, or image and act.
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Metaphor is more than that which is interchangeable within diverse media however.
Mimêsis as metaphor is also implicated in the function of naming. For the philosophers
Ricoeur and Aristotle both, mimêsis is a designating metaphor. Ricoeur explains that the
“metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else, the
transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to
species, or on grounds of analogy” (Ricoeur, “Rule” 14; Aristotle, “Poetics” 1457 b 6–9).
Whether we see a visual symbol or a petroglyphic text, both variations function in a type of
designating purpose. Aristotle explains metaphor in terms of lexis – language or modes of
speech in his discussion on words and poetry. Whether the lexicon is of music, painting, or
language, the comparison and substitution of elements is interchangeable in mimêsis by way
of onoma or the noun. The noun names or designates, or rather describes a given object or
term, not in its inner and outer details but in its ontological presence. To name is to give
designation, to re-present. The material of the representation of the object is irrelevant, for
the re-presentation in any form that names or designates it can be situated within any media.
In art, re-presentation is a form of signification akin to naming. By pointing toward, art
designates or names something. The conveyance of metaphor depends less on the distance
from one thing to another than on direct and meaningful modes of representation (Ricoeur,
“Rule” 30). So, within naming, the metaphor accommodates the model of the parts to whole,
the relationships between broader to more specific terms (genus to species), and between
particulars (species to species).
In Pollock’s drawing, he shows that both the text and the illustration name or designate
that which it is. Adam is designated and petroglyphic type writing is likewise designated by
virtue of its representation. Pollock’s drip paintings also show that the metaphor can be
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distributed among two different media, act and image, both of which convey metaphorical
meanings by designating or naming the attributes of hidden and hiding, concealed and
concealing. In showing art to be metaphorical through designating and representing, Pollock
shows art to be a narrative media which names and designates, thereby transgressing modern
art’s claim to pure form devoid of narrative content. 54 Newman, Pollock, and their colleagues
returned the role of metaphor to mimêsis in terms of the many ways in which symbols,
through imitation and representation, can take differing forms and be expressed in differing
media, while expressing, designating, and naming. Aristotle stresses this aspect of art as
being always a mimetic signifier. He writes that “an utterance is a composite significant
vocalization, part or parts of which are significant in their own right. Not every utterance is
composed of a verb and a noun; it is possible for an utterance to contain no verb. But it will
always contain a part which a part which signifies something (e.g. ‘Cleon’ in ‘Cleon walks’)”
(Aristotle, “Poetics” 37a, 33). Mimêsis, therefore is much more than imitation. As metaphor,
mimêsis is also symbolic, media diverse, and designating or naming.
Third, the metaphor can also serve as a substitution. We’ve seen that Newman interpreted
American art as being based on a type of hieroglyphic or sign system, which is to say that the
sign is media diverse and it designates. Mimêsis is also given in terms of metaphor or
substitution, which is a primary issue pertinent to our understanding of the function of
mimetic arts. Art participates in pointing and ascribing meaning in fluid and mutable ways.
Graphic and image are interchangeable. Pollock’s many drawings and paintings highlight this
association between art and narrative, image and text, or painting and dancing, calling into
question divisions between art media while asserting the way mimêsis functions in
substitution as a metaphor of sorts. Pictographic figures arranged procession-like present
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narratives, myths, and events to the mind, such that form recedes before mythologies. The
mythic representation is addressed through meaning in that the relation of the myth to its
signification is undisclosed, but the relationship between the signified and the signifier
remains and thus witnesses to the idea of meaning through metaphor as transferable
conveyance (Barthes 687-693).
Perhaps we might ask why is interchangeability or substitution important to our
understanding of the return of mimêsis to art in Pollock’s works? In the Poetics Aristotle uses
the term phora, which is to mean movement or a change of location. The term “metaphor” is
a borrowed term, wherein that which is borrowed stands in for that which has become absent,
or unillustrated (Ricoeur, “Between” 18). Ricoeur explores this same understanding of
Aristotle’s notion of mimêsis as representation in terms of the concept of metaphor. For
Ricoeur, Aristotle’s mimêsis is a borrowing or a substitution from one likeness or meaning to
represent another, and this borrowing or substitution occurs as a relocation of meaning from
one thing to another (Ricoeur, “Rule” 18, 20). The metaphor is still a representation of some
type, whether it is borrowed or is a substitution, and it conveys meaning from one medium
and form to another. This interchangeability of the signifier is easily identified in Pollock’s
sketches (for example, in the sketch called Frieze discussed previously in Chapter Three
(Fig. 44)). The hieroglyphic text takes the form of ancient American Indian symbols,
swastikas, cross-hatching lines, arrows, and markings similar to those inscribed on ancient
rocks and reiterated in several other drawings. But the signifier can just as easily be the paint
or performance of painting, for the act of painting conceals the figure and the paint itself also
conceals metaphorically, because both interchangeably conceal hidden figures. Any one of
these types of signification can substitute for another. As in Newman’s interpretation, the
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idea is given in image and hieroglyph or sign, indicating how all sign systems are mimetic,
but because meaning is fluid rather than fixed, the symbols are interchangeable and can be
substituted, and thus are metaphorical.
Another case in point is when Pollock painted Mural for Peggy Guggenheim in 1943.
He gave us his understanding of the interrelationship between media by evoking symbolic
animals of the ancient West, horses and cattle while showing them in the act of an iconic
stampede. It is not that the animals appear to be in the act of stampede, but that Pollock gave
the action or imitation of stampede new visual form as interchangeably as if actual animals
were in flight through the canvas or on a film (Fig. 65). Or as Pollock describes the painting,
It's “a stampede... [of] every animal in the American West, cows and horses and antelopes
and buffaloes. Everything is charging across [the] surface” (qtd. “Mural”).

Fig. 65 Jackson Pollock, Mural, 1943, Oil and casein on canvas, 95 5/8 x 237 3/4 in. Gift of Peggy
Guggenheim, University of Iowa Museum of Art.

The painting illustrates the way in which mimêsis functions as a means by which any idea
can be given aesthetic form, whether in word, image, tune, dance, or other medium. But just
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as meaning can be given in differing media, the signs and symbols to which meaning is
attributed to are also interchangeable, such that “flight,” “stampede,” “charging” all allude to
fluid meanings that can stand in for each other. Meaning in art by way of symbolic
representation constitutes the metaphor, which is fluid, changeable, and expressed as multimedia. Unlike emblematic or symbolic representation, which is singular and fixed in
meaning, metaphorical representation is diverse, plural, and interchangeable.
Like the multiplicity of metaphorical media in Pollock’s paintings, Pollock imitates
indigenous forms and juxtaposes these in ways that universalize them, giving them a broader
content, an ideal or truth within a transcultural and trans-historical setting. Rather than
focusing on exact copies of the forms of indigenous American art, Pollock repositions these
forms as pertaining to a universal truth that supersedes any given historical or cultural
context. More broadly, the paintings conform to Aristotle’s claim that mimêsis transcends
media specificity. The relation between two forms of mimêsis as respective naming signs
underscores the relationship between the signifier (as word and image) and the signified.
Mimêsis then, is not media specific, but rather is conveyed or represented equally in word,
text, music, dance, act, or image. Further, because meaning in the metaphor is fluid, there is a
substitutional value in art as metaphor.
In Pollock’s drawings, primitivist paintings, and drip paintings, meaning is conveyed
through two modes of mimetic representation; symbolic and metaphorical. In Pollock’s
paintings and drawings, he shows that the metaphor can be distributed among different
media, designating and naming objects and concepts, and is given with substituting to its
meaning. In so doing, Pollock transgressed modern art’s claim to pure form devoid of
narrative by naming and designating. In art, the idea is immanent to its form. But the concept
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or idea can transcend media specificity. It can be given through the naming and designation
function in any media. It is also interchangeable with other modes of representation. One
artistic mode and meaning can stand in as a substitution for any other type of representation.
The act of painting can be substituted for text or a dance, and painting can be a concealing
gesture.

Mimêsis and Allegory

American artists gave new and significant content to art through representation of
existing and new primitivist subjects while exploring these themes within matters of
signification, symbol and metaphor. But they also present new content through mimêsis as
allegory. Mimêsis as allegory can be understood in three primary ways. First, the allegory is
that which re-presents the mythic and secondly, the allegorical doubles that which is represented. Third, the allegorical is that which multiplies and reinterprets in a variety of forms
and modes. Through appropriation, Pollock looked to indigenous American art and represented those forms in such a way as to convey, not the outer abstract forms of indigenous
as symbols and motifs, or what Newman called “non-objective pattern” but direct allegories
drawn from American Indian myths (Newman, “Ideographic” 566).
Pollock especially developed a means by which he created allegorical paintings based
on American Indian symbols. Both Pollock’s The Magic Mirror, 1941, and Moon-Woman
Cuts the Circle, 1943 have alternately been interpreted as being based on Picasso’s Girl
Before a Mirror, 1929 in art history literature (Landau 69) (Fig. 66, 67, 68).
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Figure 66 Jackson Pollock, The Magic Mirror, 1941, Oil, granular filler, and glass fragment on canvas, 46 × 32 in., Menil
Collection

But in The Magic Mirror we see Navajo directional energy lines (center left), and an
abstracted Iroquois feathered masked figure taking up most of the picture plane. As the
viewer looks metaphorically into the mirror or the painting, one sees a reflecting image
looking back at the viewer. Centrally placed is a figure in an Iroquois mask, the face slightly
to the right and the arm and bent leg below and to the left in the painting. Above center at the
top of the painting, the Iroquois mask is reiterated, emphasized and given in bolder colors to
emphasize the nature of the painting in terms of masking and revealing. In the top right we
see another mask in frontal view, as if hung on the wall or reflecting back from a mirror.
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Other figures are suggested such as the vague outline of a female figure to the left as if in the
arm of the main figure, and another figure in a niche at the bottom right of the painting.
These duplications of figures, as in a palimpsest, evoke theatrical events multiplied over
many eons.
Likewise, an allegory is before us in the painting Moon-Woman. Rather than a girl
standing before a mirror, we see the Woman on the left of the painting formed in the shape of
an adopted embryonic Haida motif to emphasize birth and creation.

Figure 67 Jackson Pollock, Moon-Woman Cuts the Circle, 1932, MoMA, New York

She has a train of energy in the form of symbolic Navajo stars that iterate her divine role.
Pollock would have seen this motif at the MoMA’s “Indian Art of the United States” exhibit.
Some erroneously see the woman as being on the right of the painting wearing an elaborate
headdress. The painting has been interpreted as being based on “precedents in certain other
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portrait compositions by the Catalan Surrealist [Picasso]” (117). But upon closer inspection
we see that it is a chieftain’s feathered headdress worn by a running man who looks behind
himself at the Woman to the left. It is likely that the Man is an adaptation of Umberto
Boccioni’s Futurist Unique Forms of Continuity in Space, a reference emphasizing velocity
that has been entirely overlooked (Fig. 69). With the Woman on the left and Running Man on
our right, we see the allegory In Moon-Woman Cuts the Circle. Pollock interprets a Navajo
myth wherein the First Woman creates the moon and sun by cutting out two circles, having
them placed in the sky to provide warmth and light. In the painting the Woman on the left
yields a sharp knife prominently placed in the center top of the painting.

Figure 68 Pablo Picasso, Girl Before a Mirror, 1932, MoMA, New York

The discs which she has just cut are placed in the exact center of the painting. On the right,
First Man has brought the discs to the top of a mountain and has hurled them into the sky,
transforming them into the Sun and Moon. As he begins his swift descent homeward, the
Man turns back to look at the First Woman. Pollock focuses the action on the moment just
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before the discs separate and become heavenly lights. As with many of Pollock’s paintings,
the interpretation of The Moon-Woman Cuts the Circle can be re-analyzed to discover hidden
symbols and allegorical references to American Indian arts and themes. As mentioned, some

Figure 69 Umberto Boccioni, Unique Forms of Continuity in Space, 1913, Bronze, Metropolitan Museum of
Art, New York

look to Picasso’s Girl Before a Mirror (and Joan Miro’s Person Throwing a Stone Bird) as
main influential sources for Pollock. For some, the title is rather ambiguous but within the
context of an allegory the interpretation is rather clear. More than reiterating and altering
indigenous symbols, Pollock envisioned an ancient myth in terms of momentum and birth
rewritten in shades of red, white, and blue. Rather than progressing towards a modernist
aesthetic of pure from, Pollock reversed the modernist trend that eschews allegory and
representation. He showed, through the repetition of an idea or myth, that art is mimetic
through allegories.
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Second, Mimêsis as allegory can be understood as that which duplicates another thing or
idea. In essence, many of Pollock’s paintings (including his drip paintings) are allegorical in
nature in that they duplicate in form some other thing, and it is these duplications that define
Pollock as a representational and mimetic painter. Craig Owens in “The Allegorical Impulse:
Towards a Theory of Postmodernism” defines the allegorical as that which is a repetition.
Whether in attitude, technique, procedure, or perception, the allegorical is the repetition or
reiteration from a primary instance into a related or different form. In Pollock’s reiteration,
the Woman creates the Moon in both figure and text. The figures symbolically act out the
myth and the text labels the myth. Image and text reiterate and redefine the mythic Indian
allegory in new ways. In this way the title is not read “Moon-Woman” in identifying the
figure, but rather “Moon, (hyphen) Woman Cuts the Circle”. The emphasis is on the action of
the text, “cutting the circle”. So Moon is the subject, which is created by the Woman. In reconveying the myth of the Moon, Pollock acted on what Owens terms a “fundamental
impulse” to redeem allegory from a remote past (Owens 1052). Whether in terms of
reiteration, allegory, or representation, the fundamental impulse is one of mimêsis. In fact,
this is Owens’ first point, that the essential quality of allegory is its ability to recover that
which might otherwise disappear from view, such as indigenous art forms for example. As
Owens explains,
Allegory first emerged in response to a similar sense of estrangement from
tradition; throughout its history it has functioned in the gap between a present and
a past which, without allegorical reinterpretation, might have remained
foreclosed. A conviction of the remoteness of the past, and a desire to redeem it
for the present - these are its two most fundamental impulses. (1052)
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For Owens, the allegorical impulse is that which recovers and revalues that which would
otherwise fall into oblivion in the wake of new modes of representation. This recovering is
not the event of archiving a historical mode but of recuperating and renewing it by making it
anew. The re-presentation of the mythic is given new allegorical meanings which revivify the
mythic in the form of new presentations. Secondly, an allegory is created in the act of
doubling or reiterating and such doubling gives new meanings and interpretations.
A close look at Pollock’s Full Fathom Five reveals the depth of Pollock’s allegorical
impulse as a recovery, reiteration, and doubling (Fig. 70). One of Pollock’s first all over drip
paintings, Full Fathom 5 is a flurry of encrusted paint applied in layers of poured, dripped
and spotted paint in black, white, sea green, and shades of rust and ochre colors, beneath of
which lies a figure, hidden and buried underneath encrusted paint. As mentioned earlier, we
recall that while being restored by MoMA sometime before 1998, x-ray analysis revealed a
hidden figure of a man lying on his back with his left arm raised, hidden and buried within
the depths of a mythic sea (Adams, “Tom” 319-321). There is no reason to suggest an
arbitrary placement and covering of the figure, for the figure is part of a new mode of
representational allegory that still retains close associations between Navajo ritual and ritual
art.
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Figure 70 Jackson Pollock, Full Fathom Five, 1947, Oil on canvas with nails, cigarettes, matches, etc., 50 7/8 x
30 1/8 in., MoMA, New York

In Navajo rituals, sand paintings are made by the shaman and his assistants. Whether for
fertility, healing, to bring peace of mind or banish evil spirits, the paintings are temporary
tools for harnessing and distributing psychic forces of shamanic power. Prior to the ritual,
sand painters carefully ‘paint’ and create sacred symbols on a prepared ground with colored
sand. During the Navajo ritual clients sit or lie upon the sand paintings. The shaman takes the
colored sand from off of the symbols in the painting and pours this sand on his clients for
healing. This act disturbs, distorts and displaces the original forms and symbols. After the
colored sand is re-distributed, any remainder of the paintings’ edges and symbols are then
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destroyed as the shaman circulates about the painting, smudging, spreading, and blurring out
figures and symbols, ritually obliterating them with a feather-tipped stick as he moves about
the painting. In a type of cleansing dance, the shaman performs a covering and veiling of
magic power, pouring sand on the client, covering him/her all while obliterating the painting.
In the case of animal fertility sand paintings, the paintings are made just outside of the herd’s
pens. After the paintings are complete, the herds, such as sheep, are allowed to run over and
spread the colored sand of a painting throughout the fields. This obliteration of the painting
and the spreading of the sands insure the fertility of the flock. In other fertility paintings, the
symbols are disrupted as the shaman casts the sand from the painting into the fields. The
power of ritual sand paintings lies in the creation of sacred symbols and the distribution and
spreading of the colored sand. Power is transferred from image to recipient.
In Full Fathom Five (and his other drip paintings, including Number 1A, his first drip
painting), Pollock deliberately mixed sand in enamel paint, creating paint with a heavy
viscosity in order to do his own version of sand-painting. Like Navajo sand painters, he also
changed the orientation of the canvas, from the vertical easel to the horizontal ground.
Without brush, Pollock used a shamanic-like stick, pouring, dripping, spotting and splattering
his sand-paint, carefully moving around the canvas to cover up the symbolic figures beneath.
Like the shaman, Pollock was not creating but destroying art. Full Fathom Five combines
symbolic representation in the form of the hidden figure, and allegorical tendencies in the
forms of reinterpreting and reiterating the horizontality of sand paintings, the media of sand,
glass, and bits of string, cigarette butts, and other life objects in the paint. Furthering the
allegory, Pollock’s application of paint with a stick continues to reiterate the ritual of sand
painting and the shaman’s obliteration of the sand paintings with his shaman stick. In Full
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Fathom Five the figure outlined on the canvas is covered up, not by paint splotches, drips and
splatters, but rather by Pollock’s dance as he moves about the canvas performing the
allegory. Rather than executing a direct ritual or performing a ritual shamanic healing dance
as some suggest, Pollock’s drip paintings function as reiterations or duplications, which is to
say he creates allegories of the construction and destruction of American Navajo sand
paintings. 55 Drip paintings are allegorical, reiterations and reinterpretations of an ancient
form of ritual performance art, but in their re-presentation, Pollock gives them new forms and
meanings. In 1943, Graham, writing for Paalen’s DYN said, “Art can reunite us with our
prehistoric past and thus only certain carved and painted images enable us to grasp the
memories of unfathomable [italics mine] ages.” He declared that “Perhaps Pollock sought to
unite the “memories of unfathomable ages” with a “consciousness of modern art” in his Full
Fathom Five by hiding and covering over a figure beneath a tracery of dripping sand paint
(qtd. Rushing, “Ritual” 274).
Drip paintings are thus allegories that recuperate indigenous modes of sand paintings in
both materials and technique. The paintings enable one to view indigenous sand paintings
because of the way mimetic images point to this, and in the same way that, as Northrop Frye
says, “one text is read through another, however fragmentary, intermittent, or chaotic their
relationship may be” (qtd. Owens 1053). In this mode of viewing the painting is a type of
palimpsest. For if in Pousette-Dart’s Palimpsest, we see a “paradigm for the allegorical
work” that revalues indigenous rock art, then so too are Pollock’s Full Fathom and other drip
paintings, allegorical images that allegorize the act and materials of indigenous sand painting
(qtd. Owens 1053). Pollock’s drip paintings are likewise types of palimpsests.

275

Third, the allegorical is that which appropriates by way of confiscation. The artist takes
some culturally pertinent thing and reiterates it in a way that does not necessarily restore its
original meanings, but rather adds new meanings to it. As Owens explains, “allegory is not
hermeneutics” (1054). The artist does not excavate meaning but repurposes modes and
imagery in ways that revalues and imbues fresh meanings. Owens claims that Sherry Levin,
Troy Brauntuch, Robert Longo, and others are the first artists to create works of art based on
the works of earlier artists. But we can see that Pollock and the American primitivist artists
did so when they aestheticized indigenous art forms as early as the 1930s.
To understand the finer points of allegory and its importance for Pollock, particularly in
his drip paintings, it is helpful to compare allegorical with symbolic modes of representation.
Walter Benjamin explains the differences between the symbolic and the allegory in The
Origin of German Tragic Drama, the first serious study of allegory in the modern era. Early
theorists considered an allegory to be the development of a myth. Homer’s legends of the
universe and the divine were believed to have been derived from Nestorian beliefs or from
the orphic doctrines from ancient Egypt (as the Greek geographer Strabo believed)
(Benjamin, “Origin” 165). In this way the Homeric tales work backwards in order to move
the ancient truths forward into present myths. If it is as Owens describes, allegory is the
recuperation of an older tradition that would otherwise be relegated to a distant and forgotten
past unless it is put to new purposes (Owens 1054). But the distinction here is that the
recuperation of ancient rituals and myths are played out in new forms.
Traditional definitions distinguish between symbolic and allegorical modes of art as
being that which incarnates the idea itself in the symbolic or singular mode, while the
allegorical mode signifies a much broader concept, such that the idea and the concept stand
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in for the dialectic of the particular and the universal. But it is not just that one is unlike the
other, in an opposition, but rather one is as a progression built upon the other. As Heidegger
explains,
The artwork is, to be sure, a thing that is made, but it says something other
than what the mere thing itself is, allo agoreuei. The work makes public
something other than itself; it manifests something other; it is an allegory. In
the work of art something other is brought together with the thing that is
made. To bring together is, in Greek, symballein. The work is a symbol.
Allegory and symbol provide the conceptual frame within whose channel of
vision the artwork has long been characterized. But this one element in a work
that manifests another, this one element that joins with another, is the thingly
feature in the artwork. It seems almost as though the thingly element in the
artwork is like the substructure into and upon which the other, proper element
is built. (“Origin” 146)
The symbol brings meaning to form, and the allegory reiterates and reveals that action.
Together symbol and allegory create a structure upon which meaning is communicated
through the forms of the work of art.
Walter Benjamin explains further this relationship between symbol and allegory, “the
distinction between the two modes (symbolism-allegory) is therefore to be sought in the
momentariness which allegory lacks”. In the symbol there is a “momentary totality” and in
allegory there is a “progression in a series of moments” (Benjamin, “Origin” 165). Thus, the
symbolic looks to the eternal unchanging idea in that it describes a singular meaning,
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whereas the allegorical embraces the temporal with its multitude of fluid interchangeable
meanings. Symbols retain an overarching singular concept while allegories see the
expression of the symbolic within a field of variety and multiplicity. The symbolic signifies
the ideal and the allegorical signifies the natural and thus multiplies in meanings and
purposes. Plato’s Allegory of the Cave provides a template for how the allegorical can point
to the ideal, as the onlooker of shadows comes to leave the cave to ponder the bright sunlight,
the symbol of enlightenment. It is the allegory that points to the myth while the symbol
embraces its truth or meaning, which is another way of saying that Pollock’s drip paintings
are as mythic or allegorical as Dürer’s Triumphal Cart of the Emperor Maximilian (Fig. 71).

Figure 71, Albrecht Dürer, Triumphal Cart of the Emperor Maximilian, wood cut, 54 metres, 1512-15

The mythic is not to be confused with the symbolic, for the symbolic represents one thing or
a unified thing which is ideal. But the allegorical is mythic in that it contains within it the
narrative of past, present, and future enactments, as in a palimpsest. For example, we might
look at the emblem of the Sun King at Versaille (Fig. 72) as symbolic of the King’s power as
an ideal, while the Triumphal Entry is the articulation or expression of Maximillian’s power
as the allegory of myth played out in time and space. Benjamin elaborates on the dual types
of representation, “We can be perfectly satisfied with the explanation that takes the one as a
sign for ideas, which is self-contained, concentrated, and which steadfastly remains itself,
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while recognizing the other as a successively progressing, dramatically mobile, dynamic
representation of ideas which has acquired the very fluidity of time (Fig. 72).

Figure 72 Motif of the Sun King Louis XIV (the sun was associated with Apollo), Palace at Versailles, France

They stand in relation to each other as does “the silent, great and mighty natural world of
mountains and plants to the living progression of human history” (165). The symbolic is
representative of the singular transcendental ideal, and the allegorical presents us with the
ideal reinterpreted in a variety of terms along the line of life processes and potentialities. The
symbolic is upwardly linear, hierarchical, ever looking ascendant, while the other, allegory,
looks at the variations of life as the sequences of mythic truths played out upon the human
stage. As Schelling summarized the relationship of allegory or myth to its past, “The
Odyssey is the history of the human spirit, The Iliad is the history of nature” (qtd. Benjamin,
“Origin” 165).
Medieval and early Renaissance theorists describe allegorical paintings as emblematic in
that they appropriated the symbolic for new allegorical purposes. As Benjamin summarized,
“Painters imitated the old works of monks; but with great understanding and close
observation of objects, so that I might almost call this age the emblematic age” (167). This
tendency to allegory or the emblematic continued with increased enthusiasm in the sixteenth
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century. The fullest expression of the emblematic image can be found in Reformation
morality imagery. For example, Dürer’s emblematic woodcuts of Maximillian I illustrates
Northern European love for the iconic and emblematic allegory. In Dürer’s The Triumphal
Cart of the Emperor Maximilian published 1523, Maximilian I is regaled within a mixture of
medieval symbolism and Reformation emblems to create an “ideology of princely power”
printed on eight folio pages. Benjamin explains that “because of the seriousness of their
national character” German artists were avid in their enthusiasm for the allegorical image and
its power to “manifest…newly discovered truth” (qtd. Benjamin, “Origin” 165). Such
enthusiasm for all things allegorical was fueled by Reformist print materials as well as the
work of humanist scholars such as Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus, author of The Praise of
Folly, an allegorical satire that criticizes the Catholic Church. Such allegorical works were
produced throughout the continent as well, such as the ever popular John Bunyan’s The
Pilgrim’s Progress. Whether illustrating princely power or morality tales, allegorical and
emblematic devices made use of one mode of meaning and reiterated them in new media and
techniques. Artists were no less serviceable in the construction of complex allegories than
their literary counterparts, and by the early sixteenth-century, many relied on Cesare Ripa’s
Iconologia, a guide for creating emblems and allegorical imagery.
In the painting Birth, Pollock illustrates the form of an Inuit mask and through reiteration,
creates a narrative through the juxtaposition and intertwining of the forms (Rushing 17) (Fig.
40). One such mask would be symbolic. One mask might signify a singular ideal, but many
masks suggest the interplay between masks, masking, and unmasking played out over time.
The reiteration and recuperation of a legion of masks is allegorical. The allegorical is that
which reiterates and doubles, but in so doing multiplies in a variety of ways. It evokes the
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particulars of the mythic whereas the symbolic corresponds to the overarching ideal or
concept.
A long list of Pollock’s allegories paintings contains overt associations and reiterations of
indigenous Indian myths. Beyond the few works analyzed here the list includes various
drawings and studies, Red-on Buff Plate, Mural, 1943 and Guardians of the Secret, 1943 and
others (Fig. 73). For example, Rushing compares Pollock’s Guardians of the Secret to a
drawing and a sand painting, both of which were published in the Annual Report of the
Bureau of American Ethnology 11, which was in Pollock’s library (Fig. 74). The drawing
shows members of the Guardians of the Knife Society, and in between the guardians are the
altar and ceremonial bowls and a type of small wolf. In the sand painting, the altar is depicted
along with symbolic elements. But Pollock’s uncovering and reclaiming the mythic goes
beyond the plastic surface of canvas to represent the mythic within mythologies, repurposing
the allegorical.

Figure 73 Jackson Pollock, Guardians of the Secret, 1943, oil on canvas, 48 3/8 x 75 3/8 in., San Francisco
Museum of Modern Art
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Others have noticed the allegorical tendencies in Pollock’s drip paintings, but not all
agree on their interpretation. Hubert Damisch claims that Pollock’s drip paintings are based
on Pollock entering a trance state. He calls the paintings “the Indian example” and claims
that these have less to do with “iconic resonances” or the actual appearance of pictograms (or
Indian sand painting), and more the “marking out” of a shamanistic ritual (Damisch 30).

Figure 74 Guardians of the Knife Society at Zia Pueblo. Illustrated in Eleventh Annual Report of the Bureau of
American Ethnology (1894)

But we must not take this suggestion literally to say that Pollock was painting as a shaman in
trance, but rather that Pollock enacted an allegory and imitated a ritual, in order to arrive at
new artistic meanings for the modern world. The act of painting is the allegory which holds
space and time within the content of the paintings united in the ephemeral movement as part
of the allegory. The paint itself is the trace of the allegory. In reiterating American Indian arts
and myths through symbolic and allegorical representation, Pollock enacted and reiterated
the mythic, creating a new mode of artistic representation through a fuller application of
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mimêsis as allegory. This gesture combines the substitution and interchangeability of the
metaphor from one media to another with the notion of reiteration that constitutes the
allegory. It retains the symbolic meaning of Navajo myths while re-envisioning it within new
paradigms of artistic representation.
Rather than being the iconic Abstract Expressionist, Pollock returns mimêsis as symbolic,
imitative, metaphorical, and allegorical representation into art, thereby disregarding
modernisms claim to autonomy and pure form. To be clear, the allegorical is that which
doubles or reiterates. Owens clarifies that the allegorical is both “an attitude as well as a
technique” for the allegory chooses what it reiterates, and through technical executions does
so (Owens 1053). Further, it is through the allegory that the original is known or “is read
through another, however fragmentary, intermittent, or chaotic their relationship may be; the
paradigm for the allegorical work is thus the palimpsest” (1053). We have already seen how
the palimpsest iterates eons of petroglyphic writing in Poussette-Dart’s Palimpsest (and we
can find them in his Symphony No. 1, The Transcendental, 1941-42, and other works), but
here the drips paintings are as a palimpsest, illustrating how one work of art as metaphor and
allegory points to the original and in so doing, makes it known (Fig. 38).
In this way, just as Pollock’s drip paintings allegorize American Indian sand painters
and ritual, Hans Namuth’s 1950 preparatory black and white films for the documentary
Jackson Pollock are also allegories based on Pollock’s reiteration of the sand painting ritual.
The films point to, designate, and determine what we have come to know as a unity of time
and space in an ephemeral artistic performance. Namuth’s raw preparatory footage, which
consisted of lengthy takes that focused on Pollock silently moving about the canvas – in a
sort of dance. In the films Pollock focuses on the act of painting, reiterating the movements
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and gestures of the Indian shaman applying sand and brushing it away. The original raw
footage lacked rhetorical intervention and narration. It focused on Pollock engrossed in his
silent performance. However, as Catherine Sousloff notes, the final colored version that was
shot over a two-week period in November 1951 contains Namuth’s interpretive (or
allegorical) narration (Soussloff 62). For the film, Namuth created a pit in the ground and
covered the pit with a sheet of glass. Namuth stood in the pit under the glass while Pollock
painted on the glass above. Namuth found the perfect vantage point from which to shoot
Pollock in the act of painting and this glass painting became his work Number 29. Shot from
the vantage point of being below the glass Namuth’s camera recorded Pollock throwing,
splattering, and dripping paint onto the glass in short colorful clips that he edited into
narrated vignettes. Namuth’s final film focused on the gestures of painting and on the
materials of form without regard to the source of the allegory. The film marked the final form
of what had been a tracing of a conscious mimetic act in the making. The allegory became, in
its reiteration by Namuth, a narrative about an unconscious splattering of paint across a wide
expanse of glass. But as Namuth shot Pollock at work above the glass, the layer of splattered
paint increasingly obscures our view of Pollock painting and focuses our attention on the
paint itself. From this vantage point and in a strange and tragic irony, Full Fathom Five was
recreated on film. Pollock became both the maker casting paint and the figure obscured
behind the paint. In a sort of strange loop, Pollock became his own allegorized subject. The
day Namuth finished filming Pollock making Number 29 is the day that Pollock, having been
sober for four years, began an alcohol binge that lasted nearly five years until his death on
August 11, 1956. Number 29 illustrates the irony of mimêsis as allegory, metaphor, and
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substitution in the making between Pollock’s original work and Namuth’s doubling of that
work.
Like Pollock’s critics, Namuth focused on the sensational gesture and material form and
completely missed the nuanced allegorical event. These nuances had been established in Full
Fathom Five and earlier drip paintings. Thus, Pollock no longer needed to reiterate the exact
re-presentation, for the form of Pollock’s allegorical painting evolved into a focus on the
allegorical re-presentation of the painting and obliteration of the sand paintings carried out by
the American Indian shaman. This ritual content was infused into each successive painting.
The subject of Indian pictograms and the sick man on ground having been established in
earlier works were no longer needed elements in the allegory, because each of Pollock’s
successive works became the “interminable reinterpretations”, allegories that evolved and
synthesized until he achieved a fusion of allegorical content within allegorical form by virtue
of the creative and expressed moment (Merleau-Ponty 62). Successive works, Comet 1947,
Reflection of the Big Dipper, 1947, Number 1A, Out of the Web: Number 7, Autumn Rhythm:
Number 30, and Number 32 retain this synthesis of form and content, time and space in an
allegorical performance. But even more so, his latest works retain all of the earlier
symbolism in the form of hidden figures being revealed out of the paint for our view.
For Pollock, the art is in the making, it is in the process of allegorizing sacred ritual.
Lee Krassner alludes to allegorical performativity when she characterized Pollock’s work as
being some form of a dance (Krasner 63). Soussloff suggests that Pollock’s dance lends
“performative poetics [to] the paintings”, but we should not get fixated on the dance here, but
remember the dance is the reiteration of a ritual, captured in paint, leaving its trace (Soussloff
63). Pollock suggested this fact when he said, “Technic is the result of a need—new needs
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demand new technics—total control—denial of the accident—States of order—organic
intensity—energy and motion made visible—memories arrested in space…” (qtd. Soussloff
71). Making “energy and motion visible” meant to leave in paint a trace of the allegory of
indigenous art in its re-presentation.
That the original work of art was Pollock’s allegorical dance is reiterated in
Benjamin’s tenet that, “Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one
element: its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens.”
Because Pollock’s works are re-presentations and not reproductions (as in photocopies or
photographs and prints of the original paintings) they retain the “aura” of ritual art in the
making because they function as unique works that retain and double that upon which they
are based (Benjamin, “Work” 513). As Benjamin explains, “The uniqueness of a work of art
is inseparable from its being imbedded in the fabric of tradition” (514). In Pollock’s work,
we see the original idea and its conveyance through symbolic representation and allegorical
re-presentation. This transition from the symbolic to allegory via the performance as a mythic
recreation was missed by Pollock’s critics. As trace, Pollock’s drip paintings are allegorical
works based on both symbolic and metaphoric elements.

Mimêsis and Ritual

Our final mode of symbolic or idealist representation takes its form as ritual. Ritual
typically has associations with spiritual practices and anthropology, particularly in the
analysis of Non-Western art. But at its core we can define ritual as a mode of idealistic
representation that is based upon a foundation of the repetition or reiteration of an allegory.
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Whether in Pythagorean rituals surrounding death or rituals based on mythic heroic journeys
as found in Homeric tales, ancient Greek tragic poetry, or in the fertility rituals of ancient
Navajo peoples, or medieval Gawain poems, or as in medieval plays and theater or
enactments of the Passion, all ritual ceremonies are based on allegories and myths that form
the basis of a ritual performance or enactment. The mode of ritual can thus be defined as the
reiteration of allegory in theatrical performance or mimetic dance. This symbolic mode of
representation, more than any other mode, is at length a subject that crosses a variety of
boundaries in anthropology, religious, and postmodern studies. For example, Gadamer
believes that life is based upon a hidden series of rituals that preclude “human understanding,
acting, feeling, and loving..[that] have less to do with planning, control and being
consciously aware, and much more to do with a subcutaneous fitting into the rituality of life,
in forms of tradition, in an event that encompasses us and that we can grasp only
stutteringly” (Grondin 49). But for our purposes, we are less concerned with the purposes of
ritual than with the reiteration of allegory as constituting the ritual as a form of idealistic
representation.
As reiteration of the allegory, Pollock’s drip paintings illustrate this mode. We have
already identified the allegorical nature of Pollock’s drip paintings that conceal figures and
obliterate art as a doubling in media and techniques of Navajo sand painters. These
allegorical paintings are, in their reiteration, ritual paintings. Each painting re-envisions and
reiterates empirical objects rendered as signs and symbols, such as abstract figures for
example, and ritualistically, or repeatedly as when concealing these figures with paint in the
way the Navajo shaman obliterates sand paintings with his stick. This is not to say that
Pollock performs a ritual, but rather that he ritually or re-iteratively recreates the ritual
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paintings. Symbolic of both art making and its destruction, and the reiteration of concealing,
the drip paintings describe a class of repetition and the reiteration of an allegory, thereby
illustrating the mode of the ritual as a signifying idealistic representation. The paintings are
metaphorical performances of reiteration.
Certainly, we see how in Pollock’s Blue Poles, simultaneously disclosed and hidden
totems bracket a never-ending dance of what appear to be Indian war lances decorated with
various elements (Fig. 75). The pointing function in the painting’s articulation of paint, back
and forth and round-about is formed through the ritual dance, a reiteration of allegory and
symbolic representation. Within the paint is the trace of the ephemerality of the dance
captured in the form of pulsing and swaying paint. Motion is held within stasis, the material
properties of paint witness to a repetitious pattern of actions, an endless reiterating mimêsis.
The painting points to the dance as a ritual of reiterating ad infinitum, again and again,
perpetually in the same way forever.

Fig. 75 Jackson Pollock, Blue Poles (original title: Number 11), 1952, Enamel and aluminum paint with glass
on canvas, 212.1 cm × 488.9 cm (83.5 in × 192.5 in), National Gallery of Australia, Canberra

288

Whether in an early overall painting such as Gothic, 1944 with its juxtaposition of small and
grand figures and body parts or in Full Fatthom or late works such as White Light, 1954,
presence is hidden but felt and revealed in paint that serves as a trace of the dance. Symbolic
and hidden figures point to meanings inherent in the signs, the dance reiterates the ideals
hidden within the allegory. Each painting is nothing short of a cosmic and eternal repetition
of the ritual dance. If there is any question of formalism one need remember that the paint
witnesses to the dance, it being the trace of the enacted and reiterated ritual, or the allegory
which makes the drip paintings idealist in structure.

Conclusion

We have seen that there are several primary modes of mimetic representation that
constitute naturalistic and idealistic representation. While these modes are attributes of both
forms of representation the symbolic or ideal is primarily constituted by symbolic,
metaphorical, allegorical, and ritual modes. It is largely through these modes of idealism that
we can see there is a specific and tangible content in Pollock’s primitivist and later drip
paintings that returns mimêsis to art. This return has come about through the recuperation of
the indigenous, its symbols, allegories, and rituals that evoke indigenous myths.
Observing this recuperation first hand, Newman underscores the primary nature of art as
mimetic, declaring that “Undoubtedly the first man was an artist” (Newman, “First” 568).
Perhaps then it is no small coincidence that Pollock sought indigenous symbols, pictographs
and hieroglyphs to convey the role of mimêsis in art and continued to explore mimêsis in his
drip paintings. Figuration and representation, and American Indian symbols are so
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predominant in Pollock’s work that it is important that we account for their existence.
Newman emphatically identified and qualified the American Primitivist movement as being,
“spontaneous, and emerging from several points” and as “a new force in American painting
that is the modern counterpart of the primitive art impulse” (Newman, “Ideographic” 566). If
American painting is the “modern counterpart of the primitive” then it behooves us to
establish more fully that this “primitive art impulse” is first and foremost mimetic.
Second, symbolic representation is given as metaphor through diverse media (in the case
of Pollock, diverse media constitutes the media of paint, pictographic text, and the motion or
dance of painting. Metaphor is evoked as well through the act of signifying, labeling, and
naming, all functions derived from the representation of empirical and symbolic objects as
well as through the attachment of meaning to such objects as emblems and symbols. Finally,
metaphor is that which is changeable from one form to another, and yet within changes
meaning is retained and transferred, such as in the juxtaposition of imagery and text for
example.
Third, mimêsis is evident in the way symbolic, naturalistic, and metaphorical
representation is employed within a doubling or reiteration that constitutes an allegory. As
with metaphor, this allegory can be given in diverse media, from sand paint, to painting and
representing myths and the mythic, to executing, recreating, or reiterating the mythic through
re-presenting ritual performance. Art, mythology, and the reiteration of the mythic come
together in ways that re-produce a text or narrative in some form and in so doing become the
way in which the narrative comes to be known. We have seen how allegory functions as a
doubling or reiteration through diverse media in the way that the painting Moon-Woman Cuts
with the Knife illustrates a narrative myth. We have also seen how Pollock reiterates sand
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painting and its destruction through the media of sand and other objects in paint, the creation
of figures and the covering up of the same, and the notion of destroying art as well as
performing its destruction through performative action. But we have also seen the copy of the
allegory in Namuth’s films, which themselves function as an allegory and re-presentation of
the execution of the allegory, wherein Pollock himself becomes as the allegory of which he
painted.
Finally, we can claim ritual as another mode of symbolic representation in that ritual is
functionally and formally the repetition of the reiteration of the allegory. This review
approaches the issue of mimêsis, in terms of its most basic definition as representation,
symbolic representation, metaphor and allegory. We have seen that mimêsis, particularly in
this broader definition beyond mere representation and imitation, qualifies Pollock’s works
as particularly unique, falling outside European formalism with its emphasis on abstract
forms or “significant form”. With an emphasis on symbolic representation, narrative,
metaphorical, allegorical and reiterative ritual mimêsis, Pollock’s paintings also lie beyond
Jungian interpretations with emphasis on idealized archetypes. Instead, Pollock’s work
reiterates and recreates indigenous forms through the primary modes of mimêsis, through
symbols, metaphors, allegories, and rituals, thereby recuperating the spirit of indigenous art
through mimêsis in its broader definition.
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Chapter Six
Mimêsis and the Truth in Art

I’ve had a period of drawing on
canvas in black – with some of my
early images coming thru – think the
non-objectivists will find them
disturbing – and the kids who think it
simple to splash a Pollock out.
Jackson Pollock

Introduction

We have identified a schism in modern art and art theory between mimêsis and
formalism. We have used American Primitivism and the allegorical (including the drip)
works of Pollock to illustrate the modes of mimêsis. What remains to be discussed is how to
concretize the recuperation of the spirit of indigenous art in terms of truth or knowledge
which lies at the center of the discourse on mimêsis. For our purposes here, we will look at
the relationship between mimêsis and myth and its location in the work of art. In this chapter
we will consider mimêsis in its role of envisioning mythos or truth. In so doing, we will
explore three main questions. First, we will ask how is mimêsis implicated in knowledge,
particularly in terms of recognition, mental imaging, and correspondence? Second, we will
ask, what is the relationship between mimêsis and mythos in terms of myth, harmonia, and
consonance? Third, we will consider knowledge in terms of the underlying opposition
regarding the interlocutor in Platonic and Aristotelian notions of mimêsis. Fourth, we will
consider mimêsis as the underlying conditions for truth as alētheai. The result of these
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considerations will be that we will see how Pollock’s works are mimetic in terms of the
forms and modes of mimêsis, as well as in the functions of mimêsis as it pertains to the
relationship between art and myth. Applied to our problem at hand, we will see that the
division in art and art criticism along representation and formalism rest in the location of the
interlocutor and in the tensions between transcendent and immanent form which are resolved
in the event of truth or alētheai.

Mimêsis and Truth

Whether in art or language such as philosophy or poetry, both mimêsis and
mimeisthai are forms of expression that convey information about the ideas and objects of the
world. Our present question is that if mimêsis is implicated in knowledge, then on what
grounds can we account for this relationship between mimêsis and knowledge? There are
four key functions of thought that pertain to mimêsis and truth that we need to consider,
namely, recognition, mental imagery (consciousness), correspondence, harmonia and
consonance. We first return to Aristotle and his views on knowledge and artistic form and
then to a discussion on these four modes of truth and mimêsis.
First, Aristotle claims that poetry and art grow naturally out of the same mimetic
impulse (Aristotle, “Poetics” 1448b2-6). Further, Aristotle claims that one naturally feels a
sense of delight in mimetic works, saying that,
Though the things themselves may be painful to see, we take delight in seeing
the most perfect images of them, the forms for example of obscene beasts and
corpses. The reason is this, learning things gives great pleasure not only to
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philosophers but also to the rest of mankind, however small their capacity for
it. The reason that we enjoy seeing images is that one is at the same time
learning and gathering what each thing is. (1448b2-6)
For Aristotle, mimêsis is a means by which one learns knowledge. It causes a delight in
seeing and a pleasure in learning. Part of this delight is directly connected with the fact that
the mimetic works present a correspondence between the image seen and the thing known to
be. The delight comes from recognizing the represented object within its image. As Sallis
explains, “The difference, the remoteness of the image from the truth [real] is no longer just a
source of deception but rather is the very condition of the possibility of a certain kind of
learning” (Sallis 175). Whether the representation is like or nearly like the object represented,
the representation opens up the possibility for learning.
Aristotle also explains that mimêsis is a source of knowledge even if one has not seen
the real object before. Aristotle explains that “If one has not happened to see the thing before,
one’s pleasure is not due to the mimêsis as such but to the technique or the color or some
other cause” (Aristotle, “Poetics” 1448b2-6). Thus, the pleasure of viewing images is gained
by both the recognition of an object or idea brought about through mimêsis itself, and by the
copy’s ability to represent or imitate the real. Such pleasure is felt because of the
manifestation of the effects of mimêsis, through color, design, line, and so forth that
represents a thing even though it is presented as a first experience rather than the recognition
of a previous encounter. As Sallis explains,
For-though Aristotle leaves it unsaid – one can learn through the image only if
it is recognized as an image of the thing itself; and such recognition requires
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that somehow one has seen the thing itself already, in advance, that one has
already caught a glimpse of those obscene beasts and corpses themselves,
even if only in turning, in pain, away from them to their images. Poetry,
arising in mimêsis, would be subordinate to a prior vision of the truth. (Sallis
147)
Delight in images arises through recognition by the presentation of the copy. But delight in
images can also arise when recognition is not present. For Aristotle, the pleasure ought to be
greater in a work where recognition occurs, but delight can also be felt when viewing an
image of some previously unknown thing because learning new things is pleasurable. For
Aristotle, mimêsis is first and foremost a condition for knowledge.
Memory and Recognition

First, in terms of recognition, Pollock’s primitivist paintings and drawings are not the
only mimetic works in Pollock’s oeuvre. Pollock’s painting Bird reveals the nature of
representation and recognition (Fig. 76). Abstracted though it may be, viewers recognize that
the image presents a stylized view of a bird with spread wings. This view cannot be
dismissed by any viewer who has ever encountered a bird. Such a bird (or any bird once
encountered) becomes imprinted on the mind as a mental image of knowledge.
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Figure 76 Jackson Pollock, Bird, 1941, oil on canvas, 70.5 x 61.6 cm, MoMA, New York

Recognizing all subsequent birds in nature and art becomes inevitable. Although in the
modern interpretation of such abstracted views, the viewer ought to dismiss the subject of the
painting (the bird) and focus on the abstracted form, Pollock’s rendition makes this very
difficult to do, for the application of the paint in broad layers that radiate upon and about the
bird’s form becomes reminiscent and recognized as those attributes of birds we know, such
as flight, feathers, and light and shadow which reflect off of the silken feathers of the bird.
We cannot help but associate what we see as illustrative of what we know from our
experience with nature. Further, we know or can recognize that this bird is a variation or
reiteration of the Navajo thunderbird symbol (Fig. 77). So, through multiple layers of
experience we recognized Pollock’s bird to be a thunderbird.
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Figure 77 Navajo Thunderbird Emblem

But how do we analyze the hidden figures in Pollock’s drip paintings, such as the figure
of a man lying on his back with his left arm raised in Full Fathom Five, or the male and
female figures, she-wolves, faces, birds, and other figures, which were then covered over
with layers upon layers of dripped paint in other paintings? Being that these figures are
generally abstract, even stick-figures, how are these a continuation of Pollock’s
representational style? We might suggest here that such figures assert presence and play upon
how representation is accepted as factual statements through the processes of sight and
perception. In other words, Pollock’s most abstract works are fundamentally mimetic works,
initiated in representations from nature. In Pollock’s Full Fathom Five and other paintings,
figures are signs representing or signifying what we recognize them to be. This is not to say
we recognize any particular man (or animal), but that the representation of the sign gives us a
view of a simplification of a signification which we still recognize as such. The image
corresponds to what it represents in that it appears like it in some way. To represent the world
is to signify it, and to do so is to participate in a process of signification wherein the sign is
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signified within a correspondence between what is in the world and its signification. The
notion of recognition is elemental to the issue of mimêsis. This notion of recognition helps us
determine a certain truthfulness. If the sign or symbol corresponds or adequately signifies the
object, then the sign has merit and is perceived to be representational. Thus, it is not the
mimetic process nor the final sign but rather our recognition of the object in relation to its
sign which determines its truthfulness for us.
In its most elemental condition, recognition is tied with memory (Plato, “Symposium”
208b, 46). Recognition or re-cognition is the ability to recall or recognize an event or object
as pertaining to one previously encountered. It is a form of elemental knowing and
remembering. Repeated encounters with such objects or people creates a recognition
associated with familiarity. For example, an image or picture of one’s grandmother produces
a similar familiarity in terms of the recognition that the image corresponds to the way one
sees his/her grandmother. But if a photograph of the grandmother was taken when she was
four years of age, one may not recognize the child in the photograph as one’s grandmother.
For one would associate only with the image of the grandmother when it reflects the image
one has in mind of an older or grandmotherly woman. So, recognition depends on accuracy
or verisimilitude between the image and the real, or nature. But if one sees a picture of
anyone’s grandmother, having the properties of what one has come to see as being
‘grandmotherly’, such as grey hair, insightful eyes or perhaps glasses and such, any image of
any grandmother might be re-cognized as a generic grandmother, and thereby be associated
with one’s own grandmother. This is not to say that one would recognize the generic
grandmother in the photograph as one’s own, but that one would recognize that the image of
a grandmother corresponds to the image one has in mind and has experienced.
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Recognition also generates knowledge as a “change from ignorance to knowledge”
(Aristotle, “Poetics” 48b, 6). In this case, one learns through new experiences. Such is our
experience of nature. From birth on, one is ever engaged in encountering the world. Each
experience and encounter constitutes a growing body of knowledge presenting the basis upon
which future knowledge and engagement in the world is built and organized. Once learned,
any signification of the experience constitutes a re-cognition through memory.
Representation, signs and symbols embody experiences and create new experiences. Mimêsis
is implicated in a cycle of learning and relearning. As we have discussed, art points towards
an object which we perceive according to our previous encounters where such objects came
into play. Images and objects also create new knowledge and meaning and reinforce (or
challenge) previously acquired meanings (Husserl 72). This is why babies can learn to
recognize a dog or duck, for example, from a picture book even before encountering one in
nature. The image can precede the corresponding empirical object and vice versa. In terms of
learning, it does not matter which image is first presented to our minds.
Thus, recognition is tied with memory and learning and is so by our very nature to
instinctively imitate and learn through imitation. Aristotle is very clear in the beginning of
the Poetics to illustrate the didactic quality of mimêsis in conjunction with recognition and
memory and of its grounding in nature with learning, and pleasure. “Imitation comes
naturally to human beings from childhood (and in this they differ from other animals, i.e. in
having a strong propensity to imitation and in learning their earliest lessons through
imitation); so does the universal pleasure in imitations” (Aristotle, “Poetics” 48b, 6). Our first
engagements in the world are constituted as knowledge through a process of imitative play.
This type of formative information gathering includes parody and the imitation of others. “In
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humans, imitation is natural to childhood, and children learn most of their first life lessons
through the imitation of others” (6). Toddlers learn to speak through imitating the sounds
they hear their parents speak and generally copy most everything they see their parents and
peers do. Recognition is a form of mental play and interplay wherein something is identified
as important and then imitated and thereby learned. In terms of imitation as learning, there is
a fundamental reciprocity between learning, recognition, and art, particularly in
verisimilitude. As art imitates or reproduces a given form or idea, that form and idea is
conveyed within the representation, which is then presented as transmitted or recognized
knowledge. As Gadamer explains, by virtue of being, “every representation finds its genuine
fulfillment simply in the fact that what it represents is emphatically there” (Gadamer,
“Poetry” 119). What is given in art either corresponds to what one has previously learned, or
it presents new information for learning upon which future experiences will reinforce such
learning and produce feelings of recognition and familiarity.
In this way, the hidden figure in Pollock’s Full Fathom Five declares itself a signifier
of something outside of itself. While pointing to something outside itself, it also witnesses to
the knowledge of such existence. It mimetically reproduces what it signifies in its pointing
and witnesses to a knowledge of being through representation and recognition. That it
signifies a complete and perfect copy of a man is not in question, for the representation
conveys meaning even in its abstracted form. Gadamer further explains the relationship
between this type of imitation and knowledge,
The pleasure involved in mimetic behavior and its effects is a fundamental
human pleasure that Aristotle had already illustrated with the behavior of
children. The pleasure of dressing up and representing someone other than
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oneself, and the pleasure of the person who recognizes what is represented,
show what the real significance of imitative representation is: there is no
question of comparing or judging the degree of accuracy with which the
representation approaches what is intended by it. Of course, such critical
judgment and evaluation do exist alongside any representation, but only as
something secondary. When Aristotle describes how the onlooker knows that
“that is who it is,” he does not mean that we see through the disguise and
know the identity of the person dressed up. On the contrary, he means that we
know who is represented. Knowledge here means recognition. We recognize
whom we know, whether it is the god, the hero, or even our own laughable
contemporaries with whom we are acquainted. Mimesis is a representation in
which we “know” and have in view the essential content of what is
represented. (119)
Because of the way that imitation presents a recognizable image to the viewer, the
representative arts present a form of knowledge. Thus, mimêsis is not always the
representation of something that is already fully familiar to us. But it does make something
known or recollected through “sensuous abundance” that always “represents something”
(Gadamer, “Relevance” 36). Pollock’s paintings overtly reproduce and covertly contain
signifiers of rich and meaningful truths in the forms of American Indian signs, symbols and
abstractions of objects in the world, stick figures, animals, and the like. The American Indian
symbology is known and recollected according to the collective cultural knowledge of which
all viewers participate in, whether knowingly through their experience of Native American
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art and culture, or in terms of new knowledge. But when not known, such symbols present
new knowledge to viewers.
While we are concerned with knowledge in terms of recognition, it is important to
remember that within the learning and recognition paradigm, art and mimicry are
pleasurable, and such pleasure is returned to art. Verisimilitude is not required for one to take
pleasure in representation, imitation, and parody, for the very act of imitation itself is a
pleasure in itself. As Aristotle explains,
People are also naturally given to taking pleasure in imitation. This natural
pleasure in imitation is demonstrated by the fact that some experiences or
things painful or unpleasant in themselves can be taken as pleasurable as
images or imitations, especially of corpses. Like philosophers, people are
naturally inclined to enjoy learning, even if their pleasure is more limited, and
people take pleasure in looking at these representations because they are
engaged in a process of learning. (“Poetics” 48b, p6)
According to Aristotle, even looking at something disturbing (such as a corpse), can witness
to the pleasure of images and imitations, not because of a perverse interest in such things but
because of the fundamental way in which we take pleasure in the processes of recognition
and recall. Recognition incites a certain aesthetic pleasure, which Kant derides in favor of his
theory of disinterest. But imitation as a naming practice through recognition as
correspondence is fundamental to learning and brings about knowledge as well as intellectual
and aesthetic pleasure. Recognition between mimêsis and objects implicates art’s role in
creating knowledge and the pleasure one takes from these activities. Some of the pleasure of
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Pollock’s work lies in how the viewer recognizes and identifies with the swirling paint, the
hidden figures, the rich colors and the recessive depths created by successive and sweeping
layering and dripping of paint.
Our broader understanding of mimêsis as symbolic, idealist, and naturalistic
representation within metaphorical and allegorizing processes that implicates art’s role in
making knowledge visible, learning, recognition and its properties, and the pleasure one
takes from these activities, gives us a broader notion by which we can understand the
relationship between representation and knowledge. This relationship between knowledge as
recognition and learning in art is what is at stake in the modernist repudiation of mimêsis.
Pollock’s recuperation of the indigenous spirit of art brings the question of mimêsis to the
foreground of modern art. It returns to art a significant content by way of signification,
making visible the relationships between representation, correspondence of appearances,
knowledge, memory, recollection, and recognition. Pollock’s recuperation of mimêsis asserts
that significant content enriches and enlivens significant form, such that the formal properties
of art recede into a subservient role to enriching content. Significant content, in its relations
to learning, recall and recognition, asserts the fundamental ways in which we orient ourselves
visually in the world. In a modernist era that values form over content, Pollock saw mimêsis
via the modes and means of indigenous arts as a vehicle for reasserting the primacy of
content as knowledge over form.
Mental Image

Our second point in terms of knowledge and art concerns the issue of cognition,
particularly in terms of mental image-making. Pollock’s painting Full Fathom Five illustrates
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this type of representation as a statement of fact in symbolic and idealist terms. Pollock’s
artwork does not claim a pure abstraction without reference to the phenomenal world, as we
see in his many references to the human figure, animal life, American Indian signs and
symbols, and his idealist form. Rather, his representation is an infraction to the modernist
rules for pure form. Modernist claims overlook any inherent representational nature of art
because “abstract art is opposed to a natural representation of things” (Mondrian 371). It is
difficult to claim a modernist psychological or subjective detachment and a critique of purely
formal elements given the highly representational nature in terms of the symbolic,
metaphorical, allegorical, and ritual content of Pollock’s works. Taking all mimetic elements
into account, it is a difficult prognosis to claim detachment and non-representation for even
the drip paintings. This is due to the nature of representation and also the nature of
consciousness itself. For in terms of representation or mimêsis, even Pollock’s hidden figure
gives us more than an understanding of representation, correspondence, and recognition.
Pollock’s representational art, whether in his primitivist works, or his figures hidden beneath
layers of dripped paint, recuperates more than processes and pleasures of learning. His art
reasserts and recuperates the primary way in which consciousness occurs within signs
systems altogether in terms of mental image-making. Ludvig Wittgenstein’s work on
consciousness further underscores this point.
It is rather unusual to discuss Wittgenstein in conjunction with Ricoeur and Gadamer,
mixing a phenomenal critique of narrative and learning, and metaphors and symbols, with a
critique of signification in terms of the relations between logic and language. But let us
remember that representational art is a lexicon of signs and thus resides within a critique of
logic and consciousness as well as within theories of perception. Wittgenstein’s seminal
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work The Tractatus Logicophilosophicus sheds further light on the processes of learning and
metaphor making that underscores the importance of imaging and its relations to mimêsis.
For it is Wittgenstein who excavates the importance of the mental image as a fundamental
ground for language and philosophy, and this applies to our discussion on mimêsis. While
Wittgenstein is preoccupied with logic and the ability of language to express or even address
the concerns with logic, he shows that logic and language are based upon the foundation or
ground of the mental image. Wittgenstein explains “In the picture and the pictured there must
be something identical in order that the one can be a picture of the other at all. What the
picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it after its
manner—rightly or falsely—is its form of representation” (Russel ix). In other words, our
ability to perceive knowledge depends upon our ability to make images, either in our minds
or on the canvas so to speak. Our engagement in the world is involved in a process of picture
or image making and the subsequent making of mental images. Mental images are models of
the objects of reality. Such models or images are seen to be facts, not mathematical facts or
truths, but rather symbols of knowledge. As Wittgenstein writes, “We make to ourselves
pictures of facts” (Russel x). The body of Wittgenstein’s work proceeds to furnish diagrams
intended to structure language in a way that allows language to function more adequately as a
signifier in the way that images do. Wittgenstein’s entire system depends upon the
interpretation that language falls short of supplying the adequate correspondence between
image and world that art supplies.
In the Preface to the Tractatus, Bertrand Russel identifies Wittgenstein’s concerns with
logic and its relation to language as a signifier. He qualifies this as being,
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First, there is the problem that actually occurs in our minds when we use
language with the intention of meaning something by it; this problem belongs
to psychology. Secondly, there is the problem as to what is the relation
subsisting between thoughts, words, or sentences, and that which they refer to
or mean; this problem belongs to epistemology. Thirdly, there is the problem
of using sentences so as to convey truth rather than falsehood; this belongs to
the special sciences dealing with the subject-matter of the sentences in
question. Fourthly, there is the question: what relation must one fact (such as a
sentence) have to another in order to be capable of being a symbol for that
other? (Russell x)
Wittgenstein’s main concerns are the ways in which language accrues and expresses meaning
and how such meaning comes to signify a truth. But the main problem with language in
terms of signification, meaning, and truth is that while language does facilitate recognition in
the way that images re-present the world, but language can do so only arbitrarily.
We have seen that symbols and metaphors can hold arbitrary meanings as well. But
images (whether symbols, metaphors, allegories or verisimilitude) can cognize the world in
ways that enable mental image-making and thus recognition and learning. All of
Wittgenstein’s concerns are rooted in logic’s foundation in spatial forms, and the way in
which these forms can be seen as mental images with a correspondence which is adequately
held as either a spatial form or a mental image. Mental images can mimetically reproduce or
re-present logical, mathematical, and geometrical forms. But language, according to
Wittgenstein, because of its arbitrary nature, cannot. This appears to be a quite a jump
between the way Aristotle discusses mimêsis and the pleasure of recognition and learning.
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But in actuality, Wittgenstein is asserting the primary mental conditions which enable the
learning and recognition cycles to operate. Mimêsis as recognition and correspondence
depends upon a preexisting mental image of the thing being imitated or represented. When a
thing is represented in art which one has not encountered, the work of art imprints the object
on the mind of the viewer, creating a new mental image as a ground for further and future
recognition. This is why a toddler might learn what a tree is from either looking at trees in a
picture book, or from coming in contact with a tree. Regardless of which scene takes place
first, recognition of the second occurs through a preexisting mental image and then
subsequent correspondence and recognition. And we might recall that this cycle of cognition
produces pleasure in learning.
To further explain this point, Wittgenstein’s concerns are rooted in an emphasis on
pictorial and spatial imagery which is underscored throughout the Tractatus. Wittgenstein is
clear in his observations; “logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world”
for logic depends on a system of signification in order to represent the world (Wittgenstein
6.13). He also writes that,
The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is,
and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it
would have no value. If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the
whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is
accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it
would itself be accidental. It must lie outside the world. (Wittgenstein 6.41)
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For Wittgenstein, the world is as we see it. We have a mental image of this world and
everything in it. But any verbal commentary about the world depends upon language which
is an arbitrary signifying system. Language cannot adequately present a mirror image of the
world because it can only signify it. Language cannot represent. It can only point to a thing.
In this way, primitive hieroglyphs and petroglyphs can give us knowledge of an ancient
writing system, but not necessarily provide an exact image of what said text means or intends
to represent. This fact fueled European imagination for the possibility of deciphering ancient
texts in order to find hidden and mystical meanings during the Age of Discovery. 56 But
imagery represents a degree of correspondence to the thing being represented because mental
images previously held in the mind facilitate recognition in ways that writing systems do not.
In the American primitivist artworks, we recognize and understand imagery that represents
American Indian symbols and art objects because the representations correspond
naturalistically or idealistically to the original objects: art faithfully copies. This
correspondence is not always exact verisimilitude, for we have seen that through the
conveyance of meaning, symbols, metaphors, allegories, and even rituals convey meaning
through idealistic representation. But it is in the representation, whether naturalistic or
idealistic, that the mind draws correspondences between what is given and what is already
held in the mind and in terms of new forms of knowledge.
This relationship between text and image is underscored by the fact that earliest writing
systems were formed first as images that corresponded to objects of the world, or the world
itself. Earliest hieroglyphic scripts, as foundational language systems, denoted what they
described through a pictorial correspondence to the world. In such a script, “A proposition is
a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation that it represents”
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(Wittgenstein 4.021). In other words, the hieroglyph denotes what it proposes through a
correspondence between the object and the mental image of the object in the viewer or
‘reader’. The accuracy of correspondence then gives a ground of truth to the representation, it
is faithful to what it speaks. It “shows its sense” or it represents or demonstrates what is
false(Wittgenstein 4.022). The hieroglyph, like a mimetic work of art, shows either what is or
is not according to its correspondence to what is in the world. Thus, the hieroglyph is
descriptive of, and corresponds to, reality. It’s important to note here that this notion of
correspondence is not to suggest an exact or mathematical equivalence between mental
image or art and an object, but rather a correspondence between what is known and what is
given.
This correspondence between object and sign or hieroglyph is lost in later signs systems
which have no direct correspondence between text and image. Writing systems become
purely arbitrary because they are based on a collective agreement that such and such a sign
(written or spoken) corresponds to what it signifies. Hence Newman’s point (that modern art
is based on the “ideogram” which presents ideas “without directly naming them”) illustrates
the correspondence between meaning even when the image presents meanings which are
non-specific (Newman, “Ideographic” 565). Art as a lexicon based on an ideograph or
hieroglyph retains a certain (albeit partial) correspondence between the image and the world,
and art can also retain meaning without direct interpretations. But language depends upon
words that name and describe without illustrating (565). Within this sign to object
correspondence, our own mental image of the experience of the world allows for us to
ascribe interpretive meaning to language and non-representational art and recognize such
correspondences as true or false. When Newman describes American Primitivism as an art
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that is “ideographic” and “hieroglyphic”, he points to the nature of representation, art, and
language and how meaning is either cognized or ascribed. The image presents direct
knowledge whereas language (and non-representational art) points to a thing through the
agreement of the meaning of the signs within the text. Without a knowledge of language and
an agreement of meaning, there is no correspondence. Images however are readily
understood according to their correspondence with the world. Because of our nature being
one that possesses a signifying consciousness, it is a matter of degrees of correspondence
which connects representation to truth, a “relation between two terms, a signifier and a
signified” (Barthes 688). Mimetic images can directly reveal knowledge. Languages require
translation; they require a lexis. But images give direct and immediate knowledge, through
correspondence between image and the object being represented, and our recognition of both
through our own mental images. In other words, art and mental imaging are foundational to
conscious thought.
Image based consciousness was known to René Descartes. At the beginning of modern
philosophy Descartes found thought itself to be a matter of cognizing images. For Descartes,
the “subject” is that self which thinks. For Descartes, thinking entails such things as that
which “represents, perceives, judges, agrees, disagrees, loves, hates, strives, and likes”
(Çüçen 1). That which the thinking subject comes to know is that which lies in the
phenomenological world, the world of things. For Descartes, there is a separation between
the knower and the object of knowledge. This separation between the knower and the known
or the subject and the object constitutes a separation, gap, schism or duality which lies at the
root of modernism’s critical and artistic system, the divide between subject and object. From
Descartes onward, the basic premise of philosophy resides in the question of how the subject
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or knower cognizes the object, or that which is apart from the thinking knower in the external
world of objects (Çüçen 2-3). Descartes calls the modes of thought from the thinking self
“cogitations”. But Martin Heidegger stresses that these “res cogitans” are representations
(qtd. Çüçen 2). Heidegger interprets the object as “Bild” which is to say view or picture. So,
like Descartes and Wittgenstein, Heidegger makes the image primary in thought.
Ricoeur explains that the Descartes’ “cogito” is a concept bearing the meaning of a truth
of existence. It means that there is a correspondence between subjectivity and truth, thought
and existence. This truth is conveyed as an image because of its direct correspondence to
thought and certitude. As Ricoeur writes, “With objectivity comes subjectivity in the sense
that this being-certain of the object is the counterpart of the position of a subject” (qtd. Çüçen
5). In other words, thinking (as cogitations) is based on correspondences to objects of the
world as perceived by the subject. Heidegger calls the philosophical tradition, from Descartes
forward, “the age of the world picture”, because of the importance of such correspondence in
cognition (5). From Aristotle to Descartes, and from Wittgenstein to Heidegger and Ricoeur,
logic and thought depends upon a correspondence with an image of the world.
Ironically, Wittgenstein’s concern is that language cannot adequately represent ideal
forms much in the same way that Plato believes art cannot represent ideal forms. For Plato,
logos – the word, describes philosophy, even “where no logos can be given of a thing, then it
is not knowable; where a logos can be given, then it is knowable” (Cross 433–450). For
Plato, truth or the metaphysical otherworldliness of the Ideas cannot be represented. They
can only be described with words. The world, being a copy of such Ideas, is removed from
the Ideas by some distance. Art, as a copy of the world, is removed even further. It is an
“appearance” but not “truth” (Plato, “Republic” 596c-e). Art describes what can be seen,
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poetry describes what cannot. But Plato’s philosophical oeuvre depends upon creating mental
images with words through his allegorical and metaphorical writing. Hence the point
(mentioned in Chapter Five) that philosophers “paint with words” (Halliwell, “Aesthetics”
130n1). But for Wittgenstein, however, language is inadequate for “what can be shown, [in
imagery] cannot be said” with words (Wittgenstein 4.1212). Wittgenstein would go beyond
the notion of painting with metaphors to say that language as a signifier depends upon a
mental image, and mental images are drawn from direct experiences in the world. In other
words, an image corresponds to our mental images of the world and therefore indicates truth.
But language requires interpretation because it is an arbitrary code or sign system.
Wittgenstein’s concern is less for art than language and logic, but his analysis asserts that
mental imagery is primary to how we perceive and understand correspondence between the
world and thought. This primacy of the mental image is fundamental to our most basic mode
of consciousness. Language is learned, but images are recognized. In the works of Pollock,
we see that mimetic representation (whether symbolic in terms of idealistic representation in
the form of symbols, metaphors, allegories, or rituals, or in terms of naturalistic
representation) corresponds with the ways in which we consciously think in terms of mental
images that represent what we know and come to know about the world. Through mimêsis
and its relationship to learning and correspondences between images and things, Pollock
recuperates the indigenous spirit of envisioning knowledge in art.
The image, from Plato to Descartes, and Descartes to Wittgenstein, has a unique
underlying role in philosophy. The image illustrates the notion of knowledge as truthfulness
through correspondence between the image and world, in thought and text. As Wittgenstein
stresses, “The picture is a model of reality” drawn from experience with spatial objects
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(Wittgenstein 2.12). The image represents objects and combinations of objects and their
states of being. But because of metaphor and the interchangeability of meaning, the picture is
interchangeable with language as we have seen; it is isomorphic, for Aristotle and Ricoeur
both point to the interchangeable nature of signifiers in mimêsis. While there are limitations
upon language’s ability to adequately describe the world outside of metaphor and ascribed
meaning, the image corresponds to images of the world which are held within the mind
(McManus 12). The inadequacy of language depends on its arbitrariness as a sign system and
its struggle for mirroring, representing or picturing. Only the mimetic image can give a
mirror accounting of the world. In this way, Pollock’s hidden figures, even in their
hiddenness, declare the relationship between image, thought, and truth through
correspondence. Thus, we thus say that Pollock and the American Primitivists, in restoring
indigenous forms and myths to art, reaffirm the role of mimêsis in its descriptive and
empirical roles in the correspondence between image and knowledge.
Correspondence

Recognition and mental imaging are implicated in the perception and dissemination
of knowledge, especially in its relation to images. But recognition and mental imaging
depend upon correspondence. It is correspondence which has always been at stake in art, and
for that matter in philosophy and poetry. For our purposes here, we will now discuss our third
point, which is that knowledge, as it is ascertained or cognized through recognition and
mental imaging furthers our understanding of mimêsis, and this relationship between
recognition and the mental image, depends upon correspondence.
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In most basic terms, mimêsis gives us representation by way of a correspondence between
what is represented and the representation itself, whether by image, text, or some other
media. In naturalistic representation such as in imitation or verisimilitude in the copying of
empirical objects, this correspondence between what is to be empirically seen and
represented agrees in varying degrees of faithfulness. What is represented is recognized as
being that which it represents. In most basic terms, mimêsis gives us representation by way of
a correspondence between what is represented and the representation itself. But in symbolic
representation, whether by image, text (as in hieroglyphs or signs), or some other media
(such as dance for example) recognition still occurs and thus verisimilitude is not required.
This idea of correspondence lies at the very heart of naturalistic and symbolic representation
and particularly mimêsis. But symbolic representation also conveys meaning through
correspondence even though that meaning can be applied arbitrarily, particularly in terms of
symbols such as emblematic representation and personifications, or in terms of metaphors
and allegories. In many cases, symbolic representation agrees or corresponds to the empirical
appearance of an object, such as in hieroglyphics where images are like the objects they
signify, and in the many signs and symbols in Pollock’s work that correspond to American
Indian symbols even though the likenesses between the object or idea and the symbolic
representation are not exact.
In short, correspondence involves our mental images, imprinting, recollection, and
comparisons, which comparisons are between what is given to be known or learned and what
is represented. Correspondence is easy to see in images such as Pollock’s Flame, a painting
discussed in Chapter Five (Fig. 60). The painting simply demonstrates the correspondence
between the painting, its subject and representational style, and the title of the painting, to
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what it signifies – a flame, and that mental image of a flame which is held in the mind. The
image and its title present a statement of fact. It is what it purports to be: a painting of red hot
fire. We already discussed how such signs, symbols, or copies of nature, are differing types
of signifiers or mimetic devices or utterances which point to something else outside of them.
They direct our attention to that which is signified, either the object or the concept being
represented. They stand in for something which we cannot have always before our eyes, but
which we might want to retain or keep in mind. Though a substitution or memento, Pollock’s
flame signifies and points to some real fire and conveys this knowledge to us as viewers. We
could go so far as to suggest that there is truthfulness about Pollock’s flame because it
designates, names, or witnesses to fire in a way that agrees with our mental image or concept
of fire.
Correspondence Theory looks at the ways in which signs describe their objects.
Today the notion of correspondence is as to say that truth is according to a fact. However,
anciently and for the purposes of understanding the relations of art and myth, correspondence
was more a matter of relations: specifically the relation or pointing toward a signifier and that
which it signifies. Language (and its structure) is most generally regarded as the primary
sign. Aristotle, for example suggests that “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not
that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”
making the saying that which points to its object in relationship to its truth (Aristotle,
“Cratylus” 385b2). It is not the saying but the pointing which makes a statement true. For
example, “he is sitting” is rather vague until it designates the actual fact that a given “he”
really is sitting (Aristotle, “Categories” 12b11, 14b14). By pointing to “he” whom is sitting,
the saying is related in a truthful relationship. The pointing is a way of relating: the sitter is
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related to the way he is signified by the saying. In language or art, the representation points
to and relates to its object. The nature of this movement or pointing towards, from signifier to
the signified is fundamental to correspondences particularly in ancient thought. As we have
already seen with Wittgenstein’s observations, images directly point to their objects, and
particularly point to underlying mental images. Language on the other hand, must be
interpreted before the pointing is made sure. Representational art points more directly and
conforms more precisely to mental images and objects in life than does language. Through
correspondence, Pollock’s Flame makes a statement of fact that functions in accordance to
our understanding of signs, signifiers, fire, flames, and the correspondences between
language, art and our mental images and pre-existing knowledge. But is this pointing
sufficient for an understanding of art in its role of corresponding or disclosing knowledge as
a type of truth?
Heidegger helps us to understand correspondence and truth, and art in his essays Being
and Time, and On the Essence of Truth. In Heidegger (before his discussion on alētheai
which will be addressed more fully) we read that truth is first, a site of correspondence
(Heidegger 224). Something is proclaimed to be true or there is a certain correspondence
between a thing and the meaning or truth attached to it. 57 Heidegger succinctly explains
correspondence by writing that,
The true, whether it be a matter or a proposition, is what accords, the accordant
[das Stimmende]. Being true and truth here signify accord, and that in a double
sense: on the one hand, the consonance [Einstimmigkeit] of a matter with what is
supposed in advance regarding it and, on the other hand, the accordance of what is
meant in the statement with the matter. (117)
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So a thing or proposition agrees with its representation in some way because meaning in
some way verifiable in the way it is signified. Second, truth lies in the agreement and
acceptance that something given is true such that the truth is confirmed by the judgment of
more than one person in an agreement of the thing. Traditional notions of truth as a
proposition and agreement are based on a correspondence or agreement in pre-Socratic and
even Kantian thought.
In our first foray into understanding correspondence, we can say that whether knowledge
of the ideal or of material objects, the correspondence of what is given, such as in
representational art, and what we know establishes an order wherein the parts to the whole
agree upon the association of the sign to the signifier in a correspondence between one to the
other. But this type of knowledge is also limited to the extent that knowledge is dependent on
its own scope and limits of what can be known by what is known. There is truth or factual
information in the correspondence between image or text to the meaning of its object because
it conforms to what we do know about the object, (but it does not give us knowledge of the
thing outside of what we know of it). We see this clearly in Pollock’s Flame because the
image corresponds to what it represents in both its title and representation. It purports to be a
flame, it looks like a flame, and the correspondence of it to an actual flame is valid because
of what we know a priori a flame to be, according to our held mental images and knowledge
of flames. For our present concerns with representation and mimêsis, art functions as a
verifiable means by which the signified and the sign are in concordance and thereby
participate in our understanding of representation as a form of correspondent truth.
Whether addressing this as a Pre-Socratic concept of correspondence or according to a
Kantian explanation on the relatedness of things, there is a correspondence between images
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and meanings. In this way the relationship between art or language and truth is built upon a
ground of factual correspondence. Foundational imagery, such as the notion of a clock may
be based upon an analogue clock or a wristwatch. In experiencing or seeing diverse forms of
clocks, the mind can organize a myriad of timekeeping devices into a general notion of clock.
This foundational image allows for further distinctions about clocks such as sundials, digital
clocks, obelisks, hourglasses, clepsydras, incense, candle, and atomic resonance candle
clocks to be known and recognize in both language and art. In this way, Pollock’s flame
denotes a truth. It represents what is known. Or perhaps one of his hidden figures is seen to
be a man. This is because of one’s experience in seeing the sign of a man as being rendered
as anything from a generic portrait to a shadow of a figure or even a stick figure enables one
to recognize the correspondence between the object of a man in the world to its sign, in this
case Pollock’s symbolic figure. It is in correspondence between image and thing that mimêsis
operates in truths of facts.
Signs and symbols, or copies of nature, are differing types of signifiers or mimetic modes
or utterances which have the same functions which is to point to something else outside of
them. They direct our attention to that which is signified; either the object or the concept
being represented. They stand in for something which we cannot have always before our
eyes, but which we might want to retain or keep in mind. They function as a substitution for
the real, allowing it to be ever before us in the form of an image or painting. It is in
correspondence between the symbol or representation and its meaning held in the mind
which permits the function of knowledge and truth in relation to mimêsis. Pollock’s works
are not just copies of indigenous forms, symbols and signs. Rather Pollock’s works convey
our collective knowledge of Native American life and art transferring this knowledge into
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new forms while pointing to its precedent origins. Because of the correspondence between
what we see and know, Pollock’s works give us corresponding truths or knowledges. The
recognition of the correspondence between a representation and its object gives two primary
functions which have bearings on our present project. First, recognition of correspondences
enables art to act as a declaration of knowledge in the very way Plato fears. Second, it
enables art as mimêsis and mimeisthai to reproduce universal truths for viewers. Pollock’s
work combines declarations of knowledge as correspondences between representation of
figures, signs, and symbols and the natural world and the world of ideas. But most
importantly, his work plays upon the way viewers experience art through recognition, mental
imaging, and correspondence. Art is a direct representation of how the “I am” “thinks”. Upon
this ground of learning, recognition, mental imaging, and correspondence, mimêsis is
implicated in the role of art and knowledge.

Myths and Mythos

We have considered mimêsis in terms of its functions in knowledge as recognition,
mental images, and correspondence. We have seen that representation has significant
bearings on our understanding of knowledge as a correspondence between what is seen in the
empirical world, and what is known as mental imagery in the mind and experience. Symbolic
representation also corresponds to meaning by way of what is held in the mind as a mental
image that the sign is meant to correspond to. Art envisions truths. Now we will consider
mimêsis and its relationship to truth through an analysis of the notion of the mythos and its
relationships in harmonia and consonance. For harmonia is the underlying ground upon
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which mental imaging, recognition, and correspondence function, and mythos is the purpose
for art.
While we could conclude our study of mimêsis with our present understanding of
Pollock’s work as symbolic and empirical representation, metaphor, allegory (as these are
implicated in how viewers think in terms of recognition, mental imaging, and
correspondence), our analysis would still be lacking the most important relation between
mimêsis and art, which is the distinct way Pollock’s work bridges the gap or schism in
modern art and theory through considerations based on truth as mythos and as event. These
missing or yet to be discussed elements are at the root of the issue of mythos, or truth and its
representation in the myth. Because our current definitions of myth tend to associate myths
with oral traditions and folklore, art’s role in myth and truth have been obscured. Thus, in
this analysis we will excavate a lost and ancient understanding of truth and its representation
and relationship to myth.
Mimêsis and Mythos

Aristotle’s Poetics gives us our first understanding of the concept of myth within the
definition of mimêsis. From the Greek word μῦθος, or mûthos the myth is that which that
conveys a significant truth or meaning or a type of storied conception of life. Mythos is
expressed in the myth that reveals its meaning through artistic or expressive form. For
Aristotle, this mythos can be read as a type of correspondence between the myth and its
representation as a mythology. In De Anima, Aristotle writes that, “where the alternative of
true and false applies, there we always find a sort of combining of objects of thought in a
quasi-unity” (Aristotle, “De Anima” 430a25). He also explains that “an affirmation is a
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predication of something toward something; a negation is a predication of something away
from something” (430a25). Rather than say some specific thing exists to be true, it is the
relationship of a thing to other thoughts or to its representation that it constitutes a truth. This
definition of truth opens to the possibility of finding truth in things of themselves and in their
absence, and in combinations of things or separations of things. In art, for example, the
relation between an idea and its parts in terms of representation, absence, and appearance
constitutes a correspondence between form and truth, or rather between mythos and the myth.
Aristotle extends this tradition in his treatise on poetry. He first indicates how the
plot, or mimêsis as it is often translated, is the most important element which affects or
causes catharsis (which has been called upon to critique Pollock’s paintings when transposed
in theories of shamanic healing). But what is most important at this juncture is that Aristotle
defines mimêsis as plot at the forefront of his treatise. He begins by explaining that the plot is
primary to all other parts and elements of poetry or theater. “The Plot, then, is the first
principle, and, as it were, the soul of a tragedy” and “ought to be so constructed that, even
without the aid of the eye, he who hears the tale told will thrill with horror and melt to pity at
what takes place” (Aristotle, “Poetics” 1450.10). For Aristotle, the plot is the primary
element that enables the conveyance of purifying emotions. But what are we referring to
exactly in terms of a plot and how does this relate to representation? Aristotle gives us three
modes that define plot, namely, mythos, mimêsis, and structure, all of which will now be
addressed, for it is in Aristotle’s notion of plot that we best see the relationship between
correspondence, truth, and art.
First Aristotle’s notion of myth is defined as plot which suggests that myth must
become embodied, be given material form. Aristotle calls this concept mimêsis which is to
321

copy, illustrate, or represent. Mimêsis is not media specific, for whether by verse, music, or
paint, the idea is given material and mimetic or representational form, as we have seen in our
discussion on metaphor. But what is it to illustrate the mythic, to give it mimetic form? The
myth must exist in some form whether as an idea in the mind of the artist, or a preexisting
myth within the cultural tradition. But beyond this, the idea requires a form to be presented to
our senses, whether in verse, music, paint or some other medium. The myth requires
signification. In terms of mimêsis the signification of the myth is to make a copy of the thing
in a new form or material, as we have seen in terms of naturalistic or idealistic representation
as in symbolic, metaphorical, or allegorizing and its reiteration in performance and ritual.
This is not to say an exact copy of the myth is required for the myth to be expressed or represented. The re-presentation can take any form in any media. Because all the arts are
mimetic, the myth itself is the universal thing which finds material specificity in mimêsis or
mimeisthai - its representation. Another way to understand this is by looking at Pollock’s
figurative elements and idealistic drip elements, for they are mythic for several reasons. First,
they evoke mythic stories, which is definable as a theatrical quality wherein the action of the
myth is carried out. These stories are given in a structure or overall composition or
arrangement of the pictorial parts, and in both naturalistic and idealistic representation, the
myth is given form. For example, in Plate 1, Gouache painting, one of the drawings and
paintings given to Henderson, Pollock presents a monumental act, like a final scene within a
tragic play, within which each figure takes place (Fig. 53). The pile of tragic and pathetic
figures before a crucifixion scene attests to a larger narrative wherein both image and
narrative exemplify a truth. Or take for example Pollock’s painting Eyes in the Heat, 1946,
one of Pollock’s first drip paintings (Fig. 26). Pollock paints faces in varied positions and
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expressions and covers these with dripped paint that conceals and reveals parts of the whole.
Each layer is covered over with yet another layer, like a palimpsest expressing an ongoing
tragic truth within which each representation takes part. A monumental collection of pitiful
faces speaks to a larger account wherein both image and narrative elicit a type of life story.
Before the myth can be given, it must be given in material form within a compositional
framework or structure.
Aristotle’s notion of plot is to say the narrative structure wherein the mythic is given
form. He conceives of plot as a form of allegory in terms of what could plausibly occur
within the context of a storied-narrative, something akin to the possibilities that art opens up
rather than the specificities of history. In this, mythos as plot is less the mythic truth and
more the embodiment of a notion, or rather the work of art. This notion also distinguishes
Pollock’s form of myth as allegorical and ritual works of art rather than statements on
indigenous ritual and supernatural beliefs.
Harmonia

The signifier – sign relationship in terms of truth has a long history, reaching back to
Pre-Socratic thought and debated throughout medieval and contemporary philosophy.
Anciently, art and language or logos were understood to be not only signifiers but signs as
well. This thought hinges on the idea that there is a deeper harmony or concordance between
objects and meaning beyond what is ascribed that constitute a “hidden ontological
attunement (harmonia)” of things in the universe (Kearney 41). Within the notion of
harmonia objects in the world (and universe) exist in a harmonious relationship to other
objects. In this system, any one object is only as important as its role in relationship to the
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whole of all objects. In this cosmology, philosophy is an essential way of life that
encompasses not only thought, but myths and sacred rites as well that aid the journey of the
soul to its apotheosis, all things being parts to the larger whole (Finamore xi).
In his Poetics, Aristotle gives us a concise method for recognizing truth within his
theory of mimêsis as harmonia and truth. He wrote the Poetics as a type of handbook to
guide poets in the making of epic and tragic poetry, such that these would best affect and
inspire feelings of pity and fear (the requisite emotions for catharsis or a cleansing or
purifying experience). We know that Pythagorean rules facilitated the purification and the
doctrine of transmigration of souls through the harmonious connections between music, the
order of the cosmos, and the ordering of the soul. In Pre-Socratic thought, the arts intended to
purify (Gadamer, “Relevance” 102). Pre-Socratic philosophy concludes that there is a direct
relationship between the world and the universe, and the way these are signified in terms of
mimêsis and mimeisthai. Truth exists in both the expression and signification as well as in the
harmony between its parts. The means by which this unity is signified, either as in the parts
of the whole in its mutable forms or as an a priori condition of divine order is a matter of
relationships. The signification of these relationships is brought about in a number of ways,
through images, text, numbers, and harmonic ratios.
Much of this cosmology of harmonic relations was worked out first by Pythagoras and
then more fully by his successors. In the Pythagorean model, unities between objects are
explained through the relationships of elements and substances. The Pythagorean universe, as
further developed by Philolaus of Croton (ca. 470 to ca. 385 BC) illustrates the universe as
being made out of limiters (or finite material or element) and unlimited (infinite material or
element), or material or measurable elements and elements unconstrained to material
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structure such as the elements earth, air, fire, water, and space and time. Limiters set
boundaries for which unlimited substances yield and combine. Limiters and unlimiteds fit
together in harmonious ways which can be described mathematically. For example, the
universe comes into being when unlimited fire is fit together with a corresponding limiter,
the cosmic sphere. In Aristotle’s view of Pythagorean relations, objects - phainomena contain
truths within them, “not because the appearances are unassailably accurate, but rather
because, as he supposes, appearances tend to track the truth” (Shields). Appearances are parts
within an overall relation of parts that evidence the truthfulness of the whole. Whether in
whole or in part, truth is immanent when given form. Art presents to our view some measure
of truth.
The ordering or pairing of limited and unlimited elements creates a unity and order that
ancient Greeks termed kosmos (κόσμος), which means both “ordered-world” and also
“ornament” in a way that connotes that the universe or world is ornamented with order. The
primary expression of the order of the universe derives from ancient number theory wherein
the number one signifies a totality from which all other numbers are harmoniously related
parts. Another way to envision this is in Philolaus’ example of the numerical scale that
structures and organizes limiters and unlimiteds in a unified expression of mathematical
ratios. Harmonia or harmony is created in the relationship between the mathematical
intervals of things, including sound and music. For example, the rations 2:1, 3:2 and 4:3
respectively provide harmonious relations between things. What gives harmony between
things is the mathematical relationships underlying such things. The beauty of harmonia is
the way it presents or qualifies an overarching order amongst related things. It allows for
portions of truths of the cosmos to be expressed in artistic form.
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Pythagorean theory also noticed the harmonic intervals in music. Gadamer explains
that in Pythagorean thought, music is an expression and practice of harmony, which was an
important part of ancient cultic practice. He writes that “Pythagorean regulations concerning
purity and the doctrine of the transmigration of souls clearly belong together. The earliest
concept of imitation thus implies all three manifestations of order: the order of the cosmos,
the order of music, and the order of the soul” (Gadamer, “Relevance” 102). Thus, harmonia
is more than an adequate correspondence between things and the totality of their
representation. It is also connected to purifying practices that reveal the nature of the order of
the universe or Divine and Ideal Truth. This aspect of harmony, number theory, and music is
preserved in Plato’s Republic wherein he made the “unadulterated preservation of musical
order the basis for the order of human life in the polis” (102). Gadamer stresses how
Pythagorean theory accounts for a certain universal truth in order and harmony. It accounts
for “the miraculous order visible in the heavens above, where, apart from the irregular
motion of the planets, which do not seem to describe a perfect circle around the earth, [yet]
the same pattern constantly recurs” (101). Thus, in mimeisthai order as structure and
relationship signifies the harmony of a well-ordered universe. Gadamer further explains the
significance of harmonia in Ancient Greek thought and representation. “What is it that is
imitated, according to Pythagorean teaching? It is the numbers and the ratios between them.
But what are numbers? And what are these ratios? Clearly the essence of number is not
something that we can perceive, but a relation that we can only conceive in our minds” (101).
It is in mimêsis and mimeisthai that this order is represented or articulated, through numbers,
harmonic intervals, language, and the arts as ideal structure, and as naturalistic and symbolic
representation.
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The relationship between principles and things is inherent in the argument of
Parmenides of Elea as well, although Parmenides presents a contrary image of these relations
between art and harmonia. Writing sometime after late sixth or early fifth century BC,
Parmenides presented a view of an unchanging idealist universe which “so challenged the
naïve cosmological theories of his predecessors that his major successors among the PreSocratics were all driven to develop more sophisticated physical theories in response to his
arguments” and presented an altered view of relationship between things and the cosmos
(Palmer). In a poem that describes a mysterious journey into the Night, Parmenides suggest
that the unchanging universe cannot be signified by the changeable things in the material
world. Parmenides’ poem challenges the notion of relational harmonious unity between all
things within the cosmos and the world as being both equal interchangeable parts of a whole
and also being references of that whole. Further complicating this challenge to harmonia is
Parmenides’ concern that the world is an inadequate referent of the universe because it is
apperceived through the senses which cannot be trusted. Parmenides, like Plato, believes that
the universe can be signified through language and it is in language or logos that the
correspondence between the universe and its representation is preserved (Russell, “History”
49). As Bertrand Russell explains,
When you think, you think of something; when you use a name, it must be the
name of something. Therefore both thought and language require objects
outside themselves. And since you can think of a thing or speak of it at one
time as well as another, whatever can be thought of or spoken of must exist at
all times. Consequently there can be no change, since change consists in
things coming into being or ceasing to be. (49)

327

So if a word (or in our case an image of a thing) exists and has meaning or referent, that word
(or image) signifies a preexisting, unchanging, a priori concept or thing. While there are
many theories about Parmenides’ core concepts as outlined in his complicated and only
surviving work of poetry, one thing is certain – Parmenides breaks with Pre-Socratic theories
about the unity of a universe manifest in the harmony of its material parts while maintaining
that the universe can be expressed, represented, or signified in logos. Yet the outcomes of
signification continue the idea of harmonia, in that the sign and signifier constitute a united
whole such that one can state the nature of the existence of the universe, and this statement is
proof of the universe’s existence. As Parmeniedes writes, “if one listens to the word of truth,
it is the same thing to think and to be” (qtd. Kearney 42). Wittgenstein certainly disagrees
with the power of language to signify the world, because for him, the world is more
adequately represented by the mental image and its corresponding images in art.
Nevertheless, the notion of correspondence still remains between truth and its signification.
Mimêsis in Pre-Socratic terms, then, is constituted by a harmony of principles (truth) to its
expression in nature through logos or technai – the production or representation of such
principles in letters and arts.
In art, mythos is immanent to its form because it is given or represented in some art
form. Aristotle’s notion of concordance or harmonia which informs his notion of mimêsis as
the totality of the parts to the whole underscores the way the myth can be given through
diverse media, forms, and allegories. In this relationship, the Navajo shaman, Pollock
painting, and Namuth filming constitute diverse media and forms of the same related
allegory. The myth and its form as in art is the relationship between the thing and its referent,
and it constitutes the fact that such truths are immanent to artistic expression. Thus, there is
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an immanent and harmonious relationship between mythos and its representation and through
the harmonia all representations are related parts.
This theatricality of mythic proportions demonstrates the nature of myth and its
relationship to truth in terms of mimêsis as representation, correspondence, and harmonia.
Timothy Gorringe, in Earthly Visions: Theology and the Challenges of Art observed that
Pollock’s work returns a tragic vision to art that becomes the sole justification for painting.
“Since psychographic expression could be sustained only by the most intense life feeling, the
authentic artist was constrained to live at the highest emotional pitch” (Gorringe 179). While
this view adheres to the myth of Pollock as the existential artist par excellence, it also
suggests the mythic nature of Pollock’s work, which is to say that Pollock’s performative or
ritual drip paintings (as reiterations of allegories of sand painters and their paintings) and
theatrical representations are reaffirmations of the notion of mythos in its form as myth.
Whether found in ancient art practices, or reinterpreted as modern re-presentations, art and
art making evokes allegorical truths which are reflected in and immanent to art. Pollock’s
works make manifest the truth of art as mythologies, the outward manifestations of myth and
its varied representations. But Pollock’s work makes these notions abundantly clear by
evoking mythological tendencies and forms of distant and present art forms, particularly
those of ancient and contemporary American Indians. The relationship between Pollock’s
mythologies and those of American Indian arts bears witness to art’s role in giving form to
and uttering mythos. By making American Indian arts a point of reference and departure,
Pollock reaffirms that mythos is universal and it is in mimeisthai that mythos is given form by
way of mimetic representation through structure and composition. Exact meanings behind the
indigenous signs and symbols that Pollock re-presented in his works are lost, but the function
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of art to convey such meanings is retained in the symbols, metaphors, allegories and rituals
of art in compositional forms. This interrelated relationship between mythos and myth, myth
and mimêsis constitutes the harmonics of truths, Pythagorean unities, and the ordering of an
ancient kosmos. Mimêsis, beyond the ways in which viewers think and perceive art, also
constitutes the manner in which mythos as myths are constituted in material form. When
Pollock’s work takes on the appearance and grandeur of the mythic, it is because of the way
in which myth is embodied and structured in Pollock’s representational and ideal forms.
When Plato writes about the power of art, he agrees with Parmenides in that he
acknowledges that knowledge of truth depends upon a proper signification in logos. But he
declines to support the notion of harmonia. This is where Plato believes that art fails, for in
painting, as in poetry, the works are, according to Plato, “inferior in respect of reality” (Plato,
“Republic” 605). The artist only knows “how to imitate” and can therefore say nothing of the
truth of what they imitate, for the “imitator knows nothing worth mentioning of the things he
imitates” (602B). For Plato, the outward appearance of things is insufficient. One needs to
have a richer, deeper, more adequate representation, one that points to a fuller description of
how things really are. Plato explains that the arts play upon the weaknesses of vision and
perception, giving an appearance of things, but failing to account for things in their proper
measured, numbered and weighed attributes. Viewers are “equally ignorant” for they will
praise the paintings or poetry for their meter, color, harmony or technical brilliance, and still
fail to gain any true knowledge about the things being represented (601B, C). Viewers will
fail to have an adequate knowledge of things in their true natures as having weight, size, and
dimension. Because the arts imitate, they fail to account for the true nature of things, and
they convey or reveal only appearances but not their true structure and form. Viewers are in
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danger of accepting such mere appearances as truths and thus never learning of the truth of
real things. For example, an object, whether near or far, “does not appear the same size, I
presume, as when viewed from a distance” and “the same things appear bent and straight
when seen in water or out of it, or concave and convex because sight is misled by colors; and
every other similar sort of confusion is clearly present in our soul. It is because it exploits this
weakness in our nature that illusionist painting is nothing short of sorcery, and neither are
jugglery or many other similar sorts of trickery” (602C, D). The problem for Plato is that our
field of vision makes objects appear to bend or to be smaller or larger than what they actually
are, and the problem with art is that it draws appearances from sight rather than the sciences
of measure. Socrates asks Glaucon, “And haven’t measuring, counting, and weighing proved
to be most welcome assistants in these cases, ensuring that what appears bigger or smaller or
more numerous or heavier does not rule within us, but rather what has calculated or measured
or even weighed?” (602, D). Art, being based on sight, can disrupt the relationship between
the sign and its signifier, relaying falsehoods or appearances rather than adequately relaying
actual truths about things. Thus, the correspondence or harmonious relationship between a
thing’s true properties and its representation is disrupted by the arts. For Plato, Pollock’s
Flame is a pernicious lie, a departure from the true nature of the actual properties of heat and
gasses. But in Pollock’s Flame we see that (according to Pre-Socratic thought)
correspondence reveals the nature of truth as being that which can be signified within a
harmonious correspondence between truth and its representation within a larger whole
wherein text and image participate interchangeably – in representing this relationship through
mimêsis. For in Pre-Socratic thought, it is the relationships rather than distinct elemental
properties which signify mythos, and this relatedness supports our analysis of mimêsis. In this
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way, mimêsis as allegory reveals relationships between truths and their articulation in form.
Art participates in ways that echo the relationship between sight, image, and mental image in
cognition. The image relates to truth because of what is known a priori and thus the image
need not be scientifically accurate to convey such truths.
Aristotle applies the same unity of the parts to whole relationships found in PreSocratic thought. For Aristotle, statements have inherent relations to truth and judgments.
Truthful statements are predicated upon the measure of the relationship or ratios of truth
within them. In this model even endoxa or opinions are reputable, credible, entrenched, or
common because they represent degrees or ratios of truthfulness and because of this,
philosophy or reason can ascertain degrees of truth through any related expressions of truth.
For such expressions, statements or ideas become repeated and accepted into the common
vernacular wherein they are unreflectively endorsed and reaffirmed. Upon reflection, these
statements are seen to be varying degrees of appearances or manifestations or expressions of
wisdom. Statements advocate in various amounts of wisdom. Aristotle explains that when
reflecting on a matter, one tends to consult with wisdom from the past in order to find more
germane explanations by earlier sages that help clarify a problem to be solved or a solution to
a problem of question. This is why in domains of inquiry we are likely to find ourselves
seeking guidance from our predecessors even as we call into question their ways of
articulating the problems we are confronting.
Aristotle’s conviction that truth is relational is borne out in the Poetics wherein
Aristotle makes it clear that poetry (or any of the mimetic arts) ought to base its plots on that
which is plausible to happen, to be a realistic as possible. The imitation need not be an exact
copy of an event or object, but there must be a similarity or a correspondence between the
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two. Aristotle is particularly clear in Chapter Nine that poetry need not recount exact events
in history, for that is the work of the historian. Aristotle was more interested in the
possibilities of art than the conveyance of a specific cosmic spirituality. As Aristotle writes,
It is also clear from what has been said that the function of the poet is not to
say what has happened, but to say the kind of thing that would happen, i.e.
what is possible in accordance with probability or necessity. The historian and
the poet are not distinguished by their use of verse or prose; it would be
possible to turn the works of Herodotus into verse, and it would be a history in
verse just as much as in prose. The distinction is this: the one says what has
happened, the other the kind of thing that would happen. For this reason
poetry is more philosophical and more serious than history. Poetry tends to
express universals, and history particulars. The universal is the kind of speech
or action which is consonant with a person of a given kind in accordance with
probability or necessity; this is what poetry aims at, even though it applies
individual names. (Heath 12:51b)
Art then does not prove, but rather proposes possibilities. What is important is that there is a
relationship between how art evidences in some way a larger truth, even if that evidence is
only partial or plausible. In fact, plausibility as a relation within the overall harmonics of
truth is important enough a fact that it forms the subject of Aristotle’s now lost six books on
the poems of Homer. His text, known to us by later authors, discussed the passages in Homer
which Aristotle considered to be implausible (Heath vii).
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Aristotle’s notions of truth, particularly in regards to art, while not to be exhaustively
discussed here, are as Pre-Socratic notions of truth: related parts of a unity or whole. The
harmonics of the overall is greater than the individual properties of its parts. This is much
like the way a modern orchestra functions. All instrumental parts are significant in the way in
which they contribute to the overall sound and timbre of the musical score. Individually, each
instrument is lacking, but taken as a whole, each plays a part but in terms of differing tones,
melodies, and harmonies. Thus, each distinct part evidences some ratio of the overall truth of
the whole.
For Pre-Socratics and Aristotelians, what can be considered to be true is evident as a
correspondence and harmony between the unity of its parts and this unity can be expressed in
diverse ways. The expression of the truth of harmony becomes a part of the overall unity of
the thing. Augustine echoed this same sentiment in his treatise On Christian Doctrine when
he suggested one that, “wherever truth may be found, it belongs to his Master” (Augustine
88). Truth is relational and all truth, no matter where it is found, is a manifestation of higher
truth. Truth becomes immanent within its many related forms. In the same way, art evidences
the truth of which it envisions. In Pollock’s symbolic, metaphorical and allegorical
representations, each artwork evidences a harmonious correspondence with what each one
represents. Harmonia constitutes the relationship between truth and its representation. In
Plato, truth is idealist and beyond the ability of art to represent it. Truth can only be given
adequately in words. But in Aristotle and the Pre-Socratics, transcendent truth is immanent to
its expression or form because of its relation to other forms in harmonia. Harmonia is the
basis of the variety and relatability of all the mythological parts.
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Consonance

We have investigated truth as relational, as in narrative stories bearing truths or
conceptions of life and finding form in mythologies and art. We have also noted the notion of
harmonia as the ground upon which mythologies in varied forms, modes, and media bear
portions of life truths. We will now consider consonance, the unity of all these varied but
related parts. Aristotle’s Poetics defines mimêsis as a totality of its parts within a harmonia,
symphonia, or consonance. The term consonance, from the Latin consonantia is to denote
harmony and agreement. The term derives from the Greek term symphonia which is to say
consensus. It denotes ancient Greek beliefs that the kosmos is organized as a great and
purposeful symphony. This notion of organization and harmonics organizes Aristotle’s
account for content, meaning, or truth in art and how these truths are expressed or signified in
material form through a definition of plot as mythos, structure, and mimêsis. Plot as mythic
structure and illustration becomes the nexus point between idea and material, or idea made
material. Another way to consider structure is through the term or composition which
provides the underlying order and arrangement of all other parts and forms. Or, another way
of suggesting structure, plot, composition, is the term consonance. All parts are tied together
through consonance, or a unifying field. Thus the speech of a character in the theatre or its
appearance in art is consonant with the probable ways in which the character would naturally
speak or appear. The rising and falling action represented within a work is consonant with
probable actions according to nature.
Plot as structure, myth, and illustration within harmonia and the relation of parts allows
for a myriad of possibilities in which the myth can be illustrated. But all of the possibilities
reside within a qualifier of both probability and consonance to each other part. In other
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words, the characters on the stage or in art, with their personality traits or types, costumes,
props, and words with a particular syntax such as rhythm and assonance, articulation and
pitch, and all other parts of a play or picture are elements that can be designed and executed
in a myriad of potential ways. The constant within the craft of artmaking is the overarching
structure which gives form and limits to what is otherwise a cacophony of possibilities.
Probable or potential variables and outcomes are unified by a structure that allows and limits
these variables. It is this unity or relationship between structural forms to expressive
possibilities which constitutes consonance. Thus, consonance allows for a unity within the
work that ties probabilities with structure, and varieties in speeches and spectacle (meaning
the props, costume, music, etc.) with the overall myth. It is upon this joining between myth
and media, idea and nature, universal and particular that constitutes Aristotle’s notion of
consonance – that balance or harmony between form and content.
Aristotle stresses that any given medium expresses mythos adequately and effectively.
But what is important is how the aesthetic elements within any given medium are united to
the whole of the work of art. Aristotle writes, “As therefore, in the other imitative arts, the
imitation is one when the object imitated is one, so the plot, being an imitation of an action,
must imitate one action and that a whole, the structural union of the parts being such that, if
any one of them is displaced or removed, the whole will be disjointed and disturbed. For a
thing whose presence or absence makes no visible difference, is not an organic part of the
whole” (Aristotle, “Poetics” 1451.20). In other words, the concordance is between the idea,
its representation and the form of that representation. It is consonance or composition that
secures the harmonious relation of all the parts of art. In consonance, the work becomes a
whole and complete thing comprised of mythos and its diffusion into mimetic forms. In
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Pollock’s work, we find a deep and rich tradition of varied signifying practices, from
symbolic to idealist representation. We can say that his idealist tendencies evoke notions of
structure as in mimeisthai as the representation of divine order. When Gadamer links idealist
structure with the representation of the cosmos, he validates Pollock’s idealist tendencies.
But we can also say that Pollock’s idealist form presents a structure as a plot, that which
provides the form into which the mythic can reside. Gadamer explains this connection
between idealist forms of art and ideal order. He acknowledges the role form plays as an
overarching structure composition, or consonance upon which all other forms occur and
visually interact (Gadamer, “Relevance” 101). Further, the relationship between idealist form
and hidden figures suggest an immanence wherein the mythic finds expression amongst
representational and ideal parts which unite mimetic particulars and universals into one
harmonious expression of the whole. In both Platonic and Aristotelian thought, truth as
mythos is embodied within artistic form. In Platonic, as well as Parmenidean thought, mythos
can only be described through logos or philosophy. But in Aristotle and Pre-Socratic thought,
the relationship between truth and its form in myth is based on the notion of plot, structure,
composition or mimêsis. Thus, mimêsis constitutes the consonant field upon which all
varieties, modes, and materials of the myth can be envisioned and expressed. The
transcendent as mythos is immanent to its form through a larger construct wherein truth is
expressed or envisioned as relational (as in harmonia) to the larger whole of which it
belongs. If truth is a harmonious relation between the divine and its expression as order,
structure, or composition, and these can be represented in some symbolic or idealized way,
then Pollock’s work evidences the notion of truth in the harmonious interplay between
idealist form and significant content. When Pollock recuperates the indigenous American
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Indian spirit in art, he revivifies the relationship between mythos and myth as mythological
structure, harmonia, and consonance between all its constituent or represented parts. Art then
is implicated in the way in which philosophical tenets or mythological truths are given in
expressive form.

Mimêsis and the Locus Sanctus

We have considered the issue of myth and truth from the point of reference of
knowledge, with its correspondence, recognition, and mental imaging and concluded that art
is implicated in learning and knowledge. We have also considered how art participates in
myth making and expressions of truths, not as mathematical proofs but as plausible and
related expressions of an idea, a truth, mythos, or a myth. One of the conclusions we derive
from our discussion is that notions of myth and truth from ancient philosophical conceptions
are aligned closely with how art symbolically represents, in terms of expressive parts to a
larger whole. Symbolic and naturalistic representation gives views and referents, convey
knowledge and information, and participate in the larger discourse of assigning meaning to
greater themes and ideas.
But in our overall project of mimêsis, particularly in context of a divided and
polemical- modernist theory on Pollock, there is an opposition in how either idealist and/or
subjective form is interpreted. Modernists consider Pollock’s drip paintings as formalist,
devoid of myth and meaning. Jungian critics imbue Pollock’s drip works with subjective
meaning based on concerns of existential man and issues of sickness and healing. At the core
of this debate is the issue of who has the right or the truth of Pollock in mind and can speak
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for his works? There is a similar opposition in Aristotelian and Platonic thought that
questions truth and its representation, but at the core, the question is one of location rather
than representation. The key difference between Platonic and Aristotelian schools of thought
with regards to mimêsis, particularly in relation to Pollock and modern abstract art, lies in the
location of truth, the locus sanctus. There are two points that we will excavate at this point;
first, the differences between Aristotle and Plato with regards to the locus sanctus, and
second, we will summarize with a discussion on the location of interlocutor as the
determining factor in the iteration of truth and its myth, particularly as it pertains to critical
arguments on who has the right to speak for Pollock. Mimêsis as consonance or plot, wherein
the immanence of mythos and myth constitutes a harmonious relation or harmonia, reveals
not only the character but also the location of that truth. Both Aristotle and Plato agree that
mimêsis bears mythos through mythic representation. But Plato and Aristotle also have
differing opinions about the location of truth, the locus sanctus. Although Plato questions the
validity of artistic representations and the potential for untruths, partial truths, or falsehoods
to be represented, he admits that art conveys some related content to or away from truth.
He prefers the language of poetry or philosophy for representing truth. For Plato,
philosophy claims the privilege of speaking truths. For Plato, the locus sanctus of truth
abounds in the un-representable thing in itself. Unpresentable but understood in the intellect,
Plato signifies mythos in terms of the Theory of Forms, around abstract concepts or the thingin-itself that is iterated in mathematics and particularly in geometric shapes. Thus, Plato put
forth his theory of the embodiment of the thing-in-itself in the forms of that which is
otherwise un-representable, hence the half-equilateral triangles signifying fire, air, and water
that make up the simplest elements in the universe are un-representable. These are not
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objects of sight but are given as objects through symbolic representation or mimêsis. These
signifying geometries, even though present as mental images, are, according to Plato, not to
be confused with the location of the thing-in-itself, which resides in the transcendent or the
abstract and non-spatiotemporal realm. Or in other words, the forms are given to logos, and
like myths are representations which are given in a holy place.
Kant further articulates the locus sanctus as being apart from human intuition or
knowledge. Because one can only know what is experienced and what appears to the senses,
the thing-in-itself cannot be known. Kant calls this transcendental idealism,
We have therefore wanted to say that all our intuition is nothing but the
representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in
themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so constituted in
themselves as they appear to us; and that if we remove our own subjective or
even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all
constitution, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time
themselves would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in
themselves, but only in us. What may be the case with objects in themselves
and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely
unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving
them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain
to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. We are
concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in
general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i.e., prior to an
actual perception, and they are therefore called pure intuition; the latter,
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however, is that in our cognition that is responsible for its being called a
posteriori cognition, i.e., empirical intuition. The former adheres to our
sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have;
the latter can be very different. (Kant, A42/B59-60)
In this point, Kant agrees with Plato. The human mind cannot perceive in space time, or in
the appearance of material things (in space-time), the things which pertain to the intuitions or
intellect, the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself can be represented but it cannot be revealed
by form or material.
This emphasis on the un-representability of the ideal forms the justification for
idealist art, which only gives an account of the thing-in-itself without presenting it.
According to Nietzsche the problem of representing is the core issue in aesthetics more
generally, and modern art more specifically. Nietzsche describes the problem as being one
wherein “aesthetics began with Plato and Aristotle at the very time when “the great art and
also the great philosophy which flourished along with it comes to an end” (qtd. Gadamer,
“Relevance” xiv-xv ). Nietzsche is rather concerned with art’s role in “representing the
absolute, that is, of establishing the absolute definitively as such in the realm of historical
man” (xv). He is concerned with the location of the divine, which is un-representable, within
the temporal or representable sphere. Since the long project of philosophy and aesthetics lies
in the attempt to articulate that which cannot be represented, philosophy has a problem,
which Nietzsche knew. As Gadamer explains, “Hegel considered Plato’s Parmenides to be
the greatest masterpiece of ancient dialectic, precisely because in this work Plato proved the
impossibility of determining any single Idea by itself, independently of the totality of Ideas”
(137). In other words, the Absolute, the thing-in-itself resists being known and its location is
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problematic as well. The un-representable can only be known through symbolic
representation and in harmonia or in the represented parts of it, not in totality, and thus its
location remains incomprehensible.
In his attempt to know the Absolute, Plato locates the Ideal to the realm of the
intellect. He divides the being into three parts within a hierarchical structure that preferences
the mind over the passions and the body. Within this hierarchy all parts are ordered within a
value system of unequal parts needing regulation. What’s at stake in Plato’s thought is the
relocation of the locus sanctus from its location from within the mental images of the objects
and forms of the empirical world to the world of language that would overturn ancient
theories of harmonic truths. For in Plato, any representation of truth lies outside of truth and
imitation produces profane copies.
Aristotle, however, draws distinctions between mythos, mimêsis, and myth, not in
terms of a hierarchical structure, but more in agreement with Pythagorean theories of
harmonia or consonance, and immanence. In the case of painting, meaning is conveyed
through representation which in turn gives aesthetic pleasure. Knowledge is attained through
empathizing with imitations and this recognition of truth not only brings aesthetic and
intellectual pleasure but also knowledge. Representation locates the knowledge of truth, not
in logos, but in its representation. Truth becomes immanent to its form and expression.
Through mimêsis as representation, recognition, and correspondence, mimêsis as mythos, and
mimêsis as composition or myth, Aristotle restores a Pre-Socratic notion of mimêsis as a
mythos-mimêsis-myth triad that constitutes truth in terms of correspondence, harmonia,
consonance, and immanence. In so doing, the location of truth, the locus sanctus resides, not
in words, but in mental images and art.
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In contrast to Platonic and Kantian justification for pure form in art, Aristotle
provides a means by which to account for figuration within idealistic form in Pollock’s
representational work. For Aristotle, the locus sanctus resides in the space-time phainomena,
or phenomena immanent to concrete material. This is not to mean any material per se, but
rather it is exclusively to living materials which have a soul and are constituted in terms of
causation or its relationship to all parts within causation. Thus, the material of a thing,
together with its underlying structure, shape, or form, along with the agent itself responsible
for change and transformation and its final purpose make up the totality of the living thing.
Because living things are animated with a soul that dwells in material form, having causes to
transform and change into a final form or cause, the locus sanctus resides within given
categorical processes or events. Taking Aristotle’s basic view of truth as immanent to its
expression in material form, whether in utterance within myth or in the study of nature, the
truth of a thing lies within its living parts and related totality as harmonia in consonance.
We have discussed the location of truth in terms of Platonic idealism and
transcendence and Aristotelean immanence, and now we must look at the residence of truth
in relation to the interlocutor. Who has the right to represent or speak of truth? Is it art or
philosophy? For this is the polemic within not only the debate between Plato and Aristotle,
but also at the core of the polemical-modern episteme between modern formalism in
Greenberg and surrealist subjectivity in Rosenberg. Who speaks to the meaning or the truth
in art? The second point that constitutes the difference between idealism and immanence, in
Platonic and Aristotelian thought, and modern and postmodern art (or the divided modern
theory) involves the interlocutor in its utterance of the truth in terms of the diegesis- mimêsis
-mythos paradigm. Another way of expressing this difference is that the primary difference
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between the formality of European Primitivism and the mimêsis of American Primitivism, or
rather formalist art and idealist-representational works of Pollock, lies in the logic of diegesis
and mimêsis.
In the article “Diegesis – Mimesis” Halliwell explains the narrative properties
underlying both ancient discourses. Diegesis, contrary to contemporary definitions more
generally refers to the communication within a discursive and temporal framework. It
generally refers to the voice or narration of the muthologos, or rather the poet or the
storyteller by way of or “by means of mimêsis” or direct speech as it is voiced by the
characters or actors. Diegesis speaks to the narrative content of a play, poem, epic, or story. It
denotes the narration as it is voiced by both the actors and the narrator as in Homer’s tales.
According to Halliwell, Socrates explains the “diegesis/mimesis complex” in the Republic so
that he can underscore the importance of didactic mythos (Halliwell, “Diegesis”129).
Halliwell explains that,
From the outset … he makes the important assumption that stories/narratives
(muthoi, which signifies traditional “myths” but also artfully constructed
stories more broadly) can embody and convey value-laden beliefs about the
world. It is clear, moreover, that before reaching the typology of Book 3,
Socrates treats authors of muthoi as globally and supra-textually responsible
for everything “said” in their works: he thus criticizes Homer, without
apparent discrimination, for passages in the voice of both the poetic narrator
and individual characters. (129)
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In other words, diegesis gives the right to speak to the narrator, while mimêsis puts
expression in the characters or other arts. So, our discussion on knowledge, truth and myth,
and its location, constitutes a paradigm of the locus sanctus as immanence that is implicated
in both Platonic and Aristotelean thought. For Plato’s discourse on art defines art as having a
didactic purpose, even one which it cannot possibly fulfill because art can only represent
truth. For Plato, the myth as truth-bearing mimêsis must convey a singular or specific truth
unsullied by multiple or digressive voices and must be given in philosophy. As we have seen,
art shows through correspondence, recognition, and mental images, rather than tells. For
Plato, only one privileged voice should evoke truths or the symbolic. The arts however
constitute more than one voice, for they are a digression or a multiplicity that alters the purity
of the myth and threatens to degrade the unity of the polis. The arts reveal portions and parts
of the whole. Too many voices dilute the mythos and alter its utterance from the monologicsupra-author. At its core, the discursive and digressive distribution of mythos relies on the
“psychology of both the performer and (by extrapolation) audience” rather than relying
expressly on the interlocutor (130). What Plato or Socrates is most concerned with is the
“inducement” for the audience to empathize (through imagination) with the mimetic delivery
of the myth.
Plato’s definition of mimêsis does not differ from that which we see in Aristotle’s
discourse. Both agree that mimêsis connotes imitation and representation as practiced in the
visual arts, poetry, drama, and music. In the broadest sense, mimêsis denotes to
representation, depiction, and expression in various media (visual and musical as well as
poetic). The differences we have cited so far are concerned with truth in art and its location.
Plato’s problem is not with mimêsis per se, but rather the relationship between mimêsis and
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the imagination and the distance between this and the forms or un-representable truths.
Further, Plato’s concern is less with mimêsis than with the location of the utterance, the
interlocutor. In mimetic poetry, the poet utters what is or what might be as that which
constitutes the distance between the viewer and the grander narrative of divine truth. In
rhetoric and philosophy, the philosopher utters truth and idealistically brings the viewer to a
closer understanding of that truth (132-134).
Aristotle’s use of the terms varies little in meaning from that of Plato’s. Aristotle
maintains the broader definition of mimêsis as representation or imitation among all the
mimetic arts, including painting, music and dance in addition to poetry and theater. But this
broader use of the term, beyond art and poetry, allows Aristotle to consider the conveyance
of the myth without assigning any responsibility for the myth to the narrator or any particular
actor or part player in the case of the other arts and media. In other words, “Aristotle strips
his categories of the normative judgments made by Socrates in the Republic. He shows no
sign of taking dramatic representation to be intrinsically more powerful, or less
psychologically “distanced,” than narrative; nor, accordingly, does he think that the one
raises greater ethical concerns than the other (133). Aristotle allows for deigesis, which is to
say that the narration of the myth can be given in either the narrator or the actor’s voices, or a
combination of the two, or it can be distributed interchangeably and in substitution among
the chorus, the dancers, paintings and artworks, music, poetry and other media.
Both Plato and Aristotle conceive of “diegesis by means of mimêsis” but by the use of
the term mimesis, Plato sees the mimetic arts as distanced from diegesis while Aristotle
leaves open the possibility of diegesis through mimêsis. Plato seeks to keep mythos in its
representation as pure or close to the ideal as possible and we see this same articulation in
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formalist European Primitivism and abstract arts, which present the structure of myth without
enticing the viewer to sympathize psychologically with the myth. Truth as mimetic plot or
structure can be ascertained by way of an abstract disinterest or intellectual pleasure.
Aristotle on the other hand, as in American Primitive arts and the works of Pollock, opens the
broader possibility that mythos is conveyed through the mimêsis metaphor-representationmythos-correspondence paradigm, thus opening up the possibility of learning and pleasure
that viewers take when recognizing truth (“Poetics” 1449.25). Aristotle, through diegesis
allows all arts, in a harmonious whole, to participate in expressing the myth. He does not say
that myths can only be read by the poet, or that certain myths can only be represented in
certain media in the way that Lessing or Greenberg would. Rather, all arts are mimetic and
participate equally in expressing universal truths through harmonia and consonance which
finds material specificity only in mimêsis - its representation.
Applied to Pollock’s figurative elements and the notion of mimetic paradigm as
mimêsis as allegory- mythos-correspondence, the location of the Aristotelian interlocutor
qualifies Pollock’s work as mythic through its mimetic content and form and gives art the
right to speak to such truths. Plato, Picasso’s Cubism, and Greenbergian abstraction claims
the un-representability of truth can only be described abstractly but not represented. But if
the mythic is primarily a cathartic element, then it is through mimêsis that this act is carried
out. Mimêsis in both its role as myth and representation is the means by which one learns,
recognizes truth, and/or experiences catharsis. As Aristotle writes,
First, the instinct of imitation is implanted in man from childhood, one
difference between him and other animals being that he is the most imitative
of living creatures, and through imitation learns his earliest lessons; and no
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less universal is the pleasure felt in things imitated. We have evidence of this
in the facts of experience…the reason why men enjoy seeing a likeness is, that
in contemplating it they find themselves learning or inferring, and saying
perhaps, ‘Ah, that is he.’ (Aristotle, “Poetics”1448.5)
Thus, Aristotle's claim is that mimêsis is primarily didactic and no matter the source of the
utterance of the myth, mythos is recognized and understood. Rather than transcendent and
ascertained through thought alone, the divine is immanent to its expression. Pollock, by
invoking myth in his work claims the right to be the interlocutor of a truth, expressed in art
rather than words. But he also claims for art the right to return to the representation of the
mythic. Mimêsis in terms of the representation of mythos through painterly myth constitutes
correspondence and harmonia which reveals the character and location of truth. This
relationship between the didactic mimêsis as allegory- mythos-correspondence and its
mimetic utterance in deigesis is revealed in Pollock’s mythic and allegorical works. It is
problematic for the philosopher (who claims to be the direct interlocutor for wisdom) when
the artist listens to the muse.
This excavation of mimêsis as mythos or truth and its relationship between myth and
form is primary to our broader understanding of mimêsis, and also brings us back to an
understanding of the divided and even polemical modernist critique of Pollock’s work. It
demonstrates the divide in modernism between formal abstraction and representation and
thereby reintroduces the notion of idealist truth which was lost in Greenberg and the
subsequent modernist critiques of Pollock’s work. For in formalism, there is no interlocutor.
In the case of a sign or symbol the interlocutor is the authored narrator. But when allegory
and ritual come into play a myriad of forms reveals differing viewpoints of truth. The
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interlocutor becomes multi-vocal. There is an underlying opposition in Platonic and
Aristotelian notions of mimêsis and the location of truth which are likewise evident in the
larger modern art and criticism polemic. But Pollock’s work overcomes the divisions in
modern art by reclaiming the right of art to be mimetic in multiple ways and to therefore
claim its right as interlocutor of the mythos of which it represents and gives form.

Mythos, Alētheai and the Performance of Art

Our fourth and final point concerns the dialectic of art as a process or the event or
happening of art, which we find in terms of Heidegger’s notion of alētheai. First we will
define alētheai and second we will look at alētheai in terms of propositional function and
material syntax and event. We have considered art in its role as representing myths in a
variety of harmonious forms consonant to the myth itself. In this united orientation, art
occurs in time as an event or happening of art. The event of art is the coming together or
happening of all the related mimetic forms, modes, and functions of art in the representation
of mythos. The event of alētheai is that which discloses the unity of art’s related parts. We
can look to Martin Heidegger for an account of truth as alētheai in his work Being and Time.
In this work, truth is a phenomenological orientation towards a thing, which makes it less a
verifiable correspondence between the agreement of one thing to another, or a thing to its
meaning (as we discussed in Chapter Five), and more of an unconcealing or unveiling of
truth by virtue of an intention or attitude toward that thing, more like in terms of harmonious
relations of that which art reveals or represents in consonant ways. For Heidegger, this notion
of truth is called alētheai. The intention of art is the representation of its object, whether in
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naturalistic or idealistic form, and this coming together of the myth and in its represented
form enables the work of art to come into being. This opening or disclosing of the work is the
truth of the work of art, or alētheai.

Alētheia for Heidegger is a departure from Platonic notions of metaphysical idealism,
a priori, and the corrected-ness of apprehending and asserting (3). Plato believes that
essential truth is situated in the highest of the Ideals. Knowing truth is a matter of
apprehending or seeing truth correctly. This definition recalls Parmenides’ ideas (found in
Plato’s works) that imply our everyday mode of ‘knowing’ is based on the realm of
appearances and shadows, situating us in Heraclitus’ realm of ‘flux’. In Plato’s Allegory of
the Cave there is a distinct emphasis on sight and seeing, perceiving and apprehending the
light of the sun over the darkened shadows within the cave. Truth is evident, ascertainable,
and verifiable through powerful and deep insights. Likewise, the reverse comes into play –
there can be deceptions, falsehoods. One of Plato’s concerns with art is that it can be
deceptive. The artist in particular is one who deceives and “knows nothing worth mentioning
of the things he imitates, but that imitation is a form of play, not to be taken seriously, and
that those who attempt tragic poetry, whether in iambics or heroic verse, are all altogether
imitators” (Plato, “Republic” 447). These imitators are “concerned with the third remove
from truth” or with making art objects that imitate or have the likeness of a thing without
comporting its true nature or use. Following Platonic idealism, Heidegger is concerned that
philosophy on the whole (and technology) focuses on verifying truth rather than disclosing or
uncovering truth. Rather than focusing on an ultimately higher ground situated in the Forms,
Heidegger’s truth focuses on essences or conditions of the phenomenological experience of
truth as grounded in alētheai.
350

In Heidegger’s view all things already exist for us in a pre-existing world full of
things and meanings. Before we arrive at meaning, we are thrown into a world of objects by
birth. Meaning is accrued in the process of engaging with objects in the world as in Dasein,
the subject always oriented to its world. If we compare Heidegger’s model to art then the
objects of the world are sorts of materials and tools ready for use or fashioning. But these
objects have meanings that are pre-given and pre-existent. Even so, not all things are
understood for their meanings or focused on at the same time. Rather, all things are
apperceived in terms of how they will be of use for us. The collective and individual use and
engagement with the materials of the world condition an agreement of judgments or
meanings. The truth of a thing is uncovered or revealed through the process of collective and
pre-existing judgments and new assessments. As things are in play or put into use, meanings
are ascribed to them. Once these things are accepted into common understandings and
meanings, a truth is proclaimed or revealed about such things. Likewise, things fall out of use
and their truth can become hidden, concealed, and covered over. The process of
unconcealment is dialectical in that as some things are revealed and unconcealed, other
things which reside out of present view or use become concealed or hidden. So, for
Heidegger, truth is experienced in the ways it is revealed (or not). It is also historically
contingent upon collective intensions and agreements. The most important, evident, or
immanent aspect in the correspondence between a thing and its truth or meaning is its
uncovering or unconcealment. Truth revealed (or concealed) is an act or event.
There are two divergent yet related arguments that come into play in the unconcealing
of truth, both of which relate to our discussion on the work of art. First, there is the unveiling
of truth itself within a phenomenological intention or focused attention in doing so. We see
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this unveiling in Pollock’s last paintings wherein he deliberately disclosed his former hidden
figures, as in his painting The Deep (Fig. 78). In a letter Pollock wrote to his friend Alfonso
Ossorio in 1951, Pollock said, “I’ve had a period of drawing on canvas in black- with some
of my early images coming thru – think the non-objectivists will find them disturbing – and
the kids who think it simple to splash a Pollock out” (Karmel, “Interviews” 79). Rather than
concealing and hiding the figures, Pollock intentionally made them visible, unconcealing
them and revealing them. Secondly, there is the syntax in which this occurs, the poetry or
artistry of the unveiling itself. This is also to say the forms of mimêsis (natural and ideal
representation) and the modes of mimêsis (symbol, metaphor, allegory, and ritual) make up
the syntax within the overall structure and composition of art that envisions the mythos of the
work of art. Third, Heidegger’s analysis on truth and art is helpful in our understanding of
truth as the dialectic of transcendent and immanent in alētheai, and our understanding of the
work of art as a syntax or signifier of truth, which corresponds to our expanded definition of
mimêsis. We can see the assertion of both types of truth in Pollock’s drip paintings and final
paintings. First, in terms of propositional openings, it is clear that Pollock juxtaposes the
hidden figure beneath a swirl of abstract interlacing webbing. The placement of his figures
was concealed and forgotten, only to resurface with careful scrutiny and with the help of
modern x-ray equipment, and in the case of the later paintings, figures are revealed
deliberately. Figures are at once revealed and concealed, hidden and disclosed, truth and
untruth, and forgotten and remembered in the critical emphasis on Pollock’s abstract
qualities. Second, there are the material qualities of paint mixed with sand and other bits of
contemporary objects, and the manner in which the paint is applied, through an allegorical
performance. Combined, the concealing / unconcealing and allegorical performance
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Figure 78 Jackson Pollock, The Deep, 1953, 220.4 x 150.2 cm, Georges Pompidou Center, Paris, France

works together within a world or harmonious whole, wherein a creative freedom enables an
openness upon which the truth in art happens.
Heidegger’s essay The Origin of the Work of Art, clarifies the question at hand
between material and mimêsis in the openness of alētheai as one of totality. It is not merely
the formal object that is the work of art, but rather the materials, forms, intentions of the
artist, and the final form of art that enables its unveiling and happening of truth. Heidegger
explained, “The work’s becoming a work is a way in which truth becomes and happens”
(Heidegger, “Origin” 185). This emphasis on process and action is reiterated in his statement
that, “The works createdness, however, can obviously be grasped only in terms of the process
of creation” or in terms of its happening (183). In other words, the forms, modes and
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functions of mimêsis only come together in the creation of the work of art – in the event of
the work of art. These elements of art enable the creation of a “world” or a setting in which
the truth of the work becomes immanent to the work. In the work meaning as immanence
becomes evident. It unfolds as an act of truth, ascertained by the viewer. What is important is
not just meaning or truth but the unveiling of that truth. Art is the “becoming” and the
“setting to work” of truth (140). Unlike our discussion on emblems and symbols where the
metaphor grants that such are imbued with meanings, and as these meanings are accepted,
emblems become symbolic representations of a truth (for example, bees symbolizing industry
or power and wealth), alētheai is less concerned with corresponding or metaphorical truths
and more focused on the conditions from which truth can be revealed. Thus, we are not
saying that alētheai constitutes meaning in mimetic arts, but rather that in mimêsis the
possibility of truth is revealed as alētheai or as the coming together of all the constituent

parts of mimêsis as the event of art.
In summary, mimêsis allows for the representation of truth, the mythos in the myth.
Alētheai allows for the performance of art as an event which creates the unveiling that brings
forth the myth. The mythic, given form, requires both representation or mimêsis and the
event of the work or alētheai. In light of Aristotle’s notion of myth and immanence,
Heidegger’s analysis recovers the possibility of immanence as the happening in a work of art,
because of the unity of the subject-object in art and its expression in mimêsis, and because of
the way this unity enables the event of art, or alētheai. The performance of art demonstrates
the nature of art as immanent in the dialectic between mythos, myth and its representation in
mimêsis. It also reveals truth as an event with the result that recognition, cognition, imaging,
and memory of this truth becomes immanent to participants. In the process new knowledge is
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formed by the modes of recognition and knowledge. Alētheai is the event of art which

verifies the mimetic functions and forms of art.
Modernists claim that formalism in art is autonomous because it separates itself the
role of signifying or representing the natural and the ideal worlds. But we know from our
extended understanding of mimêsis as natural and ideal representation and as mimeisthai that
art re-presents or brings into presence the truth to which it points. Idealist art begins with the
transcendent idea and gives it immanent form. Art is the result of an idea – material dialectic.
It is in the striving to obtain or materialize the idea that the idea is given form. Once
obtained, the dialectic of striving remains as a trace within the work of art. Benjamin
describers this striving as art’s work writing that, “one of the foremost tasks of art has always
been the creation of a demand which could be fully satisfied only later. The history of every
art form shows critical epochs in which a certain art form aspires to effects which could be
fully obtained only with a changed technical standard, that is to say, in a new art form”
(Benjamin, “Mechanical” 517). It is this dialectic between striving and forming which impels
art onward into new stylistic territories. This phenomenon of striving also determines what
Benjamin calls the “aura” and the “ritual” of art. He explains that the original work of art
contains an “aura”, which is to say that the idea and the manifestation of that idea functions
within its use. For Benjamin, original works of art, prior to the schism in art and
abstractionist l’art pour l’art dictums, were based on the ritual use of art. It is in the ritual use
of art that we again see the dialectic of striving, wherein the ideal is sought for and made
manifest, immanent and transcendent, which is presence or alētheai. This dialectic in striving
constitutes the truth of art, the presence of truth, and the trace or aura of its use. Benjamin
writes, “It is significant that the existence of the work of art with reference to its aura is never
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entirely separated from its ritual function. In other words, the unique value of the 'authentic'
work of art has its basis in ritual, the location of its original use value” (514). What we have
in mimêsis and mimeisthai is art in both immanent and transcendent forms. It is in the
dialectic between these immanent and transcendent forms that the nature of the indigenous
spirit in art is apparent. This dialectic with its resultant presence or opening of its truth as
alētheai is the very notion of ritual art. Pollock’s drip paintings as allegorical re-presentations
and performances of indigenous ritual art reveal the indigenous spirit of art as the striving for
transcendence made manifest in art, giving the ideal form and making it immanent.
Indigenous art is the striving of a prayer made visible. Pollock’s drip paintings, like
indigenous ritual arts, manifest propositions or allegories in aesthetic form which are
executed as a performance or event of the work of the truth in art. Pollock’s recuperation of
Native American arts shows us the true nature of the indigenous aesthetic as being that in
which the performance of the dialectic of transcendent and immanent mimêsis with its form,
modes, and functions occurs.

Conclusion

In this discussion we have expanded our definition of mimêsis with its forms and
modes to consider the relations between mimêsis and mythos. We have considered the
functions of mimetic art in terms of memory, recognition, correspondence, and the iteration
of mythos in terms of harmonia and consonance in terms of the overall relationship between
mythos and its representation. With this expanded view of the functions of mimêsis we have
considered Pollock’s work as both allegorical and mythic. We have distinguished his works
as participating in immanence according to Aristotelian theories on art and mythos.
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Our discussion has led us to consider the location of truth, the locus sanctus and
particularly this residence of truth within Platonic and Aristotelian thought. Locating truth
enables us to ask whether truth is transcendent and Platonic, or immanent and Aristotelian.
Finally, we have found that Plato’s concerns with mimêsis have less to do with a contention
against myth and its evocation of truth and more with the rights of the philosopher over the
artist to evoke such truths. Most importantly, however, for our present purposes, we have
found that Pollock’s work returns myth to art through mimêsis by recuperating indigenous
symbols and allegories with their related ways to evoke mythic truths through the
performance or happening of art. This is evident in his early primitivist works and his later
drip paintings. The allegory of washing or wiping away sand paintings is recuperated as
dripping sanded paint. What is recuperated is repurposed and re-presented as a new
mythology revealing new meanings and truths, and new forms for the event of art to create a
clearing from which new truths can be manifest. The result of these considerations is that we
have seen how both Platonic and Aristotelian conditions of idealism and representation are
implicated in art’s responsibilities in learning and issues of truth which are relevant in
Pollock’s representational, symbolic, and idealist drip works. We have also seen that the
divisive theories on Pollock’s work are implicated in the issues of mimêsis and diegesis. But
as an event and happening of art, Pollock’s allegorical reiterations or ritual drip paints claim
the right of art as the interlocutor of significant truths. Pollock’s works, far from being solely
formalist autonomous works, are actually entrenched in the dialectic between concealing and
revealing these truths as the events and happenings of art.
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Conclusion
Mimêsis and Ritual

Many of the most abstract, began with
more or less recognizable imagery –
heads, parts of the body, fantastic
creatures.
Lee Krasner

As we have seen, the literature on Pollock’s work and life have stressed Pollock’s
alcoholism and possible personality disorder, and in so doing has contributed to the
mythology of both the artist and his work. Biographers and critics have repeatedly stressed
Pollock’s psychological states, referring to his tendencies as “brooding”, “impulsive”,
“savage”, “joy”, “pain”, “reaction” “violent emotion”. Deeper reading into Pollock’s life
indicates that he was not especially violent, but he was prone to verbosity and anger when
drunk. When interested in a topic, Pollock was very talkative, articulate, and intelligent. He
did suffer from depression, but Krasner claims that he was not suicidal. Although Lee
Krasner tried to clear up some of the misunderstandings concerning Pollock’s personality and
his work, the myth of Pollock prevails today, and he is remembered as much for his colorful
life and personality as for his artwork. The irony is that while Pollock’s work returns
mythology to art, Pollock is also part of the myth.
This underlying return of the mythic, and its associations with mythos and mimêsis
has been neglected in the critical review of Pollock’s work. While both the abstract
modernist and psychoanalytic critiques emphasize Pollock’s mental health they draw
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differing conclusions. The tenets of abstract modernism, largely set forth by Hans Hofmann
through the influential writings of Clement Greenberg, define an American modernist
aesthetic based on the flatness of the pictorial surface and the illumination of any and all
pictorial illusion or mimetic representation. Greenberg (also one of Pollock’s greatest
supporters) echoes Hofmann’s dictums in writing that, “Pollock’s strength lies in the
emphatic surfaces of his pictures, which it is his concern to maintain and intensify in all that
thick, fuliginous flatness which began – but only began – to be the strong point of late
Cubism.” Greenberg claims that Pollock adopted and expanded upon Cubist techniques, and
in so doing, relocated the center of the art world from Paris to New York City (Greenberg,
“Collected” 20-30).
However, during his lifetime, the critical review of Pollock’s work was rather mixed.
Contemporary critics emphasized the formal attributes of paint and color and calligraphic or
hieroglyphic qualities. In this mixed review, Barnett Newman also saw these ideographic and
primitive qualities in Pollock’s and likeminded artists’ works, while Harold Rosenberg
focused on Pollock’s gestural action or execution. But Rosenberg also contributed to the
mythologizing of Pollock, writing that “The tension of the private myth is the content of
every painting of this vanguard” (Rosenberg, “Action” 583). As a result, the modern
abstraction critique concluded that Pollock was the quintessential tortured artist aiming to
express the avant-garde’s intense need to transcend the particulars of history in order to seize
upon universal ideals (Rushing, “Ritual” 273).
Shortly before and soon after Pollock’s death, Surrealist and Jungian theorists (such
as Harold Rosenberg and others) began to look at Pollock’s work through the lens of
psychoanalytic thought and Jungian archetypes, a view which carefully scrutinized Pollock’s
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early childhood, relationships with peers and his lifelong battle with alcoholism. These
theorists conclude that Pollock’s work describes a type of ritual healing wherein Pollock
found solace in art and art making. Increasingly, within this discourse, art historians have
taken notice of the American Indian influences in Pollock’s early drawings and paintings and
have concluded that these elements prove Pollock acted as a shaman for self-healing
purposes.
Ironically, both critiques conclude that Pollock’s drip paintings are deeply personal
expressions of psychological pain, evidence of mental illness, the struggle with modern life
and alcoholism. This divided critique separates Pollock’s works into phases, wherein the
modernist critique claims abstraction in Pollock’s later drip paintings while psychoanalytic
based theories claim Pollock’s earlier primitivist works. This divided theoretical review is
rather problematic, since both views mythologize Pollock’s personality but fall short of
explaining the plethora of mythic indigenous references and allegories in his oeuvre. Because
these references are so ubiquitous, we must ask if there a unifying notion or concept that
applies to all of Pollock’s works as a type of underlying principle explaining both the
influence of Native American arts and aesthetics in his representational and allegorical
elements, and his abstraction.
We have addressed the socio-political context of Pollock’s youth and his formative
artistic training. We saw that within this context the representation of the American Indian
played a large role in both politics and the arts. We identified ways in which the American
Indian has traditionally been portrayed as an ethnographic subject. We also noted the changes
to this ethnographic representation as an important epistemic political shift that turned the
American Indian into an American icon, personified to symbolize the Regionalist and New
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Deal national identity and agendas. We also looked at the distribution of the American Indian
icon within all cultural sectors, from politics and fine art to popular media and
merchandizing. Because the representation of the iconic American Indian was ubiquitous
among these sectors, we have come to label this era the Indian-episteme. Pollock’s world was
one wherein the American Indian was embedded into the very fabric of the society.
We have also questioned the polemic within modernism. We have seen that the
critique of Pollock is divided along modernist and psychoanalytic discourses. We also
concluded that art criticism is epistemic, codependent on the socio-political context of the
times. While each era has predominant trains of thought or epistemes, it also has subepistemes, some of which rise to predominance while others decline and fall into disuse.
Within this view, both the modernist and psychoanalytic reviews of Pollock’s work are as
much critiques of the period’s context as they are of his work. We have seen that the modern
abstraction review is grounded in political and cold war conditions, wherein critics were
seeking to claim modernism as a supremely and uniquely American variety. This seemingly
convincing view claims that Abstract Expressionism is the natural extension and
development of analytic Cubism through a variety of influences and sources. But the critique
oversimplifies the trajectory of Pollock’s work and neglects to account for his engagement
with indigenous arts and themes.
We have also discussed the psychoanalytic critique of Pollock. This theory formulates
an interpretation of art that contradicts theories of pure form, but it is also epistemic in that it
is based upon contextual fashion trends and interests in psychoanalysis and Surrealism. This
critique claims that Pollock appropriated Surrealist and Jungian archetype imagery for
personal purposes. Within the critique of Pollock, as well as the larger epistemic discourse of
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modern theory (with its ties to the political and social discourse of its time), both theories
constitute a disunity that describes a polemical modern-episteme. From this point of view, we
see how this critical division has overlooked important indigenous elements in Pollock’s
work. Having clarified for the art historian the social, political and artistic contexts, and
having reviewed the nature of art criticism as epistemically related to its own historiography
and political situation, we have established a foundation upon which turn to a discussion on
mimêsis and all that it entails.
From a view of the Indian-episteme and the fashion for an iconic Indian in politics
and art to a view of the divided polemical modernist-episteme, we have seen that many
differing ideas made up the richly varied and tangible world from which Pollock arose and in
which he worked. The rapid political, socioeconomic and cultural changes within and
external to the United States in less than one century moved it from a nascent national
identity founded upon the notion of authenticity and origins to one of military and industrial
supremacy and superiority. Pollock’s world was one of shifting foundations, and within the
art world specifically, Pollock found himself within a polemic rooted in dualism, a schism
between art either as abstract and non-representational (pure) form, or as the representation
of the inner experience. By the late nineteenth century both sides of the debate erupted into a
myriad of differing styles. The problems of modernity, upon which Pollock deliberated, were
based on this critical divide.
But the problem of the divided critical debate began long before Pollock’s
engagement with mimetic forms of art. After Realism, and certainly since Impressionism
onward, the role of portraying the appearances of things has been overshadowed by the
theoretical divide between the formalism of Impressionism, Cubism, Futurism, abstraction,
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and other -isms, and the subjective experience of the inner and outer lived experience in
Surrealism, Social and New Objective Realisms, and Expressionism. All these movements
evidence a schism in art between formalism and content, abstraction and experience,
rationalism and empiricism. This schism in art is symptomatic of the larger dualism within
critical theory and philosophy which polarizes the issues in modernity between personal
subjective experience and rationalism.
In examining the political epistemic and divided art world, we should ask to what
extent did Pollock in fact engage extensively and purposefully with American Indian arts,
and how can we conceptualize this? We have noted key influences in Pollock’s life,
including Wolfgang Paalen and John Graham, likeminded artists and theorists who helped to
establish Pollock’s artistic interests in American Indian arts and also influenced Pollock’s
peers and fellow primitivist artists. We have found that the American Indian aesthetic was a
deeply held interest and source of motivation throughout Pollock’s life. We also analyzed
many of Pollock’s drawings to show that, rather than being the inheritor of Picasso-esque
Cubism and Surrealism, Pollock’s early work shows distinctly American primitivist subject
matter within both abstract and three-dimensional and volume-rich forms. Rather than
“significant form” terminology as coined by Clive Bell, we have noted that Pollock’s works
are instead based on a significant, even mythic content. Pollock’s references to American
Indian arts throughout his works can best be understood as content rich re-interpretations of
myth through mimêsis.
From Plato and the beginnings of aesthetics, art has been inseparably associated with
philosophy, most especially in terms of its signifying and representational qualities. Plato’s
greatest concern is the degree to which art reveals truth and determines that at best art can not
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reveal but only imitate it. Aristotle claims imitation to be a key function of learning. We learn
through imitating and seeing the imitative arts, whether these be paintings, poetry, dance,
theater, or music. When Picasso and others claim pure form and a break with tradition, it is
not just mimêsis as representation that is lost to art. Rather, the loss of mimêsis also impacts a
key component of art’s relationship to metaphysics and hermeneutics. While the importance
of mimêsis to the history and concepts of art and philosophy will be explored further in other
studies, Pollock’s recuperation of mimêsis marks a distinct break with not only the notion of
pure form, but with the notion of the avant-garde and its repudiation of tradition as well.
From Descartes forward (at least until Heidegger), the subject is defined as that which
thinks, perceives, and feels, and the natural world and all it contains constitutes the object or
objective. From Kant onward, art has increasingly followed this split between the subjective
and thinking experience and the objective natural world. Art became divided between
representations of the experiences of modernity in its outer and inner forms and focuses, and
idealistic pursuits with its ensuing formal concerns, until, with Picasso and his abstracted
Primitivism, we arrive at a purely formal conception of art. The critique as outlined by
Greenberg, Bell, and Read aligns formalist art with Kantian disinterest. Within
disinterestedness, mimêsis, once both the measure and purpose of art, fell sway to plasticity
and objectivity; the thinking, feeling subject now needs only to experience art’s forms.
Content, subject, narrative, and all connections to the natural world were split off, eventually
to be derided as being merely representational and uninteresting. The stability of mimêsis in
terms of verisimilitude and idealism became disrupted among the diverse ‘isms’ of modern
art. In its fullest identification, mimêsis is presently and generally regarded as mere copy or
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illusion, symptomatic of a traditional and outmoded past and, among other things, separated
from its broader roles of pointing and signifying.
With the decline of the importance of mimêsis from Kant onward came also a decline
in an understanding of mimêsis in its fullest. Halliwell explains that,
Within a self-consciously historicizing idiom …the semantics of “imitation”
have been considerably narrowed and impoverished in modern usage (and
equally, so far as I can tell, in all modern languages). Where once, in a
neoclassical intellectual setting, “imitation” could, in the hands of the most
subtle writers, possess a suppleness of meaning and resonance that it
“borrowed,” so to speak, from the philosophical weight of tradition that lay
behind ancient mimeticism, the standard modern significance of imitation
tends almost inevitably to imply, often with pejorative force a limited exercise
in copying, superficial replication, or counterfeiting of an externally “given”
model. Notions of this narrow type, even though they have played some part
in the history of mimesis (usually on the side of opponents rather than
proponents of mimesis), cannot begin to do justice to (their objects, modes,
techniques, psychological effects, etc.) that have been raised by arguments
whose ancestry goes back to the writings of Plato and Aristotle. (14)
In its decline, mimêsis has become narrowly defined as mere imitation and its connection to
knowledge and truth has been lost. As art experienced this rupture between subject-object, it
became no longer a question of how imitation was to be employed, whether in a hierarchical
structure as a conveyance for the elevation of the mind and soul, or as a representation of the
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material nature of life. Imitation was just simply put out of favor and its role in art was
denied altogether. Mimêsis is tangibly implicated in evidencing this split or schism and has
found itself, in problematic ways, in service to both idealism and the representation of the
cosmos and metaphysical presence as mimēma. While idealistic art seeks for underlying
structures, representational art seeks to duplicate the sights, sounds, and flavors of the inner
and outer experiences of life, and l’art pour l’art focuses on the forms of art. Within the
discourse of idealism and abstraction, the representation of nature as verisimilitude fell into
derision and gave way to formalism, pure abstract form. This is not to say art has not had
other polemical debates in other eras, such as disegno and colore or imatio and poesis that
continued throughout the Renaissance and Baroque eras, and the quarrel between
Enlightenment Neoclassicism with its argumentative sister Romanticism. But never before
has art been as diametrically opposed to itself and to its own nature and underlying mimetic
structure. Split along representational and formal tenets, art became divorced from its role in
representation. Art has blinded itself to itself. This rupture led to an avant-garde splintered
between subjective and political experience and formalism. The subjective experience of the
inner and outer lived experience is most evidently understood in terms of Surrealism, Social
and New Objective Realisms, and Expressionism. Rationality and objectivity is most evident
in avant-garde Cubism and a variety of its related abstract factions.
Within this broader context of a divided Modernism, it is only logical that Pollock’s
drip works would be coined Abstract Expressionism, as if such a critique could unite the
division in art along the notion of the expression of the inner experience of the artist within
abstract terms. This logic seems to acknowledge the idea that Pollock addressed the schism
in art through mimêsis, particularly in its idealist forms and modes. We have seen this
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division in the historical trajectory of art and the critical review of Pollock. But the missing
element in the division that created the schism, the radical separation of art into two primary
irreconcilable camps, is the issue of representation or mimêsis.
Mimêsis is generally thought to mean mere representation, illusion, and/or copies of
the natural world, but this is a relatively impoverished concept of mimêsis, particularly in
light of Pollock’s drip paintings. Therefore, we have expanded our understanding of mimêsis
as being fundamentally more than representing the empirical world. It means to encompass
both naturalistic and symbolic or idealistic representation, both of which we call the forms of
mimêsis. We have seen that symbolic representation encompasses various modes of
representation including symbols and emblems, metaphors, allegory, and rituals as the
reiteration of the allegory, allowing meaning to be attributed or recognized along several
modes and varieties of representation. This view of mimêsis enables us to account for both
the representational, symbolic, and allegorical elements in Pollock’s work. We have
concluded that even Pollock’s drip paintings are allegories of the ritualistic destruction of
Navajo sand paintings and sacred art. Just as Pollock makes allegories of ancient mythical
rites, Namuth’s photographs and films also allegorize Pollock painting. In this way we see
how fluidly allegorical works reiterate and extend the allegory (and the mythic) along various
modes and through various techniques. Pollock’s engagement or recuperation of the
indigenous spirit in art can be explained through an expanded concept of mimêsis that
validates Pollock’s profound commitment to a unique artistic vision.
Our discussion on mimêsis has led us to look more deeply into all its possible
ramifications pertaining to Pollock’s work, particularly the mythic quality of his primitivist
and drip paintings. To broaden our understanding of mimêsis within a view of
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phenomenology, and particularly within the notions of idealist form, we have also addressed
the issue of mimêsis as mimeisthai or that which represents the un-representable through
idealist form. Idealism leads us into a key issue arising from the concept of mimêsis, which is
the issue of truth in art. We began our investigation into the nature of mimêsis and functions
of knowledge in terms of recognition, mental image-making, and correspondence. We have
also considered truth as transcendent, the mythos or myth, and the ways that art provides the
structure or compositional framework in which the myth can be given form, which makes
truth immanent. In this way, transcendent truth is immanent to art. Because mimêsis had
fallen into ill-repute in modern theory our deeper account of mimêsis ultimately derives from
ancient Greek concepts and our discussion has of necessity taken its point of departure from
Plato and Aristotle, other Greek writers and their concepts, and subsequent philosophical
traditions within phenomenology. Within this backdrop, we have furthered our understanding
of the polemical modernist-episteme as one which flows from the Cartesian split, dualism,
and its ramifications in philosophy and aesthetics. This divide in modernism between formal
abstraction and the representation of inner subjective states detracts from the question of the
representation of mythos and myth. These broader questions, regarding art and truth, have
been lost to art in its mode as l’art pour l’art and the notion of pure form. With the decline of
mimetic art, art’s role in cognition, learning, and giving form to life’s truths has been severed
from art’s purposes. Art has been estranged from itself. This question of art’s traditional roles
with philosophy, learning, and cognition was lost in Greenberg and the subsequent modernist
and psychoanalytic critiques of Pollock’s work. But the decline of mimêsis is a broader issue
than what we see in American modernism as its decline is implicated in a broader schism in
modern art and art theory.
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One of the key results of our study is that the work of art occurs in the event or the
performance of art. This is significant because it is the event of art and all the striving within
the dialectic of transcendence and immanence, that the mythos becomes evident in its myth
or mythologizing structure or composition. Many descriptions of Pollock’s work allude to
qualities of action, movement, and dance. For example, Harold Rosenberg’s essay “The
American Action Painters,” characterizes Pollock’s work as an event (Rosenberg, “Action”
581). In this article Rosenberg sought to account for the motional quality of Pollock’s drip
paintings. Further, he echoes Heidegger’s notion of “thrownness” in saying that “The work,
the act, translates the psychologically given into the intentional, into a ‘world’ – and thus
transcends it” (582). It is in the subjective intention of the artist that the objective work of art
comes to be and this constitutes the “event” of art (582). Rosenberg’s two main points are
key. First, art is an act or event, particularly in the works of Pollock. Even in making
allegorical works of art, the event of art resides in the act of art. Second, as Rosenberg says,
“what matters always is the revelation contained in the act” or rather, the creative act makes a
truth (revelation) known. Again, truth is immanent to a work of art (582). But it is the
dialectic between immanence and transcendence within art’s subject-object unity that the
event or truth as alētheai of art is made manifest.
Pollock’s work evidences the event of art as being one where art is in the making.
The drip paintings particularly witness to the event of art as a process of allegorizing sacred
ritual. Lee Krasner alluded to performativity, when in an interview with Barbara Rose; she
characterized Pollock’s work as being some form of a “dance” (Rose 45). Pollock’s “dance”
leads to the conclusion that it is the dance, and not just the application of paint, that is the
reiteration or allegory of the ritual. In other words, the dance is captured in paint, leaving its
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trace. Pollock suggested this fact when he claimed that, “Technic is the result of a need—
new needs demand new technics—total control—denial of the accident—States of order—
organic intensity—energy and motion made visible—[as] memories arrested in space…”
making “energy and motion visible” (qtd. Soussloff 71). This to say that Pollock leaves in
paint the trace of an ephemeral happening of alētheai or the event of truth is in making. That
Pollock’s allegorical dance constitutes the act of art wherein the act is retained in its trace is
reiterated in Benjamin’s tenet that, “Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is
lacking in one element: its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where
it happens” (Benjamin, “Mechanical” 514). This issue of an act or allegorical performance is
further stressed in the uncovering and covering, even in Pollock’s latest works wherein his
early images are revealed within the layers of applied paint (Karmel, “Interviews” 79). In
these lush paintings, hidden figures within the depths of a blackened background are revealed
by the act of Pollock removing paint, which had been previously applied for the express
purpose of covering and unveiling the figures beneath (Fig. 78).
In the August 1949, Life Magazine article “Jackson Pollock; is he the greatest living
painter in the United States?” the article exposed current assumptions about modern art. First,
it questioned the issue of modern art as merely pure form. Second, by comparing Pollock’s
drip paintings to “yesterday’s macaroni” the article questioned the correspondence between
verisimilitude and art. Confused that the dripped paintings looked like “piles of spaghetti,”
viewers questioned the lack of recognizable subject. Pollock’s drip paintings confronted
viewers directly with issues of recognition, cognition, and memory while disclosing art’s
mimetic forms and modes as natural and symbolic representation, symbolism, allegory and
performance, along with the expression of the unveiling mythos as constituted within the
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dialectic of transcendent and immanent art. As Heidegger explains, “The work makes public
something other than itself; it manifests something other; it is an allegory” (Heidegger,
“Origin” 145-6). By bringing together the naturalistic and symbolic representation with
allegory and its meaning to which it points to, art is a bringing “together” of what is hidden
by what discloses. This bringing together constitutes the act, event, or happening of art (Fig.
79). The work of art, for Heidegger, manifests an original idea given form in a way similar to
Aristotle’s claim in the Poetics that mythos is given form in the myth and gives form to the
myth, for the work of art makes known “everything present in its presencing” (172).

Figure 79 Pollock Painting – Photographs by Hans Namuth, Agrinde Publications, Ltd. New York, 1978.

In summary, Heidegger sees art as a process between its materials, forms, acts of the artist,
and the way in which these combine to present meaning. But because meaning is ascribed in
its revelation, rather than a direct correspondence to the world by viewers in the world, the
event of truth in a work of art is historically contingent and therefore an event in time. It is in
the dialectic of being, between the ideal and its manifestation in form, that the work of art
gives mythos to myth and constitutes the event of art. When applied to our understanding of
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Pollock’s performative dance, or allegory of an indigenous ritual, the event or happening of
truth of the work is revealed. For us today, the tracery of paint in the drip paintings, and the
removal of paint in Pollock’s later representational works, reveal the concealment and
unconcealment of hidden figures and performative allegories. It is in the act of painting that
the mythic or ‘revelation’ is revealed, rather than in the final form. We retrace the act of
Pollock painting in the finality of the picture’s form that documents the performance, for it is
the performance of art which discloses the location of the unveiling of truth or alētheai. It is
through the recuperation of the spirit of American Indian arts and subjects via mimêsis and
all that it entails, including in its subject-object, transcendent-immanent forms, that Pollock
bridges the schism in art. Through mimêsis I argue that Pollock reveals the spirit of the
American Indian aesthetic as mimêsis; that which pertains to learning, cognition, recognition,
and memory, truth and myth, allegory, reiteration, ritual, and the dialectic of striving in
transcendence and immanence in art.
Although the visual and theoretical evidence elucidates the allegorical content in
Pollock’s work, unveiled by the passage of time and hindsight the works of Pollock’s
immediate progenitors further indicate the true nature of Pollock’s methods and paintings.
Artists such as Alan Kaprow and others were well aware of Pollock’s ritual dance, such that
the phenomenon of the aesthetic of Happenings is a direct inheritor of Pollock’s aesthetics.
Nowhere is this clearer than in Kaprow’s tribute, The Legacy of Jackson Pollock, 1958 and
in his Yard, which was performed in 1961 at the Martha Jackson Gallery (Fig. 80). In Yard
viewers participated in the work of art by traversing and circumambulating a field of used car
tires which were strewn about the gallery floor. In this way viewers participated in the ritual
of Pollock’s drip paintings, being at once viewers, dancers, and participants in the making of
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art. Making an allegory of Pollock’s drip paintings, Kaprow doubled or reiterated the
allegory in the performance or ritual of that allegory.

Fig. 80 Allan Kaprow, Yard, 1961, “Environments, Situations, Spaces Series”, Sculpture Garden at
Martha Jackson Gallery, New York, Photo: Ken Heyman

Alan Kaprow fully understood Pollock’s ritual and performativity in art, which he expressed
in the article for ARTnews titled The Legacy of Jackson Pollock. Kaprow’s article described
a finer understanding of Pollock’s relationship to subject, representation and allegory than
Rosenberg imagined. Kaprow wrote, “Pollock… left us at the point where we must become
preoccupied with and even dazzled by the space and objects of our everyday life….[showing
us] the world we have always had about us [a world of] happenings and events” (Kaprow 9).
If Pollock ventured an aesthetic of iconic indigenous ritual, Kaprow developed that aesthetic
to focus acutely on the ephemeral experience of art making. Kaprow developed Pollock’s
mythologies into a discourse on the rituals and materiality of everyday life. 58
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Kaprow was not the only postmodern artist to experiment with ritual art. John Cage,
Merce Cunningham, and Robert Rauschenberg also made ritual art that allegorized the
juxtaposition of the occurrences of everyday life with art making forms and modes. In view
of Pollock’s allegorical rituals, we must re-evaluate the onset of Postmodernism in terms of
the forms, modes and functions of art and its capacity to represent various modes of storied
life concepts. But most importantly, we must re-evaluate the role of the American Indian in
the making of a forgotten historical episteme and Pollock’s timeless tribute to their art and art
forms. For this reason, it is important that we rethink the traditional divisions between socalled Western and Non-Western arts. For Non-Western art presently is in need of a critical
theory. It is hoped that building on the foundation of this theory of mimêsis (with its forms,
modes, and mythos) we can find uniting tenets that bridge the divisive gaps between the
polemical-modern theory and between Western and Non-Western art. For in Pollock, pure
form, so praised by Greenberg, is actually mimetic representation that leaves its trace of
transcendent truths within forms and modes: events in time, stilled as only time can do in the
ephemeral transcendent of the immanent moment.
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APPENDIX A
Art and Mimêsis: Medieval to Neoclassicism

Throughout the early Christian and Medieval arts, Plotinus’ ideals are at play through
the reinterpretations by Dionysus the Areopagite and later the Abbot Suger of Saint Denis. In
The Celestial Hierarchy, Dionysus the Areopagite explains that the glory of God is
inconceivable to the finite mind and therefore one must make use of imitation and allegory in
order to explain the character of God. For example, one might say that “Christ is like a
worm” in order to show the humility of Christ. (Williams, 47) Medieval art is filled with
iconic symbols that explain the attributes of Christ: the peacock explains immortality, the
sunflower expresses God’s love, the lamb demonstrates Christ as a shepherd of men or the
sacrificial lamb of the atonement, etc. (Williams, 47) Thus mimêsis is both the representation
of an ideal through metaphor and the representation of an object from nature. It encompasses
a wide range of signifiers including symbols and signs. It directs from one object or the
signifier to the sign (or original object or idea) being signified. Or it directs the contemplation
of one object towards a higher or more ideal or beautiful object, moving upward in a
progression to ultimate Beauty, Divinity, or Truth. Because of this, Abbot Suger could intend
that the materials and forms of the Gothic cathedral could be imitations of the glory of
heaven. In the process of contemplating the beautiful materials of the cathedral and its
ornaments, beauty would lead the viewer to contemplate the Divine. He explains,
Thus when, out of my delight in the beauty of the house of God, the loveliness
of the many-colored gems has called me away from external cares, and
worthy mediation has induced me to reflect – transferring that which is
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material to that which is immaterial – on the diversity of the sacred virtues:
then it seems to me that I see myself dwelling, as it were, in some strange
region of the universe which neither exists entirely in the slime of the earth
nor entirely in the purity of heaven; and that, by the grace of God, I can be
transported from this inferior to that higher world in an anagogical manner.
(Panofsky, 63)
Suger’s use of analogy and metaphor retains a Platonic hierarchical relationship between
imitative forms and ideas regarding eternal Forms and Truths, embracing art’s material role
and ignoring its potential to deceive through the same use of analogy or imitation. Suger’s
analogy echoes that of Plotinus’ conviction that the higher forms give purpose and form to
lower forms, which in turn strive upward towards the Divine. While we think of Plotinus and
Suger in terms of Platonic hierarchical and idealist thought, each echo Aristotle’s views that
art and imitation are didactic tools in the acquisition of knowledge or wisdom.
In the early fourteenth century artists found a renewed interest in imitating the natural
world more directly, not as a means for meditation but through a humanist interest in nature.
The artist Giovanni Pisano praised God through imitating nature in his pulpit in the Pisa
Cathedral. Pisano’s act is a celebrated turning point in Western art where he returns art from
the idealism of the Gothic age to naturalism with its stress on verisimilitude. (Williams, 10210) From Pisano to Leonardo da Vinci, artists intensified their interest in nature, human
anatomy, verisimilitude in portraiture, landscapes and still lifes. Leone Battista Alberti
succinctly summarizes a new Aristotelian interest in nature and imitation in his influential
treatise, On Painting, 1453. Alberti writes that,
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If you despise painting, which is the sole imitator of all the visible works of
nature, you will certainly be despising a subtle invention which brings
philosophy and subtle speculation to bear upon the nature of all forms, sea and
land, plants and animals, grasses and flowers – which are enveloped in shade
and light. Truly, painting is a science, the true-born child of nature. For
painting is born to nature; to be more correct we should call it the grandchild
of nature, since all visible things were brought forth by nature and these, her
children, have given birth to painting. Therefore we may justly speak of it as
the grandchild of nature and as a descendant of God. (qtd. Williams, 61)
Just as nature inspires imitation in Aristotle’s Poetics, nature inspires art in Alberti’s On
Painting. While many other arguments concerning art and poetry ensued throughout the
Renaissance and Baroque eras, the predominant interest from Pisano until the mid-nineteenth
century was that of mimetically representing the natural world and reinforcing the
connections between verisimilitude and mimêsis. From Platonic idealism to Aristotelian
mimêsis as representation of the natural world, the history of Western art is a process of
locating the value of mimêsis, particularly in its diverse forms. Any critique of modern art
has and must situate itself within this larger discourse of mimêsis because of the fact that it
has been a primary mode of art and aesthetics since Pre-Socratic thought.
We see the perfect union of mimêsis in both its primary forms; (its representation of
the ideal and natural) in Neoclassical art, particularly in the revolutionary works of JacquesLouis David. In David’s Oath of the Horatti for example, we see verisimilitude in the
likeness between the men taking oaths to fight and protect the homeland, and the resignation
of their wives and what we know to be the postures of both types of figures in such
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emotional, psychological, and physical states. But we also see the ideals of loyalty,
patriotism, and self-sacrifice (outside of the painting) which in idealist ways the painting
points to. Mimêsis then, is a more broadly applicable to the function of art by accounting for
not only representation but idealism as well. Neoclassicism is the binding of two forms;
before the schism of mimêsis from art. But this was not without art attaining its highest
manifestation in Neoclassicism. It is this binding or balancing of idealist and naturalistic
tendencies that forms the basis of Johann Joachim Winckelmann’s praise for classical Greek
art and his theory of art and art history. This notion of the balancing of natural and ideal also
forms the basis for Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s theory of art.
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NOTES

Introduction
1

Howard Devree, writing for the New York Times, wrote that “These big, sprawling coloramas impress me as
being surcharged with violent emotional reaction which never is clarified enough in the expression to establish
true communication with the observer.” (Devree, Howard, “Among the New Exhibitions.” The New York
Times, March 25, 1945, SEC. 2, P. 8, as quoted in Jackson Pollock Interviews, Articles, and Reviews, MoMA,
edited by Pepe Karmel.
2
Hofmann taught at the Students Art League before opening his Hofmann School of the Arts. He taught both
Greenberg and Rosenberg who attended his evening lectures. According to Friedman, it was through
Hofmann’s classes that Lee Krasner met both Greenberg and Rosenberg. See Friedman, 70-72, 108-109, 136137.
3
This characterization of the mythic and art certainly agrees with Aristotelian claims for catharsis in poetry.
But Aristotle’s claims for poetry were intended as a guide for action, catharsis, and even mimêsis within
universalizing scope rather than for the sake of individual self-expression. See Poetics, Halliwell, Stephen, W.
Hamilton Fyfe, D. A. Russell, Doreen Innes, Demetrius, Aristotle, Aristotle, Longinus, Longinus, Demetrius,
and Demetrius. Poetics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1995. Print.
4
This point about Pollock’s dysfunctional family crops up in nearly all of the biographies on Jackson Pollock.

Chapter One
5

See also Newcomb, Franc Johnson., Stanley A. Fishler, and Mary C. Wheelwright. A Study of Navajo
Symbolism, Cambridge: Museum, 1956. Print.
6
The term ‘Geist’ is used intentionally for its Hegelian resonances. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel uses the
German term ‘geist’ in his book on aesthetics, The Phenomenology of Spirit to denote the general spirit, tone, or
timbre of an age. It can also be thought to be like unto Foucault’s notion of episteme wherein each age has a set
of underlying values and mindsets from which knowledge and the materials of world and culture are defined
and explained. With this in mind, Pollock’s work can be viewed as a sign or symbol of the spirit or episteme of
the age. This present chapter helps to define this geist or spirit of the era, which is one of incorporating the
notion of the American Indian within a seeking for a nascent national identity.
7
We might consider this to some degree along the lines of Heidegger’s notion of ‘thrownness’. In Heidegger’s
philosophy, particularly as outlined in his essay Being in Time, 1927 Heidegger believes that individuals are
‘thrown’ or born into a preexisting world or social condition and attitudes. Freedom for Heidegger is of utmost
importance for it enables the individual to choose to transcend one’s social world and live an authentic life. For
our purposes here, we are looking at the socio-political world from a neglected view of the importance and
contemporary social role of the American Indian.
8
Old World ethnographies refer to the tradition, stemming from the early 17th century ethnographic writers, of
arranging ethnographic data into hierarchical schemes which placed European cultures at the top, with Muslims
and Jews, and Indians and Asians following, and lastly, studies of tribal cultures. This arrangement suggested a
hierarchy based on religious values and technological advancement. One of the most comprehensive
ethnographic studies was written by the Dutch minister Francois Valentijn, 1726, Amsterdam. See LaBarge,
Maria S., Francois Valentijn and the 18th Century Dutch Frontispiece, May, 2008.
9
Octavio Paz gives José Vasconcelos credit for initiating the Muralist movement in Mexico by commissioning
the best-known painters in 1921 to decorate the walls of public buildings. The commissions were politically
motivated—they aimed to glorify the Mexican Revolution and redefine the Mexican people vis-à-vis their
indigenous and Spanish past. The first of these commissioned paintings were at San Ildefonso done by
Fernando Leal, Fermín Revueltas, David Alfaro Siqueiros, and Diego Rivera. See Paz, Octavio Essays on
Mexican Art. Helen Lane (translator). New York: Harcourt Brace and Company. 1987. 11.
10
The Department of the Interior is responsible for the management and conservation of most federal land and
natural resources, and the administration of programs relating to American Indians, Alaska Natives, Native
Hawaiians. Within the Department of Interior, the Bureau of Indian Affairs currently provides services (directly
or through contracts, grants, or compacts) to approximately 1.9 million American Indians and Alaska Natives.
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Organized in 1830, the Bureau was originally designed to be an organization that protected Indians’ rights.
Historically, however, the Bureau’s programs have instead aimed to facilitate processes of acculturation and
assimilation. These programs included placing Indian children in boarding schools, restricting Indian rituals and
religious beliefs, and legalizing the confiscation of Indian hunting lands under the General Allotment or Dawes
Severalty Act, (1887).
11
Perhaps the most iconic ethnographic image of the American Indian within the view of a dominant Western
power is the Indian Head penny. Minted by the United States from 1859 to 1909, the penny features a bust
profile of an Indian chief in full head dress. This penny is just the type of Southwestern treasure youngsters (like
Pollock) liked to find. It is an exoticized portrait of an Other living within margins of a dominant culture, close
enough to see firsthand, but remote from one’s experience outside its iconic representation, a reminder of the
American Indian ensconced in reservations near Pollock’s home, viewable from a distance, yet foreign and
iconic. While this depiction acknowledged the loss of tribal cultures, it suggested the assimilation of the
American Indian, in the form of an iconic ethnographic portrait into the dominant political-economic culture
which sought to preserve the past.
12
Simon Schama discusses the Dutch striving for a national identity that led the nation to embrace an ancient
semi-mythic tribe as their founding forebearers. Having successfully defended themselves from the Romans, the
Germanians were paragons for independence and valor, ideals the Dutch eagerly adopted after their
independence from Spain. See Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches, An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in
the Golden Age, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., NY, 1987.
13
It was no accident that one of the first reforms of the New Deal policy was The Indian Reorganization Act,
1934. This Act was intended to overturn the Dawes Act of 1887, which had allowed the United States
government to survey and divide Indian lands. The Reorganization Act forbad government intrusions into
Indian land and turned American Indian holdings over to local (and regional) self-governing tribal jurisdiction.
This act embodied the idea that the American Indian could be assimilated into the existing culture and given
autonomy to regulate their ‘own affairs.
14
Today White’s estate is now the home of the School of American Research and the SAR Press.
15
See also Horton, Jessica L. and Janet Catherine Berlo, “Pueblo Painting in 1932; Folding Narratives of Native
Art Into American Art History,” A Companion to American Art, edited by John Davis, Jennifer A. Greenhill,
Jason D. LaFountain.
16
The Santa Fe Indian School, which was established to educate Indian children from surrounding Santa Fe
reservations, came to be a center that promoted traditional and multi-cultural arts. For example, Datus Myers
was an artist living in Santa Fe who traveled to Pueblo reservations to recruit painters, potters, and weavers to
work at the Santa Fe Indian School. Looping back to politics and government bureaucracy, Myers later became
the field coordinator for the Indian Division of the Public Works of Art Project (PWAP) and used his position to
further create social awareness and support of Indian arts. Part of this awareness effort included collecting
Indian wares to sell in Ickes’ Department of the Interior Building’s Indian Craft Shop.
17
There are several good reviews of Regionalism that help us ascertain this broader social and historical
context. For more information the reader can begin with the following works; Michael C. Steiner, "Regionalism
in the Great Depression," Geographical Review 73 (October 1983): 443 and overall pp. 430-46. Robert L.
Dorman, The Revolt of the Provinces: The Regionalist Movement in America, 1920-1945 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1993); Donna M. Cassidy, “On the Subject of Nativeness”: Marsden
Hartley and New England Regionalism, Winterthur Portfolio, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Winter, 1994), pp. 227-245.

Chapter Two
18

Films such as Northwest Passage, 1940 and Broken Arrow, 1950 feature American Indians as both noble and
villainess. Following World War II, the Cold War ushered a new Golden Age of the Hollywood Western with
ever-increasing numbers of movie productions each year, reaching nearly 50 projects a year by 1956. (Richard
Slotkin, “Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-century America”, (University of
Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK, 1998), p. 347). Disney’s 1950 animated film Peter Pan contains a clip where
Peter Pan and his lost boys celebrate around a recreated Native American Indian camp. The films of the 1950s
feature no less American Indians, but such portrayals are more sympathetic to Indian viewpoints, characterizing
them as targets of racism and conquest. (Elizabeth DeLaney Hoffman, American Indians and Popular Culture,
2012, p. 44) The growth of the Western was a main element in the TV fare of the 1950’s and 1960’s, where it
ranged from 15% to nearly 25% of the total series produced in any given year ( Slotkin, ibid, p. 348) This use of
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mass media entertainment to popularize the American West and its cultural elements continued largely
uninterrupted until the early years of the 1970’s, ensuring the Western remained the pre-eminent mass-culture
genre for “the making of public myths and for the symbolization of public ideology”. Slotkin, ibid, p. 278
19
Frascina, Francis, “Institutions, Culture, and America's ‘Cold War Years’: The Making of Greenberg’s
‘Modernist Painting’, Oxford Art Journal, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2003), p. 76 (total pages pp. 69-97). See also,
Annette Cox, “The Facts of Culture: The Art Criticism of Clement Greenberg”, Art-as-Politics: The Abstract
Expressionist Avant-Garde and Society (UMI Research Press: Ann Arbor, 1982), especially pp. 141-2. These
events are also discussed by O’Brian in ‘Introduction’, Clement Greenberg, The Collected Essays and
Criticism, Volume 3, pp. xxvi-xxviii. Greenberg’s political reviews are also discussed in Frances Stonor
Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters. For an extensive discussion on
the “making” of Greenberg’s art criticism, see Caroline A. Jones, Eyesight Along, Clement Greenberg’s
Modernism and the Bureaucratization of the Senses.
20
Adams explains Benton’s treatment of the human figure, indicating that in 1911(?) Benton became aware of
the experiments of Erhard Schon (1491-1542), a pupil of Durer, and Luca Cambiaso (1527-1585), who broke
down the human figure into a series of cubes as an aid to correctly depict positions and movements. Pollock too
employed this device in his sketchbooks down into the late 1930s. (See Pollock’s sketchbooks and Untitled,
1933-38)
21
Adams writes, “It was my wife, Marianne Berardi, who first saw the letters. We were looking at a
reproduction of Jackson Pollock's breakthrough work, Mural, an 8-by 20-foot canvas bursting with physical
energy that, in 1943, was unlike anything seen before. I was researching a book about Pollock’s lifelong
relationship with his mentor, Thomas Hart Benton, the famed regionalist and muralist, when I sat puzzling over
a reproduction of Mural after breakfast one morning with Marianne, herself an art historian. She suddenly said
she could make out the letters S-O-N in blackish paint in the upper right area of the mural. Then she realized
JACKSON ran across the entire top. And finally she saw POLLOCK below that… I’m now convinced that
Pollock wrote his name in large letters on the canvas—indeed, arranged the whole painting around his name. As
far as I can tell, no one has previously made this assertion. Nor is there evidence that Pollock himself, who was
loath to talk about his art and left behind few written records, ever mentioned this coded gesture. In fact, his
decision was curiously logical and straightforward. He simply wrote the words “Jackson Pollock” very large
across the canvas. Thanks to my wife, Marianne Berardi, who observed these hidden letters while she was
looking at a reproduction of the painting with me. Curiously, at the time she was looking at the painting upside
down. By a coincidence, both first and last name had the same number of letters, so it wasn’t hard to make them
fit. So as not to make the effect too obvious, he introduced some dazzle patterns, like those used to camouflage
a ship, which makes the outlines a little difficult to read, but the “son” on the right is not too hard to make out,
the big J on the right is quite clear when you know that you should look for it, and with a bit of examination it’s
not too hard to make out the other letters one by one. “Jackson” is written more clearly than “Pollock,” but with
careful looking that also becomes visible. This could hardly be random coincidence, since while some letters,
like O form shapes that are easily found in most triangles of line, this is not the case with letters like K or N, and
to find all these letters in the right order just by accident seems extremely unlikely. And it isn’t possible to spell
out any other names in the painting, so far as I can discern.” (Adams, “Decoding” 56)
22
Jones points out that Hofmann’s influence on Greenberg was immeasurable; however, Greenberg’s tendency
was to ignore Hofmann’s tripartite view of space (space in front, in, and behind objects) in favor for the
absolute flatness of analytical Cubism. Greenberg made analytic Cubism “bear the burden of modernism’s
entire evolutionary trajectory from illusion to abstraction.” p. 181.
23
Freud writes, “The plastic arts of painting and sculpture labour, indeed, under a similar limitation as
compared with poetry, which can make use of speech; and here once again the reason for their incapacity lies in
the nature of the material which these two forms of art manipulate in their effort to express something. Before
painting became acquainted with the laws of expression by which it is governed, it made attempts to get over
this handicap. In ancient paintings small labels were hung from the mouths of the persons represented,
containing in written characters the speeches which the artist despaired of representing pictorially.” (Freud,328)
24
Jung writes, “evidently live and function in the deeper layers of the unconscious, especially in that
phylogenetic substratum which I have called the collective unconscious. This localization explains a good deal
of their strangeness: they bring into our ephemeral consciousness an unknown psychic life belonging to a
remote past. It is the mind of our unknown ancestors, their way of thinking and feeling, their way of
experiencing life and the world, gods and men. The existence of these archaic strata is presumably the source of

395

man’s belief in reincarnations and in memories of “previous experiences”. Just as the human body is a museum,
so to speak, of its phylogenetic history, so too is the psyche.” (Jung, 286–287)
25
This point crops up in nearly all of the biographies on Jackson Pollock.
26
Henderson writes, “Early in my psychiatric career, a friend asked me to see a young artist professionally
while he was convalescing from a mental breakdown. Since he was extremely un-verbal, we had great trouble
in finding a common language and I doubted I could do much to help him. Communication was, however,
made possible by his bringing me a series of drawings illustrating the experience he had been through. They
seemed to demonstrate phases of his sickness and they were followed by others showing a gradual development
during therapy into a healthier condition, a psychological reintegration, which allowed him to recover to a
considerable extent during the next two years. In contrast to these there were a number of sketches which
reflected the influence of Picasso in his “Guernica” period, or of Orozco, and would have to be classified as
experimental works…
… It sounded as if I had set Pollock the task of portraying the unconscious in these drawings. This was not the
case. He was already drawing them, and when I found it out, I asked for them. He brought me a few of the
drawings each time in the first year of his treatment, and I commented upon them spontaneously, without
establishing any psychotherapeutic rules. He did not have free associations, nor did he wish to discuss his own
reactions to my comments. He was much too close to the symbolism of the drawings to tolerate any real
objectivity toward them. I had to be content with saying only what he could assimilate at any given time, and
that was not much. There were long silences. Most of my comments centered around the nature of the
archetypal symbolism in his drawings, I never could get onto a more personal level with him, until after he
stopped bringing the drawings. So you see my role was mainly to empathize with his feeling about the
drawings and share his experience without trying to “interpret” them in the ordinary sense. They provided a
bridge to communication, and it gave him the assurance that at least one other person understood something of
their abstruse language.” (qtd. Friedman, “Energy”, 42)
27
Kramer explains that Rosenberg, “proved to be very seductive nonsense. For its effect was to provide the
Abstract Expressionist movement with an exciting new dramaturgy in which the artist now emerged as an
existential hero and his painting was to be seen not as an aesthetic endeavor but as the cynosure of a heroic
private action that was not to be judged by aesthetic standards. It was, alas, a very ‘European’ theory, which
derived from ideas to be found in Breton’s surrealism, Freud’s psychoanalysis, and Sartre’s existentialism, yet it
proved to be so appealing that it was somehow exempted from any negative association with “the old
parenthood of Europe.” (Kramer, 12)
28
Originally written as a doctoral dissertation at Princeton University in 1955, Seitz's Abstract Expressionist
Painting in America was not published as a book until 1983, when Harvard University. Press brought it out with
a forward by Robert Motherwell and an introduction by Dore Ashton.
29
This view is very similar to the one put forth by Rausalind Kraus, in “The Originality of the Avant-Garde,”
Art in Theory, 1060-1065).
30
Raverty cites other examples writing that, “The poet Frank O’Hara, curator at the Museum
of Modem Art in the 1960s, wrote a monograph on Pollock, concluding it with the following. “The effort to
achieve such a state [of spiritual clarity] is monumental and agonizing.” The art historian Sam Hunter, in the
Bulletin of the Museum of Modem Art wrote that, “Because he [Pollock] was so sensitive to his own artistic
purpose and fundamentally uncompromising, when the impulse to paint suddenly eluded him ... he was
desolated by anxiety and his own self-rebukes.”

Chapter Three
31

With the Age of Exploration, Portuguese, Spanish, French, Italian, and Dutch travelers eagerly laid claim to
foreign colonies and collected vast collections of information about lands and peoples abroad. They
subsequently gathered a large amount of geographic, biological, and anthropologic information about the world.
Dutch traders were particularly eager to collect and trade in rarities or naturalia; bits and pieces of exotic plants,
shells, minerals and precious stones, and tribal art objects or artificialia. These precious objects were collected
by royal and amateur collectors all over Europe. Kept in wunderkammers, cabinets of curiosity or even whole
rooms devoted to such collections, these bits of information and precious materials, along with extensive
printed materials such as maps, atlases, biographic and anthropologic treatises and globes, presented views of
distant lands and peoples to interested parties far afield. Geographers, collectors, and mapmakers simplified
such studies, dividing the world into four massive continental regions known as the Four Continents. Beginning
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with Ceasare Ripa, author of the Iconologia, artists began personifying the Four Continents with renditions of
female figures dressed in regional dress and accompanied by regional animals and materials goods. For
example, Europa wore a crown of architecture and road upon a horse, symbols of European culture and
agriculture. Sometimes she is dressed in a helmet and carries Apollo’s caduceus, a symbol for commerce. The
Americas was personified with a bare-chested female dressed in a grass skirt with a full feathered headdress
upon her head. She rides or sits upon either an armadillo or a beaver and carries symbolic trade goods such as
silver coins and corn. Africa comes with tusks and the turbaned Asia carries incense. The tradition of
personifying the land, linking the land with a type of mother-earth regional figure is still seen today in
nineteenth and twentieth-century cigar boxes and nineteenth-century Orientalism and primitivism. Cesare Ripa,
and Edward Andrew Maser. Baroque and Rococo Pictorial Imagery. The 1758-60 Hertel Edition of Ripa's
'Iconologia.' New York: Dover Publications, 1971. Print. Maria LaBarge, Francois Valentijn’s Oud en Nieuw
Oost Indien and the Dutch Frontispiece in the 17th and 18th Centuries, Coral Gables, FL, 2008. Print.
32
Jörg Breu created the illustrations for the 1515 edition of Ludovico de Varthema’s account of his voyage to
the Middle East, India, and the East Indies (Die ritterlich uñ lobwirdig Rayss “The Noble and Praiseworthy
Journey”). The images are specifically designed to demonstrate the “otherness” of the people of the Near and
Far East, to educate non-travelers as to the nature of the broader world then being discovered and explored. His
text is one of countless travel records published in Germany and The Netherlands during the era. A review of
this literature reinforces the degree to which illustrations of the era help to establish the notion of the exotic
from European points of view. See Lisa Voigt and Elio Brancaforte, The Traveling Illustrations of SixteenthCentury Travel Narratives, PMLA, Volume 129, Number 3, May 2014, pp. 365–398 (34).
33
For the most succinct explanation between the relationship between land and people, and its ties to primitivist
theory, see Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Maurice Cranston. A Discourse on Inequality. Harmondsworth,
Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1984.
34
According to his The Myth of the Twentieth Century, Alfred Rosenberg espoused a theory of race and biology
that asserted the Aryan as the Platonic ideal with each successive racial type being a deviant form or variation
on the idea.
35
Said develops a critical theory that claims that Oriental studies are based upon the views of ruling elite
Arab scholars who promote Euro-centric viewpoints that romanticize the Middle East. He calls for less
subjective viewpoints drawn from more objective scholars from among and within the study groups. See
Edward W. Said, Orientalism. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.
36
In his review of alterity and mimesis, Taussig explains the difficulties of representation in Primitivism and its
studies. He writes, “from First Contact time with Darwin on the beach, through the invention of mimetic
machines, to late twentieth-century Reverse Contact now-time, when the Western study of the Third and Fourth
World Other gives way to the unsettling confrontation of the West with itself as portrayed in the eyes and
handiwork of its Others” the balance between imperial power and Magic and the ensuing indigenous economies
that are thereby disrupted. Thus this study looks not to issues of alterity and its representation to excavate the
balances of power and accuracies of representations, but rather looks at a phenomenological basis in aesthetics
upon which the arts of both Western and Tribal peoples can be theorized.
37
Because the complexities of the relations of Colonial, Postcolonial, and Orientalism are implicated in the
historiography of primitivist art, a brief explanation of the basic premises of each may be helpful here.
Colonialism denotes the practice of subjugation or domination wherein a social group (most often a tribal
group) is subsumed into the political and economic system of the colonizer. Colonialism is particularly
implicated in the Primitivism art style (colonial arts from the Early Modern to the Modern eras) and particularly
in colonial travel literature such as geographies, atlases, travel literature, and maps. Such colonial and
primitivist works largely represent two underlying premises. First it portrays the dominated or dependent
culture as being personified by the exotic female. Second, the dress, accoutrements of the female, along with the
flora and fauna or representation of exotic or defining architectural settings symbolizes the geography or land of
the dependent group. The act of portrayal can also be considered an act of possession wherein the viewer takes
the position of the power by being enabled to gaze at will upon the subjugated. In response to the underlying
(epistemic) power structure and the way the arts support such as inherent Colonialism, Postcolonial theory, also
known as Orientalism (as defined by Edward Said) contests such premises. Said applied the principles of
Foucault’s theory of episteme and the production of knowledge to colonial studies (or the study of power
structures in terms of domination of tribal and small-scale societies for economic purposes). Said found that
scholars of the Middle East had a tendency to perpetuate assumptions and theories about colonized peoples and
the cultural “other” that theoretically perpetuated the foundational tenets of Colonialism or imperialism. We see
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these issues of domination in primitivist artworks and how they support such domination. Said called for a close
analysis on how colonial texts were being interpreted to deconstruct their underlying assumptions and the
manufacture and perpetuation of colonial discourses. Studies that analyze colonial arts and literature fall under
Postcolonialism or Orientalism. However, Postcolonialism looks at the consequences of colonialism and its
consequences on the colonized whereas Orientalism analyzes the ways in which studies reproduce and
perpetuate the tenets of colonialism.
38
This view depends upon the ideas within Michel Foucault’s writings regarding epistemic knowledge.
Foucault, in The Order of Things, considers the early Modern era as being an era of classification. He claims
that history possesses certain underlying conditions that constitute what knowledge is considered acceptable and
true. These conditions change over time, sometimes in sudden shifts.
39
Read’s sentiments largely echo Kant’s claims that representation obstructs one’s perception of the forms of
art. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1781.
40
W. Jackson Rushing, Native American Art and the New York Avant-Garde,183-4. Rushing compares the
Frieze with Sikyatki ceramic fragments, Eskimo masks, and Kiowa art.
41
See also the work of W. Jackson Rushing, such as his Native American Art and the New York Avant-Garde,
and his article “Ritual and Myth: Native American Culture and Abstract Expressionism” in The Spiritual in Art,
Abstract Painting: 1890-1985.
42
While Foucault mainly cites texts such as newspaper articles, monographs, letters, advertisements, and other
publications, he means to say all types of cultural artefacts which, according to art historians, include art images
and objects. See Harrison, Primitivism, cubism, Abstraction; The Early Twentieth Century, for a broader
discussion on art and discourse.
43
See John D. Graham to John Sloan, 17 November 1939 and 21 April 1949; and John D. Graham to Helen
Farr Sloan, 5 October 1951, JSA.
44
The Haida people, indigenous to the Pacific Northwest Coast of North America, and specifically the Queen
Charlotte Islands and northern British Columbia into coastal Alaska, are known for constructing monumental
totem poles and for a highly stylized abstract animal forms based on precise symmetries. Whereas the Navajo,
who settled in the West, from the northeastern part of Arizona, to southeastern Utah and northwestern New
Mexico, create intricate patterns, stylized geometric forms and pictographic signs.
45
See Appendix A.

Chapter Four
46

In the dialogue, the drinking party honor Agathon who had recently won a prestigious poetry competition and
they also discusses the attributes of love. Phaedrus, a heroic poet, is the first to comment on objects of beauty.
(Howatson, Sheffield ed., Howatson trans., “Introduction”, The Symposium, vii) Phaedrus believes that a lover
inspires one to virtuous public acts. He says, “For those feelings which ought to be the lifelong guide of men
whose aim is to live a good life cannot be implanted either by advantageous connections or public honours or
wealth or anything else so well as they are by love.” (Howatson, Sheffield ed., Howatson trans., Symposium,
178d) In such a case, the lover is an object of desire which stands in for or represents Love which is that which
inspires virtuous acts. While Plato does not make a case for how Love inspires virtuous acts, the lover is the
sign or representation of the ideal of Love. Love is the telos or final aim of desire. (Howatson, Sheffield ed.,
Howatson trans., Symposium, viii) Other speakers connect objects of love, namely lovers or beautiful objects
with the attainment of some virtue. The politician Pausanias believes that love helps men become lovers of good
public deeds and the cultivation of wisdom. (180c-185c, 184d). His discussion looks to Aphrodite the Heavenly
and Aphrodite the Common. Both goddesses are personifications of or illustrations of sexual love. In such case,
the object of love or desire is an imitation or a lower form of characteristic good acts, inspired by the gods.
(184d) The physician Eryximachus considers love that which enables the ordering or harmonizing of the
humors or elements of the body. (186a-188e) Love is mimetic of that which harmonizes. Aristophanes, the
comic poet explains that all human are severed souls and desire their other halves, their soul mates to become
complete and whole (189c-193d) Aristophanes says that, “It is Love who in the present confers on us the
greatest benefit by leading us to that which is nearest to ourselves, and for the future gives us high hopes that if
we show reverence to the gods, he will restore us to our original state, and heal us and make us blessed and
happy. (193d) Each person then becomes a personification of a wounded severed soul. The body is representing
the inner seeking and desiring soul. Agathon (194c-198a) seeks that which one does already possess, beauty,
virtue, producing beautiful and fine things, inducing others to create such things, wisdom or poetic skill He
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declares that at the touch of Love every man becomes a poet “though formerly unvisited by the Muse”. (196de). The muse and love both become models, personifications, or representations of the concept of inspiration.
47
Personifications are common in Greek art and thought. Nike is the personification of victory for example.
Victory is represented as a winged female deity, such as we see on the Temple of Athena Nike, Acropolis, and
Athens, Greece. Athena is the goddess of wisdom and war, or in other words, a personification of the abstract
concepts rendered mimetically in the form of a woman.
48
It may perhaps be argued that in Picasso’s later works he experimented with mimetic representation in varied
ways. For example, Picasso’s “Still Life with Chair Caning” of 1912, inaugurates a period of papier collées or
collages wherein Picasso, in collaboration with Georges Braque, applied diverse materials such as wood, chair
caning, paper, newsprint, and other objects onto the canvas. In this case one must question if the materials are
intended to be representative of that which they are or are merely artefacts of themselves. These experiments
exemplify the point that mimesis and representation were in decline, but were still an inherent part of art and its
functions, thus warranting such experimentation.
49
As Coleridge writes, “The composition of a poem is among the imitative arts; and that imitation, as opposed
to copying, consists either in the interfusion of the SAME throughout the radically DIFFERENT, or the
different throughout a base radically the same.” (qtd., Halliwell, 365-66) For more details on German
Romanticism, the poetry of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and idealism in art, see Stephen Halliwell, Aesthetics of
Mimesis, Ancient Texts and Modern Problems. Princeton UP, 2002 and Robert Rosenblum, Modern Painting
and the Northern Romantic Tradition: Friedrich to Rothko, New York: Harper & Row, 1975.
50
Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation, 1818, describes the world as the manifestation of
Divine or metaphysical will, or a driving force. Music is the clearest representation of that driving spirit.
51
Paris, the essential birthplace of modernity, had, in the mid-1800s, grown exponentially into a massive urban
cultural crossroads. The overcrowded city was largely structured as it had been since the medieval era and
struggled to accommodate massive population growth and immigration. The French social reformer Victor
Considerant wrote in 1845 that “Paris is an immense workshop of putrefaction, where misery, pestilence and
sickness work in concert, where sunlight and air rarely penetrate. Paris is a terrible place where plants shrivel
and perish, and where, of seven small infants, four die during the course of the year.” (cited in Patrice de
Moncan, Le Paris d’Haussmann, p. 10) Riots, disease, crime, and squalor racked the city. This was the city that
intrigued Baudelaire. He found beauty in the experience of the contemporary in all its scenes, scents, and sights.
His verse and prose poems “vividly describe the spectacle of modern Paris: its degradation and depravity, but
also its fascination and strange, endlessly surprising beauty.” It was Baudelaire, “one of the greatest and most
influential” voices of the new modernity that articulated that the subject of modernity was sensual experience
itself. The articulation of such was a sign of artistic authenticity and inner life, the pre-reflective expression of
the mind or soul of the artist. (Wood, Art in Theory, 15) Part dandy part flaneur, Baudelaire and his fellow
artists and writers, without agenda or forethought, moved about Paris experiencing the diverse flavors and
people of the growing city. The subjective sensual experience, a sort of experience for experience’s sake, or
what came to be known as the Aesthetic movement, was paramount, as evident in Baudelaire’s poem Glazier,
“The first person I noticed in the street was a glazier whose piercing and discordant cry floated up to me though
the heavy, filthy Paris air.” Intensity replaces morality, sensation replaces idealism. Such sensationalism or
authentic experience became the hallmark characteristic of art.
52
The Surrealists, the German Expressionists and Social Realists claimed art for the expression of the inner
experience of the subject within the outer lived political life. Jean-François Millet, Gustave Courbet, and
Honoré Daumier in France had established this pursuit by provoking viewer sympathy through the
representation of the pathos of the poor and peasant classes. Otto Dix, George Grosz, and Max Beckman,
working under the New Objectivity style (otherwise akin to Social Realism) portrayed German society in
distorted, satirical, and expressive ways that emphasize the political and moral experience in a corrupted
Weimar culture. Meanwhile the Regionalists in the United States, including Pollock’s mentor Thomas Hart
Benton, appropriated realism to portray the human condition in its inner experience and political outer forms.
53
Mimetic art in general is applicable to at least five distinct categories of creative production, visual
resemblance and figuration in art, emulation or imitation in behavior, dramatic reproduction in art or musical
and vocal performance, and an underlying metaphysical conformity.
54
Modern art’s claim to pure form has a very long genealogy that gives its micro-origins to Cezanne, to be
further developed by Picasso’s Cubism and down to Joseph Alpers, Hans Hoffman, and beyond. The irony is
that the most vocal supporter of modern art as pure form was Clement Greenberg, Pollock’s most enthusiastic
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supporter. However, it is apparent in Greenberg’s writings, that he saw the second-generation abstract painters
as best expressing modern art’s purity.
55
Soussloff and Polcari, to name a few, have suggested that Pollock’s work is a direct ritual performance.
However, we can modify this interpretation through the terms and functions of mimêsis bypassing
interpretations for a critique on modern and postmodern art and criticism.
56
The Renaissance literature on ciphers, hieroglyphics, and emblems is too long to list here, but the reader can
begin with the Omnium Gentium Mores, Leges et Ritus by Johann Boemus, published in 1520 wherein the
author notes the importance of ancient hieroglyphics from around the world which were thought to contain
secret and mystical truths.
57
Of course, Heidegger’s main point concerns alētheai or the event of truth; in some cases, he does recognize
the value of correspondence. But for our purposes here, we look to Heidegger for his historiography of truth and
particularly truth as correspondence prior to his argument for alētheai. See Heidegger, On Truth.
58
A distinction should be made here on the difference between what Rauschenberg was doing and the work of
Kaprow. Rauschenberg took out of his everyday life experiences the materials for making art such that the
emphasis remained in the material form of his Columbines. Kaprow left no trace of his works other than
photographs, as the material was always in a state of ongoing progression in time.
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